How To

Windows LAPS Setup with Group Policy on Windows Server 2025

A shared local Administrator password is the cheapest lateral movement path in an Active Directory network. Recover it from one workstation and it opens every machine imaged from the same build. A Windows LAPS setup closes that path: each computer gets its own random admin password, rotated on a schedule and stored encrypted in AD, where only the group you name can read it.

Original content from computingforgeeks.com - post 180491

This is the native Windows LAPS built into Windows 11 and Windows Server, not the old LAPS MSI. You’ll extend the schema, grant computers the right to write their own password, build the GPO with encryption and a managed account, then read, rotate and break it on purpose to see the errors. Every step ran in November 2026 on a Windows Server 2025 domain controller and a domain-joined Windows 11 24H2 client with encryption enforced, and the legacy MSI test ran on the same client image a few days earlier, so every output block below comes from those machines.

Windows LAPS and legacy LAPS are different products

The name is the same and the job is the same, but the two products share almost nothing underneath. Legacy Microsoft LAPS is an MSI that installs a Group Policy client-side extension (AdmPwd.dll) and stores the password in clear text in ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, protected only by ACLs. Windows LAPS is built into the operating system, has its own schema attributes and its own ADMX, and encrypts the password before it leaves the client. If you run both against the same account, you have two products fighting over one password, which Microsoft calls unsupported.

Read the table as a threat table: what each option stops, and what it still lets through.

ExposureLegacy Microsoft LAPSWindows LAPS
Same admin password on every machineStoppedStopped
Password readable by anyone with “All extended rights” on the objectExposed (clear text in AD)Stopped when encryption is on, since read rights alone do not decrypt
Someone resets the managed account by handNot handledBlocked with system error 8654 and event 10101 (tested below)
Password reuse after an admin signs in with itNot handledPost-authentication reset and sign-out
Old passwords needed after a restoreNot keptEncrypted history, up to 12 entries
Install on Windows 11 24H2Blocked (see below)Built in, nothing to install

That last row isn’t theory. We downloaded LAPS.x64.msi from Microsoft’s download centre onto the Windows 11 Enterprise 24H2 client and ran a quiet install. The package had a valid Microsoft signature, and msiexec still returned exit code 1259. The verbose log names the reason:

MSI (s) (F0:80) [15:57:33:235]: APPCOMPAT: matching ProductCode found in database, and other attributes match.  Applying appcompat fix.
MSI (s) (F0:80) [15:57:33:239]: APPCOMPAT: ApphelpCheckMsiPackage returned FALSE.  This product will not be installed due to application compatibility concerns.
MSI (s) (F0:80) [15:57:33:239]: The application 'Local Administrator Password Solution' cannot be installed because it is not compatible with this version of Windows. Contact the application vendor for an update.
MSI (s) (F0:80) [15:57:33:241]: Windows Installer installed the product. Product Name: Local Administrator Password Solution. Product Version: 6.2.0.0. Product Language: 1033. Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation. Installation success or error status: 1259.

Windows ships an application compatibility entry keyed on the legacy product code, so on this build the old client-side extension never lands. The Application log records the same failure as MsiInstaller events 1033 (status 1259) and 11708 (“Installation failed”), and C:\Program Files\LAPS\CSE\AdmPwd.dll didn’t exist afterwards. We didn’t test older Windows 10 or Windows Server builds, and those are the machines where the coexistence trap below decides what happens on a mixed fleet.

The legacy coexistence trap

Windows LAPS has a legacy emulation mode: with no Windows LAPS policy present, it will honour an existing legacy LAPS GPO and write the clear-text ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute. It only does that when the legacy extension is not installed, the machine is not a domain controller, and no Windows LAPS policy exists from any source. We did not reproduce this behaviour in the lab; the emulation conditions and the precedence of a Windows LAPS GPO over a legacy one follow Microsoft’s documentation, and only the MSI install block (error 1259) ran on the 24H2 client. The moment you link a Windows LAPS GPO, it wins over the legacy one. Don’t point both products at the same account during a migration. Either manage a different account with each product, or remove the MSI from older machines before the new GPO reaches them.

Check whether a machine still has the legacy extension before you link anything. Windows LAPS treats it as installed only when the DllName value under this key points at a file that exists, so the command reads the value and then tests the file:

$dll = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\{D76B9641-3288-4f75-942D-087DE603E3EA}' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).DllName
if ($dll) { "$dll exists: $(Test-Path $dll)" } else { 'legacy LAPS CSE not registered' }

Our client, where the MSI had been refused, printed the clean answer.

legacy LAPS CSE not registered

A path that reports False also means the legacy extension won’t interfere. A path to AdmPwd.dll that reports True means that machine needs the MSI removed or a Windows LAPS policy that targets a different account.

Requirements that decide encryption

Encryption is the reason to use Windows LAPS against Active Directory, and it has one hard requirement: the domain functional level must be Windows Server 2016 or higher. Below that, a client with encryption enabled (the default) logs event 10006 and does not update the password at all until you raise the functional level or turn encryption off. Check yours before you plan anything else:

(Get-ADDomain).DomainMode

A forest created fresh on Windows Server 2025 reports the newest level, so it qualifies with room to spare:

Windows2025Domain

Beyond the functional level, each requirement is a condition you can verify in a minute.

  • Domain functional level reads Windows2016Domain or higher.
  • Clients run Windows 10, Windows 11 or Windows Server 2019 or later with the April 2023 cumulative update or newer.
  • A Schema Admins member is available for the one-time schema update.
  • Managed computers sit in an OU you control, not the default Computers container.
  • Get-Command -Module LAPS lists 12 cmdlets on the DC and on the client.

If you are still building the domain, our guide to installing Active Directory Domain Services on Windows Server covers the forest, and the PowerShell version of the AD DS setup gets you to the same point without the wizard. For lab builds on Proxmox, the Windows Server template guide saves a reinstall per VM, but generalize the template with sysprep first: clones of a template that was never generalized share one machine SID and fail to join a domain that another clone created. Our DC came from a sysprepped Windows Server 2025 image for exactly that reason.

Schema and OU permissions

The schema update adds the msLAPS-* attributes the client writes to, among them msLAPS-EncryptedPassword for the current password and msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime for its expiry. It runs once per forest and needs Schema Admins. Run it from an elevated PowerShell session on a domain controller:

Update-LapsADSchema -Verbose

Interactively the cmdlet prompts before each change, so we ran it with -Confirm:$false, and it finished in 0.36 seconds. The verbose log runs past 80 lines, so this excerpt keeps the part worth reading. On Windows Server 2025 the cmdlet also adds ms-LAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion, the attribute behind image rollback detection. Microsoft’s LAPS overview says that attribute comes from promoting the first 2025 DC rather than from this cmdlet, yet on our 2025 DC the log shows the cmdlet itself finding it missing and adding it.

Adding the 'ms-LAPS-Password' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-PasswordExpirationTime' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-EncryptedPassword' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-EncryptedPasswordHistory' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-EncryptedDSRMPassword' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-EncryptedDSRMPasswordHistory' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion' schema attribute to the AD schema.
Adding the 'ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes' extended right to AD.
The 'computer' classSchema is missing 7 out of 7 LAPS mayContains
Successfully modified mayContain on: 'CN=computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com'

Confirm that the attributes exist before going further, because a client that can’t find them logs event 10012 and never writes a password:

Get-ADObject -SearchBase (Get-ADRootDSE).schemaNamingContext -LDAPFilter '(name=ms-LAPS-*)' | Select-Object Name

Seven names come back on a Server 2025 forest.

Name
----
ms-LAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion
ms-LAPS-EncryptedDSRMPassword
ms-LAPS-EncryptedDSRMPasswordHistory
ms-LAPS-EncryptedPassword
ms-LAPS-EncryptedPasswordHistory
ms-LAPS-Password
ms-LAPS-PasswordExpirationTime

Permissions are set per OU, so the managed computers need one. This guide uses an OU called Lab Workstations and a domain-joined client named WIN11-LAB, so substitute your own OU path and computer names. Every command from here to the GPO script uses $ou, which means you define it again if you open a new PowerShell session.

$ou = 'OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com'
New-ADOrganizationalUnit -Name 'Lab Workstations' -Path 'DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com'
Get-ADComputer WIN11-LAB | Move-ADObject -TargetPath $ou
Get-ADComputer WIN11-LAB | Select-Object DistinguishedName

Check the distinguished name before you set permissions, because a computer left in the default Computers container never receives a GPO linked to your OU.

DistinguishedName : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com

Next comes the step people skip, and it’s the most common reason a password never appears. A computer writes its own password to its own object, so the OU must grant SELF that right. We moved the client out of this OU later in the lab and the write failed at once, which the troubleshooting section shows:

Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission -Identity $ou

Only the OU you named changes, and the cmdlet prints it back.

Name             DistinguishedName
----             -----------------
Lab Workstations OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com

Domain Admins can already read the attribute. Delegate reading to a narrower group instead of handing out Domain Admins to the help desk. Create the group, add the people who will retrieve passwords (including your own admin account), then grant the group read on the OU:

New-ADGroup -Name 'LAPS Readers' -GroupScope Global -GroupCategory Security -Path 'DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com'
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS Readers' -Members Administrator, helpdesk1
Get-ADGroupMember 'LAPS Readers' | Select-Object SamAccountName
Set-LapsADReadPasswordPermission -Identity $ou -AllowedPrincipals 'CORP\LAPS Readers'

Here helpdesk1 is an ordinary domain user we created beforehand with New-ADUser, so substitute an existing help desk account of yours. The membership check confirms both accounts landed:

SamAccountName
--------------
Administrator
helpdesk1

Read permission is not the whole story when encryption is on. Each password is encrypted to exactly one principal, and once you set Configure authorized password decryptors to LAPS Readers in the GPO below, a Domain Admin outside that group gets DecryptionStatus : Unauthorized. We proved that with a second Domain Admin account later. Members added after the fact must sign out and back in so their token carries the new group.

Finally, audit who else can read confidential attributes on that OU. “All extended rights” also reads the clear-text attribute, so any unexpected principal here can read passwords that aren’t encrypted:

(Find-LapsADExtendedRights -Identity $ou).ExtendedRightHolders

On our OU the list held the read grant we just made plus four built-in holders:

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
CORP\Domain Admins
CORP\LAPS Readers
CORP\Enterprise Admins
BUILTIN\Administrators

A second OU we created alongside it (Staging, made with the same New-ADOrganizationalUnit command and otherwise untouched) listed the same entries minus LAPS Readers, so on a Windows Server 2025 domain the clean baseline is SYSTEM, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins and BUILTIN\Administrators. Anything beyond that and your own reader group is a delegation someone made years ago, and it deserves a ticket before you store passwords under that OU.

The LAPS GPO

Windows LAPS reads its policy from HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\LAPS, and the template that writes those values is %windir%\PolicyDefinitions\LAPS.admx. A domain with a Group Policy Central Store will not show the LAPS node until you copy LAPS.admx and en-US\LAPS.adml into it, because Windows does not copy them for you. Without a Central Store, the editor reads the DC’s local copy and the node appears.

Create a GPO in Group Policy Management, link it to the OU from the previous step, and edit it. The settings live under Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > System > LAPS, and three of them decide whether the password is protected at all:

Group Policy Management Editor LAPS node under Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, System with ten Windows LAPS settings and their state
  1. 1LAPS node
  2. 2Enable password encryption
  3. 3Configure authorized password decryptors
  4. 4Configure password backup directory
  1. LAPS node: the ten Windows LAPS settings under System.
  2. Enable password encryption: on by default, and it should stay on.
  3. Configure authorized password decryptors: the one group that can decrypt.
  4. Configure password backup directory: the switch that turns LAPS on.

These are the policy names and the registry values they write, as read from the Windows Server 2025 template, with the values we chose and Windows’ default when the setting isn’t configured:

Policy settingRegistry valueOur valueDefault
Configure password backup directoryBackupDirectoryActive Directory (2)Disabled (0)
Password SettingsPasswordComplexity, PasswordLength, PasswordAgeDays, PassphraseLength4, 20, 30, 64, 14, 30, 6
Enable password encryptionADPasswordEncryptionEnabledEnabledEnabled
Configure authorized password decryptorsADPasswordEncryptionPrincipalCORP\LAPS ReadersDomain Admins
Configure size of encrypted password historyADEncryptedPasswordHistorySize60
Post-authentication actionsPostAuthenticationResetDelay, PostAuthenticationActions8 hours, reset and log off (3)24 hours, 3
Configure automatic account managementAutomaticAccountManagementEnabled and four sub-valuesCustom account WLapsAdmin, enabledOff
Name of administrator account to manageAdministratorAccountNameNot set (automatic mode ignores it)Built-in RID 500 account
Do not allow password expiration time longer than required by policyPasswordExpirationProtectionEnabledNot setEnabled
Enable password backup for DSRM accountsADBackupDSRMPasswordNot set (DC GPO only)Disabled

The first row is where most silent failures start. Configure password backup directory defaults to Disabled, and while it is disabled Windows LAPS ignores every other setting, so a GPO that sets only Password Settings rotates nothing and writes nothing to AD. Open it and set it explicitly:

Configure password backup directory policy enabled with Backup directory set to Active Directory in the Windows LAPS GPO
  1. 1Enabled
  2. 2Backup directory
  1. Enabled: the policy is configured, not left at its default.
  2. Backup directory: Active Directory, which writes the password to the computer object.

The decryptor is the setting with the longest consequences. The principal is baked into each encrypted password, only one is allowed, and the help text in the dialog states the fallback plainly: disabled or not configured means Domain Admins decrypt. Put a group here, never a single admin account:

Configure authorized password decryptors policy set to CORP\LAPS Readers, the only group that can decrypt Windows LAPS passwords
  1. Authorized password decryptor: CORP\LAPS Readers, the same group that holds read permission on the OU.

Password Settings carries the strength of the password itself. We raised the length from 14 to 20 and kept the default complexity and 30-day age:

Windows LAPS Password Settings policy with complexity large and small letters, numbers and specials, length 20 and age 30 days
  1. 1Password Complexity
  2. 2Password Length
  3. 3Password Age (Days)
  1. Password Complexity: large and small letters, numbers and specials (value 4).
  2. Password Length: 20 characters, against a default of 14.
  3. Password Age (Days): 30, the default.

Automatic account management is the newer and cleaner option. Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 create the managed account themselves (named WLapsAdmin by default) and add it to local Administrators, and Windows LAPS blocks outside password changes on the account it manages. Our client began as a Windows 11 install without Microsoft account sign-in, holding only a local setup account and a disabled built-in Administrator, which is the common case automatic mode is built for. Older clients ignore the automatic setting, so on a mixed fleet you either create the account yourself and name it in Name of administrator account to manage, or keep managing the built-in Administrator, which Windows 11 ships disabled. The template also offers passphrase complexity (values 6 to 8) and an improved-readability character set (5), and both need 24H2 or Server 2025 on the client.

We built the GPO from a script, because Set-GPRegistryValue writes the same values the editor does and the result is repeatable. This is the exact script we ran on the DC. It creates the GPO, sets the values from the table, links it to $ou and prints the values back.

$ou = 'OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com'
$gpo = 'LAPS - Workstations'
$key = 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\LAPS'
New-GPO -Name $gpo | Out-Null
$dw = @{ BackupDirectory = 2; PasswordComplexity = 4; PasswordLength = 20; PasswordAgeDays = 30; PassphraseLength = 6
  ADPasswordEncryptionEnabled = 1; ADEncryptedPasswordHistorySize = 6; PostAuthenticationResetDelay = 8; PostAuthenticationActions = 3
  AutomaticAccountManagementEnabled = 1; AutomaticAccountManagementTarget = 1; AutomaticAccountManagementEnableAccount = 1; AutomaticAccountManagementRandomizeName = 0 }
foreach ($k in $dw.Keys) { Set-GPRegistryValue -Name $gpo -Key $key -ValueName $k -Type DWord -Value $dw[$k] | Out-Null }
Set-GPRegistryValue -Name $gpo -Key $key -ValueName AutomaticAccountManagementNameOrPrefix -Type String -Value 'WLapsAdmin' | Out-Null
Set-GPRegistryValue -Name $gpo -Key $key -ValueName ADPasswordEncryptionPrincipal -Type String -Value 'CORP\LAPS Readers' | Out-Null
New-GPLink -Name $gpo -Target $ou
Get-GPRegistryValue -Name $gpo -Key $key | Sort-Object ValueName | Format-Table ValueName, Type, Value -AutoSize

Link confirmation comes first, then the fifteen values the GPO now carries. Check that BackupDirectory reads 2 and the principal is your group before any client picks it up, because a wrong principal is baked into every password encrypted under it.

GpoId       : 84f168bd-c1b4-4b4f-ad67-22a427adb4e1
DisplayName : LAPS - Workstations
Enabled     : True
Enforced    : False
Target      : OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Order       : 1

ValueName                                 Type             Value
---------                                 ----             -----
ADEncryptedPasswordHistorySize           DWord                 6
ADPasswordEncryptionEnabled              DWord                 1
ADPasswordEncryptionPrincipal           String CORP\LAPS Readers
AutomaticAccountManagementEnableAccount  DWord                 1
AutomaticAccountManagementEnabled        DWord                 1
AutomaticAccountManagementNameOrPrefix  String        WLapsAdmin
AutomaticAccountManagementRandomizeName  DWord                 0
AutomaticAccountManagementTarget         DWord                 1
BackupDirectory                          DWord                 2
PassphraseLength                         DWord                 6
PasswordAgeDays                          DWord                30
PasswordComplexity                       DWord                 4
PasswordLength                           DWord                20
PostAuthenticationActions                DWord                 3
PostAuthenticationResetDelay             DWord                 8

Group Policy Management shows the same link on the OU. If the link is disabled or sits on the wrong OU, the client never sees any of it:

Group Policy Management on Windows Server 2025 showing the LAPS - Workstations GPO linked and enabled on the Lab Workstations OU
  1. 1Lab Workstations OU
  2. 2LAPS - Workstations
  3. 3Link Enabled
  1. Lab Workstations OU: the OU that holds the managed computers.
  2. LAPS – Workstations: the GPO the script created.
  3. Link Enabled: Yes, so the OU receives the policy.

Proof on the client

Windows LAPS processes policy in an hourly background task that is not a Scheduled Task and cannot be retuned, and it also reacts to Group Policy change notifications. You do not have to wait for either. On the client, in an elevated PowerShell window, refresh computer policy and run a LAPS cycle immediately:

gpupdate /target:computer /force
Invoke-LapsPolicyProcessing -Verbose

Don’t stop at this output. It only tells you the request reached the LAPS service, and hr:0x0 is success for the call, not proof a password was written.

Updating policy...

Computer Policy update has completed successfully.
BeginProcessing started
Verifying that current process is running as a local administrator
Success: current process is running as a local administrator
Verifying that current process is elevated
Success: current process is elevated
Verifying that current machine is either AD or Azure AD-joined
Success: current machine is AD-joined but not AzureAD-joined
BeginProcessing completed

ProcessRecord started
Calling ProcessCurrentPolicy RPC method
ProcessCurrentPolicy RPC method returned hr:0x0
ProcessCurrentPolicy RPC method succeeded
ProcessRecord completed

EndProcessing started
EndProcessing completed

The proof lives in Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > LAPS > Operational. Read the newest events in the same session:

Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-LAPS/Operational' -MaxEvents 40 | Sort-Object TimeCreated | Format-List TimeCreated, Id, LevelDisplayName, Message

Before the GPO was linked, every cycle on our client ended in three events: 10003, then 10024 “LAPS policy is configured as disabled.”, then 10004 “LAPS policy processing succeeded.” That combination is the trap: success is logged even though nothing is managed. Once the GPO landed, the Group Policy change notification ran a cycle six seconds before our manual one did, and it carried the real work. The client clock ran three hours ahead of the DC (UTC+3 against UTC), so 6:31 here is the same moment as 3:31 in the AD output further down. Trimmed to the events that matter, it reads:

TimeCreated      : 11/1/2026 6:31:01 AM
Id               : 10054
Message          : LAPS is processing the current policy in response to a Group Policy change notification.

TimeCreated      : 11/1/2026 6:31:02 AM
Id               : 10015
Message          : The managed account password needs to be updated due to one or more reasons (0x7A06):

                    The computer account does not have a password expiration attribute
                   The policy authority has changed
                   The policy is configured for password encryption but the encrypted password attribute was not found
                   The policy was changed to specify a different password encryption target
                   Local state is missing and/or inconsistent with directory state
                   One or more account management policy settings have changed
                   The password version identifier stored in Active Directory does not match the locally stored version

TimeCreated      : 11/1/2026 6:31:02 AM
Id               : 10018
Message          : LAPS successfully updated Active Directory with the new password.

TimeCreated      : 11/1/2026 6:31:02 AM
Id               : 10020
Message          : LAPS successfully updated the local admin account with the new password.

                    Account name: WLapsAdmin
                    Account RID: 0x3EA

TimeCreated      : 11/1/2026 6:31:02 AM
Id               : 10004
Message          : LAPS policy processing succeeded.

The order is the safety design: the new password is written to AD (10018) before the local account changes (10020), so a failed AD write never leaves a password nobody can retrieve. The 10021 event in the same cycle echoes the whole applied policy, including Password encryption target principal: CORP\LAPS Readers, which is the fastest way to confirm a client got the GPO you think it got. Our manual cycle six seconds later logged 10053 (administrator request) and 10016 “The managed account password does not need to be updated at this time.”

These are the IDs we saw or deliberately triggered in this lab, plus the two schema and functional-level errors Microsoft documents:

Event IDMeaning
10003 / 10004 / 10005Processing cycle started / succeeded / failed (10005 carries the error code)
10024LAPS policy is configured as disabled (no policy, or backup directory Disabled)
10021 / 10009Applied policy details / passwords back up to Active Directory
10053 / 10054Cycle started by an administrator request / by a Group Policy change notification
10014 / 10015 / 10016Rotation requested by an admin / rotation needed (with reason code) / no rotation needed
10018 / 10020Password written to AD / local account password changed
10017 / 10066AD write failed / LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_RIGHTS on the Windows LAPS attribute
10101 to 10104 / 10031An outside change to the managed account was blocked (10101 seen here in automatic mode; 10102 to 10104 and 10031 from Microsoft’s docs)
10006 / 10012Encryption needs functional level 2016 / schema not extended or not replicated (from Microsoft’s docs, not triggered here)

With automatic account management on, confirm the account exists and is enabled, since an account that is present but disabled is useless at the moment you need it:

Get-LocalUser -Name WLapsAdmin | Select-Object Name, Enabled, Description

Windows wrote its own description on the account it created:

Name        : WLapsAdmin
Enabled     : True
Description : This account is currently being automatically managed by your corporate administrator.

The tamper protection is worth testing yourself, because it is what stops a local admin from setting a known password on the managed account and walking away with it. We tried exactly that on the client from a script running as SYSTEM, the strongest local identity there is:

net user WLapsAdmin 'Tamper-Test-123!'

Windows refused the change, and the Operational log recorded who tried and with which binary. Run it as yourself and your own account appears as the client name.

System error 8654 has occurred.

The account is controlled by external policy and cannot be modified.

TimeCreated : 11/1/2026 6:33:17 AM
Id          : 10101
Message     : LAPS blocked an external request that attempted to modify the current automatically managed account.

               Account name: WLapsAdmin
               Account sid: S-1-5-21-2947570338-2649883975-988964596-1002
               Client name: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
               Client address: (local)
               Client process ID: 4312
               Client process exe: C:\Windows\System32\net1.exe

Forward events 10101 to 10104 to your SIEM, plus 10031. Microsoft documents 10031 for blocked password changes and 10101 to 10104 for blocks in automatic mode, and 10104 (the managed account removed from local Administrators) is the one most worth an alert. A blocked change on a managed account is either a script someone forgot about or an attacker who already has local admin, and both deserve a look. The Administrators group on the client also still listed the image’s original setup account next to WLapsAdmin; LAPS doesn’t remove other local admins, so audit those separately. Our walkthrough on adding a local user account on Windows Server shows where they live.

Retrieval and rotation

Get-LapsADPassword reads the attribute and decrypts it in one step when the caller is a member of the decryptor group. Without -AsPlainText it returns the password as a SecureString, which is the safer default for scripts. We ran it on the DC as CORP\Administrator, a member of LAPS Readers:

Get-LapsADPassword -Identity WIN11-LAB -AsPlainText

Read Source and DecryptionStatus first, because those two fields tell you how the password was stored and whether you were allowed to decrypt it. The password is masked here.

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             : WLapsAdmin
Password            : ********************
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:31:01 AM
ExpirationTimestamp : 12/1/2026 3:31:01 AM
Source              : EncryptedPassword
DecryptionStatus    : Success
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

EncryptedPassword confirms the GPO’s encryption setting reached the client, while CleartextPassword would mean Enable password encryption is set to Disabled. The expiry is exactly 30 days after the update, matching Password Age.

For the help desk, the same data sits on the LAPS tab of the computer object in Active Directory Users and Computers. We left the password hidden, and the tab follows the same decrypt rule as the cmdlet. On a help desk workstation the same tab comes with the Windows RSAT Active Directory tools, so nobody needs to sign in to a DC to read a password. To read a password there after you set up Windows LAPS, open the console from the Run box with dsa.msc; our Windows Run commands cheat sheet shows which consoles need RSAT on Windows 11 and Server 2025.

Active Directory Users and Computers LAPS tab on the WIN11-LAB computer object showing expiration, Expire now, the WLapsAdmin account and Show password
  1. 1LAPS tab
  2. 2Expire now
  3. 3WLapsAdmin
  4. 4Show password
  1. LAPS tab: on the computer object’s properties.
  2. Expire now: sets the expiry to now so the client rotates on its next cycle.
  3. WLapsAdmin: the account automatic account management created.
  4. Show password: works only for members of the decryptor group.

A Domain Admin outside the group, and RecoveryMode

To prove the decryptor setting bites, we created admin2, made it a member of Domain Admins but not LAPS Readers, and ran the same command as that account. The test ran half a minute after the expiry step shown further down, which is why the expiration time reads 3:32:02. Read permission came through and decryption did not:

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             :
Password            :
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:31:01 AM
ExpirationTimestamp : 11/1/2026 3:32:02 AM
Source              : EncryptedPassword
DecryptionStatus    : Unauthorized
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

Do not read that as a wall against Domain Admins. Get-LapsADPassword on Windows Server 2025 has a -RecoveryMode switch, meant for when the decryptor group has been deleted, and the same admin2 account ran it on the DC:

Get-LapsADPassword -Identity WIN11-LAB -AsPlainText -RecoveryMode

It came back decrypted. By then the password had rotated (3:35:08), and the value matched the current entry LAPS Readers saw in the history read further down.

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             : WLapsAdmin
Password            : ********************
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:35:08 AM
ExpirationTimestamp : 12/1/2026 3:35:08 AM
Source              : EncryptedPassword
DecryptionStatus    : Success
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

So the decryptor group separates the help desk from everyone else, but anyone who can sign in locally to a writable domain controller with Domain Admin rights can still recover any LAPS password. That’s acceptable, because that person already owns the domain, but it means Domain Admin sign-ins on DCs are the control that actually protects these passwords. Audit them like you audit the passwords.

Rotate after every use

The two rotation commands don’t behave the same way, and the difference matters when you’re closing an incident:

  • Reset-LapsPassword runs on the client and changes the password at once (event 10014).
  • Set-LapsADPasswordExpirationTime runs anywhere and only expires the password in AD.
  • An expired password changes on the client’s next cycle, up to an hour later.

From the DC, expire the password and read the new expiry back.

Set-LapsADPasswordExpirationTime -Identity WIN11-LAB
Get-LapsADPassword -Identity WIN11-LAB | Select-Object ExpirationTimestamp

Expiring returns the object and a PasswordReset status, and the follow-up read shows the expiry moved from December 1 to the current minute.

DistinguishedName : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Status            : PasswordReset

ExpirationTimestamp
-------------------
11/1/2026 3:32:02 AM

Running Invoke-LapsPolicyProcessing on the client a minute later logged 10015 with reason 0x1 (“The current password has expired”), then 10018 and 10020, so the forced cycle closes the gap. Reset-LapsPassword straight after logged 10014 “LAPS is updating the managed account password due to an Administrator-initiated request.” and the same 10018 and 10020 pair.

Old passwords matter when you restore a machine from a backup taken before the last rotation, and history only exists if you set a history size in the GPO:

Get-LapsADPassword -Identity WIN11-LAB -IncludeHistory -AsPlainText

After the first password and three rotations, the current entry and three history entries came back, all decrypted (passwords masked). Only the current one carries an expiry:

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             : WLapsAdmin
Password            : ********************
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:35:08 AM
ExpirationTimestamp : 12/1/2026 3:35:08 AM
Source              : EncryptedPassword
DecryptionStatus    : Success
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             : WLapsAdmin
Password            : ********************
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:33:12 AM
ExpirationTimestamp :
Source              : EncryptedPasswordHistory
DecryptionStatus    : Success
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             : WLapsAdmin
Password            : ********************
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:33:06 AM
ExpirationTimestamp :
Source              : EncryptedPasswordHistory
DecryptionStatus    : Success
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

ComputerName        : WIN11-LAB
DistinguishedName   : CN=WIN11-LAB,OU=Lab Workstations,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com
Account             : WLapsAdmin
Password            : ********************
PasswordUpdateTime  : 11/1/2026 3:31:01 AM
ExpirationTimestamp :
Source              : EncryptedPasswordHistory
DecryptionStatus    : Success
AuthorizedDecryptor : CORP\LAPS Readers

The post-authentication action in the GPO is the automatic version of the same habit: after someone signs in with the managed account, Windows waits out the grace period (8 hours in our policy), resets the password and logs the account off.

Windows LAPS password not showing

An empty LAPS tab or an empty result from Get-LapsADPassword has a short list of causes, and the client’s Operational log tells you which one in almost every case. Work through them in this order.

Event 10024: LAPS policy is configured as disabled

Either the GPO isn’t reaching the computer or Configure password backup directory is still Disabled. Our client logged this on every cycle until the GPO was linked, each time followed by a “succeeded” 10004. Check the first cause with gpresult /r /scope computer and look for the GPO under Applied Group Policy Objects. A computer still sitting in the default Computers container never sees a GPO linked to your OU. Then check the registry value the template writes:

Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\LAPS' | Select-Object BackupDirectory

On the working client it read BackupDirectory : 2. A missing key means the policy hasn’t arrived, and 0 means it arrived with backup turned off.

Error: “the machine has not been granted permission in Active Directory to backup the managed account password”

We caused this one on purpose: linked the same GPO to a Staging OU that never had Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission run on it, moved WIN11-LAB there, expired its password and forced a cycle. Invoke-LapsPolicyProcessing failed straight away:

Invoke-LapsPolicyProcessing : The request failed because the machine has not been granted permission in Active Directory to backup the managed account password.
    + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (:) [Invoke-LapsPolicyProcessing], LapsPowershellException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : The necessary Active Directory permissions have not been granted,Microsoft.Windows.LAPS.    InvokeLapsPolicyProcessing

The Operational log is more useful than the exception, because event 10066 names the fix and the exact OU. Note the ID: Microsoft’s troubleshooting guide documents 10065, which is the legacy-attribute version of this error, but Windows LAPS logged 10066. Trimmed to the three failure events, the log reads:

Id               : 10066
LevelDisplayName : Error
Message          : LAPS received an LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_RIGHTS error trying to update the password using the LAPS password attribute. You should update the permissions on this computer's container
                   using the Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission cmdlet, for example:

                    Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission -Identity 'OU=Staging,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com'

Id               : 10017
LevelDisplayName : Error
Message          : LAPS failed to update Active Directory with the new password. The current password has not been modified.

                    Error code: 0x80070032

Id               : 10005
LevelDisplayName : Information
Message          : LAPS policy processing failed with the error code below.

                    Error code: 0x80070032

Two details matter. The local password was left alone (“The current password has not been modified”), so the expired password stays valid until AD accepts a new one. And 10005 is logged at Information level despite the failure, so an alert that filters on Error level must key on 10066 and 10017, not 10005. Moving the computer back to Lab Workstations and forcing a cycle logged 10015, 10018, 10020 and 10004 between 6:35:08 and 6:35:09. Every OU that receives the GPO needs the self-permission, including staging and quarantine OUs.

DecryptionStatus: Unauthorized

The password is in AD and your account can read the attribute, but it is not in the authorized decryptor group. That’s what our admin2 Domain Admin saw. Add the account to the group named in AuthorizedDecryptor and sign in again, or change Configure authorized password decryptors and rotate, remembering that only passwords encrypted after the change follow the new principal.

Event 10012 or 10006 on the client

We did not trigger these, so this follows Microsoft’s guidance. 10012 means the DC the client contacted does not have the LAPS schema attributes: the schema update was never run, or replication has not reached that DC yet. 10006 means encryption is required but the domain functional level is below 2016, so no password was written. The first is fixed with Update-LapsADSchema and patience, the second with a functional level raise. Turning encryption off also clears 10006 but stores the password in clear text, which is the wrong trade for any production domain.

The password shows in ms-Mcs-AdmPwd instead

We did not trigger legacy emulation in this lab, so this follows Microsoft’s documentation. The client is in legacy emulation mode (event 10023) because no Windows LAPS policy reached it, so it’s honouring an old legacy GPO. The ADUC LAPS tab won’t show that password. Link the Windows LAPS GPO and the client switches on the next cycle. Collect Get-LapsDiagnostics output from the client if it doesn’t, since the zip it writes under $env:TEMP\LapsDiagnostics holds the logs and tracing Microsoft support asks for.

LAPS audit checklist

Run this list on a new deployment and again after any OU restructure, because moved computers and old delegations are how LAPS quietly stops protecting machines. Each item is a condition that must hold. Microsoft’s Windows LAPS policy settings reference and the LAPS troubleshooting guidance cover the edge cases.

  1. The domain functional level is Windows2016Domain or higher, so encryption is available.
  2. No machine in scope has AdmPwd.dll registered for an account Windows LAPS also manages.
  3. Find-LapsADExtendedRights on every managed OU lists only the built-in holders and your reader group.
  4. Every OU the GPO is linked to has had Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission run on it.
  5. The GPO sets Configure password backup directory to Active Directory and Enable password encryption to Enabled.
  6. The authorized decryptor is a group, and everyone who retrieves passwords is in it.
  7. Get-LapsADPassword on a sample computer returns Source EncryptedPassword and a recent PasswordUpdateTime.
  8. Alerts fire on events 10066, 10017, 10031 and 10101 to 10104, not on Error level alone.
  9. Domain Admin sign-ins on domain controllers are audited, since -RecoveryMode decrypts any password from there.

Once LAPS holds the local admin passwords, the next account worth the same scrutiny is the DSRM password on your domain controllers, which you can back up with a separate GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU. If you want a printed reference for the rest of the AD stack, our list of Windows Server administration books covers delegation and Group Policy in more depth than any single post can.

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