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French *Front National* voting: a micro and macro perspective

Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers

Abstract

In this article we study *Front National* voting behaviour from a micro and macro perspective, by taking into account individual and contextual characteristics simultaneously. We test five theories that offer explanations as to why certain social categories, such as e.g. lowly educated people, people with a low income or younger people, are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. An unfavourable out-group attitude, an authoritarian attitude and a nonconformist attitude turn out to be unique for the *Front National* electorate, whereas identification with France and political dissatisfaction can be found among other electorates to the same extent. Between regions, large variance exists in *Front National* support which is explained partly by the number of immigrants present, but only indirectly by the unemployment level.

Keywords: Extreme right-wing voting; *Front National*; multilevel analysis.

Introduction

Already by 1991 an overview of previous research with respect to the *Front National* electorate was available (Husbands 1991). This was only seven years after the first successes of the *Front National*, from which may become clear that the steady rise of the *Front National* did not suffer from lack of scientific attention. More important, Husbands' overview (1991) is rather interesting because of its severe criticism. He argued that most research of the 1980s only asked where *Front National* voters lived (with the danger of ecological fallacy), or asked who voted for the *Front National*, without taking the why-question of this voting behaviour into account. Furthermore, most research was essentially descriptive; foremost bivariate cross-tabulations were presented.

Now, nearly a decade later, research on *Front National* voting behaviour has improved theoretically and descriptively. Especially research on the longitudinal shifts in the *Front National* electorate brought to the fore by Mayer (1998, 1999) has brought new insights into the field. Furthermore, researchers took into account the various theoretical

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approaches, and contributed to building a general theory on extreme right-wing voting behaviour (Winkler 1996; Eatwell 1998; Mayer 1999; Mudde 1999). Most of these theoretical assumptions are still merely tested in a bivariate manner (Loch 1991; Hainsworth 1992; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1993; Gardberg 1993; Perrineau 1995; Mayer 1996; 1997; Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Ivaldi 1996; Martin 1996; Veugelers 1997), leaving readers questioning the importance of the empirical relations (Husbands 1991). In 1995, it was Kitschelt who published on the *Front National*, using multivariate analyses. However, a major problem remained unsolved; there were only thirty *Front National* voters in the data upon which Kitschelt based his findings. Recently, Mayer (1999) has also taken up logistic regression in her important contribution '*Ces Français qui votent FN*'. Mayer translated the various theoretical traditions on extreme right-wing voting into the funnel of causality. Although we do not agree with all elements in the model,[1] the basis that social background characteristics influence *Front National* voting via social and political attitudes, and at the same time contextual characteristics should be taken into account is crucial. This solid theoretical model Mayer proposed to explain *Front National* voting behaviour has, however, not been put integrally through the test.[2]

In this article we shall focus on the suggestions which Husbands had already proposed in 1991, which are still not honoured, or at best, not completely honoured, and secondly, we shall build on the recent work of Mayer (1999). First, we shall not only answer the question which social categories were more likely to vote for the *Front National* before the party split in 1999 in a multivariate way, but we shall also test hypotheses on why these social categories were more likely to do so. Next, we will perform multilevel analysis such that we can also answer the question whether contextual characteristics contribute to explaining extreme right-wing voting. Integrating the '*who*', '*why*' and '*where*' questions and testing on micro and macro explanations simultaneously meets the theoretical "*l'entonnoir de causalité*" (funnel of causality) that Mayer (1999, p. 205) proposes.

Additionally, an even more sophisticated way to look at the extreme right-wing is to make a division between parties to such an extent that we not only compare *Front National* voters with all voters for other parties, but also to compare *Front National* voters with each and every party electorate separately by performing multinomial logistic regression. In this manner, the extreme right-wing is not considered in isolation, but in the arena of the multi-party political system (Kitschelt 1995; Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000).


Front National **in the regions**

The regional differences in *Front National* support are large: in the 1995 Presidential elections, not more than 4.6 per cent voted for Le Pen in

the department of Corrèze (Limousin), whereas in the Bas-Rhin, in which the European capital of Strassbourg is situated, 26 per cent favoured Le Pen (see Figure 1).

Consequently, one of the main questions has been how these differences could be explained. Various characteristics of the regions have been related to the support for Le Pen: the number of immigrants, the criminality rate, abstainers of registered voters, the percentage of the population living in urban municipalities, the unemployment level, etc., were all shown to be somehow related to the popularity of the *Front National* (Husbands 1991; Martin 1996; Mayer 1999). Mayer, however, pointed out meaningfully to the importance of composition effects; differences between regions in the outcomes of voting behaviour may be due to differences in the composition of the population. It is thus not sufficient to relate regional characteristics to actual turnouts for the *Front National* with simple correlations, because composition effects are neglected methodologically (Mayer 1999; Snijders and Bosker 1999). The statistical technique of multilevel modelling makes it possible to analyse various contextual explanations of extreme right-wing voting behaviour next to individual explanations.

Figure 1 *Proportion Le Pen voters in the 1995 Presidential Elections*



Theories and hypotheses

Economic interests: contextual and individual hypotheses

The question as to why the unemployment level and the number of ethnic minorities are important for extreme right-wing success may be answered with Realistic Conflict Theory. The underlying axiom is that people are in competition over scarce resources, which may result in intergroup conflicts (Blalock 1967; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Olzak 1992). The question then is, why do people compete along ethnic lines?

Tajfel and Turner (1979) showed that people who are considered to be out-groups are more likely to be targets in conflicts; people who are perceived as different are easily accused of worse or worsened circumstances. Vice versa, people are not likely to blame the in-group, the group to which they belong themselves. Extreme right-wing parties emphasize this division between out-groups and in-group, and might therefore be attractive in regions where competition over scarce resources is more severe. As the unemployment level is an indicator of the economic situation in a region (Olzak 1992), we expect that *in regions where the unemployment level is higher* (1a) *or where unemployment increases strongly* (1b)*, people are more likely to vote for the Front National.*

Also immigration may be source of competition. The larger the presence of out-groups, the stronger competition could be perceived from which exclusionistic reactions may eventually flow (Olzak 1992). These reactions are dependent on the visibility of out-groups and the extent to which they are perceived as different. We expect that: *in regions where the number of immigrants is higher* (1c) *or has increased strongly* (1d)*, people are more likely to vote for the Front National.*

Research on extreme right-wing voting behaviour has not only focused on regional characteristics, but, of course, on individual characteristics too. Mayer (1997) argued the *Front National* in 1995 to be the first workers' party, because no other party received so much support from the manual workers. However, this statement was not tested in a multivariate equation. In 1999, Mayer indeed puts forward the importance of the social background characteristics in the model of causality. Unfortunately, occupational position is not taken into account in the logistic regression Mayer performed (1999).[3]

On the basis of Realistic Conflict Theory, we indeed expect that manual workers are more likely to vote for the *Front National*, because manual workers may perceive a stronger competitive threat from ethnic minorities than other occupational categories, as immigrants foremost operate in the same labour market segment as manual workers do (Thave 2000).[4] In turn, this perceived competitive threat leads to an unfavourable attitude towards ethnic minorities, and, because it is

exactly this sentiment upon which the *Front National* campaigns, the party becomes a more attractive option to vote for. The same argument of perceived ethnic threat and an unfavourable attitude towards ethnic minorities may hold for lower-educated people, people with a low income, and unemployed people. Thus, our hypotheses read that *manual workers* (2a), *unemployed people* (2b), *lower-educated people* (2c), and *people with a low income* (2d) *are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they have a more unfavourable attitude towards ethnic out-groups*.[5]

The social categories that are mentioned above are considered to be worse off in terms of socio-economic circumstances. Following Realistic Conflict Theory, we may also derive that people who *feel* to be worse off may react analogously (Mayer 1993, 1999; Winkler 1996). People who experience a discrepancy between their actual and subjectively claimed socio-economic position may perceive ethnic minorities as a competitive threat as well, and therefore are more unfavourable towards ethnic minorities and are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. The same may hold for people who are afraid of losing their job. Therefore, we derive that *people who experience deprivation in the present situation* (2e) *or expect deprivation in the future situation* (2f) *are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they have a more unfavourable attitude towards out-groups*.

Theory of psychological interests

Another political attitude as to why people who are considered to be worse off, or who feel that they are worse off, would be more likely to vote for the *Front National*, is provided by the classic study on authoritarianism (Adorno *et al.*, 1982). From an update of this theory, we derive that living in bad socio-economic circumstances restricts the fulfilment of desires, and leads therefore to repression of those desires (Scheepers, Felling and Peters 1990). To handle the frustration which this repression produces, people are more likely to submit themselves to a psychological need, i.e. to submit to strong leaders or to strong traditional norms, as well as to submit supposedly powerless and deviant people to themselves. The *Front National* would meet this psychological need; Le Pen is claimed to be an authority, and the programme of the party emphasizes traditional family values as well as policies to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities (*Front National* online, 1997). Now, Mayer (1997) argued that *Front National* voters are even more characterized by their authoritarianism than by their attitude towards immigrants. It is therefore interesting to test whether authoritarianism is still a strong predictor in a multi-variate analysis, and whether it contributes to explain why certain social categories are (expected to be) more likely to vote for the *Front National*.[6] We therefore state that: *manual workers* (3a), *unemployed people* (3b),

lowly educated people (3c), *people with a low income* (3d), *as well as people who experience deprivation in their present socio-economic situation* (3e), *or people who expect deprivation in their future socio-economic situation* (3f) *are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they are more likely to support authoritarian attitudes.*

Social disintegration theory

The proposition of social disintegration theory, derived from classic studies by Arendt (1951), Bendix (1952) and Kornhauser (1960), is that those social categories that may be considered to be disintegrated, or for that matter less integrated, are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties, as these parties seem to offer substitute forms of integration, by ways of their nationalistic programme. However, in previous studies on the German and Belgian extreme right-wing electorates this aspect of disintegration theory was refuted, because disintegrated categories, e.g. non-religious people, did not turn out to be more nationalistic (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet 2000).

The French situation seems to be somewhat different with respect to the likelihood of non-religious people to vote for the extreme right-wing. In The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium the non-religious were obviously over-represented among the extreme right-wing electorate (Billiet and De Witte 1995; Eisinga *et al.* 1998; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000), but not in France. We have to be careful, however, because the evidence for France concerns merely bivariate relations (Mayer 1997). Where it concerns religious practice, Mayer did not find an effect either (1999).

Billiet (1995) argued that disintegrated categories are likely to develop a form of nonconformism, because they are not integrated in intermediary institutions that have norm-regulating influences on everyday life. Although the *Front National* emphasizes certain specific traditional norms, especially with respect to the family (*Front National* online), the essential point is that non-religious people and young people could be more nonconformist and dare to oppose the status quo, in which the *Front National* is strongly stigmatized by mainstream political parties (Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000). In France, nonconfomism may refer to a rejection of widely and traditionally favoured values like solidarity and equality. Rejection of these values, but possibly in favour of brotherhood (i.e., *fraternité*), may explain why (supposedly) disintegrated categories are more likely to vote for the *Front National.* People who are socially mobile may also be considered to be disintegrated from their former social networks. From these considerations we deduce that: *non-religious people* (4a)*, young people* (4b) *and people who are socially mobile* (4c) *are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they are more likely to be nonconformist.*

Protest voting

A widespread idea is that an extreme right-wing vote is based on dissatisfaction with politics, politicians, or the political system (Stouthuysen 1993; Holsteyn and Mudde 1998). Protest voters are characterized by their distrust in everything that refers to established politics. On the other hand, these protest voters are supposed to reject ideological stances that extreme right-wing parties promote (Kitschelt 1995), such as an unfavourable attitude towards out-groups. Kitschelt takes the argument one step further: he expects that if the protest voting explanation holds, the electorate of extreme right-wing parties will not be characterized by any of the socio-background characteristics.

However, already by 1942, Fromm had found that especially the workers voted for the NSDAP out of protest, because they were dissatisfied with their own situation. Now again, we expect that people who *experience* a deprived socio-economic situation, or people who expect to be worse off in the future are more dissatisfied with pursued policies, as they are more likely to blame the system for their misfortunes. Thus, our concrete hypotheses state that: *people who perceive a deprivation in their present socio-economic situation* (5a) *or who expect deprivation in their future socio-economic situation* (5b) *are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they are more dissatisfied with the political system.*

Kitschelt's welfare state hypothesis

Kitschelt (1995) proposed that increasing international competition in the labour market could serve an explanation as to why particularly manual workers were found to be more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. Manual workers, traditionally voting for social-democrat parties, were supposed to consider redistributive governmental policies no longer to be in their interests, and possibly may have come to favour market liberal capitalism, traditionally proclaimed by conservative right-wing parties. Nevertheless, Kitschelt argues that these voters prefer extreme right-wing parties over traditional right-wing parties, because of the racist and authoritarian stances that are less obviously present among the latter parties.

Kitschelt tested his hypothesis by comparing right-wing voters to voters for all other parties, and found indeed that a favourable attitude on market liberalism positively effects extreme right-wing voting behaviour in France, Denmark, Austria, Italy and Norway. However, he did not actually test whether manual workers who are in favour of market liberalism are more likely to vote for the *Front National* rather than to vote for the social-democratic party. Our hypothesis (6) states that: *manual workers who support market liberalism are more likely to vote for the Front National versus the social-democratic party PS.*

Data and measurements

We make use of the French Post Presidential election data of 1995 conducted by CEVIPOV (*Centre d'Étude de la Vie Politique Française* in Paris) in seventy-six of the ninety-five *Départements*. Because we perform secondary analyses on data not primarily collected for the purposes at hand, we have to resort to proxies for some measurements.

From the respondents we selected those who were allowed to vote.[7] The percentage of respondents (N = 3,891) who had voted for Le Pen was 13.3, which is somewhat lower than the actual turnouts (15.2 per cent).[8] The descriptives of this dependent variable and of the social-background characteristics are listed in Appendix 1 of which some need additional information. Variables like education, income, job insecurity, age and gender are not in need of further clarification. In this Appendix 1, also bivariate relations of the social background characteristics are presented, to notify the reader of the similarities with previous research, which has been based foremost on these bivariate results.

We have built a nominal measure for occupation, containing social categories that have been mentioned in the hypotheses. We decided to keep the occupational category policemen and military employees as a separate one in the analyses, because bivariate analysis shows a remarkable strong support for the *Front National* within this category (25 per cent). It is important to note that we took into account the present occupational position, which is a necessary condition to test the hypotheses on economic threat. Retired people are subsumed within the category of 'not working' and not within the category of their former job. Also, unemployed people are considered as a separate category.

To make a division between marginal and core Christians, we constructed the variable denomination out of three questions: 'To which denomination do you belong?'; 'How often do you attend church?'; and, 'Is there something after death?' We transformed the answers to these questions into three categories: core Christians,[9] marginal Christians and non-religious. Intergenerational mobility is constructed out of the comparison of the occupation of the father and that of the respondent.[10]

Four items measured the perceived socio-economic situation of the respondent. They reflected both the respondent's situation and the perceived situation of France in general, at present and in the future. A factor analysis on the four items showed a clear two-dimensional structure: one referring to *deprivation in the present-day situation* and one to the *expected deprivation in the future situation.*

Socio-political attitudes

The 1995 programme of the *Front National* opens with the slogan '*Le départ des immigrés du tiers monde*' (*Front National* online 1997). It is especially upon this theme of immigration that extreme right-wing

parties, all over Europe, build their profile. In the surveys the respondents had to denote whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement 'There are too many immigrants in France'. No less than 74 per cent agreed (completely). Two other items that measured the attitude towards ethnic minorities correlated strongly with this immigration item. These items refer to the opinion regarding freedom of Moslems to build their own 'churches' (43.7 per cent (completely) disagree) and to the feelings towards Islam (80.4 per cent (very) negative).[11]

Two items measured an authoritarian attitude; one that refers to the opinion on the death penalty (authoritarian aggression), and the other as to whether children should be taught to think critically or to obey law and order (authoritarian submission). As a proxy for French identification, we used the questions whether one considers oneself to be French or also to be European, and with the attitude towards Europe. Nonconformism was measured by the rejection of egalitarianism and solidarity. As a proxy for market liberalism we used the attitude to profits and to privatization. Finally, political dissatisfaction refers to the question whether people are dissatisfied with democracy in France.[12]

Contextual characteristics

Numbers on present immigrants and unemployment of the *Départements* were received from INSEE (*Institut Nationale Statistique et des Études Économiques*). For the year 1995, we only have a proxy of the number of immigrants on the basis of the 1991 census, for which we selected the foreigners with an Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, or Turkish nationality (70 per cent of the foreigners from outside the EU). Unfortunately, for 1995, we cannot produce a valid measurement which the change in the percentage of immigrants expresses. This implies that we cannot test hypothesis 1d. The number of immigrants with the selected nationalities as a percentage of the total population varies at the level of the *Départements* between 0.4 per cent and 11.7 per cent, whereas the unemployment level varies between 6 per cent and 18 per cent.

Analyses

To test our hypotheses we employed multi-level analysis. With this technique, it is possible to estimate variance on the individual level and on the regional level (Quillian 1995; Snijders and Bosker 1999), with the benefit that standard errors are more accurately computed. Because we deal with a dichotomous dependent variable (voting for the *Front National* versus another party), we test a logistic model for which the binomial assumption holds. This means that the individual level variance is restricted to 1.

Logistic regression analysis was developed precisely to deal with

nominal variables. With logistic regression analysis it is estimated what the likelihood is to vote for the *Front National* versus not to vote for the *Front National*. A positive parameter β which is significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level denotes that the likelihood to vote for the *Front National* increases, when one considers the independent variable. When β is negative, the likelihood decreases. For the categorical independent variables (such as occupation, sex and denomination) the parameter β can be interpreted as the deviation in likelihood to vote for the *Front National* of a certain category as compared to the average logit (Lammers, Pelzer and Hendrickx 1995). A positive parameter refers to an increase in the likelihood to vote for the *Front National* as compared to the average logit and a negative coefficient denotes a decreased likelihood to do so.[13]

To describe our results, we refer to Table 1. In this table the logistic regression parameters from four models are presented. The *null-model* states the percentage of *Front National*-voters, controlled for variation over regions. In *Model I* only the social background characteristics are taken into account to control for composition effects, whereas in *Model II* also the contextual characteristics are added. *Model III* includes the intermediary variables, i.e. the attitudes derived from the theories – outgroup attitude, authoritarianism, French identity, nonconformism, market liberalism and political dissatisfaction – are added. If the effects of the independent variables on voting for the *Front National* decrease or disappear after controlling for the impact of the attitudes (*Model III*), then we can conclude that the differences in the support for the attitudes are partly or completely responsible for the effects of the independent variables in *Model II* (Billiet 1995), which is in line with conventional path-analysis (Davis 1985). When a social category appears to be more likely to vote for the *Front National*, and this is explained in terms of the attitudes, then the question is at stake which of the political attitudes is relevant. Therefore, we perform additional multiple (linear) regression analyses with these political attitudes as dependent variables to ascertain whether and to what extent this motive is prevalent in this particular social category (*Models IIIA to IIIE*). On the other hand, when it turns out that a certain social category is not more likely to vote for the *Front National*, it makes no more sense to investigate which attitudes they subscribe to.

Results of binomial analyses

Table 1 presents the results of the binomial analyses, which provides evidence for the tests of our hypotheses.

In *Model 0* we can find the variance between the regions to the extent people voted for the *Front National*. Because we already showed that there are large differences between regions in voting for the *Front National*, it is no surprise that the parameter at the bottom of *Model 0*

Table 1. *Model 0 to III: Multilevel variance components and logistic regression parameters β, expressing the likelihood to vote Front National. Models IIIA to IIIE: unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 3891. Bold parameters express significant effects (α <.05). Data Source: Post Election Survey 1995, CEVIPOF.*

MODELS	0	I	II	III	IIIA	IIIC	IIIB	IIID	IIIE
Front National					Outgroup	Autho.	France	NonCon	Pol.Diss.
Constant	–2.20	–2.46	–2.43	–2.86					
Social Background Characteristics					R^2 .19	.26	.15	.06	.12
Occupation									
Manual workers		–.13	–.13	–.30	**.16**	.06	.04	–.04	**.12**
Self–employed		.21	.25	–.09	**.24**	**.17**	.06	**.20**	**.12**
Lower white collar workers		**.31**	**.31**	**.37**	–.02	–.03	–.01	.04	.06
Higher white collar workers		.11	.11	.33	**–.18**	**–.19**	**–.11**	–.09	**–.13**
Service class, executives, professionals		**–1.15**	**–1.15**	–.89	**–.29**	**–.30**	–.11	**–.20**	–.08
Police/military employees		**.78**	**.78**	.57	.22	**.27**	.22	.16	–.02
Unemployed		**.37**	**.34**	**.35**	.01	.01	–.05	.03	–.01
Others		–.06	–.06	–.05	.00	.04	.03	–.01	–.00
Education									
Primary education		**.25**	**.26**	–.19	**.29**	**.32**	**.35**	**.21**	**.20**
Secondary lower education		**.20**	**.22**	.07	**.14**	**.14**	**.05**	**.05**	**.05**
Secondary higher education		–.29	–.28	.03	**–.20**	**–.27**	**–.26**	**–.19**	**–.18**
Higher education		**–.45**	**–.49**	.11	**–.40**	**–.45**	**–.37**	**–.23**	**–.22**
Income									
Less than 10000 FFr		**.21**	**.23**	.19	.01	.04	**.12**	–.01	**.12**
10000–17500 FFr		.09	.09	.12	–.02	.00	–.03	.02	**–.04**
More than 17500 Ffr		**–.36**	**–.39**	**–.37**	–.01	**–.08**	**–.12**	–.03	**–.07**
no answer		–.15	–.12	**–.23**	.13	**.35**	.13	.03	.00

Table 1. *Continued*

MODELS	0	I	II	III	IIIA	IIIC	IIIB	IIID	IIIE
Front National					Outgroup	Autho.	France	NonCon	Pol.Diss.
Deprivation in present–day situation		**.25**	**.24**	**.14**	**.06**	.01	**.08**	**.04**	**.16**
Expected future deprivation		–.03	–.03	–.06	–.02	**–.08**	**.05**	.02	**.10**
Denomination									
Catholic/Protestant		**–.52**	**–.52**	**–.32**	**–.12**	–.06	**–.14**	–.08	**–.10**
Marginal Christian		**.18**	**.18**	**.10**	**.09**	**.09**	**.04**	**.05**	–.00
Not religious		**–.24**	**–.26**	–.12	**–.19**	**–.22**	–.04	**–.10**	.05
Age									
18–26		**.43**	**.45**	**.56**	–.03	**–.21**	**.10**	–.01	**.24**
27–34		.19	.19	.19	.06	**–.08**	**.13**	.04	.07
35–44		–.02	–.01	.01	.00	–.05	.05	–.01	.04
45–54		–.09	–.10	–.10	–.02	.05	–.03	.07	–.07
55–64		–.13	–.14	–.25	.02	**.09**	–.07	.04	**–.08**
65+		**–.38**	**–.39**	**–.43**	–.03	**.21**	**–.18**	**–.10**	**–.21**
Intergenerational mobility									
Stable		.00	.01	.01	–.02	.03	**.07**	–.00	–.00
Upward or downward		.08	.08	.06	.02	.02	.00	–.00	.00
No answer		**–.23**	**–.24**	–.18	–.04	**–.08**	–.03	.00	.00
Gender									
Men		**.33**	**.34**	**.43**	**–.04**	–.02	**–.08**	.02	**–.06**
Women		**–.31**	**–.31**	**–.39**	**.04**	.02	**.07**	–.02	**.05**

Table 1. *Continued*

MODELS	0	I	II	III	IIIA	IIIC	IIIB	IIID	IIIE
Front National					Outgroup	Autho.	France	NonCon	Pol.Diss.
Contextual Characteristics									
Unemployment–level			.06	.04	**.07**	**.04**	**.07**	.02	.02
Change in the unemployment–level			.11	.08	.00	**.03**	–.02	–.03	.00
Number of ethnic minorities			**.40**	**.47**	–.03	–.01	–.02	.02	–.03
Political attitudes									
Out–group attitude				**.71**					
Authoritarian attitude				**.47**					
Identification with France				**.16**					
Nonconformistic attitude				**.25**					
Political dissatisfaction				**.15**					
Variance Components									
Regional level (*Départements*)	**.29**	**.32**	**.18**	**.18**	.007	.005	.000	.004	**.014**
Individual level	1	1	1	1	.804	.735	.852	.935	.861

is highly significant (Ω = .29). Differences between regions could, however, result from differences in the composition of the regional populations. The introduction of the social background characteristics in *model I* does not, however, support such a composition effect, as the parameter even slightly increases to .32. In *model II* the contextual characteristics are added. The interregional variance then falls to .17, which implies that the contextual characteristics explain a part of the variance, such as expected. But when we take into account the effects of the contextual characteristics in the same *model II*, we find that neither the level of unemployment nor the rise in this level contributes directly to the explanation, although the parameters are clearly in the expected direction (β = .06 and β = .11, respectively), which refutes our hypotheses 1a and 1b. We found the same results in The Netherlands and Belgium and partly in Germany (Eisinga *et al.* 1998; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet 2000), and other researchers also reported this finding (Knigge 1998). On the other hand, the number of ethnic minorities (β = .40) contributes to explaining why in certain regions the *Front National* is successful, implying that hypothesis 1c is supported; the larger the number of ethnic minorities in a region, the larger the likelihood to vote for the *Front National.*

Let us find out now whether we can corroborate our other hypotheses, in which we give explanations why certain social categories would be over-represented among the *Front National* electorate. For this purpose, we compare *Model II*, with all independent variables, to *Model III*, which includes the political attitudes.

Although Mayer (1998; 1999) showed that manual workers, referred to in hypotheses 2a and 3a, were overrepresented among the *Front National* electorate, the results of multiple logistic regression in *Model II* show that this is a spurious finding, especially due to related characteristics like education and gender.[14] This finding refutes hypothesis 2a. Unemployed people are, however, also after appropriate controls more likely to vote for the *Front National*, which we described in hypothesis 2b and 3b (β = .34). In case the attitudes have predictive power, this parameter should approach zero or at least decrease in *Model III*. Because exactly the opposite happens, namely an increase of the parameter to β = .35 in *Model III*, the socio-political attitudes do not explain why unemployed people are more likely to vote for the extreme right. Unemployed people are *not* more unfavourable towards out-groups than on average nor do they subscibe more than average to authoritarian attitudes. This contradicts hypotheses 2b and 3b. Lower-white-collar workers and police and military employees are also more likely to vote for the *Front National. Models IIIA to IIIE* show that the likelihood of the police and military is explained (foremost) by their authoritarian attitude (b = .27). These models offer, however, no clues regarding the lower-white-collar workers.

People with the lowest education, referred to in hypotheses 2c and 3c, are more likely to vote for the *Front National* (β = .26), such as was also found by Mayer (1999). In *Model III*, when we control for the socio-political attitudes, the parameter declines strongly, such as expected, and even turns slightly negative (β = –.19). Because all attitudes contribute to the explanation of voting for the *Front National* (*Model III*), *Models IIIA to IIIE* indicate precisely which attitude is supported by the lower-educated that makes them more prone to vote for the *Front National*. We expected that lower educated people are more likely to vote for the *Front National*, because of their unfavourable out-group attitude (hypothesis 2c) and because of their authoritarian attitude (3c). In *Models IIIA* and *IIIC* we find that these hypotheses are corroborated; lower-educated people do indeed hold a more unfavourable attitude towards out-groups (b = .29) and are more likely to have an authoritarian attitude (b = .32). Moreover, they also subscribe more than average to identification with France, are more nonconformist and are more dissatisfied politically. The likelihood of the lowest-educated is thus not only explained in terms of the attitudes we formulated hypotheses on. In addition, the same explanations hold for the larger likelihood of the secondary-lower-educated to vote for the *Front National* that we found (*Model II*, β = .22). They are more likely than on average to support all the distinguished attitudes too.

A low income and deprivation in the present situation referred to in hypotheses 2d and 2e, respectively, contribute to the explanation of *Front National* voting behaviour, whereas the expected deprivation in the future situation (hypothesis 2f) is not relevant. People with a lower income identify more strongly with France and are more dissatisfied with politics, but they are neither more unfavourable towards out-groups nor more authoritarian, which refutes hypotheses 2d and 3d. The effect of deprivation in the present situation (β = .24) is partly explained by the addition of the socio- political attitudes in *Model III*. The parameter falls to .14, but remains significant. It turns out that the more deprivation one experiences in the present, the more unfavourable one is towards out-groups (*Model IIIA*, b = .06) and the more dissatisfied politically one is (*Model IIIE*, b = .16). This is what we predicted in hypotheses 2e and 5a, respectively. Hypothesis 3e is, however, refuted, because deprivation of the present situation has no effect on an authoritarian attitude. Moreover, people who experience deprivation in the present are also more likely to identify with France (b = .08) and to be nonconformist (b = .04).

Next we proposed that non-religious people, young people and inter-generationally mobile people are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. However, the non-religious are not more likely to do so; on the contrary: they are less likely to vote for the party (β = –.26). It is the category of the marginal Christians which is over-represented among the *Front National* electorate (β = .18). People between age 18 and 26 are

indeed more likely to vote for the *Front National* (β = .45). In *Model III*, we find that the effect is not interpreted in terms of the political attitudes that are introduced to the model: the parameter even increases to .56. We expected young people to be more nonconfomist, which is not the case. They do, however, identify more strongly with France as compared to the average (*Model IIIB*, b = .10). Finally, intergenerational mobile people are not significantly more likely to vote for the *Front National*, although the parameter is in the expected direction (β = .08). Consequently, we have to refute the hypotheses deduced from social disintegration theory, in which we argue that nonconfomism could explain the larger likelihood of the supposedly disintegrated categories to vote for the *Front National* (hypotheses 4a to 4c).

We have already shown that the variance between the regions is explained partly by the number of ethnic immigrants present. Surprisingly, however, this variance is not explained by differences in attitudes between the regions. The political attitudes included in *Model III*, do not explain the variance between the *Départements*. This means that in regions where the *Front National* has more support, people are not necessarily more unfavourable towards out-groups.

Furthermore, the effects of the contextual characteristics on the socio-political attitudes are quite interesting (at the bottom of *Models IIIA to IIIE*), from which we can derive indirect effects of these characteristics on *Front National* voting behaviour. There is, however, very little variation between the regions in the political attitudes. Nevertheless, there is a small effect of the unemployment level in a region on the attitude towards ethnic out-groups, on an authoritarian attitude and on French identification. This implies that there is an indirect effect of the unemployment level on voting for the *Front National* via these socio-political attitudes. Surprisingly, the number of ethnic immigrants does not have an effect on the attitudes, and this is not due to composition effects, such as Mayer (1999) suggested, as we control for all relevant individual characteristics.

Results of multinomial analyses


In addition to the results described above, more information is derived from the data employing a multinomial approach. Mayer (1997) and Mayer and Boy (1997) compared the electorate of the *Front National* to the electorates of other parties too. Again, employing the multinomial method increases the chance that previously ascertained relations turn out to be spurious. In this analysis, *Front National* voters are compared to the voters for the main competitors in the political arena; the voters for the social-democrat PS (Jospin), the communists and Worker's party (Hue and Laguiller), the right-wing (Chirac and Balladur), the nationalist French movement MPF (Villiers), and to non-voters.[15]

The results of our analyses are contained in Appendix 2, in which only the full model is presented. Because *Front National* voters are the reference category, the signs of the parameters are compared to binomial logistic regression just in the opposite direction. Thus, in multinomial logistic regression, a **negative effect** signifies that the likelihood to vote for the *Front National* increases for the concerned category and, consequently, that the likelihood to vote for the party with which the *Front National* is compared, decreases.

The multinomial approach is especially interesting where it concerns Kitschelt's hypothesis on manual workers who presumably have switched from the PS to the *Front National*. In the binary logistic regression we found no significant effect of manual workers on voting for the *Front National*, which already cast doubt on the verification of Kitschelt's hypothesis. In the row of the manual workers in the full model of Appendix 2, none of the effects is negative, which implies that the likelihood for manual workers to vote for the *Front National* does not increase, everything else held constant, irrespectively of the electorate with which it is contrasted. In contrast, we find the traditional left-wing and right-wing contrast; manual workers are especially likely to vote for the socialist and communist candidates. However, Kitschelt (1995) directs in his work special attention to support for market liberalism to support his hypothesis.

Our analyses show that the more market liberal one's orientation, the more likely it is that one will vote for the *Front National* versus the Socialist Party. It implies that for manual workers who are the more inclined towards market liberalism, the likelihood of their vote for the *Front National* versus the Socialist Party also increases. This would

Figure 2. *Percentage of voters for the parties as a function of manual workers and market liberalism, everything else held constant*



suggest support for Kitschelt's hypothesis. However, as is shown is Figure 2, the likelihood to vote for the *Front National* when one is very market liberal and manual worker is hardly larger than when everything is held constant (which means no manual worker and average market liberal). Although we have to support Kitschelt's hypothesis, we may cast doubt on its relative importance.

With respect to the other socio-political attitudes, we find that an unfavourable attitude towards out-groups, an authoritarian attitude and a nonconformist attitude are rather unique for the *Front National* electorate. The variables increase considerably the likelihood of a vote for the *Front National*. Voters for the Villiers' French Movement and voters for the communists identify more strongly with France than *Front National* voters ($\beta = .21$ and $\beta = 13$, respectively). Finally, non-voters are not less dissatisfied politically than *Front National* voters. The likelihood of abstaining from voting increases just as strongly as the likelihood of voting for the *Front National*, when one is more dissatisfied politically ($\beta = .03$).

The contextual characterisitics are mostly in the same direction as we found previously in the binomial analyses. Especially interesting are the strong significant effects of the percentage of immigrants. Compared to all electorates, the *Front National* increases its support in regions where relatively more immigrants are present.

Conclusions and discussion

In this article we have shown that by employing multilevel and multivariate analysis on voting behaviour, we have had to refute some previously developed hypotheses on 'who are more likely to vote for the *Front National*?'. This is most obvious with respect to manual workers. In a bivariate analysis, manual workers have been shown to be overrepresented among the *Front National* electorate. We showed that this finding is due to characteristics related to the manual workers; particularly to their education and gender. The statement of Mayer that manual workers are strongly present among the *Front National* electorate does hold. But it is not because of a characteristic of manual workers that they vote for the *Front National*, rather because manual workers are more often men and because they are more likely than average to be lower-educated. These findings illustrate that appropriate controls are crucial.

To meet this condition, we tested hypotheses derived from five different theoretical approaches to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour (Kitschelt 1995; Winkler 1996; Eatwell 1998; Mayer 1999), in which we foremost focused on the link between the *who* and the *why* question of voting for the *Front National*. With multilevel analysis we introduced the macro- and micro-level of analysis (Eatwell 1998), and we tested the '*l'entonnoir de causalité*' as described by Mayer (1999) integral.

Table 2. *Overview of hypotheses on decisive (Contextual, Individual and Attitudinal) characteristics of people voting for the* Front National.

	Number of Hypothesis	Supported (+) or refuted (–)
Contextual characteristics		
Regional unemployment	1a	–
Regional increase in unemployment	1b	–
Regional percentage of ethnic minorities	1c	+
Individual characteristics		
Manual workers	2a and 3a	–
Unemployed people	2b and 3b	+
Lower educated people	2c and 3c	+
People with lower income	2d and 2d	–
People presently experiencing deprivation	2e, 3e and 5a	+
People expecting deprivation in the future	2f, 3f and 5b	–
Non-religious people	4a	–
Young people (18–26)	4b	+
Socially mobile people	4c	–
***Attitudinal characteristics of people more likely to vote for the* Front National**		
Unemployed people		
due to unfavourable attitude towards out-groups	2b	–
due to authoritarian attitude	3b	–
Lower educated people		
due to unfavourable attitude towards out-groups	2c	+
due to authoritarian attitude	3c	+
People with lower income		
due to unfavourable attitude towards out-groups	2d	–
due to authoritarian attitude	3d	–
People presently experiencing deprivation		
due to unfavourable attitude towards out-groups	2	+
due to authoritarian attitude	3	–
due to political dissatisfaction	5a	+
Young people		
due to nonconformist attitude	4b	–

Moreover, multinomial analysis clarified which characteristics are unique for the *Front National* electorate, compared to specific other electorates and non-voters.

Discussing the theories, we have to emphasize that all theories contribute to explain extreme right-wing voting, but at the same time, not all hypotheses derived from the theories are completely corroborated. Table 2 summarizes which hyptheses are supported. With respect to the theory of economic interests, we expected that those most strongly in

competition over scarce resources to be most likely to vote for the *Front National*. For the lower-educated this was supported, although the mechanisms proposed in the other theories are valid for the lower-educated too. For manual workers and self-employed people, the occupational categories in which immigrants are most strongly over-represented (Thave 2000), we do find that they are more likely to be unfavourable towards out-groups, but not that they are more likely than average to vote for the *Front National*, after appropriate controls. It is the category of routine manual workers, whose position has deteriorated as the unemployment level within this category is highest (Thave 2000), who are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. It is also within this category that the number of immigrant workers has been on the increase (28.9 per cent of the French; 25.1 per cent of the immigrants work in this sector). The effect of deprivation in the present situation is explained in terms of realistic conflict theory too, whereas under other economic worse conditions, people are more likely to vote for the *Front National*, but not because they are more unfavourable towards out-groups.

With respect to an authoritarian attitude as explanation for the over-representation of a category, we may name especially the police and military employees. Their support for an authoritarian attitude is strong. We may assume that their longing for respect and obedience has driven them into the arms of Le Pen.

Although previous research showed that nationalistic attitudes offer no explanation as to why disintegrated categories are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties, the French situation casts doubt on this empirical regularity. It turned out that marginal Christians rather than non-religious people, and people aged from 18 to 26 are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. Moreover, and this is crucial, these categories are more likely to identify with France than the average in the population. What is more, the alternative explanation that disintegrated categories are more likely to wave aside French traditionally held important values, and in this respect are nonconformist, does not hold either for the young people or for the non-religious. It seems, however, that it holds for marginal Christians. Despite this finding, it is important to note that the effect of nonconfomism is rather strong, and contributes significantly, next to the other socio-political attitudes, in explaining extreme right-wing voting behaviour.

Political dissatisfaction is for none of the social categories the sole explanation why they are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. Although the electorate of Le Pen is more dissatisfied with democracy than all other electorates but the non-voters, for all social categories it holds that political dissatisfaction goes hand in hand with support for (one of) the ideological attitudes. Market liberalism is such an attitude too. Multinomial analysis showed that *Front National* voters are indeed

much more market oriented than voters for the *SP*, despite the dissociation from market liberalism in the party's programme, which supports Kitschelt's hypothesis. Nevertheless, based on our findings, manual workers in favour of market liberalism are not more likely than voters on average to vote for the *Front National*, which casts doubt on the relevance of Kitschelt's hypothesis.

Realistic conflict theory predicted that high levels of unemployment and high levels of immigrants explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour. We found, however, once more, no direct effect of unemployment, which coincides with findings in Flanders, The Netherlands, and Germany. But, we did find a small indirect effect such that higher unemployment levels evoke a more unfavourable attitude towards ethnic outgroups, a stronger identification with France and a stronger authoritarian attitude, which in turn increase the likelihood of a vote for the *Front National*. The number of ethnic immigrants does have a direct effect: the more immigrants live in a region, the stronger the support for Le Pen. This finding also resembles results from analyses in Flanders and The Netherlands (Eisinga *et al.* 1998; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet 2000). Mayer (1997, 1999) pointed meaningfully to the fact that in some *Départements* where the number of ethnic immigrants is on average relatively high, villages exist where this number almost equals zero. Breaking down the regional level of analysis has sometimes led to different outcomes. Unfortunately, when there is no control for compositional effects, those findings are not very valid.

Another point drawn attention to by Mayer (1999), and what we confirmed with our empirical analyses is that in regions with higher levels of immigrants the level of out-group unfavourability is not higher, although the people in these regions are more inclined to vote for the *Front National*. The explanation Mayer (1999) gives for this paradox is that a composition effect would disguise an effect of the number of immigrants on an unfavourable out-group attitude seems to be falsified, as we took into account all considered important characteristics. The contact hypothesis as has been suggested by Forbes seems not plausible either; it does not explain why in regions with a high number of immigrants, people are not more unfavourable towards immigrants whereas at the same time they are more likely to vote for the *Front National*. This finding, which seriously casts doubt on mechanisms behind the effects of the contextual characteristics such as described in Realistic Conflict Theory, needs more attention. The lack of variance between regions in the opinion towards out-groups may be caused by the national news supply. People in regions with few immigrants may perceive the influx of immigrants into France in general as much as a threat as people living in regions with higher levels of immigrants. The translation into actual voting behaviour for an anti-immigrant party such as the *Front National*, may however be dependent on the actual presence of immigrants in the

region, as saliency of the immigration issue (Togeby 1998) may vary across regions. This idea may be addressed more thoroughly in future research.

Concluding, we can state that the theories we proposed are all of importance for explaining extreme right-wing voting behaviour. All socio-political attitudes were shown to be of relevance in the French situation. It implies that we cannot leave out a '*Baustein*', such as Winkler (1996) refers to the various theories, in explaining *Front National* voting behaviour and that we need the micro- as well as the macro-level simultaneously (Eatwell 1998) in building a general theory of extreme right-wing voting behaviour.

Notes

1 Mayer takes into account party-closeness. Although it is interesting to find out differences between electorates to what extent the voters also feel close to the party voted for, in a multivariate model it blows up the explained variance and raises more questions than it answers. The question then turns from 'Why do people vote for the *Front National*' to 'Why do people feel close to the *Front National*?'.

2 This is partly due to the progress Mayer (1999) made in her work. She decided to take a time perspective into account, which implied a loss of comparable data which are theoretically considered relevant. On the other hand, the model of causality Mayer proposed is not tested systematically and integrally.

3 Mayer does not test whether unemployed people and manual workers are indeed over-represented among the *FN* electorate. Mayer did construct a manual workers attachment variable, based on one's own, one's partner's and one's father's occupational position. When all three had manual workers positions, respondents scored having three ties with the manual workers' class (which obviously is not a possible option for respondents without a partner). Nevertheless, by ignoring a respondent's actual occupation, Mayer did not test her statement that manual workers are more likely to vote for the *Front National*.

4 Thave (2000) shows that next to the much higher unemployment rates of especially Moroccans (35%) and Algerians (30%), immigrants are strongly over-represented among manual workers; 44.1% of the immigrants are manual workers; for all working French people this is 26.3%. For Algerians and Moroccans the numbers are even higher with 48.7% and 58.2%, respectively.

5 Next to a direct effect, one could formulate an indirect effect of unemployment on extreme right-wing voting behaviour, because we expect that as unemployment increases, the competetive threat from ethnic minorities increases, and consequently the likelihood to have a more unfavourable attitude towards ethnic minorities. Although we shall not explore such hypotheses in which an indirect effect of the contextual characteristics is formulated, we shall test whether these indirect effects exist.

6 The difficulty with authoritarian attitudes, however, is that it influences the attitude towards ethnic immigrants; the stronger support of authoritarian attitudes, the more unfavourable one's attitude towards ethnic minorities and immigrants, as has been shown in a wide range of studies (Scheepers, Felling and Peters 1989).

7 People who were not allowed to vote (n=35) and people who are Jew or Moslim were left out of the analyses. Respondents with a missing on the variable 'for which candidate have you voted at the elections' (3.7 per cent) were not taken in the analyses either. Non-voters are, however, taken into account.

8 The percentage of Le Pen voters in the descriptives (11.1 per cent) is lower, because also non-voters are taken into account. In this article we shall label Le Pen voters as *Front*

National voters, although at the Presidential elections voters choose for a person and not for a party.

9 Only Catholics had to answer the question as to how often they attended Church. Then, we made a distinction between core and marginal Catholics. To make such a distinction for Protestants too, we considered the variable 'is there something after death?'. We considered Core Christians to be Catholics who attend Church at least once a month and believe in heaven after death, and Protestants who believe in heaven after death. We considered Marginal Christians to be Catholics who attend Church less than once a month and do not believe in heaven after death (but in either 'something, but do not know what', in 'nothing' or in 'reincarnation'), and Protestants who do not believe in heaven after death. Finally, we considered non-religious people to be people without denomination and who do not believe in heaven after death.

10 People who are in the same occupational group as their father are labelled 'stable'. The other respondents are labelled upward and downward, as long as they had no missing on either their own or their father's occupation. Because we had to deal with categories of occupation, the measurement is a rather rough indication for intergenerational stability and change. For theoretical reasons we combined upward and downward mobile people. From an economic point of view, one would perhaps expect differences between the upward and downward mobile people. However, in previous analyses we did not find significant differences between the categories.

11 The three items were considered to measure the same latent concept, which was supported by factor analysis results. Reliability tests showed a Cronbach's of .69, which we considered reasonable for three items.

12 All the political attitudes and the measurements referring to deprivation are transformed to *z*-scores, with an average of zero and a standard deviation of one. The contextual characteristics are transformed to *z*-zcores too.

13 The special way of dummification we used, accounts for the number of respondents in each category, which is different from the normal deviation contrast. The parameter for the reference category is deduced from the rule that all products of estimated parameters and number of respondents in a category should sum up to zero.

14 More precisely, female manual workers (n=74) are even less likely to vote for the *Front National* than the female do on average; 7 per cent versus 9 per cent, respectively. Male manual workers are a little more likely to vote for the *Front National* than men on average; 16 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. Splitting out these numbers to the various educational levels in the table below shows that being a manual worker becomes irrelevant.

Gender	Education	% FN voters within category of manual workers	% FN voters of all respondents
Men	Primary education	16	16
	Secondary lower education	17	17
	Secondary higher education	11	12
	Higher education	0	7
Women	Primary education	7	10
	Secondary lower education	8	12
	Secondary higher education	0	6
	Higher education	0	5

15 The voters for Voynet (3.0 per cent) are left out of the analysis to restrict the number of categories in multinomial analysis and to keep analyses reliable. Additional analyses in

which another category was left out showed that voters for the Greens do differ rather extremely from *Front National* voters, in almost all respects but age. Voters for Balladur and Chirac do differ little from each other. In cases when they differ, the contrast with *Front National* voters is in the same direction. The same holds for the voters for Hue and Laguiller.

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Appendix 1. *Univariate distribution of selected variables of the Post Election Survey 1995, CEVIPOF, and Front National support within these categories (bivariate).*

Candidate voted for in 1995 elections		
Le Pen (FN)	11.1	
Chirac (RPR)	19.0	
Balladur (RPR, but attracts UdF voters)	12.9	
Villiers (MPF)	4.0	
Jospin (PS)	23.2	
Voynet (Greens)	3.0	
Laguiler (Workers' Party) /Hue (PC)	10.3	
Blanc/ not voted	16.5	
Occupation		% FN vote
Manual workers	10.6	14.5
Self-Employed	6.9	15.2
Lower white collar workers	12.3	14.6
Higher white collar workers	10.4	9.8
Service class, executives, professionals	5.7	2.3
Police/Military employees	.08	25.0
Unemployed	9.1	18.1
Not working for other reason	44.1	8.5
Education		
Lower education	29.7	12.3
Lower secondary education	35.0	14.5
Higher secondary education	12.1	8.7
Higher education	24.5	6.0
Income		
<10.000 Ffr	27.9	13.2
10.000–17.500 Ffr	41.9	12.7
>17.500 Ffr	24.2	6.6
no answer	6.1	9.3
Denomination		
Catholic and Protestant: church attending and faith in life after death	11.5	4.9
Marginal Christian: Catholic and Protestant, not church attending and no or little faith in life after death	64.9	12.7
Not religious	23.6	9.9
Age		
18–26	17.4	12.7
27–34	16.5	13.7
35–44	18.8	11.4
45–54	14.0	11.0
55–64	14.6	10.6
65+	18.7	7.8
Intergenerational mobility		
Stable	17.0	12.9
Upward/ downward	61.8	11.7
No answer/ do not know/ missing	21.2	8.3
Gender		
Men	47.6	13.7
Women	52.4	8.9

Appendix 1. (*continued) Distributions of the attitudes towards present and future situation and of the intermediate variables.*

Deprivation in present situation	Improved	Stayed the same	Worsened
Is your personal financial situation worse than before?	8.5	52.4	39.1
Is the economy of France worse than before?	15.8	43.2	41.0

Deprivation in future situation	Will improve	Will not change	Will worsen
How will your personal financial situation develop in the near future?	27.8	57.1	15.2
How will the economy of France develop in the near future?	43.9	44.5	11.6

Out-group attitude	completely disagree	disagree	agree	completely agree
There are too many immigrants in France	10.8	14.4	33.0	41.8
Moslems should be allowed to have their own churches	26.8	16.9	37.6	19.3
	Very positive	Positive	Negative	Very negative
How do you think of the Islam?	2.3	17.3	41.7	38.7

Identification with France	Both the same	More to France than Europe	Only to France	
Do you have the sentiment of belonging to France or to Europe?	29.3	28.9	41.8	
	Very positive	Positive	Negative	Very negative
Attitude towards Europe	28.4	53.1	13.2	5.2

Authoritarian attitude	Completely disagree	Disagree	Agree	Completely agree
Death penalty should be reintroduced	30.5	13.1	245	318
	Think critically	Discipline		
What should the school teach students?	47.9	52.1		

Liberalism	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Attitude to profits	12.4	38.7	34.7	14.3
Attitude to privatization	9.8	45.2	32.9	12.1

Nonconformism	Very Positive	Positive	Negative	Very Negative
Can you tell whether the word Solidarity (Solidarité) evokes for you something:	55.1	35.3	7.4	2.2
Can you tell whether the word Equality (Egalité) evokes for you something:	48.9	35.4	12.3	3.5

Political dissatisfaction	Very well	Well regarding most aspects	Not very well	Not well at all
How does democracy function in France?	5.7	49.4	36.2	8.6

Appendix 2. *Multilevel multinomial logistic regression (deviation) parameters β, expressing the likelihood to vote for the Front National versus another party. N = 3761. Bold parameters express significant effects (α < .05). Data Source: Post Election Survey 1995, CEVIPOF.*

FN / Le Pen versus:	*Full Model* PC/Hue	PS/Jospin	RPR/UdF Chirac/Balladur	MPF/ Villiers	Non-voters
Social Background	.23	1.23	1.58	–.87	1.09
Occupation					
Manual workers	**.72**	**.54**	.16	.06	**.33**
Self employed	**–1.75**	**–1.10**	.21	**.45**	**–.67**
Lower white collar	**.33**	.02	**–.25**	**–.45**	**–.28**
Higher white collar	.11	.02	–.11	**–.60**	.09
Service class, executives, professionals	**.51**	**.53**	**.64**	**1.37**	**.82**
Police and military employees	**–2.14**	**–1.40**	–.59	–.39	–.68
Unemployed	**–.44**	**–.80**	**–.75**	**–.52**	**–.26**
Not working	.01	.15	.11	.12	.04
Education					
lower	.07	.06	**–.16**	.04	**.12**
lower secondary	**.11**	**.11**	.03	**–.19**	.03
higher secondary	.13	.02	**.20**	–.10	–.10
higher	**–.31**	**–.24**	.05	**.27**	**–.14**
Household income					
<10.000 Ffr	.03	**–.13**	**–.21**	**–.50**	**.12**
10.000–17.500 Ffr	.02	–.02	**–.12**	.08	**–.19**
>17.500 Ffr	.10	**.36**	**.48**	**.31**	**.20**
no answer	**–.67**	**–.70**	–.12	**.51**	–.04
Deprivation in present situation	.05	.02	**–.24**	–.10	**–.17**
Expected deprivation in future situation	**.38**	**.38**	**–.41**	**–.19**	.02
Denomination					
Catholic/Protestant	**–1.15**	**–.79**	**.60**	**1.32**	**–.44**
Marginal Christian	–.05	.02	**.05**	.02	**–.09**
Not religious	**.70**	**.33**	**–.43**	**–.70**	**.46**

Appendix 2. *continued.*

FN / Le Pen versus:	*Full Model* PC/Hue	PS/Jospin	RPR/UdF Chirac/Balladur	MPF/ Villiers	Non-voters
Age					
18–26	**–.37**	**–.55**	**–.70**	**–.73**	–.15
27–34	**–.35**	**–.71**	**–.34**	.13	–.15
35–44	.13	.01	.06	**.61**	–.03
45–54	**.27**	.08	.05	**.53**	.05
55–64	.08	**.25**	**.29**	.05	–.11
65+	**.26**	**.87**	**.63**	**–.49**	**.35**
Intergenerational mobility					
Stable	.09	.10	**–.15**	.11	–.12
Upward/Downward	**–.12**	**–.16**	**–.12**	–.08	–.07
missing	**.28**	**.39**	**.47**	.15	**.30**
Gender					
Men	**–.28**	**–.35**	**–.45**	**–.23**	**–.32**
Women	**.25**	**.32**	**.41**	**.21**	**.29**
Political attitudes					
Out–group attitude	**–1.13**	**–.92**	**–.62**	**–.47**	**–.80**
Authoritarian attitude	**–.82**	**–.99**	**–.51**	**–.45**	**–.68**
Identification with France	**.13**	**–.46**	**–.18**	**.21**	**–.20**
Nonconformism	**–.46**	**–.33**	**–.23**	**–.15**	**–.23**
Market Liberalism	**–.49**	**–.40**	.05	.03	**–.29**
Political dissatisfaction	**–.21**	**–.14**	**–.22**	–.10	.03
Contextual characteristics					
Unemployment	**–.12**	–.04	–.01	–.12	**–.09**
Change unemployment	.07	.06	–.05	**–.14**	.03
Ethnic minorities	**–.51**	**–.58**	**–.48**	**–.72**	**–.22**