

SEVENTEEN PROBLEMS OF MAN AND SOCIETY

By the same author :

THE CHALLENGE OF ASIA

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EDUCATION AND LIVING

*

INFLATION IN COMING

*

PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

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FLIGHT FROM THE CITY

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THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION

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*

THE EDUCATION OF THE WHOLE MAN

*

THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION

SEVENTEEN PROBLEMS OF MAN AND SOCIETY

by

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Melbourne Florida*

U.S.A.

FIRST EDITION



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Preface

This book is the outgrowth of a study begun over thirty years ago, in 1935, at the School of Living in Suffern, N. Y. It was then that I became disillusioned about economics and the other social sciences as means for dealing with the tragic problem which America faced in the great depression which began in 1929.

Some of these studies have been published in part, particularly in *Education and Living*, published in America in 1948, and *The Education of the Whole Man*, published in India in 1963. But that I would be ever able to publish even such a summary as is contained in this book was something which I gave up hoping until my visit to India in 1958. Originally I hoped to be able to publish separate books dealing with each problem. But that was when I believed that there were only eleven which had to be studied. I hoped that further study might actually reduce the number of problems. When I discovered that there were at least seventeen, my hopes entirely expired.

Thanks to the encouragement I received in India, particularly during my long stay at the University in Vallabh Vidyanagar in Gujarat, I started on a summary which the University planned to publish as a text book. But the breakdown of my health in 1960 stopped that work and I did not start again until after my recovery here in the United States.

I must express my appreciation for the fact that three Chancellors of the University kept up their interest in what I set out to do when Vice-Chancellor Bhailalbhai D. Patel invited me to stay at the University and start work on this book. I want to take advantage of the opportunity to make a permanent record of my appreciation for the interest taken in my work by Vice-Chancellors Bhailalbhai D. Patel, Babubhai J. Patel, his successor, and Ishwarbhai J. Patel, the present Chancellor. Though all have the same surnames, this no more means that they are related to one another than three men with the surname Smith in America must be. Vice-Chancellor I. J. Patel I wish to particularly mention because it is he who has made possible the publication of the Indian edition of this book.

Two other friends must be mentioned, Gordon Lameyer, of the University of New Hampshire, for reading the manuscript so carefully, and Porter Sargent, the publisher of the American edition of this book. It is unusual for an author to express appreciation to a publisher. But Porter Sargent has not only taken a personal interest in the ideas for which I stand, he has also helped in the promotion of one of the movements which is an outgrowth of my studies.

Since the book is being published jointly in India and America, the two greatest Republics of the modern world, I have some hope that it will receive the hearing to which I have the temerity to hope that it is entitled.

think

Ralph Borsodi
Exeter, N.H., U.S.A.
August 6, 1967

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COMINITIARE

The Most Important Problem in the World

Dr. Pell was wont to say that in the Solution of Questions, the Maine Matter was the *well-stating of them*; which requires mother-witt & Logick....; for let the question be but well stated....it will work almost of itself: as for example, the most Difficult Probleme, being thus stated; the working of it becomes very easie.—John Aubrey, *Brief Lives*.

The most important problem in the world is not the economic problem, as Marxists believe; it is not the sexual problem, as Freudians believe; it is not the religious problem as Christians and Mohameddians and Brahmans and Buddhists and the believers in any of the other supernal religions of the world believe.

The most important problem in the world today is the problem of the philosophy by which men live and the philosophy by which society is animated. This, however, is just another way of saying that the most important problem in the world is the educational problem. For this in practice is the problem with which education deals; it deals with the whole process by which not only the rising generation but also older generations are imbued with the philosophy all are supposed to practise and which the whole social life of the community is supposed to reflect. Fortunately there is a technical term *ethos* which designates precisely what I have in mind when I speak of a "philosophy for society": the *essential* character, sentiment, and disposition of a people, of a community or country, a society or culture; the *spirit* which animates its manners and customs, its practices and institutions, and which is reflected in its ideals, and especially in its values—in its ethical and esthetic, its economic and teleologic attitudes and practices.

We do not, unfortunately, have a technical term for what I have in mind when I speak of a "philosophy of education" nor for what is usually called a "philosophy of living," in contradic-

tion to the academic philosophy included in our present curriculums for the humanities. What I mean by a "problem-centered philosophy of education" and a "philosophy for man and for society" should become clear, if I am lucky, in the course of this summation of the twelve thousand pages of manuscript and notes which I have accumulated upon this subject.

* * * *

The educational and philosophical problem has peculiar cogency at this time. Not merely because what all men are and what they do, both individually and socially, is determined by their educations and their philosophies but because at this time in the world's history mankind is not just drifting but is being driven into an age of material barbarism, a new kind of dark age in which the darkness and the barbarism will not be religious but philosophical and ideological. As the shining promise of the free world fades away, what Horace said during the decline and fall of Rome has peculiar cogency for us:

Our fathers, viler than our grandfathers,
begot us who are still viler,
and we shall bring forth progeny even viler still!

* * * *

I am a dreamer, but I am also a very practical man. In practical terms I think of the crisis which mankind faces today as a problem neither in polity nor in economy. In practical terms it is to me a problem in education. Though the educational problem is the last one I shall discuss in this book, if man is to live like a man and not like a mere two-legged animal, and if he is ever to organize a society which is both rational and humane, the educational problem must be recognized as his first, his continuous, and his last problem in life.

Education, however, should not be confused with schooling. For every man is an educated man; no man can avoid acquiring an education of some kind.

Who, however, can avoid mis-education?

Who can be certain that he has been rightly educated?

The educational problem is therefore two-fold: the determination of what is right-education, and the re-education rightly of

at least the determining number* of men and women in society.

But unless they be rightly educated both emotionally and intellectually, unless both their conscious and their unconscious minds have been rightly educated, mankind will never deal rightly, except accidentally, with the problems which confront it.

The failure of mankind to deal with both personal and social problems as they should be dealt with has its source in one great mistake: acceptance of solutions to the basic problems of man and of society before all the basic problems have been adequately defined and therefore before it is possible to recognize the proper solutions of any of them.

Solutions that are right—sufficiently right—for each and every one of the basic problems of mankind already exist. But until mankind's education is problem-centered instead of solution and subject-centered, the truth about them will not be recognized and no consensus among thoughtful and concerned men and women about what to do about them will emerge.

* I owe the concept of "the determining number of people in society" to Hillaire Belloc. Belloc spoke of those who determined social action and who shaped society at any given time as "the determining minority." They are undoubtedly a minority. But I prefer to speak of them as the determining number. Who knows? Enough individuals may some day join the minority to transform it into a majority!

The Reader's Guide to these Books about a Problem-Centered Philosophy of Education for Man and for Society

....I write, and few there are Could read
the writing if they deigned to try; Yet here
and there, some weary wanderer Will under-
stand the speech, and feel a stir Of fellow-
ship, and understand Why no secret can be
told To any who divined it not before;
Why None uninitiate by many a presage
Will comprehend the language of the mes-
sage, Although proclaimed aloud for ever-
more.—Paraphrased from the "Proem" to
The City of Dreadful Night, by James
Thompson.

This is not a book. This is seventeen books. If the introductory material is included (some of which has already been published in India as "The Humanization of Humanity" and ran to 197 pages) eighteen books. This book must be read as a condensation of this published book, of around 12,000 pages of manuscript, notes and charts, and about 8,000 reports on "cases" of human action. Each page is the condensation of several chapters, each paragraph of several pages, each sentence of several paragraphs of the original material. It cannot therefore be read as can a book dealing with a single subject.

To see a landscape as one walks along a road is to be able to see each tree, each field, each house, each town, detail by detail. To see the same landscape as one flies over it in a plane is to see no details at all but to see it instead in all of its relationships. So with this book. It is the relationship of each basic problem to all the others which is what I hope to be able to make the reader see, however little he may agree with me about my conclusions about each problem. No one man can possibly write about all these problems and know enough about each one to avoid making mistakes which specialists, and even the average readers of a book like this, will spot; no one can avoid drawing conclusions about them which will be challenged as not merely controversial but as

unproven. But to prove these conclusions would require writing several hundred pages about each problem, and doing that would reduce the whole project of condensation to an absurdity.

The following suggestions are made to help the reader understand a book which at best will not be easy reading, even for specialists, and never armchair reading for anybody.

* * * *

Let me illustrate. Of the eleven chapters in the published introductory volume (there are nearly two hundred pages of additional unpublished material), nine deal with the methodology used in formulating these problems. Since I cannot devote two hundred nor even twenty pages to this material, let me reduce these nine chapters to a single paragraph:

"The methodology used in making this study slowly evolved over the years and finally boiled down to a combination of four methods, (1) the case method, (2) the classificatory method, (3) analysis of the concepts and generalizations which emerged from the classifications, and (4) the synthesis of what the analysis revealed in terms of its applicability to each problem." Unfortunately I have found it necessary to make three and not just one synthesis of each problem because of the nature of the mechanism for knowing with which man finds himself burdened, one based upon Supernal evidence, one upon Objective, and one upon Intellectual. I wish I were a Monist; it would all be so much simpler then! The Pluralist unfortunately has to accept complexity as inescapable.

To describe what these methods are, how I came to select them, and why I was driven to use them; to describe what the three kinds of evidence which must be taken into account are; to describe what a Monist and what a Pluralist is, and why I am the second and not the first, would make it necessary to write several chapters instead of a single paragraph. Somehow or other the reader will have to be indulgent enough to read the whole of this book and not be irritated too much by the dogmatism which condensation makes unavoidable.

* * * *

There are three ways in which I suggest this book be read. First I suggest that the first page or two—the premises—of each

problem be read, without reading any more of any of them; this will make clear how the magic "seventeen" came to be and also it will provide a sort of bird's-eye view of them all.

Secondly I suggest the reading of one problem in each of the three parts of the book. I believe it best to read one of the praxiologic problems first—I suggest the possessional problem (only 36 pages); then one of the problems in values—I suggest the problem of economic values (only 13 pages); finally I suggest beginning all over again with the very first problem—the anthropic problem which is one of the longest, and then reading them as I have them arranged in what I think is their logical order.

I propose this unusual way of reading to avoid two dangers. First, the danger that the reader will disagree so sharply with something I say about the very first problem that he will fail to discover that it is the study of all the problems and not the conclusions I have drawn about any of them which is the real purpose for which the book is written. Secondly, the danger that if he starts reading the noetic problems one after another he will feel that this is just another futile excursion into philosophical systematization, and fail to see that the noetic problems furnish postulates for dealing with the actual problems with which life confronts everybody.

* * * *

The space devoted to each problem in this outline varies greatly; the longest outline is that of the distribution problem, over fifty pages; the shortest, that of the Economic problem, only thirteen pages. Pay no attention to these differences. All the problems are equally important. They are like a three-legged stool. Which is the most important leg of a three-legged stool? The length devoted to each problem is merely a reflection of the difficulty I have found in trying to state it.

* * * *

Two things must be said about the methodology upon which the whole of this study is based: about the cases and about the classification and categorization of them. The roughly 8,000 cases of human actions were recorded by me and by a few helpers on four-by-six cards (a grossly insufficient number—there should have been not 8,000 but eight million, and they should have been recorded not only in the United States but all over the world). The

categorization of these cases was based upon the use of steps of classification (in some instances fifteen steps) until the lowest common denominator—the basic categories—emerged. Sometimes this final classification consisted of only two categories (in the classification of actions from their esthetic aspect, [1] beauty and [2] ugliness), and sometimes many more (for instance, in the classification of actions from the standpoint of ethics, five—[1] morally mandatory actions, [2] morally commendable actions, [3] amoral actions, [4] morally censurable actions, and [5] morally prohibited actions). No pre-determined scheme governed the number, the number varying for the same reason that the number of steps in classification varied, because the facts seemed to call for them.

* * * *

It is true that my files contain not only thousands of pages of carefully edited manuscript but also endless numbers of notes scribbled on all sorts of scraps in all sorts of places. They have been, however, filed not in the paper bags which Professor Teufelsdröck of the University of Weisnichtwo bequeathed to Carlyle (and out of which Carlyle concocted the biography of the Professor he called *Sartor Resartus*), but in quite modern filing cabinets ever since I stumbled upon the significance of a problem-centered approach to the problems of man and of society at the School of Living in 1940. That they still exist in any shape at all is a sort of miracle—the files were shipped from Suffern, N.Y., to Melbourne, Florida; from Florida to Vallabh Vidyanagar, and then to Ahmedabad in India, and from India back to Exeter, New Hampshire, where they are all around me as I write. The cartons in which they were shipped to India by air freight are gone, but I still have the four “tin” trunks in which they came back to the United States by steamer. If I live long enough, I may finish the task I undertook in India, and write them out in as definitive a form as I can.

* * * *

I cannot stress too strongly the inter-relationship of the problems. In reading, for instance, the problem created for mankind by its economic values, particularly in such a drastic condensation as this, its relationship not only to the possessional problem but to

such problems as those of production and distribution, occupation and education, is not made clear enough. Yet without taking these other problems into account, the part which it plays in the creation not only of economic but of all other values is apt to be ignored.

* * * *

Some relief from resentment about the too dogmatic tone of any of my statements can sometimes be obtained by turning to the commentary and the bibliography dealing with each problem. To inject the commentaries into the text would have required making digressions I sought to avoid. Most of them consist of clarifications of the terms I use—some of which are too technical, some obsolete, and some of which I have felt obliged to coin myself.

For years I have kept over the desks at which I worked two cards on which were two antithetical statements;

“Don’t forget Ockham’s razor: Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity.”

And right next to it this one:

“Don’t forget Borsodi’s addendum: Entities must be named whenever there is no term that designates that entity only.”

The English language, rich as it is, is nevertheless woefully lacking in words with which to describe all sorts of ideas. Phrases and sentences must be used to designate what might be better designated with a single word. Roget discovered this when he was compiling his “Thesaurus” in 1852; he discussed it in the introduction to the first edition of that famous work. But when it comes to designating concepts which philosophers and theologians, humanists and social scientists have to use, these deficiencies become most apparent. The natural scientists have developed vocabularies of their own—wasp is a very inadequate word with which to designate the hundreds of species of wasps which Kinsey described in the two books he wrote describing them. Until the social scientists face this problem and develop a taxonomy which is adequate to the needs of their disciplines, they will remain, I was going to say, *pseudosciences*, but I will avoid the use of that invidious term and content myself with *still-born sciences*.

Finally, a word of caution to my readers about my bias. No man, no matter how hard he tries, can avoid permitting some trace of his bias to intrude even into his most serious efforts to be unbiased. I am a convinced humanist, an agnostic (on many questions), a philosophical anarchist, a pluralist, a positivist (not a relativist); a radical (in the sense of going to the root of things), a rationalist (I believe in the ultimate criterion of reason); a decentralist, an agrarian, a distributist, a single-taxer, a money-reformer, a cooperator, a homesteader, a conservative (about many things), a reformer (about many other things), and finally an enthusiast.

But there are several things I am not: I am not an apologist for things as they are—not even as they are here in prosperous America. And I am not a proponent of salvation by revolution. I am not a reactionary (I am much too tender-minded for the thunder on the right), and I am not a liberal (I am much too tough-minded for the thunder on the left). I am much too hard-headed to believe in a golden age, either in the past or in the future. I don't believe there is any virtue in anything either because it is old or because it is new. Virtue, it seems to me, has to do with truth, with goodness, with beauty, and not with what is old or new. I'm neither a pejorist nor an optimist; I'm a meliorist. Things can be made better, but they can be, and to me seem to be being made, worse. Whether they will be made better by affluence as everybody seems to believe, or whether they will be made worse (as only Thoreau and I seem to believe), only God knows, and He hasn't confided His views about the matter to me. Come to think of it, He doesn't seem to have confided them to anybody recently. The race of prophets seems to have become extinct.

* * * *

Having put my readers on notice, I hope that they will nevertheless get some glimpse of what a problem-centered philosophy of education might contribute to make life better worth living (Gautama and Schopenhauer to the contrary notwithstanding). If I succeed in any measure in doing this, I will be more than satisfied.

Writing this has been fun—the same kind of fun of which Thompson wrote in *The City of Dreadful Night*:

Why disinter dead faith from mouldering hidden?

Why....wail life's discords into careless ears?

Because a cold rage seizes one at whiles

To show the bitter old and wrinkled truth

Stripped naked of all vesture that beguiles....

Because it gives some sense of power and passion

In helpless impotence to try to fashion

Our woe in living words howe'er uncouth!

PART I

Four Basic Intellectual Problems: An Introduction to Noetics

Men of superior minds busy themselves first in getting at the root of things, and when they have succeeded in this, the right course is open to them.—*Confucius*.

The Four Basic Noetic Problems of Man and of Society

To know what you know and know what
you do not know is characteristic of one
who knows.—Confucius.

Man deals with all his problems—and cannot avoid dealing with them—on the basis of assumptions which he believes to be true. It is upon the basis of these assumptions that he postulates, unconsciously for the most part, all his thinking, feeling and action. When all the problems which lead to the formulation of these basic postulates are reduced to their lowest common denominators, four problems seem to emerge which can be considered basic:

The riddle of human nature, the problem of the nature of man's own nature, the problem I think of as the anthropic problem—Problem I;

The riddle of the universe, the problem of the nature of the world in which man finds himself, the problem I think of as the ontic problem—Problem II;

The riddle of historiography; the causes of the events which constitute the history of the world and of the individual experiences constituting every biography; this I think of as the etiologic problem—Problem III; and

The riddle of communication; the problem of distinguishing between truth and error and of verifying and validating and communicating what is true; this I think of as the epistemic problem—Problem IV.

The fact that most of mankind takes the answers provided by custom and tradition to all four for granted does not make their study less important. For what man believes about them is not purely a matter of belief; what he assumes to be the truth about them is reflected in everything he wants, everything he does, and every institution he creates. The formulation of these

four basic noetic problems (and the evaluation of solutions of them) cannot, therefore, be too rigorous.

* * * *

Because his solutions of these problems underlie the manner in which he deals with all his problems, consideration of these noetic problems logically comes first in any study of the basic problems of man and of society.

The bitter conflicts in the past and the bitter conflicts still taking place as a result of dogmatic religious and ideologic insistence that particular solutions of these noetic problems must be accepted make it clear that all solutions should be subject to the reservation that they are true "to the best of existing knowledge and belief." It is easier, as a matter of fact, to arrive at conclusions about what is not true about them than what is true. Some of mankind's most widely accepted solutions have subsequently been proved patently mistaken. When these mistakes are recognized, ground is cleared for the recognition of what is nearer to the truth about them.

All beliefs, all values, all actions, and all institutions then tend to become more rational and more humane.

PROBLEM I.

The Riddle of Human Nature : Psyche or Soma?

A balanced science of man....must be expected to establish a view of the human person as lucid and reliable as the discoveries of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, and as acceptable as the religious gospel of love. The consensus will thus express the first scientific synthesis having the force of religion, and the first personal and social religion carrying the authority of science. Nothing less powerful can restore the intellectual, moral and spiritual order.—L. L. Whyte, *Everyman Looks Forward*.

After a lifetime of devotion to the building of a Socialist world, Max Eastman finally gave up all faith in Socialism and wrote a book about his complete change of heart which he called *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism*.¹ In this book he makes the following significant statement:

A false and undeliberated conception of what man is lies at the bottom, I think, of the whole bubble-castle of Socialist theory. Although few seem to realize it, Marxism rests on the romantic notion of Rousseau that nature endows men with the qualities necessary to a free, equal, fraternal, and a family-like living together, and our sole problem is to fix up the external conditions. All Marx did about this with his dialectic philosophy was to change the tenses in the romance: Nature will endow men with all these qualities as soon as the conditions are fixed up. Because of his stress upon economic conditions, Marx is commonly credited with the cynical opinion that economic self-interest is dominant in human nature. He believed that human nature is a function of the economic conditions, commonly variable and capable of operating, once these conditions are "ripe," on the divinely rational and benign principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." It was to protect this optimistic dogma about human nature that the Stalin government felt obliged to stamp out the true science of genetics. According to that science, traits acquired during the lifetime of an organism are not appreciably transmitted in heredity. Only by selective breeding, whether artificial or natural, can profound changes be made in the nature of any species. While men's acquired characters may, and undoubtedly do, change with changing economic (and other) conditions,

the underlying traits of human nature remain the same. There is little doubt that Marxian bigots in the Kremlin were moved by this consideration in liquidating the world-famous geneticist, Avilov, and supporting the Charlatan, Lysenko, in popularizing a belief in the wholesale heredity of acquired characteristics. Without such belief, the whole Marxian myth that economic evolution will bring us to millennium falls to the ground.

Could anything make the importance of what is thought about the nature of human nature—about what in this study is being called the anthropoic problem²—clearer?

Three indisputable facts make it necessary for every man to believe in some sort of solution of this problem:

1. The first is that sanity and survival for the individual human being are impossible unless he acts upon some theory of the nature of human nature. Whether the theory is right or wrong is less important than that he have a theory of some kind; for with none at all, he has no basis for dealing in any way other than animalistically either with his fellow men or with society as a whole.

2. The second is that in trying to formulate such a theory, mankind has always assumed that there is something basically the same about all human beings. It has been assumed, for instance, that all human beings are basically immortal souls or that they are all nothing but mortal bodies; that all human beings are in some ultimate sense equal or that Equalitarianism is nonsense; that all human beings are basically good or that they are all basically bad; that all human beings should be held accountable for what they do (because they are free to choose what they do), or that no human being should be held responsible for what he does because he is a mere biological machine.

3. Finally there is the fact that man alone among living creatures does not find life worth living if he merely takes himself for granted. As a result he is driven to find some explanation for the existence of mankind and, in fact, for the existence of the whole world. He finds it almost impossible to be content to believe himself a mere animal; he wants to believe that his life is invested with a significance no other animal possesses.

Subjective versus Objective Nature of Man—The real riddle of human nature³ which is posed by these facts is not of man

considered as a body and brain, but man considered as a mind or soul. As a body and brain he is an object just as everything in the universe, from the tiniest atom to the mightiest galaxy, is an object. The real anthropic problem is not man as an object; we already know so much about his anatomy that it is a misnomer to call him a riddle. The real riddle is created by the subjective⁴ and behavioral and not the objective⁴ and biological nature of man.

The anthropic problem is twofold; it tends to drive every man to live his life upon the basis of some sort of answers to two questions: the question of why the human beings with whom he has to deal behave so differently from one another, and the question of what is basically common (if there is anything at all) in the nature of all mankind.

The answers to these questions which every individual accepts as true obviously affect the way he deals with every one of his experiences. To whatever extent his solutions are mistaken, he tends to injure not only himself but also others. When large numbers of human beings have acted upon wholly mistaken assumptions about the nature of man, they have too often bathed mankind in holocausts of death and destruction. (The Christian Crusades, the Islamic Jihads or holy wars, the Holy Inquisition, the Crusades against witchcraft, Hitler's Pan-Teutonic Second World War, the war between Indian Muslims and Hindus over the Partition, Stalin's wars upon his own Kulaks and upon the Free World, are examples.) Only after a determining number of human beings learn how to distinguish between what is true and what is false about human nature is there the slightest hope that horrors of this kind will cease and that "man's inhumanity to man" will begin to lessen.

Irritability and Plasticity in Man—That man's sanity and survival depend upon his acting upon an adequate theory of human nature becomes clear if the following ten facts are taken into consideration:

1. The first is one of six facts in connection with his biology, the fact that in the course of his evolution there emerged, in addition to the biological irritability which he shares in common with

all animals, a capacity for what I think of as psychologic irritability⁵. It is important to understand the mechanism involved.

All animals, including man, react to the world of objects and the world of events with which they find themselves confronted. But in man biological irritability is retained only to a limited extent. Babies still display it as less complex animals do, but very shortly after their rearing has begun, it begins to be supplemented and to a degree replaced by what I call psychological irritability, an acquired characteristic capable of limitless development. Man can be irritated and can react not only as do animals, solely in response to the stimulus of his sensations, but also in response to something which takes place only in his mind. He reacts not only to sensations (touching a hot stove), but also to perceptions (the grandeur of a landscape), to inceptions (memories, ideals), to slogans ("Liberty, equality, fraternity!") and sometimes reacts to them more explosively than to the stimulus of even the most violent physical sensations.

2. The second fact is that in the course of his evolution he has been almost wholly deprived of the instinctual mechanism which automatically directs all other animals in what they do to survive.

Because of this he reacts to his experiences (responds to stimuli just as do all animals), but unlike all other animals cannot rely upon his instincts to determine for him how to react. If he reacts wrongly, he becomes sick, sometimes mentally and sometimes physically; if his reaction is a vitally mistaken one, he does not survive at all.

I consider this fact so important that I hope I may be able to call attention to it in the discussion of most of my seventeen basic problems without boring my readers to distraction. Here some justification for the importance I attach to the plasticity of the instincts⁶ in man is called for.

In the course of evolution, a mutation in the genus *Homo* (of the family *Hominidea*, the sub-order *Anthropoidea*, and the order of *primates*) produced a new species, *Homo sapiens*, in which an all-important new characteristic from the standpoint of our problem emerged. The instincts of *Homo sapiens*, instead of being virtually crystallized as in all other living organisms

(being capable of changing only over eons of time as one species evolved into another), became plastic. It became possible for man to transform their dictates, in a sense transcend them. As a result it became possible for man during his individual maturation to develop a *mind*, a *consciousness* of the objects and the events confronting him, a *conscience*, a *self*, and in addition to experiencing animal sensations, to develop *perceptions*, *inceptions*,⁷ *conceptions* and *abstractions* of the highest order. In short, because of the plasticity of his instincts, man is not a mere brain responding to the stimuli of sensations, but a mind capable of responding to subjective inceptions (during introspection) and of deliberately creating order in his own life and, to an extent, imposing it upon what is outside of him. He is a mind capable of creating social orders (free social orders such as the English, Swiss and Danish orders, and totalitarian orders such as the Catholic, Fascist, and Communist social orders). And finally he is a mind capable of creating artistic and scientific "orders"—creations like the Eiffel Tower and the Taj Mahal, like the *Descent of Man* by Darwin and *The Great Learning* of Confucius, like the English language and the science of biology.

3. The third fact in connection with his evolution grows out of the magnitude of the learning capacity with which the plasticity of his instincts and his development of psychologic irritability endows him. Because of this he develops, unlike all other animals, not one integral nature but two natures, one hereditary, and one acquired. The difficulty of distinguishing between the truth about one from the truth about the other is the principal reason for man's confusion about the nature of human nature.

4. The fourth fact in connection with his evolution is the emergence in him of two kinds of biological energy not present in actuality (*in esse*) in any other animal, even if faint traces (*in posse*) of the possibility of them may be found in the higher apes. All animals, both asexual and bi-sexual, inherit one kind of biological energy which I think of as *metabolical*. All sexual animals, including of course man, inherit a complex of three—*metabolical*, *survival*, and *sexual*—but only *Homo sapiens* inherits a complex of five.

Hereditary versus Acquired Traits—That man inherits physical traits (such as skin color, hair type, cranial form) is, of

course, obvious. That he inherits psychological traits is not so obvious, it is denied by Equalitarians. But that he inherits mental traits, and that they vary from individual to individual, from geneology to geneology (by families), and from race to race (and from sub-race to sub-race by nationalities), is incontestable. All that is necessary for these variations to develop is for in-breeding to continue long enough.

What the facts indicate is that man inherits and not only acquires his psychological nature; what they indicate is that he inherits not only a set of physical traits but also a set of mental traits, and that it is both his inherited and his acquired mental traits which as a whole constitute his nature or temperament.

Man's Hereditary Nature—the nature with which every human being without regard to race or sex is endowed—consists most conspicuously of the complex of energies with which he is endowed at birth. This hereditary endowment includes not only physical but also psychologic energy. The simplest manifestation of his inherited energy, metabolic energy⁸, manifests itself not only at birth when he takes his first breath but before that in the very first act after his conception (and even in the sperm and ovum before conception). Survival energy manifests itself, perhaps along with metabolic; sexual energy manifests itself later, though if Freud is right, much earlier than we used to think; cultural energy manifests itself still later; necrotic energy last of all. The whole complex manifests itself in at least five readily identifiable forms:

(a) *Physical energy* needs no elaborate definition. Man has muscles, internal and (in a sense) external, the first driving his internal organs, and the second driving organs of his such as his hands and fingers. That he is driven to use his muscular energy is self-evident; he must use it or he dies.

Since I think of the other four forms of energy with which man is endowed as psychologic energy⁸, some justification for the use of the term is needed. As I use the term, it refers to the energy man displays in responding to subjective stimuli—to the stimuli which originate in his own mind.

(b) *Survival energy* manifests itself in the myriads of activities in which every man engages for the sake of self-survival.

Not only man, every kind of plant and animal, from the simplest unicellular organism to the most complex multi-cellular organism, is endowed with this kind of energy, but animals display it only in responding to biologic irritations, to the stimuli of sensations. Man alone, because of the plasticity of his instincts, can sublimate this simplest and most primitive form of biologic and psychologic energy; he can divert it into sexual and cultural activities; he can sacrifice its utilization altogether—he can commit suicide.

(c) The second kind of psychologic energy—the energy he displays in all his sexual activities—I think of as *genetic energy*. Only organisms which reproduce sexually are endowed with it; asexual organisms are neither born with it nor do they display a trace of it. Asexual organisms have only survival energy; they multiply by fission for no discernible reason other than that they may themselves be able to survive.

In man, as in all sexual organisms, the primary function which this energy fulfills is reproduction; it makes possible not self but race survival. Because of the plasticity of his instincts, man can sublimate his sexual energy as he can sublimate his survival energy. He can devote it to cultural activities—to the cultivation of the good, the true, and the beautiful—but he can also divert it to sexual activities practised for their own sake and not for reproduction. He can repress and even suppress all ordinary and properly human manifestations of it—he can in a sense repudiate instead of sublimate it; he can, in other words, use it either decadently or creatively. When he uses it creatively, he permits himself to function in accordance with all his potentialities; when he uses it perversely and purely for the animal gratification it provides, he demeans himself. Sometimes he sacrifices self-realization altogether in one of the highest forms in which he can use sexual energy, fatherhood and motherhood.

(d) The third kind of psychologic energy is *cultural energy*. Only man is endowed with cultural energy. No other animal possesses anything remotely like it. It displays itself in man's efforts at self-realization and self-expression, in all his artistic, scientific, religious, and philosophic activities. Its utilization provides him satisfaction in contrast to gratification; he does not therefore hesitate to sacrifice immediate pleasures and animal

gratifications, and sometimes life itself in the attempt to realize some humane or cultural goal for others, for his family, for his nation, for humanity as a whole.

(e) The fourth kind of psychologic energy is negative rather than positive; it is what I think of as *necrotic energy*. It is the retrudation in contrast to the sublimation of the other forms of energy with which man is endowed. This retrudation of energy plunges him into what has come to be called alienation⁹. It displays itself in acts of self-damage or self-annihilation. It manifests itself only when frustration of any of man's normal and positive energies is so extreme as to drive him to escape from the rigors of living. And escape can take an infinite variety of forms. It may be displayed fitfully in the temporary escapes provided by drunkenness or drug addiction; it may be displayed relatively permanently in some sort of neurosis or psychosis, or in its ultimate form of suicide, homicide, and war.

5. The strength of man's instinctual drives—the quantity of each of the kinds of energy and potentiality for the display and utilization of each of them—varies from man to man. All men have some of each of them. The differences in the hereditary natures of men is a difference only in the relative strength and weakness of each of them and of all of them together.

6. The last fact in connection with man's evolution is the emergence in him of what has developed in no other animal, the capacity for developing a mind and of being able to develop it to an almost unlimited, almost God-like extent.

Man's Acquired Nature—Every man is born with a central nervous system and the complex of energies which emanate from it, but each man acquires and develops a mind of his own *after* he is born. Every man is born with a brain; no man is born with a mind.

Man's acquired nature—the nature he gradually acquires as a result of his education and experiences—displays itself in two kinds of activities: the mental activities of his mind and the motor activities inspired by it.

Obviously when we seek an answer to the question of the nature of man's acquired nature, his mental activities are the essence, his motor activities only the form, of our problem.

The Mind-Complex in Man—His mental activities, however, are the product not of a single mind but of a complex of minds. We recognize this truth when we recognize that man has an unconscious as well as a conscious mind. But this is an oversimplification of the facts. He has at least five (and perhaps six) quite distinguishable minds, and displays an equal number of quite distinguishable mental activities.

He has first of all what I think of as an *instinctual mind*, or rather a complex of instinctual minds, one perhaps centered in each of his plexi and not a single one centered in his brain alone.

In a sense it is a misnomer to speak of an instinctual "mind" at all, since man's mind comes into existence (develops and emerges) only after he is born. But because of the interaction of this hereditary "mind" with his acquired mind (or minds), I feel justified in ignoring this anachronism. All men are hereditarily endowed with something (for want of any better term I am calling it a mind) which more or less automatically controls and directs their various physiological activities. Because of the plasticity of the instincts in man, this control is not as automatic in him as it is in all the lower forms of animal life; it is subject to direction by those "parts" of his whole mind complex which he acquires after he is born. His breathing, the beating of his heart, and the digestion of his food are instinctually controlled, it is true, by what I am calling his instinctual mind; but this control is influenced by what he thinks with his conscious mind and what he feels with his unconscious mind.

Secondly, he has an *unconscious mind*, the mind he uses when he is asleep, when he is in any kind of trance, when he is completely unconscious. It manifests itself not only in his dreams and in whatever he does while unconscious, but also in his emotions after he becomes conscious again.

His unconscious mind is the seat of his memories; it is a sort of storehouse. But memories should not be confused with recollections; we recollect with our conscious mind, we memorize with our unconscious mind. Man's unconscious mind comes into existence only after he is born and as he acquires a stock of memories. The memories with which he stocks his unconscious mind include not only facts of which he becomes consciously

aware but also sensations experienced and emotions he has been conditioned to value. The emotions should not be confused with the sensations; sensations are inborn, emotions are acquired. Even embryos are equipped to sense when they are injured and to sense when they are "fed." But human beings have no feelings about good or evil until they have acquired a stock of values and have been conditioned to emote to them.

All of man's deep-seated impulses to action are produced by his emotions; they spring from his unconscious mind. It is this fact which makes his emotional education so enormously important. Because of the part which the emotions play in all man's activities, because of the enormous extent to which his conscious thinking is a mere rationalization of his emotions, and because of the minuscule extent to which most human beings reason and use their intelligences objectively, man might better be called *Homo emotus* than *Homo sapiens*.

Thirdly, he has a *subconscious mind*. This is the mind which he uses in those habitual actions and activities which he performs while he is awake and conscious, but of which he is unaware unless he directs his attention to them. Because all habitual actions reflect what has been previously memorized, even though performed when awake, his *subconscious* actions are in a sense controlled by the unconscious mind. An enormous part of every man's activities is subconsciously performed; most of mankind's activities are probably performed by men who are in a very real sense half asleep.

Fourthly, he has a *conscious mind*, the mind with which he perceives and with which he reasons. Everything mankind has done to create civilization, he owes to the use of this mind. But it plays, if anything, an even more important part in his life. Because this is the mind with which he can replace impulses with decisions, because this is the only mind with which he can control his emotions, it is the most important mind in the whole complex of his minds if he is to behave like a human being and not a mere animal.

Fifthly, every man has a potentiality for acquiring a *self-conscious mind*. He can develop a mind which is acutely aware of the activities of all of his minds. He can use this mind to inte-

grate all his minds and to realize a true Self in contrast to the diffused and confused Self which is all that most of mankind ever acquires.

Finally, there is evidence—in the verity of which many great men have believed—which suggests that man has the potentiality for acquiring a *supraconscious mind*, a mind which makes possible those mental activities of which immediate cognition, as in telepathy, without the interposition of any of the senses, is typical. This is the mind with which mystics and prophets claim to have acquired revelations from the Absolute and with which they believe they can commune with it.

The hypothesis of such a mind is based upon one of two alternate assumptions. One is the possibility that man is a psyche rather than a soma; that he is an immortal soul rather than a mortal body; that his psyche can experience knowledge from the Absolute and not merely sense knowledge through his sense organs. The alternate possibility is that even if he is not a soul, he nevertheless has powers for acquiring knowledge other than those dependent upon the use of his senses and his conscious mind.

Most of those who believe that man has a supraconscious mind assume that it is a higher mind than the conscious mind and that it furnishes truer knowledge than that which can be obtained by the use of the intelligence in evaluating consciously what is learned through the senses. But the possibility must not be overlooked that if man has such powers, they may be rudimentary vestiges of powers which the lower animals still exercise; they may be mere survivals of powers which man's antediluvian ancestors exercised in their fullness before man developed, in the course of evolution, the kind of senses and the kind of conscious mind with which he is now equipped.

And of course the possibility that the concept of a supraconscious mind itself may be illusory must not be ignored.

7. We come now to three consequences with which man finds himself confronted because of the kind of mind with which he is equipped.

The first of these is the fact that man alone in the animal kingdom has a consciousness of Self. He is not only conscious of the fact that he comes into existence (is born), functions for

a time (lives), and then ceases to function (dies), but he is also conscious of the fact that he will live only for a relatively short period of time, and then inevitably die. Consequently he cannot, like other animals, take himself and what happens in his life from experience to experience for granted. And he does not: he does something about it.

8. The second of these consequences is that as man emerges from childhood into manhood, he becomes aware of the fact that since he and his fellow men choose at least to some extent the way in which they behave, they do not all behave in the same way (they must either be born with or acquire different natures). And he uses the whole of the complex of minds which he acquires in dealing with the problem which this creates for him. This is the problem of choosing how to deal with his fellowmen, choosing what he should himself do from time to time, and choosing that to which he himself should devote his life as a whole.

9. We come now to the last of the three consequences which must be taken into account because of the mind-complex which man alone in the animal kingdom has developed.

*Human Nature or Human Temperament*¹⁰—To deal with the problem he faces because he cannot take what happens to him from moment to moment for granted, every man develops on his own initiative or acquires from those who influence him three sets of traits: a set of beliefs about man and about the world, upon which he bases his values; a set of values which shape and determine what he does and how he lives; and a set of practices with which he tries to achieve and realize his values.

These traits, as they shape and modify his own inborn complex of energies, create what is sometimes called his temperament but what in this discussion I have been calling his nature.

10. Of these three sets of traits, the values are the real determinators of human nature. It is no exaggeration to say that *when you know a man's values, you know the man*. The advice of the ancient Delphic oracle, "Know Thyself," did not answer a question; it raised one. And the answer to the question it raised, "How to know yourself," can be summed up in six words: "*To know yourself, know your values.*" But to know them, it is futile to take into account the values a man merely professes; to know

them a man must dredge up his real values from the depths of his unconscious mind.

* * * *

What now does the study of existing knowledge about the anthropoic problem (knowledge which is probably sufficient for us to deliberately embark on the task of humanizing human nature) tell us? I think of three things:

First, it enables us to make a fairly adequate answer to the two-fold problem into which the riddle of human nature resolves itself.

The first part of that two-fold problem can be briefly stated: "What is the key—the central key—which can be used to tell us what is the nature of a particular man?" The answer is clear. The key to man's nature is what he values. The key which reveals our own natures to ourselves is our own values. There is therefore no one human nature; there are innumerable human natures. Our problem is simply to reduce the number of natures to a manageable number of types. Even reducing them to only two types, introverts and extroverts or tender-minded and tough-minded, insufficient as this is, is enormously useful. To go further and raise the question of the nature of values would be leaving this first of our basic problems and injecting into it the study of Problems V, VI, VII, and VIII. That study dare not, of course, be avoided, but it has to be postponed.

If mankind ever seriously undertakes the systematic and scientific study of values—as seriously as it is now supporting the study of how to land a man on the moon—we shall find ourselves equipped with an adequate arsenal of weapons for knowing both ourselves and other men.

The second part of the two-fold problem can be summed up thus: "What is common—what is basic—in the nature of all human beings?" Again the answer is clear.

Mankind is by nature neither good nor bad.

Men are not equal but different.

Men are not determined and irresponsible; they have sufficient freedom of the will to be responsible and to be held (and to hold themselves) accountable for what they do.

Man is born, so far as we know, only with drive and energy. True, all men do not have drive and energy to the same extent nor do they have the same amount of each of the various kinds of energy with which they are equipped. But knowing that all but the most hopeless imbeciles have some of each, we know that men can be reached in depth through one or another of them.

This is enormously important. It frees us from any lingering doubts about the possibility that there is any trace of truth in the vicious doctrine of original sin. It ends that kind of naive Determinism. It also frees us from the romantic doctrine that man is born good. It is how the complex of man's energies responds during his formative years (which is all that he seems to be at birth, aside from matter) to the challenges with which life presents him that determines whether the nature he acquires will be good or bad. There is a frightening element of chance in what each human being becomes, but then there is a frightening element of chance in everything that takes place in the universe. We can, however, by taking thought do something about it—at least do something with ourselves and with those over whom we exert any sort of influence or power.

Second, this study of existing knowledge enables us to make a choice from among the three basic categories into which all theories about human nature fall: (1) Psychic doctrines, doctrines mostly of a religious nature; (2) Somatic doctrines, doctrines to which Materialists and Atheists subscribe; and (3) Pluralistic doctrines, doctrines to which Humanists and Agnostics can logically subscribe. Admittedly my choice among them—which is Pluralistic—is dependent upon the answer made to another basic problem, Problem IV, the problem of the verification of mankind's beliefs. Those who choose not to rely upon reason but to rely either upon revelation (Supernaturalism) or upon sensation (Objectivism) to establish what is ultimately true, of course, will disagree with the conclusions I voice.

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*Psychic Anthropic Doctrines*¹¹—That man is essentially a soul, and an immortal soul at that, as Supernaturalists maintain, is possible but undemonstrable. A man may believe, as countless millions have and do, that he has an immortal soul; he may

base his belief upon what he takes to be an authentic revelation of the truth about the matter, but there is no way in which this belief can be satisfactorily demonstrated. Man simply isn't equipped with the kind of mind which makes demonstrable knowledge possible. He can experience that kind of truth, he cannot know it.

The number of doctrines which are Psychismic is enormous, particularly if the variations developed by the theologians of each of the great religions of mankind are included. All of them are in essence what I think of as Psychic or Spiritual Monisms—attempts to reduce staggeringly complex concepts to a single underlying principle.

Some of the doctrines in the following brief list are sufficiently suggested by the terms used to designate them, but where this is not the case I feel hopelessly handicapped in trying to describe them in this effort at condensation of the problem. Immortalism is the only one which is virtually self-explanatory :

Immortalism, that man has an immortal soul;

Infusionism, Creationism, and Traducianism are three distinct doctrines which Christian theologians have developed to explain how mortal man becomes equipped with a new, personal, immortal soul;

Transmigration (in Hindu *Samsara*) makes it possible for Brahmanists and Buddhists to avoid this problem by maintaining that there is always the soul of a dead organism ready to enter the body of every new born organism;

Spiritual Voluntarism, which maintains that God endowed man with freewill and that, if man sins, he does it of his own volition and can therefore be justly held accountable for it;

Corruptionism, the doctrine that man is by nature bad, that he is born in sin;

Prestabilism, (Leibnitz, Kant), that man is born with a pre-established harmony of mind and body; that he is by nature good;

Spiritual Equalitarianism, that every human soul is equally precious in the eyes of God—equally entitled to try for salvation but equally subject to damnation;

Predestinarianism, (Spiritual Inequalitarianism), that there are at least two or more kinds of souls, those predestined for salvation and those for damnation; with Roman Catholics there are also those which are destined for purgation; with Brahmanism four kinds of souls or predestined castes (Hindu *varnashrama*) into which each person is born.

* * * *

*Somatic Anthropic Doctrines*¹²—Somatism, which is a Materialistic interpretation of the nature of man, can be reduced to a simple Monistic proposition, that man is a material body and nothing more, and that therefore everything about him is susceptible of a Materialistic explanation. His so-called mental behavior and all the marvellous achievement of his so-called mind are in fact, according to Somatic doctrines, produced simply by vastly complex motions of the atoms composing his brain, atoms which are ultimately of a chemical or electrical nature.

Among some of the more important doctrines which fall into the category of Somatic solutions of the riddle of human nature are the following:

Mortalism, that man and everything connected with his body is mortal;

Necessitarianism, that man is not a free-agent and therefore not responsible for what he does;

Epiphenomenalism, that the so-called mind's activities are a secondary phenomenon appearing in connection with the body and caused by bodily activities;

Behaviorism, that all of man's subjective phenomena is in fact simply a mistaken interpretation of objective bodily acts;

Allonomism, that human nature is controlled by stimuli acting on human beings from the outside;

Freudianism, that, on the contrary, human nature is controlled by unconscious drives which are then consciously rationalized;

Tychism, that man's nature, like everything that happens in a universe governed by chance, is a purely fortuitous by-product of events;

Instinctualism, that the ultimate explanation of human nature is to be found in his instincts;

Emotionalism, that the ultimate explanation, on the contrary, is to be found in his emotions;

Intellectualism, that neither the instincts nor the emotions but the intellect is the fundamental factor in human nature, as the savants of the Enlightenment believed;

Voluntarism, that, on the contrary, it is the human will which is fundamental;

Equalitarianism, that all members of the human race are in some sense equal and that this is true also of aggregations of human beings of all kinds;

Inequalitarianism, that the Equalitarians are mistaken, and that as a matter of fact both individually and in aggregations mankind is unequal. Among doctrines which grow out of Inequalitarianism which are particularly important, there is:

Racism, that the races are unequal and that one race is therefore entitled to predominance;

Racial Hybridism (Human Hybridism or Human Mongrelism), that since one race is always either superior or inferior to another, the offspring of miscegenation is almost certain to be inferior to the better race and often to both;

Feminism, that the feminine sex is superior to the masculine;

Masculinism, that the masculine sex, on the contrary, is the superior sex and entitled to the perquisites of superiority;

Depravityism, that man is by nature a predatory and depraved two-legged animal; that he is not born good but on the contrary bad, and if he nevertheless is good, this is an unnatural acquired characteristic which weakens him in the struggle for survival;

Misanthropism, that every man, since he never can wholly escape from his depravity, is ineradicably hateful and justifies the hatred of man for all men, including himself.

* * * *

That man is a body, as Somatism maintains, is indisputable, in spite of the Brahmanic doctrine of *maya*. That he is a body can only be questioned by those believing, as Brahmanists do,

that the world and everything in it is a delusion. But to maintain that man is nothing but a body, as consistent Somatists do, is possible only if the most important facts about man are ignored. Behaviorists, who are Somatists, ignore them. It is not possible to account for facts like Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and Beethoven's "Eroica," the Taj Mahal and the *Bhagavadgita*, the discovery of the theory of relativity and of the second law of thermo-dynamics, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, without postulating that man is more than a body, that he is a unique organism, unique mainly because he has a creative mind.

* * *

*Pluralistic Anthropic Doctrines*¹³—Instead of trying to provide a simple Monistic solution to the riddle of human nature, there are a large number of doctrines which recognize that complexity cannot be avoided. These justify their being categorized as Pluralistic, because all of them maintain, either explicitly or implicitly, that man is neither a soul nor a body but a species of animal which has not merely a body and brain but a body, a brain and a mind, and perhaps also a soul. No Monistic theory, either Psychic or Somatic, can possibly, according to this Pluralistic approach to the problem, represent the full truth about what is involved.

Among the most important of the doctrines which fall into the Intellectual, in contrast to either the Objective or Supernal approach to the problem, are:

Psycho-Physical Parallelism, that for every mental change there is a concomitant, parallel change in the brain;

Psycho-Physical Interactionism, that mind and brain are distinguishable but always interact with one another;

Autonomism, that human behavior is controlled from within and not exclusively controlled from the outside (as maintained by Allonomism);

Innatism, that human nature is the expression of man's innate ideas rather than those he acquires by experience:

Facultyism, that while man has only a single brain, he has a plurality of faculties, (in my interpretation, also a plurality of

minds), all of which have to be taken into account in accounting for human nature;

Gestaltism, that man's nature functions as a whole, that he experiences everything as a whole, including his perceptions and inceptions, and that he responds to all his experiences as a whole;

Bonhomoism, that man is by nature good and that it is society which corrupted him (Rousseau);

Innocentism, that man is by nature neither good nor bad, but is born innocent, a *tabula rasa* (Locke);

Telicism, that the purposes of the individual are essential to the understanding of human action;

Volitism, that the will of man is free and therefore he chooses and decides on courses of action and ends to be striven for;

Philanarianism, that man is by nature a fraternizing animal and not a masquerading brute as Misanthropism assumes;

Homometrism, that both individuals and aggregations, including classes, nations, and races, when measured and compared with one another by their significant characteristics differ in degree and are in no sense equal as Equalitarianism assumes;

Sexual Complementism, that the sexes naturally complement one another and that both Masculinism and Feminism are therefore mistaken interpretations of human nature;

Racial Agnosticisism, that because of the difficulty of distinguishing hereditary traits from traits which are culturally conditioned, the truth about the real differences among races has not yet been established;

Racial Ignosticism, that the truth about the real differences between the races can never be known;

Racial Homogenism, that the highest development of the potentialities of each race calls for exoracial (exogamic) not endoracial (endogamic) reproduction;

Racial Eugenism, that the mating of men and women of the same race maintains the purity of the race and can be said to improve it if by improve is meant the intensification of characteristics peculiar to each race.

That man is neither a soul nor just a body but an organism—the most complex and highly evolved of all organisms—is to me indisputable. That he has both a mind and a body is demonstrable. That he has a soul will always remain a matter of doubt, since there is no way in which its existence can be adequately established. It is not necessary, in case one is tender-minded and shrinks from the idea of eternal extinction, to postulate an ultimate Supernal destiny for his soul; it is possible to be bored by the very prospect of eternal existence. So far as all Psychic doctrines about his soul are concerned, this disposition of them seems to me good enough.

Nor is it necessary to postulate an ultimate Somatic explanation because one is tough-minded and is revolted by the superstitions of Psychists. It is sufficient to call attention to only two things which Somatists tend to ignore in order to understand why I cannot subscribe to any purely Somatic explanation of human nature.

The first is that it is the organism man and not a machine called man which exists. The belief that he is a living machine is a contradiction in terms; machines are inanimate, they do not live.

The second is that the most important thing about man is not that he merely exists. The fact that inorganic substances are capable of evolving into organisms like man is a wonder, it is true, but that is not what is most wonderful. It is the fact that man is capable of writing a poem like Keat's *Ode on a Grecian Urn*; that he is capable of discovering Plank's quantum theory, and that he has the fortitude which Columbus displayed in trying to reach India by circumnavigating the globe; and finally that he is capable of sacrificing his life for an ideal, as did the five volunteers who died to establish the truth about the cause of yellow fever. It is no explanation for all these things to reduce him to nothing but a living machine.

What the acceptance of the Pluralistic approach does is to enable us to dispense with some of the most troublesome beliefs about human nature, beliefs which millions of human beings (both intelligent and foolish) have wanted to believe and still want to believe true.

Immortality—Man has long believed, and still wants to believe that he has an immortal soul. If believing this has helped and will still help men to live better lives than they would if they doubted or disbelieved in the existence of their soul, it might be better not to seek the truth about this question. But evidence that believers have lived better lives than non-believers is simply non-existent. On the contrary, there is no justification for ignoring the fact that those who believed they had immortal souls perpetrated some of the most horrible butcheries in all history and that they indulged in some of the most fiendish persecutions it is possible for anybody to imagine.

What this insistence on the Pluralistic nature of man seems to indicate is the wisdom of treating the belief in immortality Agnostically. On this basis, every man should deal with his fellow human beings, and with the phenomenal and actual world in which he finds himself, as if living here and now like a normal human being was his primary concern (keeping at all times in mind the possibility he might be a soul and that he might after death find himself in an eternal spiritual world of some sort). Treating one's fellow men and treating one's life this way cannot possibly prove offensive in the eyes of a benevolent God of any kind.

*Equalitarianism*¹⁴—A second important belief about human nature, the belief that all men are in some ultimate sense equal, can be dismissed equally briefly on the basis of a Pluralistic approach to human nature. Is it true that all men, without regard to birth or race, family or nationality, are in any significant sense equal? Are all the obvious differences between men environmentally produced? Or are there significant differences, because of the variations in the drives and energies with which they are born, which both individuals and society as a whole must accept?

What the Pluralistic nature of man seems to indicate is that the belief in equality has no basis in fact. Human beings are not equal. They should not be dealt with as if they were. Some are superior in one respect and inferior in another. There are even some who are superior in all significant respects and other inferior to them in the same significant respects. And this is true both of their hereditary endowments and their environmental acquire-

ments. That all men are equally entitled to justice is true, but no one should forget that the equal treatment of unequals—the equal treatment of child and of adult, of the intelligent and of the stupid, of the good and of the bad, of the rich and of the poor—involves a travesty of justice.

The stubborn and unpleasant truth must be recognized: Equalitarianism is a mystique; there are no facts whatsoever which indicate that "all men are born equal," or that both sexes are equal, or all families, or all classes, or all nations, or all races, or all cultures and civilizations. And if they are not born equal, their potentialities for development are not equal either.

There are only three possible ways in which mankind can deal with the problem of the relationship of those who are superior (or are convinced that they are superior), and those who are inferior (or are believed to be inferior), (1) inhumanely by enforcing submission and accompanying it with exploitation (tempered occasionally by a revolt); this is the way in which mankind for the most part has dealt with it; (2) by encouraging clamor for equality and by sentimentally attempting to impose it, or, (3) by inculcating a social philosophy both in the superior and the inferior which leads to a kindly and complementary relationship which both are conditioned to accept but which will be kindly in fact only if every vestige of exploitation is eliminated from it. Any attempt to impose Equalitarianism in the name of a sentimental Humanitarianism will lead to the degeneration and demoralization of the superior or to a revolt by them into some sort of Fascism (which is what Communist theoretical Equalitarianism with its emerging "New Class" is developing into). All attempts at compromising with the facts, particularly if it takes the form of intermarriage, must mean an elevation not of the inferior but a deterioration of the superior and, because of that, to the injury ultimately of everybody.

It is not right-education, therefore, to stimulate clamor for equality; right-education should aim at developing and inculcating humane relationships between those who are different from one another, including relationships between those whose differences consist of superior and inferior characteristics.

*Free Will versus Fatalism*¹⁵—A third one of these beliefs, and one of the most troublesome, is that of Determinism and Fatalism. Men naturally tend to believe that they have the capacity for making choices of their own. Yet the opposite doctrine about the nature of men has been widely believed by the Fatalistic followers of Mohammed and by the Deterministic followers of Calvin. To-day Behavioristic psychologists, most Freudians, and very influential scientific Positivists maintain that there is no basis for the belief in free will. The question is not an academic one; no resolution of the moral problem is possible without disposing of it. The law assumes that man is a responsible being capable of making choices, and that when he violates the law he chooses to do so and is to be held accountable for what he has done.

The question is, are human beings biological machines whose behavior is hereditarily and environmentally determined, living in a mechanistically determined universe, or have they some degree of true free will and therefore some capacity for making choices of their own? Is man capable of making rational decisions, or is he by nature inescapably impulsive? Is he, like all other animals, governed exclusively by inexorable sequences of causes and effects; is all his choosing and deciding an illusion; is all his thinking and reasoning merely the rationalizations of his unconscious mind?

What this study seems to indicate is that, because of the plasticity of man's instincts, man's behavior is not determined in the inflexible manner in which instincts and the situations they face determine behavior in all other animals. What it also seems to indicate is that in the course of his evolution a characteristic emerged in man not found in any other species of animal. While it does not enable him to transcend sequences of cause and effect, this characteristic does enable him to initiate such sequences on his own volition. He himself, it is true, is at all time a product of a long and complex series of sequences, but he is a unique product—a living organism which in many situations is able to use its own mind (to "make up its own mind") and to use its own will for the purpose of making choices of its own. This of course must take into account the fact that the exercise of man's own will is possible only in situations in which there are no environmental determinants which make it utterly impos-

sible for him to do so. (He cannot, for instance, own a steel mill in Communist Russia; he could not have built a steam engine before the discovery of metal.)

*Man: Good or Bad, Both, or Neither?*¹⁶—The disposition of a final set of beliefs is also made possible by a Pluralistic interpretation of human nature.

Mankind has always believed—and every culture in the history of mankind has reflected the fact—that there is a right way and a wrong way for human beings to act. Consequently, every society has enacted laws and every society has punished the “bad” men who violated them. Since mankind has had to believe that men are responsible for what they do, it has had to believe that society was morally justified in holding the “bad” accountable for their violations of the law. These beliefs are important to the moral justification not only of legal punishments for crime but also of religious punishments of sinners (and religious rewards for the pious) in their after life.

If man is in fact merely a biological machine, the question of whether he is by nature good or bad becomes irrelevant. He just exists. He, like any other animal, just acts. If this is true, legal punishment of the criminal becomes an injustice, the doctrine of original sin becomes a vicious untruth, and the doctrine that he is born good a romantic and dangerous error.

But if man is not a machine—if he is an organism belonging to the one species of animal equipped with some degree of free will—the question of whether he is made into what he is by birth, by environment, or by himself, becomes enormously important. Plainly the answer to the question of whether all men should be held accountable for what they do is dependent upon the answer to this question. Plainly the question of whether there can be such a thing as moral education, or whether it is useless, depends upon the answer made to this question.

The Pluralistic answer seems to indicate that he is an organism endowed at birth (so far as behavior is concerned) with only one thing, energy. He is at birth neither good nor bad; he is a moral neuter. Whether he acquires goodness or badness, and whether as a result he behaves morally or immorally, is determined by his emotional education, his conditioning, his self-education and auto-conditioning after he is born, and by the effect

upon the depths of his unconscious mind of his hygienic and traumatic emotional experiences as long as his character can still be influenced.

In the long course of man's evolution, three characteristics not present in other animals emerged: (1) consciousness and self-consciousness, (2) a capacity for making choices and making decisions, (3) and the kind of energy which expresses itself in activities more sublime than those which make for survival and reproduction. As a result man finds himself equipped with a very considerable potentiality for conditioning others emotionally and educating them intellectually, and by the same token, potentiality for educating and conditioning himself. It is for this reason that each man should hold himself responsible for what he does, and that all men should be held accountable for what they do. This is true both of normal men and of those unfortunates who are psychologically subnormal. Men are, it is true, educable and ineducable, but only those who are complete and hopeless imbeciles are completely ineducable.

Society of course must protect itself against misbehavior, whether that misbehavior is by normal or subnormal man. But no matter how ineducable morally and no matter how incorrigible, every man must be held accountable for what he does.

How he should be held accountable is an ethical, not an anthropic, problem.

* * * *

It is difficult for me to find misfortunes greater than the low priority which modern man and modern thought attach to the problem of the nature of human nature. Thousands of times as much thought is given to the problem of how to land a man on the moon, and hundreds of thousands of times as many dollars spent upon that silly problem today as upon this supremely important problem. Yet there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that if all the knowledge we already have that is significant for our problem were properly analyzed and synthesized, it would be possible for us to deal with the riddle of human nature rationally and humanely instead of as we are dealing with it now—with indescribable and inexcusable confusion, stupidity, and brutality.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem I: The Anthroptic Problem

Some understanding of my difficulty in writing outlines of problems I have been studying for so many years can be obtained from the fact that the material of which this one problem is a condensation consists of about three hundred pages of manuscript, notes, charts, and cases. To reduce this material to an outline, I had to eliminate virtually all the illustrative material. In the original manuscripts there is a separate file of material on the brain, on the mind, and on each of the six minds in the whole mind-complex—eight files of material reduced to eight paragraphs! I mention this to anticipate the criticism that so much of what I have written for this book will be considered too dogmatic.

1. Max Eastman, the author of *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism*, (The Devin-Adair Co., N.Y., 1955), was one of the intellectual leaders of Socialism in America. After the Russian Revolution in 1917 he moved to Russia, learned Russian, lived there for several years, helped in the building of the present Russian regime, and then in his old-age returned to America completely disillusioned with the whole idea of Socialism.

2. *Anthropoics versus Anthropology*—To designate with a single word the whole phrase "the problem of the nature of man," I have used ever since 1940 the word *anthroptic* (from the Greek word *anthropos*, meaning man). Anthropology, it is true, has already pre-empted the word but as in the case of all the social sciences it has devoted itself primarily to accumulating facts about behavior in different cultures without concerning itself too much with the nature of the problem man everywhere poses to himself. Recently there has been some improvement in this respect. In a sense anthropology can be considered a sort of introduction to anthropoics. Anthropoics itself, since it deals with the nature of man, deals with the root assumption of all the religions, all the philosophies, all the arts, and all the sciences which deal with man either individually or socially.

3. *The Riddle of Human Nature*—The question might well be asked, is there such a thing? The answer I believe is unquestionably, yes.

What makes the great poet, dramatist, and novelist is not merely the beauty of what he says but the fact that *what he says* is the reflection of an observer keener than most professional psychologists. That an observer of human nature as keen as Shakespeare should make two completely contradictory statements about man *both of which are true* (one being true of some men while the other is true of other men), I think proves what I am trying to prove. In *Measure for Measure* Shakespeare says:

But man, proud man, dressed in a little brief authority, most ignorant of what he's most assured, his glassy essence, like an angry

ape, plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven as make the angels weep.

While in *Hamlet* he says:

What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form and moving how express and how admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god.

4. *Subjective versus Objective*—The subjective aspect of man's life has to do with his mental life in contrast to the objective aspects which has to do with everything which exists or which takes place outside of his mind in the phenomenal world, including his body and brain. It is true that the concept of mind is a hypostatization, but for me the evidence pointing to its existence is so overwhelming that it has to be taken for granted.

5. *Biologic versus Psychologic Irritability*—Irritability is defined by biologists and physiologists as the characteristic response which every living organism makes to the stimuli of environmental changes. Cells, for instance, respond by changing shape, by producing or ceasing to produce motion, and by engaging in other activities of their effector organs. Man responds both physiologically and psychologically, sometimes with his nervous system and body, sometimes with his mind only. Finally, he responds not only to objective stimuli, but also to subjective stimuli; he responds to stimuli which originate in his mind and to those originating in his afferent nerves. The subjective stimuli and the response it evokes I think of as psychologic irritability.

6. *Instinct* as I use the term refers to an inherited tendency to perform unreasoned and unwilled act characteristic of the species. After birth, man acquires traits and habits; these not only can modify but can distort and seemingly entirely suppress what might be called the normal expression of his instincts. When repression or suppression takes place, man's instincts nevertheless continue to affect his behavior, but since they are unable to express themselves normally, they express themselves neurotically and psychotically.

In the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (edited by James Baldwin, Macmillan, 1911) instinct is defined as "An inherited reaction of the sensori-motor type, relatively complex and markedly adaptive in character, and common to a group of individuals."

Walter S. Hunter (*Human Behavior*, Chicago University Press, 1919) suggests three objective methods of distinguishing between instinctive and learned behavior, (1) an instinctive behavior pattern must be exhibited in relatively complete form on its first appearance in the life history of an organism, (2) the behavior pattern should be biologically useful on its first occurrence, (3) it should occur universally in a given species. I should like to drop out item two; I think there are instinctive behavior patterns which are not biologically useful to the species displaying them; they may have been useful to antecedent species in the tree of evolution but may be, like many physical characteristics, rudimentary rather than useful to the species inheriting them. Whether they are biologically useful does not

seem to me important; what is important is whether they are inherited. I should also like to add an item to replace the one I think misleading; *it must be inherited, not learned after birth*; it must put in its first appearance almost without exception at the same time in the life-cycle in all specimens of the same species. This is implied in part in Hunter's first criterion and in part in his third. But it is particularly important in the case of mankind, because it requires the elimination of acquired cultural peculiarities. Learned behavior patterns appear at about the same period in the life-cycle in all the members of a given human culture, but only those which appear in all cultures (all races too) can be considered instinctive.

Two different things it seems to me are involved, and to refer to both of them as if they were in fact one is to indulge in dangerously unscientific nonsense. Skin-color is an hereditary physical trait differing in different sub-species (races) of mankind. But white men (and particularly women) frequently tan their white skins by using sunlight or even artificial light as a dye. But does widespread indulgence in this acquired behavior pattern in our culture alter by a particle the fact that whiteness of the skin is inherited? Not at all. Whiteness is an inherited characteristic; tanning is an acquired one.

Another illustration, this one a psychological and physiological rather than physical and anatomical characteristic: Sexuality is an hereditary characteristic displayed by all bi-sexual organisms. But sexual behavior patterns in man vary enormously from culture to culture and even in individuals belonging to the same culture. The "instinct" can be so conditioned that indulgence in it is apparently completely suppressed (St. Anthony!). But what does this prove? That sexuality is an acquired or learned trait? Nonsense. What it proves is that the "instincts" in man are so plastic that he can, if he wishes, acquire apparently sexless behavior patterns. It proves that sexual behavior patterns in man are learned (not that he has no inherited sexual instinct) and that, unless all science since the time of Freud is completely wrong, acquired sexual behavior patterns which repress or suppress the normal display of sexuality merely result in some abnormal display of it.

Today, a half century after Baldwin and Hunter, most biologists and psychologists make no references to instincts at all, because they insist that it is impossible to distinguish between inherited and acquired behavior and that scientists should therefore restrict themselves to describing what they can actually observe—the actual learning habits not only of man but of all animals.

This seems to me to be a mistaken idea, because it is based upon the answer to a question which has been improperly formulated. The question is not "What are the inherited traits or instincts of mankind?" The question is a two-fold one: "What are the inherited physical characteristics of mankind?" and "What are the inherited mental characteristics of mankind?" To the first question anatomists, biologists, and paleontologists can

make unequivocal answers by the hundreds. Man, they say, is a biped. He is. Man has a plantigrade posture. He has. And so on. To the second question I believe equally conclusive answers can be made, only none of our scientists are trying to make them. Reading between the lines, however, it is possible to find many answers. And one of them is the point from which I have started and from which I think a fresh start should be made the objectively observable fact that man inherits energy. This he does not acquire after birth; he is born with it. He has it even before he is conceived; both sperm and ovum come into existence endowed with energy.

Physiologists call this energy metabolism and distinguish between two kinds of it, anabolic and catabolic. Now if it is possible to establish the existence of not only one but two kinds of inherited energy, I believe it is high time that we get busy, find out if there are not more than two, and if it is not a fact that the characteristics of animals called instincts (because all the individuals of a species seemed to display them) are in fact the characteristic forms in which their inherited energies express themselves. If this is true, the facts call for a revival of the use of the concept of instinct.

7. *Incept and Inception* are concepts I have found it necessary to develop to designate the response made by man to a stimulus originating not in an afferent nerve but in his own mind. Incepts are developed during introspection and reflection in contrast to percepts which I use to designate the responses made to stimuli originating in the sense organs.

8. *Biologic and Psychologic Energy*—I have been criticized by friends for using the term, energy, to designate displays of what I think of as man's survival, genetic, cultural, and necrotic behavior. But that there is such a thing as biologic or bio-chemical energy seems to me indisputable. When this energy displays itself in man's psychological behavior and in his psychological characteristics, I see no reason why it should not be called psychologic energy.

9. *Alienation*—There is now an extensive and growing literature dealing with the problem of alienation. The problem has become increasingly a matter of concern to thoughtful students of the human condition today. There is a bibliography on alienation and a discussion of both its nature and what might be done about it in the Commentary on Problem IX, the psycho-physiological problem.

10. *Types of Human Temperaments*—The importance of this matter is made clear by the number of attempts at their definition and classification. One of the oldest is the Brahmanical classification into four hereditary natures, *brahmin*—teacher-priest; *kshatriya*—ruler-warrior, *vaishya*—trader-craftsman; and *shudra*—peasant-laborer. Hippocrates in Greece also distinguished four inherent natures which he called *choleric*, *sanguine*, *melancholic*, and *phlegmatic*. One oddity of man's attempt to wrestle with this problem was the thousands of years of belief in the innate difference

in the natures of *plebians* and *patricians* and of the *commonalty* and the *nobility*.

Dozens of scientific and pseudo-scientific studies of the problem have been made, some of the most acute ones by Freud and his followers. One of the latest is Sheldon's which divides temperaments into three inborn types, *viscerotonic*, *somatotonic*, and *cerebrotonic*. William James' *tough-minded* and *tender-minded* classification became famous. C. G. Jung used *introverted* and *extroverted*; R.E. Vernon, Gordon W. Allport, and E. Spranger had six classifications of "dominant value directions" they called *theoretical*, *economic*, *esthetic*, *social*, *political* and *religious*; David Reisman had two *inner-directed* and *other-directed*, and I must not forget my own three, *quality-minded*, *quantity-minded*, and *herd-minded*.

Finally, temperament should not be confused with morphological or physical typologies such as Ernst Kretschner's three, *pyknic*, *asthenic*, and *athletic*, and Sheldon's *endomorphie*, *mesomorphie*, and *ectomorphie* physiques.

A word must be said about the word temperament itself. As it will be used in this study it means what at present is designated by such words as human nature, disposition, predisposition, constitution, character, personality, types, attitudes, statistical factors, traits, drives, and habits. Temperament itself, comes from the Latin *temperamentum*, meaning a proper measure, a mixing in due proportion. As I will use it in this study it will refer to only one thing, the character of mind and mental reactions characteristic of an individual, both those he has acquired and those he has inherited; the totality of the mental characteristics he displays in what he believes, values, and does; what he is intellectually and emotionally and not what he pretends, the very fact of pretense, however, being a factor in the actuality of his temperament.

A few of the books which discuss temperaments, no matter what the author calls them, are listed below:

W.H. Sheldon, *The Varieties of Human Physique*, Harper, N.Y., 1940; *The Varieties of Human Temperaments*, Harper, N.Y., 1942.

Ernst Kretschner, *Physique and Character*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1936.

William James, *Psychology: Briefer Course*, Holt, N.Y., 1923.

David Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd*, Doubleday, N.Y., 1953.

C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, Pantheon Books, N.Y., 1959.

Ralph Borsodi, *This Ugly Civilization*, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1929, Chapters IX to XII, pp. 203-255.

Gordon W. Allport, *Personality*, Holt, N.Y., 1937.

Gardner Murphy, *Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure*, Harper, N.Y., 1947.

R. B. Cattell, *Personalities and Motivation, Structure and Measurement*, World Books, N.Y., 1957.

11. *Psychic Anthropic Doctrines*—The outstanding protagonists of a psychic solution of the anthropic problem were, of course, Jesus, Mohamed and the writers of the Vedas and Upanishads; all the others are in a sense mere commentators upon the solution which these insisted mankind should accept. I do not recommend going back to the writings of Jonathan Edwards, Bishop Butler, Calvin, and Luther, nor to the *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas or the *City of Man and the City of God* of Augustine, much less to the Holy Bible, the Glorious Koran, the Zend-Avesta, and the Mahabharata and Ramayana for an understanding of the ideologies which consider man a soul, unless one is a scholar with ample time for what this would involve. Bits and pieces of books of this kind will prove illuminating to the average reader, but nothing written prior to the scientific revolution will help very much in dealing with the problem as it confronts man today. All the following are outstanding defences of the Psychic solution of the anthropic problem which take modern science into account:

Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, Harpers, N.Y., 1945.

Lecomte du Nouy, *Human Destiny*, Longmans Green, N.Y., 1948; "The Road to Reason," 1948.

Wilhem J. Pinard, *Mind, a Psychological Orientation*, Forum Pub. Co., Boston, 1959.

Vinoba Bhave, *Self and Knowledge*, Sarva Seva Sangh, Navanassi, Benares, India.

Carl Jung, *The Undiscovered Self*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958.

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Scribners, N.Y., 1932.

Lucien Levy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1926.

R. J. Forbes, *Man and Maker*, Schuman, N.Y., 1950.

Fred Hoyle, *Man and Materialism*, Rutgers University Press, 1958.

Sir Oliver Lodge, *Raymond; or Life and Death*, Doran, N.Y., 1916; *The Immortality of the Soul*, Bell Pub. Co., Boston, 1908.

James H. Hyslop, *Life After Death*, Dutton, N.Y., 1918; *Science and a Future Life*, Putnams, N.Y., 1906.

Charles C. Everett, *Immortality and Other Essays*, American Unitarian Association, Boston, 1902.

Robert A. Millikan, *Science and Life*, The Pilgrim Press, Boston, 1924.

Edmund W. Sinnott, *Cell and Psyche, the Biology of Purpose*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1950.

John H. Holmes, *The Affirmation of Immortality*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1947.

William James, *Human Immortality, Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1898.

J. B. Rhine, *The Reach of the Mind*, Apollo Editions, N.Y., 1961.

Charles C. Everett, *Immortality and Other Essays*, American Unitarian Association, Boston, 1902.

J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, Dutton, N.Y., 1922.

Aurobindo Ghosh, *The Ideal of Karma-Yogin*, Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, India.

Albain G. Widgery, *Immortality*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1964.

Felix Adler, *Immortality, A Modern Scientist's Answer to the Question, Whence and Whither?*, New York Society for Ethical Culture, N.Y., 1904.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Phenomenon of Man*, Harpers, N.Y., 1959.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Theory of Life*, found in *Miscellaneous, Aesthetic and Literary*, George Bell & Sons, London, 1885.

Plato, *Republic*, in *Dialogues* trans. by Jowett. Clarendon Press, Oxford, England, 1953.

12. *Somatic Anthropic Doctrines*—The following are outstanding expositions of various approaches to the problem all of which assume man to be a body and not a soul:

Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1956.

W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, Beauford, Boston, 1953.

Paul H. T. d'Holback, *The System of Nature*, J. P. Mendum, Boston, 1953.

Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1956.

Erwin Shrodinger, *What is Life*, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., 1951.

George Gamow, *Mr. Tompkins Learns the Facts of Life*, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., 1953.

Ernest Borst, *Man, the Chemical Machine*, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1952.

John D. Williams, *The Compleat Strategyst*, McGraw, N.Y., 1954.

Charles Mayer, *Man: Mind or Matter*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1951.

Sir George Stapledon, *Human Ecology*, Faber & Faber, N.Y., 1964.

Sir Charles Sherrington, *The Integration of the Nervous System*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947; *Man and his Nature*, Mentor Books, N. Y., 1940.

Ernest A. Hooton, *Why Men Behave Like Apes and Vice Versa*, Oxford University Press, London, 1941.

Launcelot Hogben, *Dangerous Thoughts*, Norton, N.Y., 1940.

Wilhelm Reich, *The Function of the Orgasm*, found in "The Discovery of the Orgone," Orgone Institute Press, N. Y., 1942.

Corliss Lamont, *The Illusion of Immortality*, Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1949.

George W. Crile, *The Phenomenon of Life*, Norton, N.Y., 1936; *Man, an Adaptive Mechanism*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1916.

Ivan Pavlov, *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes*, International, N.Y., 1928-1941.

Calvin Hall, *A Primer on Freudian Psychology*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1956.

George E. Coghill, *Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior*, The University Press, Cambridge, England, 1929.

John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1929.

Julien Offrey de La Mettrie, *Man a Machine*, Editions Bossard, Paris, 1921.

James H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Harper, N.Y., 1921.

H. L. Mencken, *A Book of Prefaces*, Knopf, N.Y., 1917.

Jacques Loeb, *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*, University of Chicago Press, 1912.

Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, Open Court, Chicago, 1912.

William Osler, *Science and Immortality*, Hughton Mifflin, N.Y., 1905.

Charles Darwin, *Descent of Man*, Appleton, N.Y., 1895.

Thomas Hobbes, *Human Nature*, in *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, The University Press, Cambridge, England 1928.

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Dutton, N.Y., 1930.

13. *Pluralistic Anthropic Doctrines*—For the study of Pluralistic approaches to the problem, I suggest the following:

Carl Rogers, *The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth*, Harper, N.Y., 1956.

Louise Morgan, *Inside Yourself*, Hutchinson, London, 1954.

L. K. Frank, *Nature and Human Nature*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1951.

Lionel Trilling, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1955.

Max Eastman, *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism*, Devin-Adair, N.Y., 1955.

Alfred Korzybski, *The Manhood of Humanity*, International Non-Aristotelian Library Pub. Co., Lakeville, Conn., 1950.

James B. Conant, *Modern Man and Modern Science*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1952.

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Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1945.

George Orwell, 1984, Harcourt, N.Y., 1949.

Harry Overstreet, *The Mature Mind*, Norton, N.Y., 1949.

Ashley Montagu, *Man in Process*, New American Library (Mentor), N.Y.; *Human Heredity*, Sigrent Science Library, 1959.

L. L. Whyte, *Every Man Looks Forward*, Cresset Press, London, 1946.

Henry Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, Macmillan, London, 1930.

Alexis Carrell, *Man the Unknown*, Harper, N.Y., 1939.

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Holt, N.Y., 1922.

Raymond B. Fosdick, *The Old Savage in the New Civilization*, Doubleday, Doran, and Garden City, N.Y., 1928.

C. Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, Holt, N.Y., 1925.

W. Trotter, *Instinct of the Herd in War and Peace*, Unwin, London, 1916.

Alfred Asler, *Understanding Human Nature*, Greenberg, N.Y., 1927.

William James, *The Energies of Men*, Moffat Yard & Co., N.Y., 1908.

Nicholas Tinberger, *The Study of Instincts*, Oxford Press, 1951.

Walter S. Hunter, *Human Behavior*, Chicago University Press, 1919.

William Osler, *Science and Immortality*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1905.

Rudolf Eucken, *The Meaning and Value of Life*, A. & C. Black, London, 1909.

Thomas H. Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*, Appleton, N.Y., 1896.

14. *Equalitarianism and Inequalitarianism*—The question of whether man is in any sense equal, or whether he is in all senses different and unequal, crops up in problems of all kinds, ranging from the validation of mere social prejudices to matters about which men have enslaved, exploited, and exterminated one another. Here are a few titles dealing directly or indirectly with six kinds of equality and inequality: (1) individual, (2) familial, (3) sexual, (4) social, (5) national, and (6) racial.

Individual:

David Wechsler, *The Range of Human Capacities*, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1935.

L. M. Terman, *Genetic Studies of Genius*, Stanford University Press, 1925, with M. A. Merrill, *Measuring Intelligence*, 1937.

C. Spearman, *The Abilities of Man*, Macmillan, London, 1950.

Family:

Henry Goddard, *The Kallikak Family, Study in the History of Feeble Mindedness*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1912.

R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes*, Putnams, N.Y., 1910.

Innes H. Pearse, *The Peckham Experiment*, Allen & Unwin, London, n.d.

Sexual:

All the great religious scriptures are in one respect uniform; they all agree on the subjection, and presumably the inferiority, of women to men. This is true of the prescriptions about the matter in most primitive cultures. There are, of course, exceptions; there are still a few matriarchal cultures, notably in India and in Lamaist Thibet, though the Thibetan prescription was equalitarian rather than matriarchal.

In the last quarter of the last century, one of the most astute misanthropes who ever lived, Arthur Schopenhauer, wrote a little essay entitled *Of Women*. With the clarity and force of diction for which Schopenhauer is notable among philosophers, he summed up in a few pages what was, until the Feminist Revolution, generally believed to be true about the difference between men and women. The last two paragraphs are worth quoting, since it is a little difficult to get hold of this essay:

In the "Politics," Aristotle explains the great disadvantage which accrued to the Spartans from the fact that they conceded too much to their women, by giving them the right of inheritance and dower, and a great amount of independence; and he shows how much this contributed to Sparta's fall. May it not be the case in France that the influence of women which went on increasing steadily from the time of Louis XIII, was to blame for that gradual corruption of the Court and the Government, which brought about the Revolution of 1789, of which all subsequent disturbances have been the fruit? However that may be, the false position which women occupy, demonstrated as it is, in the most glaring way, by the institution of the *lady*, is a fundamental defect in our social scheme, and this defect proceeding from the very heart of it, must spread its baneful influence in all directions.

That women is meant by nature to obey may be seen by the very fact that every woman who is placed in the unnatural position of complete influence, immediately attaches herself to some man, by whom she allows herself to be guided and ruled. It is because she needs a lord and master. If she is young, it will be a lover; if she is old a priest.

Arthur Schopenhauer, *Of Women*. (My copy is in a little book published by the Gold Medal Library, N.Y., without date.)

August Bebel, *Women and Socialism*, Boni & Liveright, N.Y., 1918.

D. C. Hobman, *Go Spin, You Jade*, Saunders, Philadelphia, 1957.

"Equal Pay for Equal Work," *United Nations Magazine*, 1960.

Ashley Montagu, *The Natural Superiority of Women*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1953.

Amran Scheinfeld, *Women and Men*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1944.

Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, *The Soul of Woman*, Dutton, N.Y., 1923.

Otto Weininger, *Sex and Character*, Heinemann, London, 1906.

John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women*, Longmans, Green N.Y., 1869.

H. R. Hays, *The Dangerous Sex: The Myth of Feminine Evil*, Putnam's, N.Y., 1965.

Social:

H. N. Brailsford, *The Levelers and The English Revolution*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1961.

Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, Norton, N.Y., 1955.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, Labor News Co., N.Y., 1939.

Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, Dutton, N.Y., 1915.

National:

Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism, Myth and Reality*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1955.

Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1957; *Prophets and People*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1946; *The Idea of Nationalism*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1944.

Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, R. R. Smith, N.Y., 1931; *France, A Nation of Patriots*, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1930.

Racial:

Theodosius Dobzhansky, *Heredity and the Nature of Man*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1964.

"The Races of Mankind," Public Affairs Pamphlets, No. 85, N.Y., 1961.

Carleton S. Coon, *The Origin of Races*, Knopf, N.Y., 1962.

Franz Boaz, *Race, Language and Culture*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1953.

Roger Williams, *Free and Unequal*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1953.

George L. Abernethy, *The Idea of Equality, an Anthology*, John Knox Press, Richmond, Va., 1959.

Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper, N.Y., 1944.

Carey McWilliams, *Brothers Under the Skin*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1943.

Launcelot Hogben, *Race, Reason and Rubbish*, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1942.

Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1934.

Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color Against White Supremacy*, Scribners, N.Y., 1920.

Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race or the Racial Basis of European History*, Scribners, N.Y., 1916.

Joseph A. Gobineau, *The Inequality of the Human Races*, Putnams, N.Y., 1915.

15. *Free Will versus Fatalism*—For the bibliography dealing with this problem see Problem III, the Etiologic Problem.

16. *Man's Moral Nature*—The Classic approaches to the problem are three: that man is by nature good, as maintained by Jean Jacques Rousseau in *The Social Contract*; that he is by nature bad, as maintained by Thomas Hobbes in *The Leviathan*; and that he is both good and bad, as maintained by Peter A. Kropotkin in *Mutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution*. What the evidence seems rather clearly to establish is that at birth he is not born with any moral nature at all, and that whatever sort of moral nature he finally finds himself equipped with is acquired after he is born.

But this is only incidentally an anthropoic problem; it has really to do with Problem VI, the Ethical Problem. A bibliography dealing with the subject will be found at the end of the discussion of that problem.

PROBLEM II.

The Riddle of the Universe : Chaos or Cosmos?

To be surprised, to wonder... is the sport, the luxury special to the intellectual man. The gesture characteristic of his tribe consists in looking at the world with eyes wide open in wonder. This faculty of wonder... is the one which leads the intellectual man through life in the perpetual ecstasy of the visionary. His special attribute is the wonder of the eyes. Hence it was that the ancients gave Minerva her owl, the bird with ever-dazzled eyes.—José Ortega y Gasset.

The second of the basic noetic problems is what Haeckel (in the year which marked the dawn of the twentieth century) called the riddle of the universe. Three facts out of innumerable, indisputable facts are sufficient to make clear why mankind has from the very beginning felt it necessary to find some sort of answer to what I now think of as the ontoic problem.

1. The first fact is that man is not only confronted with the world¹ but, unlike all other animals, is conscious of the fact. He cannot, therefore, take its existence for granted. He cannot, because of the plasticity of his instincts, rely upon them as animals do and merely accept the world's existence. He has to find some sort of explanation for it and for the multiplicity of objects, including human beings, of which it is composed.

2. The second is that his reactions to life and how it should be lived are determined by whether he believes the universe to be a chaos or a cosmos; whether he believes it a world of infinitely small atoms and electrons and infinitely large objects, like the galaxies, scattered meaninglessly and at random throughout space, or a world in some enigmatic sense orderly and designed making it necessary for man to believe in a God like Jehovah, the Creator, or in some other supernatural First Cause to account for its existence.

3. The third fact is that the life of every man is profoundly affected by the explanation of the nature of the world which he accepts as true. If he believes in the existence of any kind of supernal world (the indescribably ecstatic Heaven of Christianity or the Paradise of Islam), and particularly if his enjoyment of it in an after life is dependent upon the salvation of his soul, his first concern here on Earth will be *what he should do to attain salvation* (pray, worship, propitiate) and how to destroy everything (false churches, false doctrines) and everybody (idolaters, heretics) that threatens to undermine his faith in it. If, in addition, he believes in the existence of a supernal Hell (Christianity, Mohammedanism) or a supernal world of darkness (Paganism, Judaism), he will fear and struggle to escape from having to suffer eternity in it.

If he does not believe in it, if he only believes in the existence of the objective world in which he finds himself living for the short period of his lifetime, he will devote himself to a purely secular (non-religious) and temporal (here and now) life, making the most of what it offers as Secularists and Humanists, and Materialists and Hedonists, do.

What makes this a pressing and important problem and not a mere academic study is that over and over again in the history of mankind the believers in some supernatural explanation for the existence of the world have been willing to kill and to persecute for the sake of their beliefs (Christians *versus* Mohammedans; both *versus* Gentiles); that men are still willing to persecute (Russian Atheists persecute Christians) and to kill (Muslim Pakistani *versus* Brahmanical Hindus, and vice versa) those who will not accept their explanations for the creation of the world.

* * * *

What must be taken into account in dealing with the riddle which the existence of the world created for mankind?

The ontoic problem² is so easily and so generally confused with the first and the third of these basic noetic problems that, if it is to be adequately dealt with, consideration of it must distinguish between *what exists* and *what occurs*,³ between existing entities on one hand (the riddle of the universe—our present problem) and the subjective aspect of man's nature on the other (the

riddle of human nature—our previous problem). It is equally important to distinguish between the problem presented by the spectacle which the universe presents to man (our present problem) and the problem created by the fact that he is an unavoidable participant in its activities (the riddle of historiography—the next of the noetic problems which we shall consider).

* * * *

The world can be said to consist of entities, of which the world itself is one and all the other objects (atomic and astronomic), scattered about on the Earth and throughout the vast reaches which astronomers explore. Unfortunately, this scientific (this Naturalistic and Materialistic) conception of the nature of these entities is not the only one which has to be taken into account. There is a religious (and Supernatural) conception which maintains that not only physical but spiritual entities exist, and that there are two worlds and not one with which man must come to terms.

The Naturalistic and Materialistic conception of the nature of our problem assumes that the only entities with which we have to deal are either (1) physical objects (like the Earth and the human beings who inhabit it), things which can be seen and heard, which can be "sensed," and which we know exist as a result of immediate sense-perceptions, or (2) hypostated entities like the "State," objects which are inferred, mental constructions the existence of which can be objectively demonstrated. (Yet real and tangible as both these kinds of entities seem to us, for thousands of years, and still today, millions of Hindus and Buddhists believe the natural world to be nothing but *maya*, nothing but an illusion. And part of the problem with which ontologists must deal is created for us by the depth of the convictions of those who believe in *maya varda*).

Hypostatizations of persons and places exist, however, which are based not upon mental constructions, the reality of which can be objectively demonstrated, but upon mental constructions which those who believe in their existence ask everybody to accept on faith. It is hypostatizations like God and Satan, like Heaven and Hell, like souls and demons, which provide Supernaturalists with

their conception of a world which includes supernal entities. Our knowledge about this world is based upon knowledge which comes at first hand by inspiration and revelation to a few fortunate men and women but comes to most believers at second hand, from listening to priests and mystics and from reading sacred scriptures and the speculations of metaphysicians and theologians.

To consider the riddle of the universe we have, therefore, to take into account not one world but two, the spiritual world based upon faith and revelation, and the physical world not of uncommon but of common sense. Just as Brahmanism and Buddhism deny the reality of the physical world, so Materialism and Objectivism deny the actuality of the existence of the spiritual world, of all supernatural objects and events, and of all revealed and parapsychological knowledge about them. Naturalism and Pluralism do not make quite so sweeping a denial of their actuality because, to be strictly logical, they must concede the possibility that some spiritual objects and some spiritual events, of which we have knowledge either by immediate revelation or by parapsychological investigation, may exist. But until their actuality can be demonstrated as fully and completely as can natural entities like matter and energy, they can only be said to subsist, not exist.

To resolve the riddle, we must distinguish between what is true and what is false in the beliefs about the entities which compose the two worlds.

Each of these two worlds consists of an immense variety of entities and objects.

*The Supernal World*⁴—All the supernal entities, for the existence of which mystics and saints have vouched and which are described in religious scriptures and in the writings of theologians and philosophers, are of three kinds: supernatural, metaphysical, and parapsychological.

The supernatural entities are of two kinds, supernatural persons: Brahman, God, Allah, Jupiter, Zeus, Osiris, gods, goddesses, Satan, angels, demons, atmans, souls, and the like, and supernatural places: Heaven, Paradise, Nirvana, the Happy Hunting Grounds, Hell, Hades, Sheol, Gehenna, and others.

The metaphysical entities include mental constructions such as archetypes, entelechies, nous, paratman, tao, mana, das Ding an sich, á priori.

The parapsychologic entities include things and places seen clairvoyantly, knowledge heard telepathically, and knowledge obtained by precognition.

Many theologians and philosophers attempt to solve the riddle of the universe by ascribing its existence—its design and creation—to one or more of these spiritual entities in the reality and existence of which they believe.

*The Objective World*⁵—All the objective entities, all the objects in the everyday world we sense, are of three kinds: atomic objects, astronomic objects, and terrestrial objects.

The atomic objects include all existing objects and all the new discoveries of objects and forces inside the atom and in the world considered as an aggregation of atoms. They include the atoms themselves, of course, the electrons, protons, neutrons, and wavi-cles (particles-waves) moving about in space-time.

The astronomic objects include the galaxies, the stellar systems, our own solar system; the Sun, the planets, the Earth, and other astronomical bodies.

The terrestrial objects are of two kinds, inanimate and animate. (In my Pluralistic and not Materialistic world, three kinds—inanimate, animate, and hypostatized).

Four kinds of inanimate objects exist: (1) météorologic objects like outer space, the stratosphere, the atmosphere, clouds; (2) geologic objects like fossils, land, rocks, minerals, the solid and molten interior of the Earth; (3) geographic objects which in turn are of two kinds, (a) natural geographic objects like mountains, valleys, deserts, and islands; continents, and (b) artificial geographic objects like archaeological ruins, modern towns and cities and the buildings, machinery, tools, weapons, commodities, and merchandise in them.

The animate objects are, in turn, of two kinds: (1) biologic objects consisting of plants, animals, and human beings, and (2) demographic objects consisting of the populations we variously call tribes and races, nations and civilizations.

The world, Materialists insist, consists only of tangible objects (substances in the language of classical philosophy—matter and energy in the language of modern science) such as are suggested by this enumeration. It is to the riddle posed by the existence of a world of tangible physical objects such as these, and not the intangible hypostatizations constructed by men's minds, that Materialists insist we should confine ourselves.

But this would mean ignoring not only the fact that hypostatizations dealing with the Supernatural but also with the natural world exist—even when the things hypostatized do not! Heaven may not exist, but the belief in it does. The State may not be a tangible fact (no one can point at any object in the world and say, "There, is a State."), but to the man it taxes or jails there is no question that something very real, even if it is intangible, does these things to him.

It is at this point that the real riddle of the universe presents itself. Physical science can boast that the riddle represented by tangible objects is no longer really a riddle. But it is grossly unscientific for it to ignore the fact that man lives for the most part, not in the tangible but in an intangible world of his own construction, even if all hypostatizations dealing with the Supernatural world are ignored because they have to be vindicated by faith. What must be considered if the real riddle is to be considered are at least six distinct kinds of hypostatizations dealing with the natural world: (1) ideological, (2) possessional, (3) philosophical, (4) scientific, (5) legal, and (6) literary. All of them deal with "things" which would not exist at all had man not constructed them. This is not true of the things Materialists and Nominalists believe to be real. God, at least in theory, would continue to exist while the stars would continue to exist as facts even if there were no mind of man in which any of them were referred to.

1. Among the ideological hypostatizations would be included all religious and social movements, all social systems (sacred and secular), all economic systems (Mercantilist, Capitalist, Communist), all political systems (Monarchist, Democratic), and all social institutions (survival, genetic, cultural, necrotic).

2. Among the possessional hypostatizations are such things as property rights, goodwill, patents, copyrights, and grants of privileges and powers.

3. Among the philosophical hypostatizations are Materialism and Hedonism, Idealism and Stoicism, Optimism and Pessimism, Cynicism and Humanism.

4. Among the scientific and artistic hypostatizations are all the theoretical sciences and all theories about the arts.

5. Among the legal hypostatizations are what lawyers call legal fictions—things like constitutions and statutes, like corporations sole and corporations aggregate.

6. Finally, among fictional literary and artistic hypostatizations, we have two kinds: fictitious persons such as Hamlet, Ophelia, Shylock, and Portia, and fictitious places like Atlantis, Utopia, and Erewhon.

These hypostatizations are a part of the world which must be taken into account even if they have no physical existence. Not only are they real but they are the most real so far as man is concerned even if they have been wholly produced by his imagination and ingenuity. If Protagoras was right when he said *homo mensura*; if it is true that man is the measure of all things, then man must measure this world. And if he was right when he said *panton chrematon metron anthropos*, and everything is relative to human apprehension and evaluation, then man must not only apprehend the world but also evaluate it.

* * * *

The problem of man confronting an overwhelming world has troubled mankind from the beginning of time, and from the beginning of time he has done something about it. If the myriad of solutions to which he has resorted, both primitive and recent, are studied, they too, as with all the solutions of man's various basic problems, can be classified without too much difficulty as dependent upon one or the other of the three basic categories of knowledge: Supernal, Objective, and Intellectual. The revelations vouchsafed to mankind which purport to solve the riddle of the universe in supernal terms I think of as Supernatural Ontoic ideologies and doctrines; the doctrines and ideologies which deal with it in Objective terms as Materialistic, and those which deal with it in Intellectual terms as Pluralistic. Before discussing the first of these radically different approaches to the riddle of the universe, the problem of whether the world is a chaos or a cosmos

should be considered, since all three approaches to the riddle of the universe are in effect attempts to dispose of this particular problem.

Chaos and Chaosism—The word, chaos, we owe to the Greeks; the concept, to the Mosaic and the Greek accounts of creation which referred to a state of formlessness and confusion which supposedly existed before the creation of the "orderly" world in which we find ourselves. The speculations about the matter have been called Chaology. Chaosism, a term which I have had to invent, refers to the doctrine which maintains that the world was or still is a chaos. There are, therefore, two Chaosisms, one supernal in its nature (Supernatural Chaosism), and the other Objective (Materialistic Chaosism). Supernatural Chaosism still maintains that the world was originally a formless confusion of primordial matter but that this antecedent state of chaos ended when the world we know was created by a First Cause or a Creator God.

Materialistic Chaosism, on the other hand, is a relatively modern doctrine developed by sceptical philosophers and scientists who insist that the world we know is still a chaos and always will be, and who consider nature lawless, or at least not necessarily observant of the uniformities called for by law. Implicit in this Materialistic doctrine is of course the assumption that the proposition that the world is now an orderly cosmos is completely mistaken.

Cosmos and Cosmosism—The word cosmos, like the word chaos, comes to us from the Greek, and while common usage treats cosmos as a synonym for universe, actually the word designates the highly speculative theological and metaphysical proposition that the world is an orderly system.

Cosmology is that branch of metaphysical speculation which treats the universe as an order, in contrast to cosmogony which is the term astronomers use to designate the scientific study of the origin and evolution of the universe. Cosmosism, on the other hand (another term I have had to invent), is the doctrine that the world, in spite of its obvious and apparently chaotic appearance in terms of common sense, is, in its ultimate essence, an orderly and harmonious system. Cosmosism is a strictly Supernatural solution of our problem; it has to be taken on faith; the only knowledge

which vindicates it comes to us from revelation. Astronomy, which restricts itself to Objective knowledge and is necessarily Materialistic, sees no such order and harmony, while Pluralistic doctrines dealing with the problem cannot logically admit that Cosmosism is anything more than a devout hope.

As we shall see in trying to sum up the whole problem, what Pluralism seems to indicate is that the world is a chaos but a chaos in which there are organisms creating a temporary state of order (and often a very wonderful one) for themselves.

Before we come to the evaluation of the various strictly Supernatural solutions of the riddle of the universe, account must be taken of the fact that these solutions are embedded in the creeds and canons of the various long established traditional religions of mankind and that they are sanctioned by supernatural revelations, and not naturally as in the case of Materialistic and Naturalistic theories and religions. But since the very notion that there are such things as Materialistic and Naturalistic religions may seem strange, it is necessary to make clear why I feel justified in calling them religions.

Supernatural versus Materialistic and Naturalistic Religions—

There are two Latin sources, and not one, from which our word, religion, derives. The first is the word, *religio*, which in Latin meant *restrained, forbidden, tabooed*; the second, *religare*, which meant *rely upon* (from *re+ligare=to bind*). *Religare* provides us with a derivation for any doctrine upon which those who really believe in them really rely; about which they have strong and deeply felt convictions; in which, if a conventionally religious term is used, they have *faith*. *Religio* therefore justifies the conventional usage of the word religion to designate what I think of as Supernatural Religion, while *religare* similarly justifies the use of the word to designate the strongly felt convictions which I think of as Materialistic and Naturalistic Religions. Any doctrine or ideology, any profession or practice, any pursuit of ends or purpose whatsoever, based either upon faith or principle which reflects complete conviction and which arouses emotions, expressed and practised with fervor, zeal, fidelity, devotion, and conscientiousness, can on this basis be properly called a religion. Not only Naturalistic ideologies and doctrines like Humanism and Ethical Culture inspire such zeal in those who believe in them but

strictly Materialistic ideologies and doctrines—Atheism and Communism, for instance—inspire precisely the same strong feelings as does devout belief in Christianity and Mohammedanism, and just as believers in these two religions have martyred themselves for their beliefs, so have a plethora of Communists. In every essential respect any set of such deeply felt beliefs and convictions which arouses such devotion is a religion and ought to be called a religion.

We need one or two words in addition to religion to designate concepts which now can only be described with a phrase; I suggest *religiology* and *Religionism* for the purpose; *religiology* to designate the study of religion and religions in the same sense that *theology* designates the study of the various supernatural and theistic religions and *Religionism* to designate the doctrine which maintains that profession and belief in a religion, practice of its tenets, and affiliation with a fellowship or church of those who are like-minded is necessary to the full development and flowering of the highest potentialities of mankind.

And while still on the subject of terminology, we need three more terms with which to modify the words religion and Religionism as they are above defined; one to designate those doctrines which are Theistic and Supernal, which will be called Supernatural religions and Supernatural Religionism; one to designate those doctrines which are Atheistic and Objectivist, which will be called Materialistic religions and Materialistic Religionism, and one to designate those doctrines which are Pluralistic and non-Theistic (not Atheistic, but without any affirmative belief or disbelief in the existence of the divine) and concerned only with the problems of man here and now, in this world and while he is still alive—these doctrines will be called Natural religions and Natural Religionism.

On the basis of this terminology, Christianity and Mohamedanism are Supernatural religions, Capitalism and Communism are Materialistic religions (much as it may surprise the ardent devotees both of Capitalism and of Communism), and Humanism and Unitarianism, Naturalian religions.

* * * *

Supernatural Ontoic Doctrines and Ideologies—The doctrines and ideologies which I am calling Supernatural in this study of the

ontoic problem, all have in common the fact that they rely upon Supernal knowledge (knowledge obtained by inspiration and revelation), to vindicate what they insist is the solution of our problem. This knowledge, they maintain, provides mankind with truer insight into the nature of the world than that obtainable Objectively or Intellectually. The spiritual world, according to these Supernatural religions, consists of two kinds of "entities" or "objects", supernatural places like Heaven and Hell, and supernatural persons like God and Brahman, like atmans and souls.

Pluralism versus Monism—It is repetitious but unfortunately unavoidable in outlining each of these basic noetic problems to have to call attention to the fact that both spiritual and material solutions of the problem are essentially Monistic in nature. The Supernatural doctrines which we are now considering are logically all Monisms which vindicate in one way or another the centrality and primacy of Supernalism. The Materialistic doctrines which we will next consider, even though they utterly repudiate Supernalism, are equally Monistic about the centrality and primacy of Objective knowledge. But this is not true of those doctrines which deal with the problem on the basis of noetics and ratiocination; they are free to use as the premises of their reasoning about the matter both Supernal and Objective knowledge and to construct their hypostatizations and solutions of the problem with any knowledge which can be vindicated in terms of substance, of semantics, and of logic. It is this fact which explains both my partiality to Pluralism and my rejection of both Supernaturalism and Materialism. And it is this fact too which explains why my own beliefs and my own religion is a Humanistic one which can incorporate truths no matter where they come from.

Manaism (Panpsychism) and Animism—The first revelations received by the medicine-men and witch-doctors (in their trances and frenzies) of the primordial tribes to which our antediluvian ancestors belonged was probably nothing more than that there was such a thing as *mana*, an extra-physical, supernatural power immanent in and emanating from the whole of nature. Then came *Animism* which maintained that everything in the universe and all things, and not only mankind, are endowed with indwelling souls and that these souls have powers more or less like, but usually much stronger, than those possessed by man. With Animism came

also *Fetishism*, *Shamanism*, and *Spiritism*. Of these only Spiritism survives to this day, though considered not very respectable by the better established religions. *Spiritism*, which is what the French call our Spiritualism (and which I prefer because it releases the word, Spiritualism, for use as an antonym for Materialism), maintains that man can communicate with the spirits of the dead through the agency of mediums of various kinds.

Divinism—The revelation that divinities existed came much later, probably after a period lasting tens of thousands of years during which Manaism and Animism sufficed mankind. Divinism, which is a generic term, is basic and common to every religion which maintains that a deity or that deities exist. But the revelation that divinities existed took two forms, one Theistic and the other Satanistic.

Satanism—About *Satanism*, *Demonism*, and *Diabolism*, existing Supernatural religions (all of which at one time believed in them), do not like to speak in this scientific age. But belief in the reality of devils and demons was at one time virtually total. Not only the Satanistic cults but orthodox theologians believed in the existence of the Devil (variously called Beelzebub, Lucifer, Satan, Apollyon). Everybody believed in the existence of demons (including those very interesting demons called incubi and succubi) and of witches and sorcerers, the human practitioners of Satanism and Diabolism.

In Jewish and Christian theology the Devil was the supreme spirit of evil and unrighteousness, the tempter and enemy of mankind, the prince of apostate demons, the ruler of Hell, the adversary of God—subordinate to Him yet able to act by His sufferance. Satanists and Diabolists liked to travesty Christian rites; what was called the Black Mass was both a defiance of Catholicism and an incantation of black magic. In spite of the persecution to which they were subject, Satanists considered their religion much more enjoyable than orthodox Christianity.

Pan-Satanism, which was originally a Gnostic sect, was a much more highly intellectualized form of Satanism. It seemed to provide those who believed in it with a much more reasonable explanation of the riddle of the universe than any kind of Theism; the world in which we lived, according to its proponents, could not

possibly be the creation of a good Divinity; it had to be the creation of a Satanic one.

Theism—The earliest Theism was probably *Pantheism* (Cosmotheism, Physicomorphism) which maintained that the universe as a whole is God and that all things are simply modes or manifestations of God. It probably evolved out of Animism by Anthropopsychism, the ascription of a soul like that of man to nature and to that which governs nature.

Then came *Polytheism* with a whole Pantheon of gods. Polytheism probably was the end-result of a process of apotheosis and *Anthropolatry*, as *Anthropotheism* and *Euhemerism* maintain. Polytheistic theology was probably the first to distinguish between *Immanent Theism* (divinity is present in everything, in every event, and everywhere) and *Transcendent Theism* (in which divinity is in a Heavenly, Supernal world, frequently at the top of some Olympic mountain apart from the Objective world in which man lives).

The first Theisms were all *Anthropomorphisms* and conceived of divinity as a person with human attributes (He was angry, jealous, pleased), and with an idealized or diabolized human form. *Deism*, in contrast to Theism, was a relatively modern development, espoused by intellectuals who were willing to concede that since there had to be a First Cause, a faineant God must exist, but that the sort of world in which we live proves conclusively that once He had created it, He ignored it, and let it go to the dogs on its own.

Dyotheisms, such as *Zoroastrianism*, disposed of the dilemma posed by the existence of evil in a God-created world by maintaining that there were two deities, one good and one bad, engaged in a continuous struggle for the rule of mankind.

Monotheism, which is generally believed to be the highest form of man's revelation of the truth about God, has never logically disposed of the problem of the existence of evil. Trinitarianism, which Trinitarians insist is in some miraculous fashion also Monotheistic, is equally unable to dispose of the problem except by adding to Monotheism some form of Satanism.

We come now to what the specific historic, the so-called higher religions, the "religions of the book" with prophetic founders, and what they have to contribute to the resolution of our problem. What

most of them have in common is *Transcendentalism*; in one form or another they maintain that there is not only a Supernal world but that this is a different world from the Objective world we know and in which we find ourselves living. This was true of all the Semitic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism—at least until the advent of Modernism, which raised doubts about the matter, though Fundamentalism with its belief in the existence of two worlds is still the revelation in which the vast majority of believers in the Semitic religions believe. It is true of some variations of *Brahmanism* and *Buddhism*, of *Sikhism* as a whole, and of *Parseeism* (the living representative of ancient *Zoroastrianism*, *Mithraism* and *Magianism*), though the more intellectual Parsees insist that their's is really a nature worship, in this respect akin to intellectualized *Shintoism* and *Taoism*, though *Taoism* is very definitely not only Immanent and one-worldly but also Non-theistic.

With *Brahmanism* and *Buddhism*, Transcendentalism is avoided by this simple expedient of the revelation that there is only one world, a Supernal and not an Objective one. Both see the tangible, Objective world as *maya*, illusion, and consider life in this delusive world a sort of Hell of suffering, escape from which (salvation—*moksha*) can only be attained by living a life, or a succession of lives in various re-incarnations, which eventually frees the individual soul or *atman* from the grip of delusion and so make possible re-union with Brahman in Nirvana. Brahmanism, however, is for the most part Polytheistic (though there are Brahmanist denominations which are not only Monotheistic but also Agnostic and Atheistic). Buddhism is Agnostic about any and every kind of Theism; Gautama considered it of no importance in comparison with what he considered essential in the religion he founded.

Divinism, whether it develops Transcendentally or Immanently, provides revelations not only about the rulers of the supernatural world but also about the supernatural places which constitute that world. *Heaven* in most religions is one of them, *Hell* another. Heaven in Christian theology is the abode of the blessed dead and the dwelling place of God and His angels; Hell the abode of the Devil, the evil demons over whom he rules, and the place (or state) of punishment for the myriads of sinners doomed eternally to suffer the torments of the damned.

The Christian Heaven is *Elysium* in the Greek and Roman religions; *Valhalla* and *Asgard* in the Norse; *Nirvana* in the Brahmanist and Buddhist religions; and so on *ad infinitum*.

Hell is *Tartarus* in the Greek and Roman religions; *Nifleheim* in the Norse; *Aralu* in the Babylonian, *Bandhana* in the Brahmanist and Buddhist.

Variations are endless; Roman Catholicism adds one place it calls *Purgatory*; it is difficult to say whether Hades (Greek) and Sheol (Hebrew) were Heavens or Hells, both being gloomy places deep in the bowels of the Earth in which the dead existed eternally with no hope of return to a brighter life. In general the Heavens were placed above the Earth, the Hells below it. The abolition by astronomers of the doctrine that the Earth is flat and that there is a firmament above it created difficulties for sacred cosmologists from which they have never freed themselves. Where to put Heaven and where Hell in relation to a globe which is whirling about not only on its own axis but around a distant Sun, may seem an insoluble problem to a sceptic, but nothing is beyond the ingenuity of theologians. The Modernists among them tend to think of them allegorically or as states of mind rather than places; but there are still Fundamentalists who simply will not compromise with the scientific cosmogonists and insist that the Bible is right and modern science wrong.

Platonism—The two most ingenious attempts to rationalize the existence of a Supernal world, I think, were those provided in Ancient Greece by Platonism and in Ancient India by the doctrine I shall call *Mayaism*. Since the first looms large in modern academic philosophy and the second is central to one of the greatest of living religions, what they contribute to the solution of the riddle of the universe should be considered.

The essence of Plato's cosmic philosophy can be stated this way: there are two worlds, one Supernatural (Real) and one Objective (Shadowy). The world which Plato considered the Real world was the Supernal world; our Objective world he considered a shadowy world, as in his famous parable of the cave. The entities existing in the Real world (Real in Plato's terminology, Supernal in the terminology of this study), he considered the archetypes of which the corresponding entities in our world

of the senses were imperfect approximations or ectypes, as they are called. A tree in our world is an ectype; so is a house, so is everything on the Earth, including the Earth. In strict logic man is also an ectype, a poor replica of the archetype in whose image he is formed. All the things of which we become aware through our senses and everything known to us as a result of inferences based upon sensory data, exists, it is true, but none of them are completely real; they are shadowy copies of what is real; they are, in fact, a combination of some of this ultimate reality (being) with ordinary matter (not-being); they are objects of opinion or probable knowledge in contrast to what we can know about ultimate reality by "rational insight," by coming to know transcendental universals (of which mathematical concepts are the most perfect approximations). These eternal verities (universals in the language of medieval scholasticism) are the objects of true knowledge; ordinary knowledge, which is based upon our sensory perception of particular material objects (particulars in scholastic terms), is only reminiscent of true knowledge.

No wonder devout scholastic apologists for Aquinas and Aristotle denounced the Nominalists, who, beginning with Roscellinus, insisted that universals had no existence; who very plausibly argued that universal terms indicative of a genus or species—collective terms such as animal, man, tree, rock, house—were mere abstractions; that only particulars existed; that only a particular animal, a particular man, a particular tree really existed. If the Nominalists were right, the foundations not only of Aquinasism and Aristotelianism, but of orthodox Catholic theology, were non-existent.

Neo-Platonism—Through Aquinas (and via the writings of Aristotle), Platonism eventually permeated Christendom. It survived, however, until the Fifth century of the Christian Era as an influential, living, religious philosophy. But Neo-Platonism was non-Christian; it so provoked the hatred of Christian fanatics in Alexandria, that its last great exponent, Hypatia, was foully murdered by a group of monks, her followers dispersed, and the Academy, which Plato founded nearly eight centuries before, destroyed.

Neo-Platonism at its end consisted essentially of three doctrines: (1) that the Objective world is an emanation (or lapse

from real or ultimate being of the immanent deity, (2) that the soul of an individual may be re-united with the deity in trance or ecstasy, and (3) that sensible men should have contempt for the world or matter and devote themselves to the liberation of their souls through Asceticism and Mysticism.

Mayaism (Maya Varda)—The Brahmanist doctrine of *maya*, enshrined in the sacred Vedas of India, has more than a shadowy resemblance to Platonism. The world, the Brahmanist sages insisted, was not merely a shadow of the real, supernal world, it had no existence at all. It existed only as a delusion in the minds of man. Once the premises on which the doctrines of *maya* rests are granted (a matter of faith, not fact; of scholastic logic not scientific ratiocination), *Mayaism* becomes one of the most ingenious of all vindications of the idea of the existence of a single supernal world. One fantastic supernatural doctrine after another then follows quite logically, including *samsara*, the transmigration of souls; *varna shastra*, the caste system; *karma*, punishment in this life for sins committed in previous incarnations; finally *sammadhi* and *moksha*, devotion to escape from the wheel of life and its sufferings through reunion with Brahman.

Since existence in this world, delusive though it be, is inescapably a life of suffering, this world and not a future world is Hell; Heaven is the future world which all may achieve after endless reincarnations in expiration of their sins. *Moksha* (salvation) which means permanent reunion with Brahman in ecstatic bliss, can, however, be anticipated in *sammadhi* (mystical trance) which provides temporary communion with Brahman.

The doctrine was rationalized by Shankaracharya about 800 A.D., and as long as it prevailed in all four Indian castes, it made for "peace of mind" and reconciled even the lowest and most abject Indian to his lot.

The basic doctrine of *maya* became a part of Western thought firstly in Transcendentalism (where the concept of Brahman became the concept of an "over-soul" and the goal of life, communion and reunion with it), and then through Schopenhauer, in whose philosophy Brahman became "the world as Will and Idea."

As a rationalization of the problem of evil and of suffering, it is infinitely more rational than Satanism, to which both Chris-

tianity and Mohammedanism have resorted. But as a rationalization of the existence of nothing but a spiritual world, it falls far short of what is needed because it makes no answer of any kind to the question of why Brahman should have bisected Himself and permitted billions of *atmans* (individual souls), to exist for life after life in a Hell from which, if they were sufficiently observant of *dharma shastra* (the law of duty), they might eventually escape.

Spiritism and Extra-Sensory Perceptionism—Two more doctrines must be mentioned one of which, Spiritism, is entirely predicated upon the existence of a supernatural world densely populated with the ghosts of mankind. From these ghosts communications can be received through the agency of mediums; the ghosts can manifest themselves to ordinary human perception through the same agency; they can make themselves heard by ringing bells, knocking on tables, speaking through trumpets, they can be seen, and they can even be felt by materializing themselves in the form of ectoplasm.

Extra-Sensory Perception, to use the label for the doctrine which Rhine has made famous, while it does not explicitly establish the existence of a supernatural world and of supernatural personalities, provides a foundation of mathematical if not of empirical evidence of the existence of at least a Preternatural world, and at the very least presupposes the existence of Preternatural powers of various kinds.

Spiritism, unfortunately, lends itself so readily to charlatanism as to justify extreme scepticism with regard to it, while Extra-Sensory Perceptionism suffers from the trivialities of what those who possess extra-sensory powers seem able to do with them.

What the judicious person who examines the wealth of material which psychical research provides must conclude, it seems to me, is that there is something (vague though it be) which Materialism dismisses as unbelievable and not merely unscientific, and which should not be dismissed unconditionally. What the situation calls for is not just the accumulation of more of the same sort of psychical research and evidence of which we now have such an abundance, but concentration on the question of

how to determine its real nature and how to establish either its validity or invalidity by the test of right-reasoning.

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To the crucial question, the question of whether the world is a cosmos or a chaos, all Supernatural solutions of the ontoic problem make substantially the same answer: *the world is a cosmos*. In one way or another, implicitly if not explicitly, they are logically forced to maintain that it is an orderly world (however disorderly it may seem to our finite understanding) because it is the handiwork of an orderly deity. Prior to that historic occasion when a Creator (or a First Cause) created the world, it was a chaos, it is true, but since it is the created, existing world which confronts mankind, it is a cosmos and not a chaos with which man has to deal. In one way or another all Supernatural doctrines assume (and most of them insist) that there is a Supernatural deity with the power of creating, governing, and ending the world. Beyond this point of agreement, what the metaphysicians and the theologians of each of the Supernatural religions tell us varies infinitely. About the deity or deities which rule in that Supernatural world, each affirms as a matter of faith things which others deny just as positively.

That millions of men, both thoughtful and thoughtless, accept the verity of one of these Supernal solutions of the ontologic problem is a fact, but how much of it can be accepted by disciplined, rational minds is something else again. It is true that faith in beliefs of this kind is justified and rationalized on the ground that men who believe in them are better and kinder social animals. But that they are in fact invariably better and kinder because of this is simply not true; the evidence recorded on the saddest pages of history makes it clear that far too often beliefs of this kind make men and women bigoted and fanatic, that they generate heresimachy and persecution, and that they are responsible for some of the most inhuman and bloodiest of mankind's wars (the Thirty Years' War, for example). Genocide is not a Nazi invention; religious wars were often wars of extermination (the Crusade against the Albigenses; the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day).

The trouble is that there are too many contradictions in what the mystics and the prophets, the priests and the theologians, the metaphysicians and the philosophers tell us about the nature of the supernal world, and there seems to be no way of eliminating them. It is obvious that no consensus about the nature of the supernal world will ever be achieved until every particular religion and religious sect gives up its own historic revelations and its own traditional beliefs about the matter.

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Materialistic Ontoic Doctrines—Materialistic answers, in contrast to Supernatural answers to the riddle of the universe, developed as soon as skepticism about mythical religious explanations of the origin of the universe began to appear. In ancient Greece *Hylism* was one of these developments, in ancient India *Carvakaism*. Both survive to this day, in the west as *Materialism*, in India as *Varda Mayatism*.

The naive *Hylism* of the famous Ionian Skeptics developed refinements; *Hylomorphism*, the doctrine that everything in the universe that really existed had ultimately a material form; *Hylozoism*, the doctrine that the existence of entities which had life needed no more explanation than the existence of inanimate entities because matter itself was ultimately animate; and *Hylotheism*, the doctrine that matter is the only God there is.

Atheism—To explain the existence of a Hylistic or Materialistic world which had in some form always existed, man needed no First Cause and, for the same reason, no Creator God. Atheism, the denial of the existence of any deity, is therefore a Materialistic doctrine—a logical corollary of belief in the reality and sole existence of a material and phenomenal world.

Objectivism appropriately designates the Materialistic doctrine which maintains that there is and can be no Preternatural and Supernatural world because there is only one real world, the objective world, known to us by both common and uncommon sense. Objectivism maintains that only that is real which is ultimately known to us through the mediation of our sense. Since what the Supernaturalists claim about the supernal world is ultimately based upon knowledge obtained by inspiration and revelation, there can be no such Supernatural world for the objectivist.

On this basis, the Greek Hylists ceased to take the "scriptures" of their own religion (their own great sacred epic poems) seriously; they considered the cavorting of the gods in a Supernatural world atop Mount Olympus childish fables; they refused to take the descriptions of Elysium, Hades and Tartarus (the regions of the dead in the supernal world on the other side of the River Styx to which Charon ferried the dead) as descriptions of anything real and existent. When the Christian Apostles came along with their version of a Supernatural world (with a Trinitarian God and with a Heaven and Hell), they naturally attached no more credence to the new Christian than to the ancient Greek version of the nature of that world.

Materialism—There is not much difference in the approach to the problem between modern Materialism and ancient Hylism. What it maintains about the nature of the world is not so naively Materialistic, but it still insists that the world is solely phenomenal in nature; it denies the existence of any supernal world ruled by divinities and populated with the ghosts of mankind.

The world, according to modern physicists, consists not of matter and energy but of waves and particles (wavicles). Whatever the nature of the underlying azoic substance of which it is composed, all the changes in the world and all of its marvels are produced by processes of material evolution influenced by random combination of elements and sequences of events, some of them of the most trivial and some of the most catastrophic nature. The galaxies and all the solar system of which the world is composed are scattered at random throughout space. Our Earth came into existence along with our entire solar system as a result of a celestial explosion of inconceivable dimensions, and it will eventually either die out altogether a few billion years from now when the Sun has finally burned itself out or it will disintegrate altogether when some star powerful enough to explode the whole system collides with our solar system. Everything on the Earth, the marvel of man himself and of all his creations, is the product not of any divine plan but of a chance concatenation of elements and events which has made his evolution possible. The universe with which he is confronted is a chaos, was a chaos when the substance took on the form of the Earth on which he finds himself, will still be a chaos after it finally disintegrates. All that exists

is in a state of complete confusion and complete disorder; all that seems orderly in the universe is what man himself reads into it, and this exists only in his own mind and in his own efforts in dealing with it.

From my standpoint and my Pluralistic approach to the ontoic problem, the modern Materialist like the modern Supernaturalist tends to be Monistic. The Supernaturalist tends to make God the sole factor ultimately necessary to explain what the world is and why it has come into existence. The Materialist sees no necessity for such an explanation. Both the Supernaturalists and the Materialists find it easy to become dogmatic, the first because the truth has been revealed to them, the second because science has shown clearly that there is no need for the hypothesis of any Creator. The Atheist is as dogmatic as the Theist; the Theist says there is a God, the Atheist that there is not. The Theist, unfortunately for him, cannot prove that there is a God (none of the alleged proofs stand up if carefully analyzed), but neither can the Atheist prove that there is no God. The Atheist can (as can the Agnostic without becoming an Atheist) deny the existence of any specific kind of God the Theists describe (it is impossible to describe what is infinite in finite words), but that some kind of God exists—some kind of omnipotent entity such as Schopenhauer called an omnipotent will—nobody can logically deny. The premises for making such a denial simply do not exist.

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Pluralistic Solutions of the Riddle—Fortunately the man puzzled by his confrontation with the world does not have to choose either a Supernatural or Materialistic solution of the problem, for there are Pluralistic solutions in contrast to the two Monistic solutions for him to consider.

Pluralists can accept what the Materialists affirm as true about the universe in so far as it is positively affirmed upon the basis of scientific demonstration. But they do not need to accept what the Materialists deny about the world on the basis of inferences which cannot be demonstrated as true.

Naturalism—The doctrine of Naturalism (which expands what man can know about nature, not only from sensory observation but from any source of knowledge, into a world-view)

provides a basis for this rejection of a purely Materialistic solution of the problem.

If the concept of nature is used to refer to the essential character or constitution of everything, a Naturalian view of the world must include everything embraced in it; it can leave nothing out. If there is in truth more than one world, and one of them is a Preternatural or Supernatural world, that too must then be considered a part of nature and of what is natural. But the words nature and the concept of the natural are more often used in more limited significations, as referring only to what is objective. When so used, the conception of anything Supernal and the very idea of a Supernal world and of Supernal entities becomes something outside of nature, something unnatural, something supernatural. But since we have the word, objective, with which to designate what "natural" in this limited signification means, the word nature and the doctrine of Naturalism might better be used to designate something which Objective and Objectivism do not.

If Naturalism is thus distinguished from both Objectivism and Materialism, the Naturalian must be a Pluralist. He has no need therefore to indulge in Reductionism; he need neither reduce everything to something which is Supernal in nature, as the Monistic Supernaturalist must logically do, nor to something which is objective in nature as the Monistic Materialist must do. The Materialist reduces the world, animate and inanimate, to some ultimate form of matter and energy; he dismisses everything of an organic nature as being a mere manifestation of material forces. The Naturalian can simply take for granted the complex of things which as a whole constitute the world; he can take everything animate and organic on the Earth and everything inanimate and inorganic on it equally for granted.

He can accept less from the Supernaturalist, because very little of what the Supernaturalist maintains is susceptible to satisfactory demonstration. But he cannot dismiss evidence such as Parapsychologists like Rhine provide about the existence of forces in the world seemingly Preternatural in nature. Until much more is known about them, he must accept the possibility of their existence. Because of the limitations of man's mind and senses,

he may never be able, however, to obtain the knowledge needed to go beyond this point. He may have to remain Ignostic.

Agnosticism and Ignosticism—Concerning many beliefs about the nature of the world the Pluralist must, therefore, be satisfied with a sort of contingent Agnosticism; about them he may have to be satisfied to remain timelessly a truthseeker; about others he must logically remain not merely agnostic but positively Ignostic.

Realism—Naturalism predicates itself upon Realism, which maintains that entities and objects, events and occurrences, known by adequately verified perception or ratiocination exist independently of their being known mentally by human beings. By this test, the reality of objective entities and of the objective world is incontestable. But this cannot be said about Supernatural entities and the Supernatural world.

Supernal entities like God can be said to subsist⁶ but not to exist because our knowledge of them is limited to what we can learn about them from inspiration and revelation. Their reality cannot be adequately verified perceptually or ratiocinationally. Whatever reality they have is in men's minds; all the rest is a matter of faith. But this, of course, does not justify dismissing the possibility that in spite of this they may nevertheless exist and that there is, even if it cannot be demonstrated, a spiritual world.

For Pluralists there cannot therefore be one Monistic world, either Supernal or objective, nor two worlds, but a world complex. The world and everything in it cannot be reduced logically to an azoic simplex; Realism insists that it is a complex and should be accepted as such. Without this, it is impossible to reconcile the demonstrable fact that the universe contains both animate and inanimate objects.

Natural Religion—Just as there are Supernatural and Materialistic religions, so there are Naturalian religions. Of all the religions which fall into this category, the most important is probably Buddhism, if a distinction is made between those Buddhist denominations (of which Thibetan Mahayanism is typical) which are Supernaturalistic, and what might be called Gautamaism—the religion actually taught by Gautama. Hinayana Buddhism comes much closer to being a Natural Religion than Mahayana.

Zen Buddhism probably is even still closer, if not to Gautamaism at least to Naturalism.

Confucianism is another Naturalian religion; so is Taoism, if stripped of its magical accretions. Now that Communist China has a State established Materialistic religion, (what shall it be called? Dialectical Materialism? Marxism? Communism?), it is difficult to say how much is left of the following of these two Naturalistic religions.

In the West, *Humanism*, even for those Humanists who most positively repudiate religion, is a religion; so is *Ethical Culturism*; so is *Unitarianism* and *Universalism* (if its Deism is reinterpreted as most of its leaders re-interpret it today). What seems to be common to all these religions is what can be technically called *Anthropocentrism* to distinguish it from the Theistic preoccupation of Supernaturalistic religions. They all place man's well being here and now in the center of their concern; they are this-worldly rather than other-worldly. Yet they are not and, to the extent to which they are Realistic and Naturalian, they cannot logically be Materialistic. They can and should wholeheartedly subscribe to the proposition that man cannot live by bread alone, as our study of the anthroptic problem has made clear.

Most of the believers in Natural Religion (any deeply devoted believer in some social movement or cultural cause which is concerned with life here and now is really a believer in Natural Religion) are unaware of the fact that they are religious in nature; most of them unfortunately are unaffiliated with any organized Natural Religion. In their often painful revolt against orthodoxy, against Supernaturalism, and against the Church, they have tended to identify organization with religion, and, having revolted against religion, are also in revolt against organization. The question might well be asked, to what extent does the solution of the riddle of the universe which I have called Pluralistic and Naturalistic call for religious affiliation?

The answer, I believe, both in practice and in terms of the highest values is for two reasons affiliation: (1) practically, because this is the only way in which they can make their convictions count, particularly against those with convictions which are not merely superstitious but prejudicial to mankind's real well-being,

but also (2) theoretically, in dealing with the ultimate aloneness of every individual in the immensity and the individual finity of the world in which he finds himself. There are various ways of mitigating this ultimate aloneness, friendship and family being one of them, but one of the most rewarding is religious fellowship with those having like values, like beliefs, and like convictions. Affiliation provides a means for dealing with both these problems.

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Crucial to the solution of the riddle of the universe is, of course, the question of whether in adopting one's beliefs and organizing action upon them one should believe that the universe is a chaos or a cosmos. For the Materialist the objective evidence upon which he relies establishes clearly that it is a meaningless chaos; for the Supernaturalist the religious experience upon which he relies proves clearly that it is a designed cosmos. Since the Pluralist is logically doomed always to hold metaphysical beliefs contingently, he must logically accept the purely objective evidence about the random character of the universe considered as a whole. But he cannot equally logically ignore the strictly objective evidence that all living things, unlike inanimate things, are perpetually engaged in trying to create an order—an order at least in which survival for them is easier and more desirable. Here on Earth he knows that an extraordinary two-legged creature has evolved which lives, knows that it lives, and knows that it is confronted by the world. It has the capacity, demonstrated over and over again, for creating a sort of social order which it calls tribal or national; a sort of economic order which is expressed in its marketing, production, distribution and monetary systems; a sort of moral and political order which it calls "law and order"; and, finally, a sort of esthetic order which is symbolized in its architectural structures, in its music and drama, in its prose and poetry, in its painting and sculpture.

The Pluralist dare not ignore this ordering capacity of man if he is to be consistent and logical. He need not dismiss it as temporal as does the Materialist nor exalt it unduly as does the Supernaturalist. That an order-seeking and an order-making creature should exist in a chaotic universe is for him an inescap-

able fact even if he has no answer as yet, and perhaps no means for ever obtaining an answer, to the riddle it poses.

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That man is a wonder, that the world is a wonder, that time and events are a wonder, are true. Yet nothing seems to me a greater wonder than man's extraordinary capacity for order-making (a capacity of which *Homo sapiens* is the supreme exemplar in the animal kingdom), even if the greatest monuments in which he embodies it, both cultural and architectural, all seem destined eventually to decay and pass away.

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Perhaps there is more significance than he himself realized packed into one of those witty things for which Oscar Wilde was famous; perhaps in the final analysis man will prove to be God, because, as Wilde put it, "Nature imitates Art."

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem II: The Ontoic Problem

This outline is a condensation of over three hundred pages of manuscripts, notes, and charts. In the original there were chapters not only on the various "objects" which comprise the phenomenal world but also those assumed to exist by various religions and schools of thought in the supernal world. But there were separate chapters dealing with each of the various categories of objects in both these worlds; for instance, on the "natural" and "artificial" (man-made) objects (both "hypostatic" and "fictional") of various kinds which constitute the phenomenal world; each chapter was an attempt to show how the available knowledge about these objects could be used to throw light on the riddle of the universe.

1. *World versus Universe*—I have used the term world throughout this discussion to refer to what the term universe usually designates. The term universe comes to us from Latin, *uni*, meaning one, and *versum*, meaning to turn; by derivation universe means to turn into one. But the world is not one thing, but a multiplicity of things; it would be better described as a multiverse.

Using the term *world* seems to avoid this terminological bias. Though world is used frequently as a synonym for the Earth, the fact that we have a perfectly acceptable term with which to designate our planet, makes it unnecessary to use world for that purpose. This fact frees it for the use I am making of it. The word itself is derived from a variety of old English roots, most of which can be used to suggest "old." Certainly the dictionary definition of world, using the phrase "the Earth and the heavens" not only refers to something as old as eternity but lends countenance to my substitution of world for universe.

2. *Ontologies versus Ontology*—Of all the subjects with which philosophy has traditionally concerned itself, ontology seems to me the least rewarding. If *being* is defined as what actually exists (what can be known phenomenally), we have some objective basis for discussing what it refers to. But if it is defined as what exists ultimately (that is, exists supernally), the only knowledge about it we can have must be based upon some revelation, and no amount of analysis of such knowledge can ever be anything more than an analysis of the words we use in trying to describe it.

The term ontology has already been pre-empted by philosophers and metaphysicians; they use it to refer to what is, in theory, the science of being but is in fact that branch of academic philosophy which carries on an endless discussion of the nature and the essential properties and characteristics of being, about the nature of which they are in disagreement. Most of these discussions, unfortunately, invest the concept of being with such charismatic and even mystical properties as to deprive the discussion of

any genuinely scientific force; as it is used in this study it is merely a synonym for anything and everything which exists.

As I use it in the discussion of what I have so long called the ontoic problem, it refers to any endeavor to consider scientifically (that is logically and systematically) the nature of the world, any part of it, and anything and everything, including man, which any school of thought, even the most unscientific, alleges it to be. Even delusions and illusions, dreams and visions, myths and legends have existence, at least in men's minds. The derivation of the word from the Greek word *onto*, meaning things which exist, justifies the use I am making of the term.

3. *The Ontoic Problem versus the Anthropic and Etiologic Problem*—Both Anthropoics and Ontologics are studies of a static nature—studies of objects which exist—but in the case of the object called *Homo sapiens* by zoologists, the problem isn't one any longer about the physical nature of man. We have limitless numbers of well-established facts about his physical nature, but about his mental and subjective nature we know relatively little.

In the case of ontoics, however, everything except man's mind has to be considered objectively, as if it had tangible, physical existence; this is true even of the objects (perhaps better called the entities) represented by the Preternatural or Supernatural world and everything alleged about them including God.

The etiologic problem, on the other hand, is a study of a dynamic nature; it is the study of events and experiences and the question of their causation. It deals with the same objects as anthropoics and ontoics, but considers them as they in fact are, things "in flux," things constantly in motion and constantly engaged in changing, however slowly. What the geologist deals with usually changes very slowly (even the rocks change over eons of time); what the historian deals with changes very rapidly. They are for immediate use static, but in the long run, not static at all.

4. *The Supernal World*—What the major religions have to say about the noumenal world is scattered throughout their sacred scriptures. The following five books concentrate upon this problem, though they are very unorthodox and very out of the ordinary:

Rudolf Steiner, *Knowledge of the Higher Worlds and Its Attainment*, Putnams, N.Y., 1932.

P. D. Ouspensky, *A New Model of the Universe*, Knopf, N.Y., 1934.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Edge of the Unknown*, Murray, London, 1930.

Sir Oliver Lodge, *Man and the Universe*, Methuen, London, 1909.

Steward Edward White, *The Unobstructed Universe*, Dutton, N.Y., 1941.

5. *The Objective World*—A bibliography dealing with this would have to be a virtual catalogue of scientific works; some one who would like merely to dip into this literature will find any good encyclopaedia

completely adequate. One of the following provides a synoptic rather than specialized view of the sciences: the others emphasize the wonder in contrast to the details of the sciences.

The Universe, by the editors of *The Scientific American*, Simon & Shuster, N.Y., 1956.

Jean Henri Fabre, *The Wonders of Instinct*, Century Co., N.Y., 1918; *The Insect World of Jean Henri Fabre*, Dodd, Mead, N.Y., 1949.

Maurice Maeterlinck, *The Life of the Bee*, Dodd, Mead, N.Y., 1940.

Rachel Carson, *The Sea Around Us*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1951.

Liberty Hyde Bailey, *The Holy Earth*, Scribners, N.Y., 1917.

John Burroughs, *The Breath of Life*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1915; *Time and Change*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1912; *Ways of Nature*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1905.

Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1960.

6. *Subsistent versus Existent*—All Supernal entities have a sort of existence in men's minds and in the words they use in speaking and writing about them. A distinction needs to be made between this kind of existence and the kind demonstrable with regard to tangible objects. This distinction is not at all academic since all "living" hypostatizations have the same sort of shadowy existence. Yet in spite of this, if they still have "life" in them and men still act as if they were real, they have consequences as real as if they were not in fact figments in men's minds. The State has this sort of existence in contrast to the State's president or prime minister whose existence is of a very different order of being.

To mark this distinction I am using the words, *subsist* and *subsistent*, to denote this shadowy sort of existence and the words, *exist* and *existent*, to denote objects about the substantial existence of which there can be no rational doubt. By *subsistent*, then, I mean the being of any entity which is conceivable and about which true statements and not only false statements can be made, but which are not, in fact, real or existent; by *existent*, the being of anything which manifests itself by extension in time and space and which therefore exists independently of its being known mentally by human beings.

The State *subsists*, it does not *exist*. No amount of intellectual legerdemain will ever establish its existence. While positive negation is not justifiable, this is probably also true of the being of all supernatural entities like Satan. They *subsist* in men's minds and they will *subsist* as long as men believe in them and ministers and priests discuss them, but that their existence will ever be demonstrated is exceedingly improbable.

Supernal Ontoic Ideologies:

Paul Tillich, *The Eternal Now*, Scribners, N.Y., 1963.

Walter R. Matthews, *Theism*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1964.

Heinrich Zimmer, *The Philosophy of India*, Pantheon, N.Y., 1951.

Carl Jung, *The Undiscovered Self*, Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1958.

Jacques Maritain, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism*, Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1955.

Oliver L. Reiser, *The Evolution of Cosmologies*, in "Philosophy of Science," Vol. 10, No. 2, April, 1952.

Fred Hoyle, *The Nature of the Universe*, Harper, N.Y., 1951.

Aurobindo Gosh, *The Riddle of this World*, Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, India.

Mahatma Gandhi, *My God*, Navajivan Pub. House, Ahmedabad, India, 1962; *My Religion*, Navajivan Pub. House, Ahmedabad, India.

Aldous Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*, Harper, N.Y., 1954; *The Perennial Philosophy*, Harper, N.Y., 1945.

Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, Willett, Clarke, N.Y., 1941.

Karl Barth, *God in Action*, Round Table Press, N.Y., 1935.

Rudolf Steiner, *Goethe's Conception of the World*, Anthroposophic Press, N.Y., 1928.

Alfred North Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., 1920.

A. S. Pringle Pattison, *The Idea of God*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1920.

George W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, University of Chicago Press, 1948; *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, England, 1942.

C. C. J. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1920.

Paul Carus, *The Gospel of Buddha*, Open Court, Chicago, 1909.

William James, *Varieties of Religious Experiences*, Longmans, Green, N.Y., 1904.

Jane Ellen Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of the Greek Religion*, Cambridge University Press, 1903.

Arthur James Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, G. H. Doran, N.Y., 1915; *Foundations of Belief*, Longmans, Green, N.Y., 1895; *A Defense of Philosophic Doubt*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1879.

Robeson W. Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, A. & C. Black, Edinburgh, 1889.

Hesiod's *Theogony*, in *Hesiod*, Macmillan, London, 1934.

Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, C. P. Putnam, N.Y., 1912; *Elan Vital*.

Materialistic Ontoic Ideologies:

Albert Einstein, *Out of My Later Years*, Philosophical Library, N.Y., 1950.

George Gamow, *One, Two, Three, Infinity*, Viking, N.Y., 1947.

R. W. Sellers, *The Philosophy of Physical Realism*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1932.

Arthur S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., 1932.

Hyman Levy, *A Philosophy for Modern Man*, Knopf, N.Y., 1938.

Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, Liveright, N.Y., 1953; *Totem and Taboo*, Moffat, Yard & Co., London, 1918.

Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, J. M. Dent, London, 1937.

Ernst Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*, Harper, N.Y., 1901.

John B. Stallo, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*, Appleton, N.Y., 1897.

Paul H. T. d'Holbach, *The System of Nature*, J. P. Mendum, Boston, 1853.

David Hume, *Natural History of Religion*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1957.

Lucretius, *The Nature of the Universe*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959.

Pluralistic Ontoic Ideologies:

Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1960.

Werner Heisenberg, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1958; *Physics and Philosophy*, Harper, N.Y., 1958.

Lloyd and Mary Moraine, *Humanism as the Next Step*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1954.

Sir James Hopwood Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*, The University Press, Cambridge, England, 1948; *Physics and Philosophy*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1943.

Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1948.

Max Planck, *Where is Science Going*, Norton, N.Y., 1932.

Sir John Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, Longmans, Green, N.Y., 1912.

- William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, Longmans, Green, N.Y., 1909.
- G. T. Holyoke, *English Secularism*, Open Court, Chicago, 1896.
- Thomas H. Huxley, *Science and Christian Tradition*, Appleton, N.Y., 1896.
- Leslie Stephen, *An Agnostic's Apology*, Putnams, N.Y., 1893.
- Sir John Lubbock, *Use of Life*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1894.
- Thomas Paine, *The Age of Reason*, Bobbs-Merrill, N.Y.
- R. B. Winn, "Is Nature Rational"? in *Philosophy of Science*, July, 1939.
- Paul Carus, *The Gospel of Buddha*, Open Court, Chicago, 1909.

PROBLEM III

The Riddle of Histrography: Events and Experiences, Causes and Effects, Challenges and Responses. A Study of the Etiologic Problem

Nature will be reported. All things are engaged in writing their history. The planet, the pebble goes attended by its shadow. The rolling rock leaves its scratches on the mountain; the animal, its bones in the stratum; the fern and leaf, their modest epitaph in the coal. The falling drop makes its sculpture in the sand and stone. Not a foot steps into the snow, or along the ground, but prints, in charters more or less lasting, a map of its march. Every act of man inscribes itself in the memories of his fellows, and in his own manners and face. The air is full of sounds; the sky, of tokens; the ground is all memoranda and signature; and every object covered over with hints, which speak to the intelligent.... this self-registration is incessant.—Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Representative Man*.

We are living in one of the most challenging periods in all history. It is trite to say that upon the response we make to the challenge this creates for us is dependent the happiness of mankind. But it happens to be true. For upon that response is dependent the future course of history, whether events in that future will revivify and perhaps realize the vision of a really free world, or whether we will continue to sink into the blackness of a secure but regimented totalitarian world.

Crisis such as these are not novelties. It has not been unusual for mankind to be challenged by crises as grave as this one, nor has it been unusual for the responses made to them to be the wrong ones. In a sense we are continuously confronted by such challenges. The problem is a perpetual and a universal one. Because of the nature of this one, it might well have been the first

problem I should have considered in this study. Only my desire to present these basic problems in a strictly logical order has made me consider this one third, rather than first.

Like the two previous problems we have considered, this is first of all a noetic problem—a problem created for us for mental resolution by the many alternative explanations offered for the etiology of history.¹

The problem originates because of two facts:

1. The fact that the world itself and everything in it is dynamic in nature—not static, as consideration of man and of the universe, as if they were objects, tends to imply. In actuality man confronts not “things,” big and little, but events and experiences² in which every single, solitary “thing,” animate and inanimate, including himself, including the Earth and the Sun and the rest of the universe, plays a part. The riddle of historiography³ is created for him by the state of flux in which all things exist and subsist, including himself (so vulnerable), including the hardest and solidest of the rocks; it is created for him by the procession of events of which the cataclysmic explosion which gave birth to our Sun and its planets was one, and of which every page of human history (so many of them blood-stained) is a part; by the succession of experiences, so many of them meaningless, so many of them ugly and painful which constitute his life—a life to which he clings so desperately yet doomed nevertheless to end with his own death and with the loss of everything and the death of every one he loves, and about all of which he cannot help asking “Why?” To paraphrase Emerson, the problem is created for him by the fact that all things (not only man) are engaged in writing history. This is the first fact.

2. The second is that the manner in which all problems and all conditions and situations are dealt with is determined by what each man or the determining number in a society believes about the causes of events and the causes of human experiences.

These beliefs about causation reduce to three:

1. The belief that all human history as well as the historiography of the whole world reflects a divinely created Supernal or Supernatural plan of some kind (as most of mankind has always believed);

2. The belief that histiography reflects a purely Mechanistic and Deterministic scheme of things in which man's ability to choose is purely illusory (as Fatalists of all kinds believe);

3. The belief that this is a world in which, no matter how many events and experiences take place which are beyond man's control, there are a sufficient number of them about which he can do enough on his own initiative to make life worth living (as realistic Naturalists and Humanists of all kinds must logically believe).

Biologic Irritability and Instinctual Plasticity—The whole of this study of man's and of society's basic problems is based upon the meaning attached to events and experiences, and to the fact that every event and every experience in man's life is in some degree a challenge to which man cannot avoid making a response of some kind. Biologists call the animal phenomena of response to stimuli biologic "irritability," and the fact that man cannot rely upon his instincts to determine the responses he makes to what stimulates him, they call the "plasticity" of the instincts in man. Both the fact of "irritability" and the fact of "plasticity" suggest the validity of Toynbee's famous interpretations of history in terms of challenge and response.⁴

An *event*, in the meaning attached to the term here, is anything which has in fact transpired at some place and during some interval of time (however short), beginning and ending with some change, some motion or some action in some thing or things, animate or inanimate. It is not merely, therefore, something important—important enough to make the newspapers or to be recorded in histories. Even trivial actions are, in the literal meaning of the term, events.

It is necessary to emphasize two things, that events are objective in nature (what takes place is subject to observation just as is any other fact which is objective in nature), and that they have antecedent causes of some kind and subsequently produce effects of some kind.

Experiences, on the other hand, are like events in some of their characteristics (they take place during some interval of time and at some particular place, they have antecedent causes and have subsequent effects), but differ in essence because they are

purely subjective in nature. All that others know objectively about experiences is what they are told about them by those who have had them (each individual, of course, has immediate or subjective but not objective knowledge of his own experiences). Hearsay knowledge of the experiences of others (even if the hearsay is that which the experienter himself has reported) becomes objective only to the extent to which it is possible to confirm it from independent observation, and then it is the event which is observed rather than the experience.

Child-birth is an event, but giving-birth is for each mother an experience which men can observe and try to imagine but which they can never experience. It is not only an experience for the mother but also for the child. If the Freudians are right, the painful transition from the safety of the womb to the insecurities of life is for the child a life-long traumatic experience.

This usage of experience fills a gap in scientific terminology; as the word is used by Empiricists it really means experiment; we have no other word at present with which to designate what transpires subjectively, action by action or episode by episode. This is the interpretation of William James, which led him to make the distinction between Positive and Radical Empiricism.

Cause refers not merely to the necessary antecedent of an effect, but to Aristotle's *efficient cause*, the immediate agency for the production of the effect. The moment remote causes are used to explain an effect, investigation can be endless (interesting as this may be), since they can be endlessly retraced, going back in theory to creation itself. This restriction on the meaning attached to cause is enormously important in ethics. Modern Ethical Relativists⁵ deny the validity of any kind of ethical distinctions because, when the causes of acts are retraced, not even the most vicious rapist or the bloodiest murderer can be held responsible for his crimes—he was not the cause of them; he himself was the product of causes which made him what he was!

Effect, on the other hand, here retains its current meaning of the event which follows from an antecedent cause. More specifically and in the sense in which I use it, the word refers not only to objective events but also to subjective experiences which follow from antecedent causes.

Again, this is not an academic but an enormously important practical matter. Ethical Subjectivists⁵, just as they wipe out evil motives (no individual can be held responsible for his motives, since they are actually caused by antecedent causes for which he cannot be held accountable), so they wipe out evil consequences because when the consequences of a deed called evil are traced into the future far enough, what is called good must ultimately come from it. Consider the ultimate "good" which has come so far out of Hitler's slaughter of six million Jews—the United Nations has adopted a resolution condemning genocide! No doubt if we wait long enough, genocide itself will stop being practised. After all, mankind has pretty well stopped practising cannibalism. Unfortunately the six million dead Jews may have very dubious opinions about the validity of ignoring how they died because of the future good which came from their murder.

All this perhaps tedious definition is essential if Toynbee's grand conception of human history in terms of challenges and responses is to be accepted, and the present-day tendency to reduce to futility all attempts to elicit meaning and to find lessons in man's behavior and mankind's history is to be abandoned. If the evidence indicating that man has some power for determining how he acts is accepted, and if the doctrine that he acts entirely automatically (as Mechanism assumes) and ultimately by chance and at random (as Tychism assumes) is abandoned, the study of causes and effects in history, geneagraphy and biography becomes practically and not merely philosophically meaningful.

Challenge and Response hardly need definition, but one comment about the sense in which they are here used needs to be made. Toynbee used them to refer to civilizations; his history was in effect a study of the challenges to civilizations and the responses they made to them. I wish to include, in fact emphasize, the idea that the life of every individual consists of a sequence of challenges and responses and that his responses should not be thoughtless and impulsive as if he were a mere animal, but reflect the lessons it is possible to obtain from the study of histiography.

* * * *

In trying to understand man and the world in which he finds himself, and at the same trying to build a foundation for right-

education, not merely human history but world history in the broadest conception of the term must be integrated and evaluated. This is what I refer to as historiography. I suggest as a beginning that at least ten kinds of history be included in the concept.

*Sacred History*⁶—We must begin with what used to be called sacred history. But the concept of sacred history must not be restricted to that of the culture into which we happen to be born. Evaluation of our own sacred history without comparison with others is impossible. The history recorded in the poetry, the scriptures and bibles, and the traditions of all religions must be included, partly because so many millions believed and still believe unquestionably in their verity, partly because they purport to supply us with a record of the activities of not only the gods of the ancient world (Greek, Roman, Scandinavian, Egyptian, Indian, Chinese) but of the God and gods in whom people today believe (God, Allah, Jehovah) in creating the world and in governing its activities, but even more because of the important part the various sacred histories have played in secular history itself. (What would the history of Europe from Spain to Turkey be like, and of Africa from Egypt to Morocco, if the part played by Koranic sacred history in both continents were ignored?)

It is an ironic commentary on the bias with which history is written that the sacred histories of some peoples (for instance the ancient Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Babylonians) is invidiously distinguished from that of peoples with so-called higher religions by calling them mythologies and creating a special scientific study about them called mythogony. Yet the fact is that these "mythological" religions are in origin, in substance, and in the role played by them in history the same as the "higher" religions. This bias will never be eliminated until mythology and mythogony disappear and all the so-called mythical religions treated as an integral part of comparative religion as a whole.

Astronomic History, as recorded in astronomic observations of the beginning, the movements, and the end of stars and star systems, and in inferences about the origin and destiny of the Earth and of our Solar System, is macroscopic history, as atomic history is microscopic history.

In astronomic history events spread out in intervals of millions of years; when terrestrial history begins, intervals shorten to mere millions. When organic history begins, events speed up tremendously. But when mankind's history begins, they go by almost like lightning. In individual biography, they are continuous; one experience follows another without a break. A galaxy is born; it takes billions of years for it to die. A species of animal is born; it takes millions of years for it to die. A man is born; it takes only three score and ten years for him to die.

Atomic History, as recorded by physicists, is today providing us not only with the history of what goes on inside the atom but also the part it plays in both astronomic and terrestrial history. And what would current history be like, in the nuclear and missile age, if it weren't for atomic history?

Geologic History, which is the history of the Earth as recorded in its rocks and soils, is not just an academic study; without it how different would be our own history—a history without any of the great dams and other engineering works the study of geologic history has made possible.

Oceanographic History—without it how different would be the part played by mankind on the high seas.

Paleographic History, which paleontologists write for us, provides us with the history of life on the Earth as recorded in its fossilized remains.

Biologic History, as unravelled by evolutionists, has not only provided us with an account of the origin of all plants and animals, it has enabled us properly to evaluate what sacred history said about the origin of man. The controversy which Darwin precipitated with his theory of the origin of man shook Christendom to its foundations; if Darwin was right, sacred history as recorded in the Bible was wrong. And if the Bible was not infallible, how could we know that Christianity was true?

Archeologic History, as it is being patiently unravelled by archeologists, provides us with almost all that we now know about the prehistoric, unwritten history of mankind.

Geographic, Ethnographic, and Demographic Histories each provide important bodies of facts which can be (but are very little) used to throw light on the etiology of mass-behavior.

* * * *

History proper⁷ ought to be a veritable quarry of lessons in the etiology of social, economic, and political behavior, but little of it is written with that in mind. Yet even as it is, it contains lessons of the utmost importance to which no one pays any attention, least of all the politicians who are responsible for so much of it. Most unfortunately, since it has been nationalized and made into a political instrument, it has been diabolized. Instead of being written and studied for the purpose of throwing light on mankind's inhumanity to man—on mankind's social pathologies and social tragedies—and to provide lessons about how to avoid endless repetitions of the same mistakes, the same injustices, and the same bloody and destructive wars which dot its pages, it is an instrument shaped to enlist the emotions and the patriotic feelings of everybody in the promotion of what their political misleaders call "the national interest."

If this is to be ended, and if history's immense potentialities for promoting the well-being of mankind realized, it must become a three-fold study, (1) past history, which is all that it is for the most part today; (2) current history—which is left to be exploited by the popular press, and (3) future history which, as a scientific study, is non-existent.

1. *Past (Rise-and-Fall) History*⁸—However much it may add to the mere task of recording the past, history should be written upon a foundation of causal analysis of what has taken place, is taking place, and will take place. At the very least, the determining number of people in society must be made aware of the lessons history can teach. These lessons must replace the naiveté of catering to "the voice of the people." For the "voice of the people" is not the "voice of God"; the voice of the people is the voice of the people—for the most part nothing more than clamor for stupidities and for prejudices which, unless they are rightly-educated, make the people what Alexander Hamilton called them, "a great beast."

2. *Current History*⁹—Without adequate analysis and study of current history, past history becomes a mere part of the tragic and romantic literature of mankind. What is done currently internationally, intra-nationally, and locally, community by community, determines not only the current but the future well-being or ill-being of mankind. For it is always the current situation with which individuals and groups deal, and it is at this point that the lessons of the past are either applied or ignored.

3. Finally there is *Post (Future Predictive) History*¹⁰—If the future is to provide hope, instead of providing the cynics justification for saying, "I told you so," nothing is more important than the use not only of historic knowledge but the historic imagination (given the current situation and the continuance of current trends) in providing adequate predictions and extrapolations of what the future holds in store. It is possible to distinguish at least four kinds of Predictive History, by novelists (*The Brave New World*, Aldous Huxley): by utopians (*Walden Two*, B.F. Skinner); by historians (*Whither Mankind?* Charles A. Beard), and by scientists (*Where is Science Going?* Max Plank). It is a genre of its own.

* * * *

History proper may stop with the account of mass-behavior, but historiography should not stop there. From the mass it should proceed to the individual. In the final analysis mass-behavior is a hypostatization of individual behavior; masses (nations and races, empires and civilizations) are, in fact, figments of our imagination; only individuals act.

Geneagraphic History,¹¹ of which there is almost none in comparison with the others, is the history of families in contrast to that of nations and individuals. Some pioneer scientific work has been done in this field by LePlay¹² and his followers.

Its importance as a contribution to the etiology of human genetics is suggested by the famous "History" of the Kallikak family¹³ and by the case "histories" provided by such famous families as the Bach family and the Adams family. But for every scientific study of geneagraphy there are probably a half dozen fictional geneagraphies (Blackmore's story of the Doone family in *Lorna Doone*; Galsworthy's *Forsythe saga*; Balzac's *Comedie*

Humaine). So important is the contribution which this might make toward a revival of pride in family (but on a eugenic and not caste basis) that its neglect is inexcusable.

Finally, there is *Biographic History*,¹⁴ of which there is already enough to make a major contribution to the understanding of man and his responses to the challenge of events. Unfortunately it consists mainly of the histories of famous men; we need equally detailed histories of the lives of unfamous men and women (LePlay confined his studies to such families). It is surprising what significant lessons can be drawn from the lives of insignificant men and women.

* * * *

What I have called the etiologic problem and solutions to it date back to the beginning of mankind. From the very beginning man has not only asked questions about his origin and his destiny, he has accepted answers of some kind to them. All these solutions to the problem, as in the case of solutions to all basic problems, fall into one of our three doctrinal or ideological categories. In the case of solutions of the etiologic problem, I think of supernal interpretations of history as *Preternatural Etiologic Doctrines*, of objective interpretations of it as *Mechanistic Doctrines*, and of intellectual interpretations as *Pluralistic*.

Preternatural Etiologic Doctrines and Ideologies—All the solutions of the riddle of historiography which I think of as *Preternatural* have two things in common: (1) they all take for granted the proposition that no natural or empirical or merely intellectual explanation of the causes of events is adequate—this negative doctrine is what I think of as *Preternaturalism*, and (2) they all take for granted the proposition that the true explanation of events is that they have been in some ultimate sense divinely caused—this positive doctrine I think of as *Divinism*. All interpretations of events must properly, therefore, be interpretations of the nature of the divine will.

About the nature of the divine will, unfortunately, theologians and religions differ, though each theologian and every religion is certain about which interpretation is the true one.

Divinism—Three different explanations of the manner in which the divine will functions are probably the most important.

The first is that either on His own initiative or in response to prayers and petitions of the right kind He intervenes into the ordinary operations of nature and into the course of events recorded in one or more kinds of histiography. This has been called *Occasionalism*; in my terminology it is *Divine Interventionism*. The second is that every event and everything that takes place is an expression of His will; in my terminology this doctrine is *Divine Predeterminism*. (If this is the way all our actions and all events are caused, then Calvin's monstrous doctrine of *Predestinarianism* is vindicated). The third is that He neither intervenes nor predetermines; that having played the part of Creator or First Cause in creating the universe, He leaves events to nature and to nature's laws as He leaves us to our own devices and to our wisdom or folly. This makes him a faineant divinity, and I think this conception of the role played by divinity as *Divine Faineantism*.

Petitionism—In spite of the fact that belief in Deism or Faineantism has greatly increased since the scientific revolution, and in spite of the inconsistency involved in believing in Predeterminism or some other form of Fatalism and yet praying for Divine Intervention, in practice, if not in theory, the overwhelming majority of believers in Preternaturalism habitually pray, and pray for the granting of desires or requests by an act or dispensation of Divine Intervention. A certain kind of impudence is really reflected in making such petitions, since the deity is often asked for a miracle—for a suspension of the laws of nature, if that is needed in order to grant what has been requested.

For some divinities or for some supernatural agencies, prayer and petitioning may not be enough and the practice of *Propitiationism* is called for. By making blood-sacrifices or burnt-offerings, paying tithes, buying indulgences, giving alms, and making donations to sacred causes and institutions, God or the supernatural agency being addressed in this way can be persuaded to favor the petitioner or petitioning group, and if He has been angered, appeased and persuaded not merely to grant favors but to consider expiated a sin or crime committed by them.

To assure the favor of the entity or of entities powerful enough to grant such favors, both individual petitioners and the

congregations to which they belong (the nations, religions, denominations, churches, temples, synagogues), devote themselves to various forms of *Ritualism* of which three are most important, (1) adoration and worship, (2) observance of commandments, including in many religions the command to evangelize, and (3) belief in the metaphysical assumptions of a creed.

Finally, to communicate and receive communications from the powers capable of controlling events, there is recourse to divination, mystical communion, or the revelations of holy scriptures, holy Churches, holy Priests and Prophets. But at this point, since the quest for ultimate truth is involved, we are touching upon the Epistemic problem, Problem IV, the problem of how to validate and to verify knowledge.

Fatalism and Predeterminism—Fatalistic religions and religious doctrines are logically compelled to repudiate the whole of Interventionism. The Calvinistic interpretation of Christian sacred history was Deterministic; not only great events but the most trifling experiences of humble men and women were predestined by God. Christians, however, were not the only believers in the ideology of Predestination; Muslims were also believers in Fatalism (they believe in a God-ordained fate; "It is the will of Allah").

The Roman Catholic interpretation of Christian sacred history and that of most Protestant denominations, including those which are most Fundamentalistic in their interpretations of it, completely denied Predestination; God was a Voluntarist and had endowed man with free-will. There is a measure of inconsistency in this interpretation and in the belief in divine Interventionism; if God can be persuaded by prayer or by other means of propitiation to interpose His will into the course of events, man's free-will operates most efficaciously not when it leads him to make the right decisions about how to deal with a problem but when he uses it to petition God to do what he, the petitioner, wishes done about it.

One other doctrine must be briefly touched upon in this outline, Satanism or Pan-Demonism.

Pan-Demonism (the belief in the existence of demons or genii localized in all sorts of natural phenomena and capable, like Satan, of effecting events and intervening into the ordinary

operations of nature—one of the most ubiquitous forms of Satanism), inverts the whole of this ideology by substituting for a good God, or good divinities or spirits, what many religious people and even more believers in the Preternatural believe to be a mere agency (the power of evil agencies rather than good ones).

When I am confronted with these conflicting solutions of the etiologic problem—each of which, puzzled mankind is assured, has been revealed as the truth by God—the temptation for me to say, “A pox on all of them,” is irresistible.

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All that we know is mental, it is true, but even though merely mental and unilluminated by any divine insight, this much we can take for granted: there is only one cause about which man can do anything, that is the cause about which he has the power to do something. About the rest, he will have to rediscover what all animals other than man take for granted: the world exists, it has always existed, it will always in some form exist. It has not been caused; it is both cause and effect; it is itself not only the first but also the last cause; no other first cause needs to be discovered; he does not need to create a Creator to account for histiography.

The derivative notion that God (or any other kind of Preternatural power) can or will do anything for him, is nothing but hope based upon faith. On the other hand, the notion of Mechanists of all schools (that man can do nothing about the matter anyway, that what he thinks he is doing about them is an illusion) is based on the assumption that there is some esoteric reason why he should deny the dictates of common sense and deny that he has the power to do something, however little, about events and about his own experiences with them.

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Mechanistic Etiologic Ideologies—Mechanistic solutions of the problem are all of them consistently Deterministic, only they base their Determinism and their denial of free-will on a scientific interpretation of causes and events. Mechanism is a scientific doctrine; Mechanists think of themselves as scientific.

*Determinism*¹⁵—Fatalism, Necessitarianism, or Determinism, whatever the term used, designates not one self-consistent doctrine

but in reality three classes of doctrines, all of them dealing with Determinism. The first of these is the answer to the riddle of historiography which Communists and Marxists, Socialists and Statists, make, variously called *Historical Materialism*, *Economic Determinism*, and *Social Determinism*. The second is the answer which Malthusians, Predatory Capitalists, Imperialists (Cecil Rhodes), and Fascists (Mussolini, Hitler) make—the Determinism usually called *Social Darwinism*. Finally there are entirely antithetical doctrines such as *Indeterminism* and *Mutatism*, to which Libertarians and believers in a free state and free economy subscribe, but these are Pluralistic and not Mechanistic in nature.

Historical Materialism maintains that all forms of historiography (natural, human, and biographical) is merely a record of evolutionary changes of matter and of material entities (including man) and should be interpreted in terms of physical and not spiritual or ethical causes. It considers interpretation in terms of divine or even of individual human causation, or in fact any non-material cause, as chimerical and mythical.

Economic Determinism (Scientific Socialism) maintains that social systems, the institutions of which they are composed, and the ideologies which rationalize them, are determined mechanistically by changes in the modes of production. By this theory Marx predicted an inevitable increase of antagonism (class war) between capitalists and workers (bourgeoisie and proletariat); an inevitable concentration of ownership of capital; an increase of exploitation and of misery for the workers; the inevitable disappearance of the middle classes (the petit bourgeoisie); an inevitable revolt of the workers (the proletariat), and as a result the triumphant expropriation of all the expropriators.

Social Darwinism, on the other hand, interprets events and history, as a reflection of the evolutionary struggle for the survival of the fittest; it sees man, both individually and in aggregations, as inescapably acting as a competitive and not a cooperative animal, and sees the struggle of each against all as not only essential to the evolution of higher forms but as inescapable, since all attempts at abrogating it finally result in the degeneration and extinction of those belonging to the societies which try it.

Before evaluating these solutions of the problem and taking into consideration the point of view of Indeterminism and Mutationism, one more group of Mechanistic doctrines must be taken into account: *Tychism*, *Accidentalism*, and the doctrine I think of as *Immutatism*.

Tychism considers that everything which occurs, occurs by chance, that the variations which develop as a result of evolution are purely fortuitous, and that events and history, however much man may think he determines and causes any of them, are in fact matters of caprice. Not cause but chance should be considered, according to them, the objective reality which explains histriography.

Accidentalism, if it is to be considered in any way a distinct doctrine, may be used to designate the doctrine that the assumption that events are causally related is an illusion, and that, as a matter of fact, the appearance of connection is a merely temporal and spatial accident with no assurance that it will continue in time or that it operates in the same way throughout all space.

Both *Accidentalism* and *Tychism* deny *Uniformitarianism*, which we will consider when we turn to *Pluralistic* solutions of our problem.

Immutatism seems to me a necessary term to designate the doctrine that the world (as evidenced by events both natural and human) does not change in essence but merely in form; that the world merely exists and events merely take place, and that they do not change either for the better (*Optimism*) nor for the worse (*Pejorism* and *Pessimism*) and that nothing can be done about the matter (*Meliorism*). *Immutatism* is the antithesis of *Mutatism* which is a *Pluralistic*, not *Mechanistic*, approach to causation.

Mechanistic Causationism—I have had to coin the term *Causationism* because I know of no designation for the common doctrine—perhaps there is none because of its commonness—which explains causes and effects. There are really three kinds of these doctrines, (1) *Preternatural*, which I think of as *Causal Divinism*; (2) *Mechanistic (Causationism and Uniformitarianism)*, and (3) *Pluralistic (Multiple-Causationism)*.

Mechanistic Causationism cannot be reconciled with extreme *Tychism*, even though both of them are *Mechanistic* in their nature;

it is, however, a logical corollary of Mechanistic Determinism. Briefly stated, the Mechanistic solution of the problem of causation maintains that every event is both an effect and a cause, that considered as an effect there is always an antecedent event which has caused it and that considered as a cause, there is always a subsequent event (effect) of which it is the cause. If this is true, neither Supernal nor human intervention into the chain of causation is possible; there can be no God or any kind of Preternatural force or entity capable of, in any manner, affecting events. Finally, human beings can have no free-will; they cannot initiate any event by choosing and willing because the very act of choosing and willing (if it is not a pure delusion) is itself the effect of antecedent causes, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Uniformitarianism—Mechanistic Causationism justifies the doctrine called Uniformitarianism which grounds itself upon the assumption of the uniformity of nature and of a natural world which is governed by what are called the laws of nature. It justifies the concept of cause on the ground of the invariability or regularity of the succession of events and the proposition that identical antecedent states or events (causes) are followed by identical effects or events.

Uniformitarianism seems so plausible and is so completely accepted by most modern sciences that it is difficult to question it, and yet I believe it does not fit all the facts which have to be taken into account.

* * * *

If the Mechanistic interpretation of events is right, there are no lessons to be learned from history; or if there are, they are not lessons about which man can do anything.

The Mechanists of all schools of thought have, in recent years, been increasingly troubled by scientific elaboration of the principle of probabilities and by Heisenberg indeterminacy principle. They have, as a result, been driven to try to reconcile Mechanism with Tychism (everything happens by chance).

Either resolution of the problem, "everything that happens is Mechanistically determined" or "everything that happens, happens by chance," reduces man to a nullity and to the status of a spectator, aware of what is going on, aware even of what he himself

is doing about things, but, in actuality, a mere cog in the machinery of fate.

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Pluralistic Etiologic Doctrines—There are two kinds of Pluralistic etiologic doctrines between which it is desirable to distinguish, one consisting of conclusions about the genesis of the events in which human beings have been and are involved, and the other with the genesis of those events which make up histiography as a whole. I shall begin with histiographic doctrines and gradually shift to doctrines about the part man has and can play biographically, geneagraphically, and historically in dealing with the events by which he finds himself confronted.

Indeterminism—The Pluralist must logically begin with a negation, with the doctrine which I think of as Causal Indeterminism which maintains that events and histiography are neither Mechanistically nor Preternaturally necessitated but that there is even in inanimate matter—in the physical entity called the atom—manifestations which are free and autonomous. As Schroedinger has apparently demonstrated, in the course of organic evolution, there is a steady increase of freedom and autonomy it culminates until in the organism we call *Homo sapiens* and expresses itself in what historically has been called free-will.

Multiple-Causationism—Indeterminism makes necessary the substitution of the concept of Multiple-causation for that of Mechanistic causation. Multiple-causation assumes that events are never the resultant of a single cause but always of a multiplicity of them. It is true that it is possible, and absolutely essential if man is to live a rational life, to isolate what I think of as the significant cause of various categories of events so as to be able to avoid those which are harmful and to cause (produce or create) events which are beneficial, but this does not alter the fact that every particular event is multiply caused—that it is not the product of a single sequence or chain of events but of a multiplicity of them.

In the physical sciences (inorganic chemistry for instance), it is possible to conduct controlled laboratory experiments in which the cause of a particular effect, in theory at least, can be entirely isolated. But the moment this is tried in the biological sciences, the difficulty of setting up satisfactory controlled experiments be-

comes enormous. And with human beings, except for relatively simple activities (such as the ingestion of toxic substances), it is virtually impossible. Human beings instinctively rebel at being treated like guinea pigs, and controlled experiments about the most important actions by human beings which are recorded in their biographies, genealogies, and histories, are impossible.

Multiple causation becomes an essential explanation when the question of Determinism is raised. Every human event proves to be in part determined by natural causes, in part by social forces, and in part by individual choice or acceptance. No matter how strongly endowed he is with will-power, every individual's activities are effected by fires and floods; no matter how idiosyncratic and individualistic, he can never completely shed the characteristics with which he is endowed by social forces (his education, for instance), nor avoid having to accept or to struggle against the dictates of social forces in what he does or does not do at any particular time.

Man's actions are always complexes, never simplexes.

Evolutionism—The Pluralist can logically accept evolution as an explanation of causality and historiography. But if Spencer's famous definition of evolution is used, that it "is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity," then devolution must be either implied by evolution or explicitly recognized as essential to the evolutionary explanation of causality.

Evolution, however, designates not a single doctrine but a number of very different doctrines, all of which have in common acceptance of the facts but interpret them differently. There is *Darwinism* (natural selection); there is what I call *Mutationism* (De Vries); there is *Emergent Evolutionism* (Morgan); there is *Creative Evolutionism* (Bergson); there is *Holism*, or Holistic Evolution (Smuts); there is *Kropotkinism*—the doctrine that evolution must be interpreted not only as establishing that there is a competitive struggle for the survival of the fittest but that many species of animals—particularly man—in struggling for survival, cooperate as well as compete.

The Pluralist can logically accept Darwinism, Mutationism, Emergent Evolutionism, Holism and Kropotkinism. But he cannot accept Creative Evolution, except Agnostically, because it provides a ground for Metaphysical, Preternatural and even Supernatural Teleocisms; it reads into histiography an ultimate purpose, it repudiates mere Existentialism. Nor can he accept Social Darwinism which ignores the most significant of all facts about human beings—the facts to which Kropotkin called attention, his cooperative and fraternal characteristics in contrast to his competitive and predatory characteristics.

Reference to one additional form of evolution which I think of as cultural is needed because no adequate Pluralistic explanation of the rise and fall which marks the history of civilizations is possible without it. The doctrine, which I call *Cultural Evolutionism*, maintains that social and cultural conditions—environments—do not merely change but evolve in a manner analogous to biological evolution and devolution, and that they play an enormous role in the causation of history, geneagraphy, and biography. Indeed without some such a doctrine, the concept of social forces is foundationless.

This brings us to the consideration of doctrines which deal with human in contrast to natural events, to the specifically human aspects of histiography.

Autonomism—The doctrine of Autonomism, already discussed in the consideration of the problem of human nature, maintains that life and living processes, and in particular human life and human activities, are the manifestation of an activity possible only by virtue of a state of autonomous organization of the organism (Haldane, Bertalanffy, Ritter, Smuts).

Volitivism—The most important implication of Autonomism in man is that without free-will, autonomy is an illusion. Without free-will, man becomes an automaton, a machine, a mechanism.

What Volitivism maintains is that there is ample evidence that the individual has the freedom and power of choosing and willing among alternative courses of action; that free choice and self-determined decision follow from conscious use by him of his will; that his decisions are real, not illusory nor predetermined for him by agencies or forces over which he has no control; that he is not

prevented from acting voluntarily and autonomously by antecedent Preternatural or divine, physical or social, or other forces or imposed necessities; that no matter how much these forces enter into and affect his activities, they never completely predetermine what he does, and that no explanation of history is possible without taking the individual human factor into account. This is the essence of Carlyle's and Emerson's theory that history is a record of the changes and of the activities caused by great heroes, but it applies even more fully to the changes and the activities which constitute the history of local communities and small gregations. Their history simply cannot be explained Mechanistically or even Preternaturally, since they so plainly reflect what individuals in the community or the gregation do.

At this point recognition of another doctrine discussed in connection with the anthropic problem also is needed. Teleocism, or more properly *Causal Teleocism*, maintains that no human action, and no human event, can be performed without reflecting either an unconscious human need or a conscious purpose, goal, end, objective, design or meaning. The purpose may not be consciously recognized, but it is there nonetheless. The individual, in other words, cannot act consciously without acting out some purpose of which others than himself are conscious, even if he himself is not.

Finally, we come to three sets of doctrines, (1) Pessimism and Pejorism, (2) Optimism and Meliorism, and (3) Neutralism and Existentialism, each of which maintains that it represents the truth about the causes and effects, the events and experiences, the challenges and responses which are recorded in historiography.

Pessimism and Pejorism—Pessimism maintains that events, natural, and human, are essentially evil, completely evil, or as evil as they conceivably could be; that historiography as a whole is, therefore, evil; that the evil in life overbalances the good in it, and that life, therefore, is preponderantly evil. Pejorism is even more pessimistic; it maintains that the world is growing worse; that so far as life on the Earth is concerned, this worsening is a natural consequences of the activities of man; and that man has the power, and uses it, to make it worse. No Buddhist, who takes what Gautama taught seriously, would quarrel with this, and in this he would be supported by many modern exponents of Existen-

tialism—even if they are not as forthright in saying so as was their great predecessor nearly three thousand years ago.

Optimism and Meliorism—Optimism views the same facts in an entirely opposite manner. Life is essentially good, completely good, or as good as it conceivably could be; the goods in life overbalance the evils, and life is, therefore, preponderantly good. Leibnitz originated the term to designate the doctrine that everything, being the work of God, is ordered for the best; that in the end, everybody will be happy. As he put the argument: "God being allwise must know all possible worlds; being all-powerful must be able to create whichever He might choose; being all-good, He must have chosen the best." But in a period of rising wealth and power, there are plenty of secular Optimists who can vindicate their Optimism without resorting to Supernaturalism to do so.

Meliorism, a conception we owe to George Eliot, not only maintains that history proves that life is good but that it is becoming better; that this betterment is a natural consequence of the efforts of man; that man has the power, and uses it, to make it better.

Histiographic Neutralism—The Pluralist, surveying the whole of histiography—past, current, and future, without overlooking geneagraphy and biography—may be tempted, as I often am, to be a Histiographic Neutral. Neither the past nor prospects for the future are wholly good or wholly bad; there have been periods, particularly if the world is broken down into civilizations as Toynbee has broken it, when it was getting better followed by periods when it was getting worse; the future may prove equally cyclical. But there are times when I feel that we must be growing better—after all, if the archeologists are right, there was a time when we were all cannibals, and, whatever else we do today, we do not practise cannibalism. But then I think of what the non-cannibalistic, scientized, and technicized human race has done during the twentieth century—World War I with poison gas, World War II with bombs, Hitler's Jewish genocide, Stalin's Kulak genocide, the Hindi-Pakistani partition, the OGPU and the GESTAPO—I think it demonstrably worse; I think the advocates of original sin have a lot of history to prove that man is by nature not good but evil.

Until we have histories and biographies which are evaluations and not merely records, the Pluralist had probably better suspend judgment.

Existentialism, which looms so large in the thinking of intellectuals today, is an ideology which at first blush seems to deal with the ontoic problem (the Greek word *ontos* means not only being but also existence), but in fact is used to designate the speculations of a group of philosophers who are troubled by the fact that, confronted by the situation in which man finds himself, he cannot take himself for granted but must justify his sheer existence. The founder of the modern movement, Søren Kierkegaard, disposed of the problem supernaturally, and maintained that the soul of man could account for itself and make peace for itself only as a matter of faith. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, who between them have popularized the ideology today, though apparently anti-religious, (they are Communists and Atheists) also have a faith; they believe that man could at least mitigate the problem of enduring his existence by putting his faith in the beneficence of an omnipotent communist State.

What is common to the widely different solutions of the problem of such Existentialists as Kierkegaard and Sartre is concerned with the importance, to the individual man, of accounting both intellectually and emotionally for his own existence, and their conviction that the answer to the question of "Why I should continue to exist" requires finding the answer to the question of "Who am I?" This intensely subjective egotism, they all believe in one way or another, can be mitigated by what I think of as the corollaries of man's inner life. Kierkegaard mitigates it by having faith in Christianity, Sartre by having faith in Communism. To these (to me) rather weird conclusions, they come by four corollaries of man's awareness of his existence and of his inner world:

1. The first corollary is that there is a better world, a world which can be "felt" but not known. For Kierkegaard this one is the Christian's future paradisiac world; for Sartre, there is instead the Communist's future paradisiac Materialistic world.

2. The second corollary is the fact that no amount of egoistic concern with their "I"-ness, with their Egos, with their

Selves, can obscure the fact that the world is populated with other human beings who also exist.

3. Thirdly, the fact that all mankind is confronted with a period which for sheer inhumanity has hardly ever been surpassed—a state of affairs which also exists—and which it is not sufficient to accept with Christian resignation or Stoic fortitude.

4. Finally, that the existent historic situation, no matter what it is at any given moment, must be dealt with in some fashion, or life becomes unendurable.

To me this is a statement of the riddle of histiography rather than the answer to it, for Existentialist Kierkegaard's answer to it is the Christian answer and Existentialist Sartre's answer, the Communist answer. After two thousand years of Christianity and a sample half century of Communism (the best in each case as well as the worst of what Christians and Communists have so far been able to achieve), both answers leave me chilled to the bone.

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The Pluralist has an inestimable advantage over both Preternaturalists and Mechanists in dealing with the riddle with which histiography confronts him. He can accept the part that Determinism plays in history and in the causation of events and experiences (the question with him is, what part of various kinds of events is determined by nature and what part can be determined by man?) He can be a Tychist and believe that chance plays a part in causation, but he can also believe that man has the power of reducing and even suspending chance altogether when he takes a hand in affairs (the question for him is, how great are the powers which he has for taking matters in hand and to what extent must he reconcile himself to whatever it is that takes place?) He can even concede the possibility that God (assuming that there is one), in the final analysis, determines both what takes place in the matrix of history and what man chooses to do about it, only he will probably consider the evidence indicating that God interposes His will into the course of events exceedingly dubious, and even more dubious the evidence that He will do so if man petitions Him in the right way and with sufficient zeal.

That, it seems to me, is enough. Man does not need to ask for more. He does not need to discard the evidence of his common sense that he can and does play a part in events; he does not need to discard experience and to assume that he can learn nothing from it and that wisdom based upon it is an illusion. But if he has the august power of launching sequences of causes and effects which go marching down the corridors of time, it becomes enormously important that he understand himself, understand the world in which he finds himself, understand history and the events and experience of which he is not merely a spectator but in which he himself acts and participates.

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It is true that the fact must be accepted that sheer luck (or the "will of God") plays a part in every man's life. There is no escaping the part which chance plays in life. One man is born in a prosperous home, another in a slum. One receives first rate schooling, another poor schooling, a third not much schooling at all. One marries a perfect mate, another a slut or an alcoholic. One is born pretty and healthy, another crippled or diseased. The irrationality of chance pays no attention to social systems; in Capitalist America, being born rich or poor is a matter of chance; in Communist Russia being born in the family of a Moscow bureaucrat or a family of nobodies in Siberia is also a matter of luck.

But if the Mechanists and Fatalists are mistaken, as Pluralists insist the evidence indicates, enough things are not determined and enough things can be done to make life interesting and worth enduring by those who have been taught to respond to the challenge of luck, whether good or bad, as a man should and not as a mere chicken or a mere machine.

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The etiologic problem, though purely noetic, is not academic. It is important, peculiarly so at this time. For if neither the Preternatural nor the Mechanistic interpretation of the part man plays in dealing with events is right, the initiative and power with which man finds himself left is still formidable enough to dispose of some of the most pressing and critical problems with which he has to deal. Our world, and the whole idea of a free

world, is being threatened by a combination of two political, economic and social ideologies—Socialism and Totalitarianism—both of which vindicate themselves by assuming that Historical Materialism and Economic Determinism are valid solutions of the etiologic problem. Determinism is found not only in avowed Marxists. The prevailing Deterministic tone of modern social science, modern psychology (Pavlov, Freud, Watson), modern philosophy (Russel, Sartre), modern history (Beard, Barnes), and most modern novelists reflects the idea of Economic Determinism. But if a Pluralistic interpretation of both biography and history is valid, the argument of the protagonists of Socialism and Totalitarianism (that we should resign ourselves to their triumph, because it is Economically Determined) comes pretty close to being outright nonsense.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem III: The Etiologic Problem

In the original almost four hundred pages of manuscript, notes, and charts from which this outline of the etiologic problem has been condensed, there was a separate chapter on how each of the various kinds of history could be used to throw light on the problems of historiography as a whole raised. Two of the special bibliographies, one on rise-and-fall interpretations of past history (interpretations of what actually happened as a result of failure to reverse social trends in the past), and the other on predictive—past or future—history (interpretations of what will happen if existing social trends are not changed), give some indication of how the study of historiography can be used to throw light on social problems; two of them, the genealogical and biographic bibliographies, give some indication of how historiography can be used to throw light on personal problems (individual in contrast to social problems).

1. *Etiology versus Teleology*—The basic problem is not teleology (is, or is not, the universal caused or purposed?) but etiology (what effects are due to what causes?). That there are *purposes* is obvious. The typewriter on which this is being written was designed and manufactured for a purpose; I am using it for a purpose. But that there is an incredible amount of disorderly purposelessness in the universe is also indisputable. What, for instance, is there of purpose in the recent earthquake which devastated Alaska? The basic problem seems to me the causation, ultimately, of everything which occurs so that knowing the causes, we might deal with events and experiences more intelligently.

The word etiology comes to us from the Greek words *aitia*, meaning cause, and *logos*, meaning description. The dictionary defines the word as the science, doctrine, or demonstration of causes. The only real literature dealing with etiology is medical and deals with the etiology of diseases. But it is here being used broadly in its literal signification—the systematic attempt to find the causes of the events recorded in historiography and the experiences in living recorded in man's biographies.

2. *Events and Experiences*—The distinction I am making between events and experiences is essential if we are to lessen the confusion between what is objective and subjective in the life of man.

Events are important because objectivity about what causes them is so important. But experiences are equally important not only because they provide us with inner subjective knowledge of the Self but because they provide both immediate and mediate or "second hand" knowledge of what to do about events. Why are the old, just because they are old, wiser than the young? Not because they necessarily know more (very

often they do not) but because they have had so many more years of experiences.

3. *History, Historiography and Historiography*—The dictionary definition of historiography is the writing of history, but by "history" it means human history. I have broadened historiography to include not merely human events but all events, including man's subjective experiences; in effect I am using it to refer to history proper, to man's subjective history, to his experiences in living, to his belief in sacred history, and finally, to what used to be called natural history. Etiology is the study of the causation of all history, not only the causes of the events recorded in human history.

The word historiography is far better phonetically than the word historiography; it rolls off the tongue far better if the superfluous "o" is eliminated. In Greek *histi* and *histo* (both of which we use as combining forms in English) come from the same word, *histion*, meaning a web, as of cloth. In many English words *histi* is already used as the equivalent of *histo*. We have geography, why not historiography?

The introductory chapters of Wells' "Outline of History" are really a brief survey of historiography up until history proper appears on the scene.

4. *Challenge and Response*—Not only Toynbee's history should be consulted to get the full significance of the concept of history as challenge and response but also Bagehot's almost forgotten little book *Physics and Politics* from which Toynbee admits he obtained the inspiration for his concept of challenge and response.

5. *Ethical Relativism and Ethical Subjectivism*—A sharp distinction should be made between these two doctrines. Relativism maintains that there is no real distinction between good and evil because all codes of ethics are merely the arbitrary dictates of particular social customs, and these customs vary from time to time and culture to culture and so do not justify basing any objective distinction upon them. Ethical Subjectivism, on the other hand, maintains that no one is responsible for what he does, because his motives are not his; they are the product either of antecedent causes, or of social and environmental conditions—or of both—for neither of which he is responsible; not the individual but society is, therefore, responsible for the evil men do. This was the argument of Clarence Darrow in the famous Leopold and Loeb murder case in the United States and the argument of Charles Bradlaugh in an equally famous murder case in England.

The argument that good must ultimately come even from evil is the central contention in Edward Carpenter's *Civilization, Its Causes and Cure* in which he defends Ethical Subjectivism. The book was inspired by the scandalous case of Oscar Wilde and Lord Alfred Douglas's homosexuality; "don't worry about homosexuality," Carpenter argued; "all so-called evil ultimately turns into good." Neither Ethical Relativism nor Ethical Subjectivism are pejorative doctrines (the world is bad and get-

ting worse and worse) but romantically optimistic (the world is good and getting better and better). We do not have to worry about evil or do anything about it, they argue; time will ultimately take care of the matter for us. But in the meantime, is there nothing which needs to be done? That is the question which bothers me; I haven't time to wait till Doomsday; I've got to do what I can about it while I am still here to do it; at least I can do something about it in myself and perhaps in my immediate family, if not in the whole of society.

6. *Sacred History.*

Bhagavad Gita, translated by S. Prabhavananda and C. Isherwood, Mentor Books, N.Y., 1963.

The Mahabharata and The Ramayana, in *The Great Indian Epics*, John C. Oman, G. Bell & Sons, London, 1899.

Hesiod's *Theogony*, in *Hesiod*, Macmillan, London, 1934.

Homer's *Iliad*, University of Chicago Press, 1962; *Odyssey*, Doubleday, Garden, N.Y., 1961.

Moses, Genesis, in *The Holy Bible*.

The Gospel According to Saint Matthew, in *The Holy Bible*.

Ernest Renan, *The History of the Origins of Christianity*, Mathieson & Co., London, 1890.

Sir James G. Frazier, *The Golden Bough*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1940.

7. *History.*

Herbert J. Muller, *The Uses of the Past*, Mentor Books, N.Y., 1954.

H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1956.

James H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making*, Harper, N.Y., 1927.

W. E. H. Lecky, *A History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, Appleton, N.Y., 1925.

R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1926.

J. B. Bury, *A History of Freedom of Thought*, Holt, N.Y., 1913; *A History of the Later Roman Empire*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1889.

Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, *Letters on the Study and Use of History*, Cadell, London, 1770.

8. *Past (Rise-and-Fall) History.*

Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934.

Frank Chodorov, *Rise and Fall of Society*, Devin-Adair, N.Y., 1959

Sir Hinders Petrie, *The Revolutions of Civilization*, Peter Smith, N.Y., 1941.

Count François de Volney, *The Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires*, Peter Eckler Pub. Co., N.Y., 1926.

Brooks Adams, *Laws of Civilization and Decay*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1895.

Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Appleton, N.Y., 1873.

9. *Current History*; current "crisis" history; current "age" history, etc.

Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, Dutton, N.Y., 1941.

Charles A. Beard, *Whither Mankind*, Longmans, Green & Co., N.Y., 1932.

10. *Post (Future Predictive) History*.

Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, Modern Library, N.Y., 1951.

Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society*, Knopf, N.Y., 1964.

Henry B. Stevens, *The Recovery of Culture*, Harper, N.Y., 1953.

George Orwell, *1984*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1949.

Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World*, Harper, N.Y., 1946.

Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Scribners, N.Y., 1946.

W. T. Stace, *The Destiny of Western Man*, Reynolds & Hitchcock, N.Y., 1942.

Max Planck, *Where is Science Going*, Norton, N.Y., 1932.

Henry Adams, *The Tendency of History*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1928.

Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y., 1950.

James Burnham, *Suicide of the West*, John Day, N.Y., 1904.

11. *Geneagraphic History*.

James Truslow Adams, *The Adams Family*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1930.

Corliss Lamont, editor, *The Thomas Lamont Family*, Horizon Press, N.Y., 1962.

R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes*, Putnam's, N.Y., 1910.

Henry Goddard, *The Kallikak Family, A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-mindedness*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1912.

Frederick Morton, *The Rothchilds*, Atheneum, N.Y., 1962.

12. Pierre G. F. Le Play (1806-1882) was a French engineer, economist, and sociologist whose most important work was probably *L'organisation de la famille*, published in 1884. The significance of his work and that of his followers has been lost because of the shift in interest from the family as a force in events to interest in impersonal social forces.

13. Dr. Henry Goddard's *The Kallikak Family, a Study in the Heredity of Feeble-mindedness*, was published in 1912. With today's knowledge of heredity, this was an oversimplified approach to the problem, but it created a tremendous stir at the time it appeared since it seemed so conclusively to settle the great debate about which was most important, heredity or environment.

14. *Biographic History.*

Bradford Smith, *Men of Peace*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1964.

Gamaliel Bradford, *Portraits of Women*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1916; *Damaged Souls*, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y., 1931.

Colin Wilson, *The Outsiders*, Victor Gollanz, N.Y., 1916.

Thomas Carlyle, *Heros and Hero Worship*, Rand McNally, Chicago, N.d.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Representative Men*, in *Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, W. H. Wise & Co., N.Y., 1929.

James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, Holt, N.Y., 1878.

Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives*, Tudor Press, N.Y., 1935.

15. *Free Will and Fatalism*—Without a decision on this crucial etiologic problem, no rational approach to events and to experiences—to the events constituting mankind's history and to the experiences of the individual with both his own and mankind's history—is possible. This study is based upon the assumption that Fatalism is a mistake, that man does have some capacity for determining what happens to him and in history even though there are plenty of forces which play a determining role in both. The following are just a few of the titles arguing pro and con on this problem:

John David Mabbott, *Free Will*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1963.

Henry Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, Macmillan, London, 1930.

John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1929.

Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1910.

Maurice Maeterlinch, *Wisdom and Destiny*, Dodd, Mead, N.Y., 1898.

Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysic of Ethics*, translated by J. W. Semple, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1886.

Jonathan Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, edited by Paul Ramsey, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1957.

Preternatural Etiologic Doctrines:

A. H. Maslow, *Religions, Values and Peak-experiences*, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1964.

Lecomte du Nouy, *Human Destiny*, Longmans, Green, N.Y., 1947.

Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Random House, N.Y., 1944.

Marco Pallis, *Peaks and Lamas*, Cassell, London, 1939.

Jan C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, Macmillan, London, 1936.

Mechanistic Etiologic Doctrines:

George Gaylord Simpson, *The Meaning of Evolution; a Study of the History of Life and of its Significance for Man*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949.

Harry E. Barnes, *An Economic History of the Western World*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1937.

George Plekhanov, *Essays in the History of Materialism*, John Lane, London, 1934.

Edward Carpenter, *Civilization, Its Causes and Cure*, Scribners, N.Y., 1921.

Ernst Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man*, Putnams, N.Y., 1910; *The History of Creation*, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1906.

Clarence S. Darrow, *Resist Not Evil*, C. H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1903.

J. Loeb, *Forced Movements and Tropisms*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1918.

Brooks Adams, *Law of Civilization and Decay*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1895.

Paul T. T. d'Holbach, *The System of Nature*, J. P. Mendum, Boston, 1853.

Charles Darwin, *Origin of the Species*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1958.

Pluralistic Etiologic Doctrines:

Lionel Trilling, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1955.

Ortega y Gasset, *Toward a Philosophy of History*, Norton, N.Y., 1941.

Julian Huxley, *Evolution—the Modern Synthesis*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1941.

C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, Dover Pub. Co., N.Y., 1946.

R. B. Winn, *The Nature of Causation*, Philosophy of Science, April, 1940.

Erwin Schrodinger, *What is Life*, Macmillan, London, 1936.

C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, Holt, N.Y., 1931.

Nils Bohr, "Light and Life," *Nature Magazine* No. 131, 1933, pp. 421-423, 457-459.

Peter O. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*, Knopf, N.Y., 1925.

Count François de Volney, *The Ruins; or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires*, Peter Eckler, N.Y., 1926.

Patrick Geddes, *Evolution*, Holt, N.Y., 1911.

PROBLEM IV

The Riddle of Communication: Verification and Validation

Pilate saith... "What is truth?"—The Holy Bible: St. John 18:38.

Revelation: "How do I know about the world? Inward light!"—Lao Tze

Sensation: "Man... can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact... of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything."—Francis Bacon

Ratiocination: "Men of superior minds busy themselves first in getting at the root of things, and when they have succeeded in this, the right course is open to them."—Confucius

None of the great noetic riddles of mankind presents us with greater difficulties than does the riddle which Pilate posed when he asked, "What is truth?"

In philosophy the problem is dealt with academically in the so-called science of epistemology. As I see it, the philosophers have made no science out of it; it is still the same old problem doing business at the same old stand—the problem I think of as the epistemic¹ problem. This is the problem of how to discover, formulate, and communicate the truth; how to verify the beliefs and to validate the values on the basis of which man deals with every problem with which life confronts him. It is both an intensely practical and an enormously important problem, because every man, consciously or unconsciously, acts and lives his life on the basis of assumptions and communications (articulated sometimes, but most often inarticulated), about the right way of dealing with every problem about which he must make a decision.

A hundred facts, of which these five seem to me the most important, make it necessary for mankind to make some sort of answer to Pilate's famous question:

1. The fact that man is confronted with problems and, in the effort to dispose of them, acts on the basis of what he believes to be true.

2. The fact that none of the problems with which he has to deal can be dealt with rationally and humanely without distinguishing between truths and errors.

3. The fact that, because of the plasticity of his instincts and his inability to rely upon instincts to dictate to him what he should do and feel and believe, he cannot take what he believes about anything for granted.

4. The fact that he tends to feel so strongly about what he *believes* to be true, that when he is mistaken he not only suffers but often suffers willingly the most useless hardships; he not only inflicts but deliberately inflicts unnecessary hardships on others; he not only has killed but has deliberately killed millions on the basis of *beliefs* which are in fact demonstrated or demonstrable errors—Christian crusades, Mohammedan jihads, Holy Roman Catholic inquisitions, the fratricidal Catholic Protestant persecutions, Hitler's slaughter of six million Jews because he *believed* in the superiority of the Teutonic race, Stalin's slaughter of seven million kulaks and countless other millions, because he *believed* that the way to the salvation of mankind required revolutionary extermination of the bourgeoisie and revolutionary conquest of non-Communist nations by fire and sword.

5. Finally, there is the fact which makes the problem especially acute at this time, that modern science has by its discovery of the relativity principle, the uncertainty principle, and the probability principle made modern man lose his confidence both in the certainties of traditional religion and the various time-tried common sense methods in which he used to believe and upon both of which he used to rely to establish the truth of what he believed he knew. Modern man is profoundly skeptical; he no longer believes what his instincts tell him is true, what his senses tell him is true, what his feelings tell him is true, not even what his reasoning tells him is true. The determining number of peo-

ple in the modern world believe there are neither absolute truths nor absolute errors; they believe that the most completely demonstrated truths are nevertheless irremediably relative and subjective in nature; that it is impossible to verify satisfactorily anything known or to validate satisfactorily anything considered morally and artistically right. For modern man there are no standards, no norms, no ideals. He is not only a Skeptic but a Solipsist; he is not only a Relativist, he is a Cynic.

Since the problem has always existed, and since man has had to do something about it implicitly in his way of living and explicitly after he became aware of the problem's existence, solutions of some sort have always existed. But when we turn to the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of mankind, we find not one solution about the validity of which everybody is in agreement, but dozens of solutions, each of which we are told by some group of enthusiasts is the only solution upon which ultimate reliance should be placed. About none of them nor any combination of them is there any consensus among modern skeptics.

In considering what might be done and what has already been done about the problem (there are solutions not only in science and philosophy but also folklore and religion), two aspects of the problem should be taken into account—the distinction between man's subjective experiences and his knowledge of objective events, and the distinction between the form in which a truth is expressed and the substance of what is said about it.

Subjective Experiences versus Objective Events—Every truth (and every conviction based upon what is believed to be true) has its ultimate source in either what some man has said (or some men have said) about a subjective experience (communion with God) or in what some man has said (or some men have said) about an objective event (the Bolshevik revolution, the Second World War, the slaughter of millions of Jews at Buchenwald, the origin and descent of man [Darwin], the circulation of the blood [Harvey], neurotic symptoms [Freud]). Both subjective experiences and objective events are realities, but the kind of knowledge which it is possible to obtain about them is very different. The truth about objective events can be established

because they are observable, communicable, and verifiable on the basis of facts which can be observed by many persons and of inferences from the facts which can be made by anybody. The truth about them can be known.

But this is not true of all subjective experiences. Certain subjective experiences are as truly objectively demonstrable as is the case with objective events. Others are not.

Subjective experiences (such as communing with God) cannot be observed and cannot be verified. It is possible to see a mystic entranced; it is possible to see a yogi in samadhi. These are objective events. But when a mystic says that he has been communing with God, it is impossible to know that this took place through the use of any of man's senses, and it is impossible to verify the truth of what the mystic says *even though the mystic sincerely believes that what he is saying is true*. The mystic, it is true, had a subjective experience; he can use words to try to communicate what he experienced, but as a matter of fact what he experienced is incommunicable². It is because of this that so much of what mystics report about their trances are couched in paradoxes and parables. And because such experiences are incommunicable (even to himself), not even the person who has such an experience can know what he has experienced in any meaningful sense of the word "know"; he can only accept what he believes about it (and others accept what he says about it) on faith. To speak of immediate knowledge in connection with them is to indulge in a misnomer; no man can have any immediate knowledge of them, he can only have immediate experience of them. Such experiences are ineffable, unknowable, incommunicable, and unverifiable; no amount of faith in their verity can alter these facts.

This is not the case with subjective awareness and consciousness of man's four basic instinctual drives (described in detail in the discussion of the anthropoic problem). Hunger is one of these basic instinctual drives (survival). If this hunger is not promptly satisfied, it makes itself visible by loss of weight, and if pushed beyond the limits of starvation, even more visible by an equally objective fact, death. In this respect it is as demon-

strable as the sensation of heat, which becomes visible when it causes perspiration, when a fever thermometer is used to measure the body's heat, and when it causes (if a burn, for instance, is severe enough) an actually bodily lesion.

The Problem of Form—All truths, like knowledge of all kinds, consist of answers which somebody has made to questions that somebody has asked (including questions he has asked himself). No truth, therefore, can be truly known until the answer to the question it purports to answer has been adequately formulated in a statement or proposition³ of some kind. But formulation, no matter how perfect, does not lessen by a particle the necessity—for verifying the substance of what it is asserted is true. What makes formulation so important is the fact that inadequate or improper formulation makes verification of what really is involved impossible.

Right formulation involves three things: symbols, syntaxes, and systems. In the verbal formulation of truths the symbols are words, the syntaxes sentences, and the systems languages. If error in formulation is to be avoided and what is believed to be true properly represented, three difficulties must be dealt with:

The *symbols* used—the words—must have only a single meaning and referent, (the semantic problem). Ideally this involves the use of a disciplined vocabulary which reflects a maxim which I put in this way: *One word, one meaning; one meaning, one word.*

The *syntax*—the construction of the sentences—must be free from self-contradiction, (the logical problem).

Finally, the *system* used—the language or any other system which is substituted for language—must be adequate dictionally (symbolically) and its inbuilt ambiguity (grammatical incongruities) must be minimal. Fortunately, more than one system can be used in stating the same truth, and the systems themselves can be constantly improved.

The first step, and the unavoidable first step, is not the making of statements in customary systems of communication, but the choosing of the system or systems to be used. Among the available systems, six are sufficient to make clear what choosing involves:

Pictorial systems, (several are used in dictionaries to communicate the meanings of words);

Mathematical and arithmetic systems;

Cartographic systems (maps);

Diagramatic systems (mechanical, architectural, engineering drawing);

Linguistic systems (every language is a linguistic system).

Of all the available systems, languages are not only the most universally used but also, since everybody uses them, the most drawing);

The Problem in Linguistic Communication—In the use of verbal systems of communication, the language is adequate only if its vocabulary is large enough to provide all the words needed for the representation of the truths being sought, being formulated, or being communicated. Many languages make formulation difficult, simply because of their deficiencies in vocabulary. The English language, in part because of its already immense vocabulary and in part because of the freedom with which it borrows words from other languages, provides a quite adequate means of verbal communication in spite of its alphabetical poverty, its spelling inconsistencies, and its grammatical deficiencies.

To be adequate a language must contain enough nouns and pronouns to represent all the particulars and universals (abstractions) needed to designate both the tangible and the intangible objects and subjects to which reference has to be made, and enough adjectives to make possible any necessary modifications of the nouns used.

It must also contain enough of all the other classes of words required by the grammar of the language. These classes of words will include, among others, enough prefixes and suffixes, enough verbs and adverbs (to represent actions), enough conjunctions (to make necessary combinations), and enough prepositions (to designate position, direction, time, and other abstract relations).

English, because of its enormous vocabulary and its hospitality to words from other languages, nevertheless illustrates some of the difficulties involved in the adequate formulation of knowledge. Roget's famous *Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases*

is thought of as a dictionary of synonyms and antonyms; it is actually a classification of all the ideas the English speaking world has developed in the course of its efforts at communication. Roget found it possible to classify all the words in the language into no more than one thousand ideas. Unabridged English dictionaries usually contain over 550,000 definitions. The fact that there is no logical relationship between words and ideas makes accurate formulation of knowledge fantastically difficult. Each word can be used to connote dozens of ideas; each idea can be designated with dozens of words; no one who tries to formulate what he knows in words can be certain that he has done so. No one who tries to communicate what he thinks he knows, can be certain that those who are the recipients of his communication actually understand what he thinks he has communicated to them, and vice versa.

In addition the language or system used must be ambiguity proof, or at least its inbuilt structural ambiguities minimal. Few languages measure up to this need, even English; actually German may measure up to this need better than English. That is the reason it is so often necessary to use two distinct systems of communication (verbal and mathematical) in communicating scientific knowledge, and three (verbal, arithmetic, and diagrammatic) in communicating the plans for constructing houses, bridges, and machines. Ideally an ambiguity proof communication system would be one which makes it possible to represent "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

If the reality it is sought to represent is to be adequately formulated and adequately communicated, five things must be recognized:

1. That the truth about anything can only be known (cognized) if expressed in statements or propositions;
2. That no truth can be known in any other way (experienced, yes, but known, no);
3. That the truly important thing about any statement which is called a truth is not who insists that it is true (which prophet, "Buddha"; which philosopher, "Aristotle"; which scientist, "Freud") nor which institution ("Church", "the Holy Bible",

"the Law", "Science", "The Communist Manifesto"), but whether the statement is in substance true or not;

4. That every true statement is the statement of a tautology; every fallacy the statement of an incongruity. The equation $2+2=4$ is the statement of a truth, and the proof that it is not a fallacy is provided by the fact that it is a tautology. What is true of equations is, of course, also true of propositions of all kinds;

5. That no matter how perfectly what is believed to be reality is described in a statement, if what has been formulated is not, in fact, the real truth, what we have is an exercise in logic and not progress in truth-seeking. Statements such as "all human beings are equal," "all men are equal," "all men and women are equal," "all races are equal," "all nationalities are equal," may be formulated so that they *perfectly represent what is believed to be true*. But if what is believed and what has been perfectly formulated *is, in fact, not true*, the perfectly formulated statements will not represent actualities but wishes, illusions, and prejudices.

Form is one thing, essence another. The way a "truth" is stated is important, but the substance of what is referred to is crucial.

The Problem of Substance—We come now to verification of the substance of what is believed or asserted in contrast to the statement in which it is described and communicated.

Knowledge, however obtained, always consists of answers to questions which somebody has asked. Very often the questioner, as in the case of Darwin, asks the question of himself. Charles Darwin, in effect, asked Charles Darwin the question, "How did man originate, was he specially created 'in the image of God,' as the Bible maintained, and if he was not specially created, how did he come to be what he is?" At some time, during the twenty years between the time he asked himself the question and the time he finally communicated his answer to the whole world in *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man*, Charles Darwin answered Charles Darwin, "Man evolved into what he is by a process of natural selection." What the Judaic, Christian, and Islamic worlds had believed to be the truth about the matter, that "Man, like every living plant and animal, was

pecially created," was shown to be a colossal error in spite of the fact that the then "known" world accepted as true what God Himself had revealed to Moses, and what Moses had recorded in the first chapter of the famous "Pentateuch."

Sometimes truths are discovered by a reverse process. An answer, and a true answer, is already known. But the whole truth about it is discovered only after the question to which it is an answer has been properly formulated. This was the case with regard to the truth about penicillin. Penicillin had long been known as a variety of bacteria, but its meaning, certainly for the well-being of mankind, was not discovered until Waksman finally found the right question to ask, "What use can be made of a bacterium with the peculiar properties of penicillin?" and then found that its meaning to mankind was "penicillin can be used as an antibiotic."

* * * *

*Verification*⁴—Not to ask "Is it true, or is it false?" but "Can it be verified, can it be validated?" is the way to deal with the problem of substance.

In the frame of reference I am using throughout this whole study, beliefs before being treated as truths must be verified⁵, values before being practised must be validated⁵.

To verify, in common usage, means to prove to be true. In my terminology it means to determine whether the substance of anything said is or is not in accord with reality.

To the question which Columbus raised about the shape of the Earth when he roamed about in Italy and Spain saying "The Earth is a sphere," the Church answered, "It is flat." Both answers to the question are typical of what I have in mind when I speak of the formulation, statement, and communication of a belief. At that time what the Church insisted was the truth about the matter (it insisted that the truth about the matter had been revealed to Moses by God Himself) was almost universally accepted throughout the Christian world. Columbus demonstrated by his discovery of America that this generally accepted belief could not be verified. Had he circumnavigated the globe, he would have verified his own belief about the matter by experimental demonstration; this waited, however, for Magellan and del Cano.

To verify a belief it is necessary to discover an actual truth; to discover an actual truth is to justify belief in it.

There are innumerable ways of discovering truths; not the least important is stumbling upon them by sheer accident. Most of the truths known to primitive man were discovered over and over again, each time by accident, in the eons of time they spent on "trials and errors." Finally, these truths, too, along with all their primitive superstitions, became embodied in the folklore (the beliefs) of *Homo primitivus*.

Of all the methods of verifying the substance of any proposition (methods which can be accepted as reliable because their use has been vindicated by rigorous intellectual analysis), the most useful are probably the following (Monists pin their faith in one of them, Pluralists rely only upon a combination of them):

The method of wisdom: there are two kinds—customary wisdom (prevalent opinion which may be general or may be expert); and traditional wisdom (opinion going back to time immemorial);

The legal method: a dialogue between plaintiff and defendant, prosecutor and accused, proponent and opponent;

The dialectical method: thesis, antithesis, synthesis;

The method of authority: propositions assumed to be true because recognized as true by experts in the matter involved;

The pragmatic method: propositions assumed to be true because they "worked";

The experimental method: trial and error, laboratory testing, demonstrating;

The classification method: Aristotelian, Linneausian, Deweyan;

The metric method: units and measurements;

The arithmetic method: numbers and equations;

The mathematical method: signs and equations;

The statistical method: ratios and correlations;

The perceptive method: perception or observation. There are two kinds, common observation and uncommon observation. The more reliable of the two is uncommon; it involves systematic

observation and re-observation until the perception is clear and accurate; common observation is apt to be superficial;

The inceptive method: systematic introspection and reflection upon what is already known;

The inductive method: particulars and inductions;

The deductive method: generalizations and deductions;

The publishing method: publishing discoveries and verifications of discoveries, so others may verify the discoveries and verify the verifications.

If the substance of a statement or proposition believed to be true is verified by the use of a considerable number of these methods and contradicted by none of them, it will come as near to being true as fallible man is ever apt to come. This it seems to me is the answer to the question of "What is truth?" the famous question to which all the Pilates of the world think there is no answer.

* * * *

Validation—To validate, in contrast to verify, in the language of this study means to establish the validity of values. In common usage verify and validate are used synonymously. But the verification of values presents such distinct problems, as we shall see, that the use of a distinct term to designate the process is justified.

Values are subjective; they are emotional states and impulses, not objective, observable facts. Only their effects are "visible". There is, therefore, only one way of testing objectively the validity of what is subjective, that is by taking advantage of the fact that human beings cannot avoid expressing their values in their behavior. What this means is using as the data for study, not their values, which provide no data, but their behavior which reflects their values.

Consequences, however, are not uni-directional; the consequences of human action ramify at random in all directions. An act performed by a certain person at a certain time and place has consequences which affect all sorts of persons most of whom have no direct interest in or relationship with the doer of the deed or the deed itself.

They affect not only individuals but groups, and ultimately humanity as a whole. They are, as the Hindu doctrine of *karma* insists, timeless; in theory they affect eternity and keep on having consequences, however faint the effects and however impossible it may be to trace them. If consequences are to be used scientifically and objectively for the purpose of evaluating human behavior, only those traceable can be used and only the *probable consequences* of particular kinds of acts. Exceptional circumstances may make the *actual consequences* of some particular act so very different from the consequences which follow usually from acts of that kind that the exceptions have to be disregarded. By taking account, then, only of the direct lineal and disregarding the random areal consequences, the effect upon those involved and upon mankind as a whole can be determined.

The test to which acts of various kinds should be subjected for the purpose of evaluating them systematically and objectively is four-fold:

1. Establishing categories for all kinds of human actions based upon rigorous classification of large numbers of cases drawn from all classes and many cultures;
2. Verifying the facts about their actual consequences;
3. Establishing their probable consequences statistically;
4. Determining how they work pragmatically—what they do to and how they affect the persons directly involved in them; how they affect those who are related to the doer and doee, and how they affect various groups to which each belongs.

This is the method of validating human behavior which I have used since I first developed it in 1948. But I believe it vindicates itself not merely in terms of the elaborate technique to which I have resorted but also in terms of the fact that unconsciously (and of course unsystematically) this is the method to which the common sense of mankind has driven it to resort—even though common sense itself has so often been warped religiously, politically, and socially.

Validating, then, according to this four-fold test is dependent upon the probable consequences of each type of deed

1. Upon the doer of the deed;

2. Upon the doer (the one to whom the act is done—the victim or the beneficiary of the deed);

3. Upon the immediate dependents of the doer and the doer (wife, children, aged parents, servants, and their employees and other intimate associates—partners, fellow-workers, fellow-members);

4. Upon the group, party, class, religion, nationality, and race to which the doer and the doer severally belong;

5. Upon society at large;

6. Upon humanity as a whole when the act or deed has either immediate international or enduring historical consequence (the consequences of the murder of the Archduke Francis Joseph; the agreements entered into at Yalta; the invention of gunpowder; the invention of the atomic bomb; the discovery of America; the discovery of the circulation of the blood; the invention of the steam engine; the discovery of the cause of yellow fever).

These consequences follow from the expression in action of all kinds of values, not only ethical but also esthetic, economic, and telic⁶ values. A venal writer today—the wild woods of our biggest cities are full of them—reveals in what he writes both his ethical and his esthetic values; a shopper reveals her economic values by the sort of things she buys, a manufacturer by his indifference to what he makes or by the quality of what he manufactures; finally every man reveals his telic values by the sort of purposes to which he devotes his life.

Consequences are of two kinds: life-enhancing (euthenian) or life-inhibiting (dysthenian). The consequences of the acts of a criminal inhibit life (dysthenic) almost invariably for his victim, and usually also for himself. It is in the denial of the distinction I am making between euthenic and dysthenic actions which alone makes it possible for otherwise reasonable men to be Relativists about values of all kinds.

But if concepts like “life-enhancing” and “life-inhibiting” are not to be mere evocative exclamations, it is necessary to give them objective content. There are three kinds of indisputable facts which give to both of them objective content (in the language of General Semanticists, objective referents):

(1) The facts about the antithetical nature of nature; sometimes nature is benign, sometimes nature is deadly (the sun shines and the rain falls and the Earth yields its fruits in abundance, but sometimes there are tornadoes and earthquakes, fires and floods).

(2) The antithetical nature of human activities—the consequences of some of them enrich life, others have consequences which are injurious and deadly (murder, even if it makes the murderer wealthy and even if he succeeds in evading the law, is certainly injurious to his victim and to society as a whole).

(3) Finally there is the antithetical nature of life; all life is inescapably anabolic and catabolic in nature (nothing more vividly enters into the very marrow of man's being, into the depths of his unconscious mind than the distinction between his desire to live and his horror and fear of money-less destitution, of disease, and of death).

Upon this triple foundation of facts it is possible to account for and to provide objective referents for the age-old distinctions man makes between the wholesome and the unwholesome (the humane and the bestial) purposes to which men devote their lives; between good and evil actions; between beauty and ugliness; between wealth and illth—between what in my terminology is euthenic and dysthenic.

Every theory, every existing doctrine and ideology, whether religious, scientific, or philosophical, which deals with the problem of establishing the truth and of providing mankind with truths upon which it can rely, falls into one of three categories, each of which makes utterly different and utterly irreconcilable assumption about the ultimate nature of knowledge. The doctrines reflecting these assumptions I think of as Supernalism, Positivism, and Rationalism. When any solution of the epistemic problem whatsoever is carefully analyzed, it will be found that it is vindicated (usually unconsciously) by one of these three assumptions, two of which, Supernalism and Objectivism are Monistic, and one, Rationalism, Pluralistic.

Monism versus Pluralism—A final discussion of the distinction between the Monistic and the Pluralistic approach to these

four basic noetic problems is unavoidable in connection with the epistemic problem.

The Monist bases his approach to the problem of truth on the same premise as his approach to all other problems; there being only one ultimate reality, there must be only one ultimate method of distinguishing between what is true and what is false about them. The Monist, as in the case of Albert Einstein, is fascinated by the conviction that back of the multiplicity of forms with which the world confronts him, there must be some one unifying principle which is applicable to the essence of everything. The Pluralist sees no necessity for any such unity. In this respect he is satisfied with a sort of Existentialism.

Supernal Monism, premising itself upon the assumption that ultimate reality is Supernatural and Preternatural, assumes that the final and decisive method of establishing the truth (no matter how much theologians and metaphysicians shrink from such a raw statement of the matter) is a matter of faith.

Objective Monism, premising itself upon the assumption that everything is obviously and ultimately nothing but matter and energy, assumes that the decisive and final method of distinguishing what is true from what is false is the knowledge provided by the positive sciences, the sciences which base themselves ultimately upon facts which have been or can be sensed and perceived.

Epistemic Pluralism, on the other hand (or as I think of it, Epistemic Intellectualism), being free from any predisposition to think Monistically about anything, maintains that nothing important should be accepted as true on the basis of any one method of verification. There being many methods of verification, many methods should be used, and the more important the questions, the more methods and the greater the number of times each method should be used.

*Supernalism, Objectivism and Intellectualism*⁷—I have had to resort to the use of the word supernal to designate two epistemic doctrines, *Supernaturalism* and *Preternaturalism*, which differ in form but not, as we shall see, in essence. What they have in common—in my terminology their Supernalism—is not only their rejection of Objectivism and Intellectualism, but also their belief in Subjectivism. The test of ultimate truth, according to

Supernalists, is either what man can learn from the use of certain innate Preternatural powers with which all men are endowed, or what he can learn from the Supernatural revelations of those exceptional individuals who are capable of being inspired. The truths revealed to mankind by prophets like Moses and Mohammed were obtained by inspiration; they were Supernaturalists. The truths upon which Lao Tze in Ancient China and Plato in Ancient Greece relied were obtained, according to them, by the use of innate powers which all men possessed in some degree, powers which Lao Tze called man's "inner light." Both were Preternaturalists. All four, however, had in common the fact that they were Subjectivists, not Objectivists; they were all of them Supernalists.

Objectivism and Positivism, on the other hand, completely rejects Supernalism, lock, stock and barrel. There is only one ultimate test of truth, as Hume and Comte insisted, and that is knowledge objectively and positively obtained. According to *Objectivism*, true knowledge can only be obtained through the mediation of the sense-organs and from inferences based upon knowledge so obtained; according to *Positivism*, from the positive sciences which premise all the knowledge they obtain upon natural phenomena (the properties of knowable perceptible things) together with their invariable relations of coexistence and succession in space and time. All other kinds of knowledge must be dismissed as theological and metaphysical; interesting, perhaps, but dangerous; capable of inspiring the most savage fanaticism and of not much more use to mankind than the crudest superstitions of the most primitive of our antediluvian ancestors.

Intellectualism resolves the problem neither in terms of revelation nor of sensation, but of what, for want of a better term, I have called ratiocination.

Unfortunately, the term Rationalism, which might better be used, with an irresponsibility typical of the history of philosophy, has been used to designate two entirely different doctrines—the epistemic Preternaturalism of thinkers like Plato and the epistemic Naturalism of thinkers like Darwin. Its use to designate Platonism I consider a complete misnomer. As I shall use the term in this study, it will not refer to the deductive reasoning of Platonists (or rather to their deductive logicizing), but to a combination of

several kinds of reasoning including deductive, introspective, and inductive.

By *revelation*⁸, as I have used the word just now, I mean knowledge obtained direct from God or from some other supernatural or preternatural source and communicated to ordinary mortals by prophets, mystics, sages, and sacred writers or by philosophers and metaphysicians subjectively qualified to communicate truth without error. By *sensation*, as I used it above, I mean simply knowledge obtained ultimately through the sense organs by the operation of reflex arcs. By *ratiocination*, on the other hand, I mean knowledge obtained and which can be obtained by systematic reasoning from verified premises to verified conclusions. This is the kind of reasoning which any genuinely logical and semantically valid Intellectualism must consider the ultimate test of truth.

The term, *ratiocination*, is now considered obsolete; it used to mean the process of exact thinking; it was virtually a synonym for the use we make of the word *logic*. John Stuart Mill considered it a synonym for deductive reasoning, but since we have in the word, *deduction*, a perfectly good term with which to designate deductive reasoning, I consider *ratiocination* free to be used to designate the kind of reasoning which is not only logically or grammatically right but also right in substance. This would provide us with a term with which to distinguish this kind of reasoning—the only kind of reasoning in which responsible human beings ought to indulge—from the mistaken or deliberately misleading use of formal logic to come to false or sophisticated conclusions, to win an argument, or to establish that a thesis is wrong by showing that “logically” no conclusion can be drawn because an opposite conclusion can just as “logically” be drawn. Relativists and Gradualists, Subjectivists and Solipsists, seemingly delight in this kind of specious reasoning to prove that no clear conclusions can be drawn about anything at all.

* * * *

Supernal Doctrines Dealing with the Epistemic Problem—The ground has now been cleared for a survey of some of the more important of the various doctrines all of which purport to solve the last of the four great noetic riddles confronting mankind,

What might be called *Religious Absolutism* (it could be called Religious Dogmatism almost as well) describes the approach to truth of almost every Supernatural religion which bases its authority upon a revelation made to a prophet (Zoroaster, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed). The traditions and scriptures of these religions in which the prophet's revelations are embedded or recorded become the means, by exegesis (as in medieval Scholasticism) at the hands of a priesthood (rabbis, imams, mullahs, ulemas, brahmins, gurus, bonzes, dalai lamas, ministers, priests, popes), for determining the truth about anything and everything. ("The Earth is stationary; it is the Sun and Stars which move!", the medieval theologians said).

Innatism and Inspirationism—Revelation, as scripturally recorded, and the application of what has been revealed to questions involving truth and error by interpreters sacredly qualified for the purpose by their church, is supplemented by two doctrines which are psychologically very similar to revelation. Innatism maintains that every person is born with a faculty which provides "inner light" and which can be resorted to in determining what is true, and Inspirationism that, in addition, it is possible for some men to obtain special revelations applicable to problems of any kind, including those of an epistemic nature.

The psychological process involved seems substantially the same as that which takes place in intuition. Intuition I use to designate the end-result of unconscious cerebration when some idea which has been unconsciously developed suddenly springs into consciousness. What the facts seem to indicate is that what is believed to be supernatural inspiration (usually with no thought about the possibility of its being naturally intuited), is vindicated as a matter of faith rather than upon the basis of fact and of ratiocination.

What is called *Fideism* (basic reliance upon faith rather than upon reason, especially in matters of religious truth) is undoubtedly the matter involved. Faith, it is true, is usually defined as the assent of the mind of one or of many individuals to the truth of what is declared by another. For a person who has faith in the revelations of his religion (the inspirations of its prophet or prophets), it is natural to think of his own experience with an "inspiration" as supernaturally inspired rather than naturally in-

tuted. Glossalalia ("speaking in unknown tongues") is an example of this kind of Fideism.

The theory which critics of this have called *Obscurantism* contributes an explanation for some of it. What this calls attention to is the fact that there are many religions (stigmatized by the more respectable religions as "cults") but also many *religieux* and numerous preachers and theologians of the higher religions who attach a peculiar value to obscurity, who identify it with profundity, particularly if it denigrates reasoning and the positive sciences as a basis for establishing what is true. Obscurantists often attach an esoteric significance to words (mantras such as *Om*) and to non-verbal "knowledge." The verbalized truths and knowledge of natural science, being easy to understand, do not seem to them profound enough.

Obscurantism and *Esotericism* are bedfellows. Esotericism, which is stigmatized as cultism by religious modernists, maintains that there are doctrines and practices to be found among the initiates belonging to secret circles which have a higher validity than those dictated by both common sense and by science.

Manticism—There is no escaping from the similarity of this Esotericism to reliance upon Manticism (by divination and oracles, *theomancy*; by the Bible, *bibliomancy*; by spiritual mediums, *psychomancy*; by spirits in a magic lens, *cristellomantia*; by the stars at birth, *astrology*; by clairvoyance, telepathy, precognition, *extrasensory perception*; by *haruspicy*, sacrificial appearances; by *hieromancy*, the entrails of animals sacrificed; by *anthropomancy*, the entrails of a human sacrifice; by the hands, *palmistry*; by numbers, *arithmancy*).

The unavoidable trouble with Supernal solutions of our problem is contradiction. No consensus ever emerges, except relatively meaningless affirmations like "God is truth." Christians maintain that Christian revelations alone are true; Muslims that only Mohammed's revelations are true; Jews that only Mosaic revelations are true; Brahmanists that only Brahmanical revelations are true. If what all these revelations revealed was alike instead of different, revelation might prove an acceptable and adequate solution of our problem. But neither scriptural nor individual revelations provide us with any verifiable means of estab-

blishing which revelation is the one to accept as ultimate and final. Ultimately and finally, what all revelators ask us to rely upon is not reality but faith—faith in the revelation which they have directly received or faith in the revelation which they accept from others.

I am sure that Supernalists and Metaphysicians were the “doctors and saints” who inspired Omar Khayyam to write:

Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and saint, and heard great argument
About it and about: But evermore
Came out by the same door wherein I went.

* * * *

Objectivist Solutions of the Epistemic Problem—Back to all the doctrines which have in common Objectivist criteria for distinguishing between truth and error is the theory of knowledge which maintains that the sense organs are mankind's sole ultimate source of knowledge (the modern theory variously called *Sensationalism*, by Locke, Hume, and Condillac, and *Sensationism*, by modern reflex arc psychologists). The implication of this theory is that, if a statement can be evidenced and vindicated in terms of sensations, it is true, and if it cannot be, it is an error, a fiction, or an illusion. The doctrine has an important kernel of truth in it but, like most Objectivist doctrines, is only a part of the whole truth and, unless the whole is taken into account, can be as misleading as the most misleading of supernaturally inspired revelations.

The element of truth in the theory is this, that mankind acquires a great deal of its knowledge by the operation of reflex arcs which begin with a stimulus furnished by a sense organ and which end in a response in the brain, and that an enormous number of statements claimed to be true can be verified or disproved by the use of our sense organs. That water in a container is water (and not carbolic acid) can be objectively demonstrated by looking at it, smelling it, tasting, and touching it.

But what is not true about it is that the sense organs are man's only source of knowledge and that every statement claimed to be true which cannot be vindicated by sensate tests, or some highly refined scientific forms of such tests, is untrue.

There are other sources of knowledge, of which the most important and probably most neglected by Objectivist science is the source of knowledge represented by man's four basic instinctual drives, the flashing into consciousness of some manifestation of a drive for survival, for generation, for self-expression, or for annihilation. When any specific manifestation of any one of these drives is not only felt but the feeling is verbalized (communicated to oneself or to others), it becomes known and constitutes knowledge. But, unlike sensation-generated knowledge, it is subjective and not objective in its origin; it functions in inflex and not reflex arcs; it is immediate and not mediate knowledge as I have already pointed out; its reality and the truth about it can be objectively demonstrated.

Empiricism—Objectivists are all Empiricists; they seek the truth in scientific (systematic) observation and experiment, and (to the extent that they reflect philosophy from Locke to Hume) believe this the only method of establishing it. Quite logically they dismiss what Supernaturalism in all its forms maintains are the ultimate means of establishing what is true. The question is whether they are equally logical (and scientific) in dismissing everything subjective as a source of truth (including notions and ideas such as my theory about the reality of inflex arcs, my theory of the instinctual drives as sources of knowledge, and my denial on these grounds of the Monistic theory that all knowledge originates in sensation).

Scientism—What this all leads to has been invidiously called Scientism, the doctrine that the bodies of knowledge represented by the Objectivist sciences should be the real basis of man's beliefs and the basis of his activities; the most extreme Scientismists even stick their noses up at the psychological and social sciences; they are not Objective enough; only the physical sciences and the biological sciences are really Objective. And of course mathematics. As for such sciences as axiology, most of them do not even know that the concept exists. Philosophy and theology they do not think about at all; both are for them beyond the outer pale.

Is it any wonder that the great bulk of the scientists—the scientific specialists, rather, since most scientists do not take science (that verging almost on the study of philosophy) but only the

restricted field in which they specialize as their field of study—are Epistemic Monists? They ignore that man has to live, including scientists, as a whole and deal with a whole world. Normative science they consider a contradiction in terms. There is only descriptive science, and if technology insists upon calling itself science, then it must be called applied science. Axiology, since its matter is normative, cannot be dealt with scientifically. Values, therefore, in spite of the enormous part they play in living, cannot be established scientifically. Scientists, if Scientism is right, should have nothing to do with them.

* * * *

The trouble with purely Objectivist solutions of the epistemic problem is that they cannot by their very nature take into account all the knowledge which mankind has acquired and is still acquiring. In strict logic they can only take account of evidence which comes to man ultimately in the forms of sensate experiences and raw sensations, preferably scientifically observed and systematically described. On this ground they must equally logically dismiss the possibility that truths may be discovered in inceptions and hypostatizations because these exist only in the human mind—because man can only experience them and cannot cognize them through the senses. They must, if they are to be consistent, dismiss the possibility that truths may be found in inferences and conceptions because these are produced by mere thought. Finally, they have to disregard accumulations of theoretical and hypostatic knowledge so overwhelming not only quantitatively but pragmatically as to make disregard of it ridiculous. They refuse to take into account what not only Supernaturalists but Intellectualists insist must be taken into account; they ought to ponder the bit of wisdom embodied in the second part of one of the most famous of the analects of Confucius: "To know what you know, and know what you do not know, is characteristic of one who knows."

* * * *

Intellectualist Solutions of the Problem of Verification and Validation—The characteristics common to all epistemic doctrines, which I believe fall into the category I call Rationalistic, may be summed up as follows:

They all maintain that ratiocination (systematic reasoning) and not revelation or sensation should be the ultimate test of truth;

They all take it for granted that whatever any considerable number of people believe to be true, without regard to the source upon which they rely to vindicate their beliefs, should be examined, since the belief (no matter how absurd it may seem at first sight) is important in direct ratio to the number of people whose lives are affected by it;

Finally, they all recognize that even the most careful study will require distinguishing not merely what is in fact true from what is in fact false, but what it is impossible to determine to be either true or false and about which a Scotch verdict of "not proven" must be rendered.

Some of these characteristics may be explicitly avowed in a doctrine, but all of them must be implicit in it to justify categorizing it as Intellectualistic in nature.

* * * *

Before considering the most important of these Intellectualist doctrines, the air must be cleared by considering some which I think of as Irrationalistic. Those who indulge themselves with them, often unconsciously, are to be found not only among believers in Intellectualism but even more often among believers in Objectivism and Supernalism.

The first I think of as *Gradationism*—from the syllable *grad* in grading—and those who practise it maintain that differences in man and in nature are never polar; all differences are differences of degree only. Gradationism is particularly popular in modern biology, psychology, and social science, though popular in all the sciences because of the part evolution plays in everything. There can be, therefore, no real difference between beauty and ugliness, between good and evil, and in its most extreme form, between truth and error—because everything is a matter of degree.

Reductionism and Gradationism are very similar in obscuring what would otherwise have to be admitted as true. Reductionists wipe out actual differences by reducing what is particular (and therefore different from other particulars) to what is universal (and therefore alike in that it belongs to a class of things).

Bertrand Russell once used Reductionism to reduce man to what he considered his proper place in the scheme of things when he said "there is no real difference between man and the amoeba."

Redefinitionism is much more common among theologians and philosophers than among scientists, though it is still frequent enough even among scientists to make it a sort of epistemic plague. It is implicit in the practice of using a term such as God, which had an accepted meaning when He was called Jehovah (the God of a tribe) and then still using the same term, God, by attaching it to an entirely different meaning (for instance a force for good in man), and creating endless confusion thereafter about just what is meant when the word is used.

Subjectivism, which has already been discussed, is, however, also used to designate the doctrine which denigrates everything in the realm of truth-seeking on the ground that in the final analysis all knowledge and all judgments cannot avoid being subjective; that even so-called objective, empiric, and positive facts have an inescapable subjective nature. Everything should be treated, if not purely contingently, at least as if it were in essence subjective and not objective.

Relativism is blood brother to Subjectivism. By positing itself on the variability found in all nature, including human knowledge, differences in human values and human practices (and for that matter differences of any kind) become meaningless because they are all derived from what is contingent, local, temporal, individual and tribal.

Finally, we come to *Solipsism*, which makes it possible to deny everything which can be claimed as true. Since each conscious Self knows and can know nothing but the modifications and states of its own mind, nobody can know anything about anything outside of himself. Solipsism provides a basis for a *Scepticism* which makes all attempts at the formulation of standards or principles of any kind useless.

Nominalism and *Conceptualism* provide a rational way of escaping from an irrational impasse, the first by recognizing that ultimate reality can only consist of concrete particulars and the second by recognizing that universals have no reality except as abstractions, categorizations, and hypostatizations⁹. Intellectual-

ism dictates the use of the scientific method to provide us with clear knowledge of concrete particulars, and as has already been made clear, the use of the case and classificatory method to lessen and perhaps altogether avoid ambiguity in the use of universals.

Ambiguism is the practice of using a word which has no definite meaning (which is suggestive and evocative rather than denotative), of using a word which has many meanings without making clear which of the meanings is intended, or of deliberately using such words for the purpose of seemingly saying and proving something when in fact nothing is being said or something which is obviously untrue would have to be admitted.

Amnesianism—The idea of Amnesianism, a widespread epistemic weakness, I owe to Sorokin, who called sociologists who indulge in it Amnesiacs. Amnesianism is the practice of treating as a new discovery something which a writer (speaking as an authority) should know has already been discovered, or what is worse, deliberately giving to an already named theory or already discovered item of scientific knowledge, a new designation and pretending that it is something new and different. It is a kind of scientific malpractice.

Epistemic Methodology—If the Irrationalisms I have been describing are to be avoided, an adequate epistemic methodology must be developed and made into a discipline as rigorous as the scientific method at its best. Method is the essence of science; in fact scientific knowledge differs from common sense knowledge principally in the fact that it is knowledge which has been systematically and methodologically studied, in contrast to knowledge which has been acquired just in the ordinary course of events. Until the importance of methodology is universally recognized in all the sciences, and particularly in those infinitely complex sciences which deal with human beings and their values and activities, ancient errors and superstitions will continue to bedevil mankind as they are bedeviling it today.

The prevalence of these various Irrationalisms, and particularly Ambiguism, makes the first step in the development of such a discipline the observance of two epistemic principles which I think of as *Ockhamism* and *Linnaeusism*.

Ockhamism—We owe to William Ockham (d. 1349) what has been called the law of parsimony, a law which is universally

accepted and universally disregarded. Methodologically the law calls for making the least possible number of assumptions in explaining ascertained facts or asserted truths. The principle is called Ockham's razor, and he phrased it "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity."

Linnaeusism—But Ockhamism needs an addendum, which I have phrased "New entities must be named whenever there is no existing name which designates that entity only." We owe to Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778), the basis for this addendum when he developed his famous binomial system of nomenclature. Without some such system of providing designators for the enormous number of new entities needed, biology, botany and zoology would never have become real sciences, and without the practice of Linnaeusism neither would the physical and mathematical sciences. (The Greeks, as a matter of fact, practised Linnaeusianism, particularly in geometry, long before Linnaeus).

Until the human and the social sciences substitute Ockhamism and Linnaeusism for Ambiguism and Amnesianism, they will remain pseudo and not real sciences. And until this happens, neither epistemology as it now exists (nor the epistemic science which I believe ought to be developed to replace it) can be really relied upon not merely in dealing with the four great noetic riddles we are now considering but with any of the really important problems with which man has to deal.

* * * *

Sixteen different methods for dealing with the epistemic problem have been listed in the discussion of the problem of verification in this study (q.v., pp. 127 and 128), but there undoubtedly are others and even these sixteen should not be taken for granted. Some of them, ratiocination may show, should not be used, some, that they should be used only for particular purposes, some, that they should be used only in combination with others. What the Intellectualist approach to methodology calls for is not one perfect method but a multiplicity of time-tried methods. (The Intellectualist, with regard to methods as with regard to other problems, is a Pluralist, not a Monist.)

What such a Pluralistic approach to methodology leads to is the conclusion that *nothing important should be considered a truth*

unless its verity and validity can be established by right answers to five crucial questions:

1. Is the statement of the alleged truth which is being evaluated properly and adequately formulated? In other words, is its formulation free from ambiguity and self-contradiction? (q.v., pp. 122-125).

2. Do the premises upon which the alleged truth is based consist of adequately and properly verified realities and not of mere hypostatizations taken for granted and treated as realities? (q.v., pp. 125-126).

3. Has the answer both to the first question (which deals with the problem of form) and to the second question (which deals with the problem of essence) been verified by many different methods, by many different persons, in many different places, at many different times, so that the verity of both can be accepted? (q.v., pp. 126-131).

4. Do the methods which are used, each of them and all of them, provide all the kind of answers which are vindicable by ratiocination and which time and trial shows must be taken into account? Do they exclude methods (Supernatural and Preternatural) which provide answers which are vindicable only by faith? Do they include methods which—about many so-called truths—provide answers (Ignostic and Agnostic¹⁹) which Objectivism and Scientism ignore?

5. Finally, is there any contradiction between the truth, after its seeming verification, and other truths similarly verified in the past? Or, to put this in other words, is there any contradiction between the seemingly proven new truth and the seemingly proven, time-tried, existing body of truths?

If this last question cannot be answered in the negative (if the answer is that there is such a contradiction), then the apparent truth being evaluated cannot be accepted as true *unless re-examination of the accepted existent truths which contradict it proves that they have been mistakenly accepted as true.*

Or, if all of the first four questions cannot be answered in the affirmative (*and no amount of re-formulation of the statement of the truth being evaluated, no amount of analysis of the validity of the methods used, and no amount of re-verification*

of the results makes it possible to answer them in the affirmative), then the apparent truth being evaluated cannot be accepted (a) either because it is in fact an error, (b) because it is not yet possible with existing knowledge to establish the truth about it (ignosis), or (c) because the limitations of man's mind make it impossible to ever establish the truth about it (agnosis).

* * * *

To concretize what I have all too abstractly said above, recall how the great controversy between religion and science about the discovery of evolution resolved itself.

(a) Darwin formulated with magnificent precision what he believed to be the truth about the *Origin of Species*. Species, he said, originated not in an act of divine creation but by a process of natural selection.

(b) The premises upon which he based what he said was the truth about the matter, consisted of a massive array of facts which he spent twenty years accumulating.

(c) Subsequent parsing of his formulation (his answer to question 1), subsequent re-examination of his facts (his answer to question 2), and subsequent analysis of his methods (his answer to question 4), have developed no substantial grounds for questioning the adequacy and verity of his conclusion.

(d) Yet his conclusion was immediately challenged and its truth utterly denied by Christian theologians on the ground that they contradicted accepted truths about creations as revealed to mankind in the sacred scriptures and sacred traditions of Christendom.

What happened, of course, was that re-examination of the validity of these accepted Christian truths proved them to be dogmatic assertions pure and simple. (This made it possible to answer question 5 in the negative).

And since the disposition of the original controversy in this manner, the fact that no subsequently discovered truths have in any essential respect contradicted his conclusion about the origin of species, it is still possible to answer question 5 in the negative.

And so the matter stands.

* * * *

And yet, unpalatable as the truth may be, in spite of the immense number of truths which mankind has managed to accumulate—truths about the verity of which no reasonable doubt needs to be entertained—the fact remains that there are things about which the most sapient of *Homo sapiens* is still ignostic and other things about which, no matter how much more sapient he becomes, he will always have to be agnostic.

The Supernalist disregards both difficulties—both Ignosticism and Agnosticism—by clinging to his faith (Fideism). The Objectivist dismisses both of them and vindicates his dismissal with the wonders of science (Positivism). The Intellectualist can neither disregard nor dismiss them. About them he is doomed to remain a perpetual truth-seeker. But this makes him neither a Solipsist nor a Cynic. Unlike Supernalists and Objectivists, he cannot accept Ignosticism and Agnosticism and say with Wittgenstein: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one should be silent." What he knows he knows, and what he knows is available still to know, he knows can make life more worth living. And when, for any reason, knowledge can no longer do that, he knows that it can still make struggling to learn the truth and even risking his life for the sake of some kinds of truths, worth while.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem IV: The Epistemic Problem

1. *Epistemics versus Epistemology*—Both the Greek words *Episteme*, meaning knowledge, and *epistole*, meaning epistle, come from same root, *epi*, meaning to send. I think of epistemics, which is here used to designate the theory of communication (and not of epistemology, the theory of knowledge), as a basic noetic problem. In the evolution of man, the need for effective communication antedated the need for and invention of verbalized knowledge. I think the evidence indicates clearly that what knowledge, in fact, does is to make communication enormously more effective.

2. *Communication and Dissemination*—Communication as it is here used refers not only to communicating with others but also to self-communication; reasoning is impossible without self-communication.

Experiences of a spiritual and subjective nature which are incommunicable cannot be known, because knowing depends upon the use of symbols, syntax, and systems of communication. Experience of objective events, on the other hand, are communicable. But, while it is impossible to communicate subjective experiences, it is possible to induce them in others and imbue others with them; it is possible, so to speak, to infect others with them (There is unfortunately no term other than this invidious one, infect).

3. *Statement and Proposition*—A proposition is the expression in language, or in some other system of communication, of anything which may be true or may be false but which is capable of being believed, doubted, or denied. Equations, maps, musical notations, and mechanical drawings are all systems of communication which may be used in expressing propositions of various kinds.

A statement, on the other hand, is the expression of a proposition linguistically, and it cannot be used to designate a proposition when expressed mathematically or in some other system of communication. Propositions are a genus, of which statements, equations, maps, drawings, etc., are species. Communicating, knowing, and reasoning are impossible without the use of propositions.

4 and 5. *Verify and Validate*—The word verify comes into English from two Latin words; our "veri" comes from *versus*, meaning true, and our "fy" from *ficare*, meaning to make. To verify a belief is to establish its truth. To validate (which comes from the Latin *validus*, meaning strong) a value is to establish its appropriateness for a rational, humane, and normal human being.

6. *Telic*, from the Greek word *teleos*, meaning *purpose*. See Problem V.

7. *Supernaturalism, Objectivism, and Intellectualism*—While my termino-

logy is, I believe, less awkward, the essential distinctions involved are those used by Pitirim A. Sorokin in his *Crisis of Our Age*. He described these three kinds of knowledge as follows:

Ideational truth is the truth revealed by the grace of God, through his mouthpieces (the prophets, mystics, and founders of religions), disclosed in a supersensory way through mystic experience, direct revelation, divine intuition, and inspiration. Such truth is called the truth of faith. It is regarded as infallible, yielding adequate knowledge about true reality-values.... *Sensate truth* is the truth of the senses, obtained through organs of sense perception. If the testimony of our senses shows that "snow is white and cold," the proposition is true; if our senses testify that snow is not white and not cold, the proposition becomes false.... *Idealistic truth* is a synthesis of both, made by our reason. In regard to sensory phenomena, it recognizes the role of the sense organs as the source and criterion of the validity or invalidity of a proposition. In regard to supersensory phenomena, it claims that any knowledge of these is impossible through sensory experience and is obtained only through direct revelation from God. Finally, our reason, through logic and dialectic, can derive many valid propositions—for instance, in all syllogistic and mathematical reasoning. Most Mathematical and syllogistic propositions are arrived at not through sensory experience, nor through direct revelation, but through the logic of human reasoning. Human reason also "processes" the sensations and perceptions of our sense organs and transforms these into valid experiences and knowledge. Human reason likewise combines into one organic whole the truth of the senses, the truth of faith, and the truth of reason.

8. *Revelation* may be somewhat more specifically (even if negatively) defined as (1) knowledge obtained which does not originate in any sense-perception (sensation), and is not derived from (2) ratiocination but is either ascribed to (a) a communication from God or some demonic source, (b) an extra-sensory cognition, or (c) a presumed faculty of the human mind which knows by "inner light" or by a "still small voice."

9. *Abstractions, Categorizations, and Hypostatizations*—Abstraction, which is now used to refer to all three of these concepts, I distinguish from *categorizations*, which I use to designate classes of things (universals), and from *hypostatizations*, which I use to designate any term intended to signify entities to be treated and considered as if they had some independent existence of their own, even though they subsist only in the human mind. *Abstractions* I restricted to designating only the qualities of an entity; they are adjectival and adverbial in nature. What lawyers call legal fictions are all hypostatizations, but theologians, philosophers and scientists all use hypostatizations (frequently without being aware of it). Thus *action* is an abstraction; it is an aspect or quality of things which act. *Group action* is a categorization; it is one class of actions. A *group*, on the other hand, is a hypostatization; when we treat an aggregation of human beings as if they had independent existence as a group, it is very easy to forget that only the individual human being exists. To treat the "group" as if it had existence may lead to the belief that groups act, when, as a matter of fact, it is only the members of the so-called group who can really act.

10. *Agnosticism and Ignosticism*—The term agnostic we owe to Thomas H. Huxley, and ignostic to Charles S. Peirce. By *Agnosticism*, I mean a doctrine which maintains that there are propositions widely believed to be true but about which it is impossible to establish absolutely either their truth or falsity, verification being impossible because of the limitations of man's mind. By *Ignosticism*, I mean a doctrine which maintains that there are many propositions believed by some to be true and by others to be untrue, about which it is possible with the sort of mind man has to some day establish the truth, but that until this has been established, the Rationalist must be content to acknowledge ignorance.

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PART II

Four Basic Problems in Values: An Introduction to Axiology

Life has a value only when it has something valuable as its object.
We may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion and without values.
—George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to *The Philosophy of History*.

Four Basic Problems in Values : An Introduction to Axiology

Life has a value only when it has something valuable as its object.... We may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion and without values.—George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to *The Philosophy of History*.

The most important and the most neglected of all sciences is axiology.

Axiology is important because values are the key to the riddle of human nature and to the riddle of human history; they are important because every human action is the reflection of an individual value and every human institution the outgrowth of a social value. Every reaction to human experiences and every reaction to the events with which human beings are confronted—no matter what the race or religion, the nationality or the culture, the society or civilization, the class or the ideology involved—is conditioned by personal and group values. It is impossible, therefore, to avoid the influence of values. The only question is whether the values are valid or invalid.

* * * *

The Plasticity of the Instincts in Man—All values are acquired. No one is born with a set of values; no values are inherited; all values are acquired after birth. They should not be confused with man's instinctual drives. These are racial endowments, not values. He is born equipped with a set of autonomous responses to the stimuli of his experiences, but in man these responses operate in a manner entirely different from those of all other animals. They are really *tendencies to respond* in a certain manner, rather than *invariant responses*, as in all other animals. The actual manner in which he responds is determined by his values. In all other animals the responses consist of physiologically dictated reflex actions; they are invariant reflex

actions. In man, because his instincts are malleable and plastic, they consist of acquired, psychologically inspired reactions. In animals, reactions are inelastic (except insofar as man himself interferes with the manner in which they normally function). It is this plasticity of his instincts which makes it possible for man to respond not merely physiologically but psychologically to axioc stimuli.

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Axioc Stimuli—Man's responses to what biologists call "irritability" and psychologists call "stimuli" are not, therefore, a mechanical physiological responses; they are conditioned by his values, beliefs, and habits of action. The "irritations" which he experiences and which call for the making of a value-judgment in responding to them, I think of as axioc stimuli. Reading a newspaper account of a rape or a riot is such a stimulus; the reader's reaction to it is determined by his ethical values. Looking at paintings and statues in a museum is another kind of axioc stimulus; the onlooker's reaction to it is determined by his esthetic values. Finally, shopping in a store and looking over the goods on a counter is still another kind of axioc stimulus; the reaction of the shopper to it is determined by his economic values.

Life consists of an enormous number and an infinite variety of such stimuli and "irritations," some of which call for telic, some for ethical, some for esthetic, and some for economic responses.

* * * *

Values—Values are emotional judgments. They are generated by feelings, not cognitions; they are emotional¹, not intellectual² judgments.

(1) The psychological mechanism which generates emotions is the unconscious, not the conscious, mind; mankind's felt judgments spring into the conscious mind from the depths of his unconscious.

(2) Judgments, in this context, can always be expressed in either prescriptive or ascriptive sentences—in sentences which either prescribe what human beings should or should not do or

ascribe validity or invalidity to what human beings have or have not done.

* * * *

There are as many different kinds of values as there are different kinds of human actions and human activities. Classification of values seems to indicate that there are at least four basic categories with which any real science of axiology must deal:

Telic values, which deal with convictions and prejudices about ends and means, about the really important purposes of mankind and the auxiliary purposes to which man resorts in trying to realize them—Problem V;

Ethical values, which deal with the problem of good and of evil—Problem VI;

Esthetic values, which deal with the problem of beauty and of ugliness—Problem VII;

Economic or Utilitarian values, which deal with the problem of distinguishing between what Ruskin called wealth and illth—Problem VIII.

* * * *

The Validation of Values—Values can be validated. Their validity or invalidity can be established intellectually, objectively, and scientifically. The prevailing conception of the relativity of all values is demonstrably false. Values, it is true, vary from time to time and from place to place; they are variable. But this does not alter in the slightest degree the validity or invalidity of the human behavior with which the values deal. The crucial test of validity of a value is *the probable consequences of action in accordance with its dictates*. If the probable consequence of action in accordance with a specific value is euthenic³, if it makes for life or enhances living not for the "doer"⁴ alone but for any "doee" of such an action, it is valid; it is dysthenic⁵ and invalid if it inhibits living or is destructive of life, again not for the "doer" alone but for any "doee" of such an action.

Only, as the discussion of the subject in the outline of the epistemic problem should have made clear, it is not sufficient to formulate values poetically. Metaphor and allegory have their place in the inculcation and dissemination of values. In finally putting into words values, the validity of which has been established, we must take the utmost care to be complete and precise,

In spite of the dissemination for over two thousand years of the value expressed in the commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother," and its continued profession if not inculcation to this day, fathers and mothers are very little honored today and may have been only outwardly honored in the past. The commandment, however, is hopelessly imprecise. What, specifically, is "honoring"? and how natural for children to resent the fact that nothing is said about how fathers and mothers should treat their children so as to justify being honored by them. The commandment is imprecise and incomplete.

* * * *

Inculcation and Dissemination—The problem of inculcation and dissemination is discussed at some length in the outline of the educational problem, the last problem in this study of the basic problems of man and society. Here it is sufficient to emphasize the fact that they should not be confused with instruction. Instruction is a problem in intellectual education; it is directed at the conscious mind. Inculcation and dissemination are problems in emotional education; they are directed at the unconscious mind. Instruction, it is true, is necessary when discussing the validity of various values; it is not essential and indeed may interfere with effective inculcation and dissemination—in imbuing the individual with values and in disseminating to society values which have been, presumably, previously validated.

* * * *

Inculcation cannot be avoided. Inculcation begins at birth. Man acquires a set of values willy-nilly. The responsibility for inculcation must, therefore, be embraced, and the inculcation must be deliberate, but of course with previously validated values.

There is nothing unchangeable about the values man acquires. Values can be changed, even though those acquired early in life and long professed and practised can be changed only with effort and with difficulty. The values of both individuals (by inculcation) and of groups both large and small (by dissemination) have been changed; they are being changed today more rapidly than ever before. It is true that the acquisition and the inculcation of values begins at birth in the acceptance or rejection of the child by its parents; it is true that the values inculcated and acquired during the first few years of life affect the unconscious

mind so deeply that their alteration is not easy. But this does not alter the fact that values can be changed and that it is easier to change them in the modern, virtually traditionless world than ever before. It is difficult, however, to say which is more difficult, to change values or to distinguish those which are valid from those which are invalid.

* * * *

Finally, if the problem of values is ever to be rationally and humanely dealt with, those who undertake the creation of a genuine science of axiology and the formulation of an adequate code of values must recognize four things: that in axiology as in all sciences, no matter how good any initial formulation may be, truth-seeking can never end; that axiology is a normative and not merely a descriptive science; that it cannot be created without the fusion or integration of material from at least a dozen sciences and disciplines—psychological and biological, sociological and anthropological, political and economic, legal and medical, historical and biographical, religious and ethical, philosophical and educational; and that of the methodologies which might be used in creating the science the most important is the application of the case method⁶ and the classification method⁶ to the study of human actions and human activities.

* * * *

Notes

1. *Emotional Judgments.*—Emotional, in that like all emotions they spring from the unconscious mind.

2. *Intellectual Judgments.*—Intellectual, in that they are the product of conscious use of the reasoning powers but are not necessarily valid or invalid. A person with a prejudicial judgment which is invalidated by established facts nevertheless uses his intellectual powers, such as he has, to make the judgment.

3. *Euthenic.*—A state or condition in which the individual is both mentally *euphoric* (normal and optimal mentally) and *eucrasic* (normal and optimal physically).

4. *Doer and Doee.*—It is unfortunate that we have no word the connotation of which suggests the person who does an act, nor for the Person who is affected by the action of a doer.

5. *Dysthenic.*—A state of both *dysphoria* (mental ill-being) and of *dyscrasia* (physical ill-being).

6. *Case Method, Classification Method.*—The importance of these methods is discussed in Problem IV, the epistemic problem.

PROBLEM V

Convictions and Prejudices: The Problem of Telic Values

So much does the soul require an objective at which to aim that when it does not have one, it will turn all its powers upon itself and create false and fantastic problems in which it does not even believe, rather than not have something toward which to work.—Montaigne

It is the pervasive part which man's purposes play in his life, and the enormous value he often attaches to them, which justify consideration of what I think of first as the telic problem.¹

Nine facts create the problem:

1. The fact that the essential purpose² to which he devotes his life and what he does from day to day to realize it (without regard to whether it is a purpose which he has accepted unquestioningly or whether it is a purpose which he has deliberately adopted) involves not only himself but his family, his group, his nation, and sometimes humanity as a whole; ("No man is an Island intire of it self").

2. The fact that he cannot escape (no matter how completely he accepts the prevailing purposes in personal living and in dealing with social and religious, political and economic problems) from doing something about what those with strong convictions insist he should do with his life. To do what they would have him do is doing something about his purpose in life, but to fail to do what they would have him do is also doing something about it.

3. The fact that sometimes the convictions he adopts or those which he unconsciously accepts about his purpose in life are valid (William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolitionists: "Slavery is wrong"), but sometimes they are not (the Southerners: "Slavery is justified"). Sometimes they are so demonstrably true that

everybody is justified in thinking of them as convictions, but sometimes they are so demonstrably mistaken that everybody should think of them as prejudices.

4. The fact that mankind attaches its emotions so strongly not only to beliefs which can be validated ("cigarette smoking is harmful") but also to beliefs which are in fact erroneous ("cigarette smoking is harmless").

5. The fact that, while all human purposes are of two kinds, *ultimate ends* and *means for their realization*, there is usually confusion between means and ends. There is confusion when means are dealt with as if they were ends, confusion when means are used which are inconsistent with the ends being sought, and confusion when the ends themselves are so poorly understood as to be identified with ends entirely inconsistent with them.

6. The fact that no man is moved to realize any important purpose (if its realization is difficult) unless he has strong convictions or prejudices about it, unless he has a strong emotional attachment to it which he believes is justified.

7. The fact that he so often acts not upon the basis of purposes he publicly avows but upon the basis of values to which he is subconsciously attached. Unless a purpose avowed is the same as the value attached to it, it is a mere mask behind which he moves toward the purposes he really values.

8. The fact that none of the problems about which he is moved to do anything can be rationally and humanely dealt with without validating what he does about them, without distinguishing between purposes based upon what is true (which alone justify his having convictions about them) and purposes which are in fact mistaken (which inevitably invalidate his convictions).

9. Finally, the fact that he cannot rely upon his instincts and his impulses, as can all other animals, to provide him with purposes which are appropriate to *Homo sapiens*. To provide him with purposes which are rational and humane, no; to provide him with purposes which are irrational and inhumane, yes. But irrational purposes are for apes, not human beings, and inhumane purposes are for tigers, not mankind.

connection with each of the other three problems in values would anticipate consideration of the institutional and educational problems with which this study ends, and it would also duplicate what will have to be said at that time. Here I am trying to consider axiologic problems only. Since education is essentially a praxiologic and not an axiologic problem, it would involve a digression which would tend to obscure the distinctions in the basic problems which are my principal aim in writing this book. The matter can be dismissed for the time being; anybody who wishes to indulge in this digression should turn to the discussion of Problem XVI and XVII.

One thing, however, must be said. The word education connotes instruction rather than inculcation to most people; it suggests schooling. Emotional education (in contrast to intellectual education) involves suggestion and conditioning; it is directed at the unconscious mind and not, as instruction is, at the conscious mind. It takes place everywhere, not only in school.

The strictly axiologic aspects of inculcation involve consideration of two problems, the problem of how to increase the intensity of man's sensibilities (sensibilization), and the problem of how to create a strong monitory conscience (monitorization).

The Problem of Sensibilization—To make clear what sensibilization involves, it is necessary to distinguish between sensitivity and sensibility⁶. Sensitivity is inborn; it refers to the acuity of the sense organs. Sensibility, on the other hand, is acquired; it refers to the acuity of man's perceptions. Sensitivity is neural; sensibility is mental. Sensitivity, it is true, can be intensified (it can also be dulled), but it remains neural nevertheless. Sensibility has to be created; it has to be cultivated and disciplined to intensify it.

Sensitivity is an inborn characteristic of all living things; it is an epiphenomena of the biologic irritability of all living organisms. Sensibility is a characteristic which only man acquires; he alone can acquire it because he is the only animal in which psychologic irritability develops.

So far as the emotional aspects of the telic problem are concerned, the problem is to humanize⁵ men's emotions, to transform mere human animals into humane beings who are keenly self-

conscious about the fact that they have emotions, keenly aware of the fact that they must be controlled and directed, and even more keenly conscious of the fact that they must not permit mere impulses to govern them. As we shall see when we come to emotional education in the consideration of education as a basic problem of its own, there are many teaching and learning techniques which can be used to create and intensify sensibility about purposes, about convictions, and about the importance of validating strong emotional commitments of any kind.

The Problem of Monitorization—To make clear what monitorization involves—what the creation of an adequate telic conscience involves—it is necessary to distinguish the part played in man's life by biologic attraction-and-avoidance reactions (which man inherits along with all his other inherited characteristics) from the part played by psychologic attraction-and-avoidance reactions (which he acquires along with all his other acquired characteristics).

Homo sapiens, like all other animals, has an inborn faculty (I called it his instinctual mind in the discussion of the problem of human nature) which makes him respond to the stimulus of any *neural experience* (to the stimuli triggered by his biologic irritability) with a reaction of either attraction and simultaneously a sensation of pleasure or with a reaction of avoidance and simultaneously with a sensation of pain. What he touches and tastes, what he sees, hears, or smells produces these reactions and sensations. But *Homo sapiens* acquires after he is born a characteristic—psychologic irritability—which makes him respond to the stimulus of any *mental experience* with a reaction either of attraction and simultaneously an emotion of happiness or with a reaction of avoidance and simultaneously an emotion of misery. What he perceives in contrast to what he merely senses gives him these mental reactions and emotions.

Man fortunately develops not one but a complex of consciences. He develops a conscience with regard to any genus of activities, some species of which he has been conditioned to value and others to disvalue. He develops an ethical conscience because he has been conditioned to feel some actions to be moral and others immoral. He feels guilty if he disregards its monitions.

and virtuous if he observes them; he condemns others if they do what his conscience tells him is wrong, and he approves what they do when his conscience tells him it is right.

He develops an esthetic conscience if he has been conditioned to feel some things beautiful and others ugly; he feels uncomfortable if he pays no attention to its monitions, comfortable if he takes them into account. The greater his esthetic sensibility, the more discriminating will his taste be in fine arts like music and painting, and in utilitarian arts such as cooking and dressing.

He develops a telic conscience if he has been made to feel that some purposes are valid and others invalid, that some of the emotions it is possible to feel about them (convictions) are valid and others (prejudices) invalid. If he disregards the monitions of such a conscience, or if others disregard it, he will feel that the behavior involved is irrational and inhumane. If the monitions are heeded, he will feel that he and others who heed them are behaving like reasonable and humane human beings.

The conscience, to the degree to which it has been cultivated, acts as a monitor (in Freud's language, a censor). It substitutes for the instinctual biological attraction-avoidance reactions (which man inherits and upon which he dare not rely) acquired, culture-imbued or specially cultivated attraction-avoidance reactions of its own. Its avoidance-reactions (guilt-feelings) make human beings automatically aware of anything which they may do (or others do) which violates their values.

The control of behavior cannot be entrusted by man to his instincts and impulses; impulses should be monitored. And of no kind of behavior is this truer than of what he does to realize his purposes; of nothing is this truer than of his convictions and his prejudices. He simply dare not take them for granted. It is not enough that they should be occasionally intellectually examined by his conscious mind. When he is moved to act by a conviction (or a prejudice), the impulse itself must be monitored.

For purposes of analysis, I have separated validation (the intellectual aspect of the telic problem) from inculcation and dynamization (the emotional aspect of the problem), and education (the practical aspect of the problem). But in living all three function continuously and simultaneously because feeling and

judging are inseparable. Everybody feels that his convictions are valid; nobody feels that he has prejudices at all—much less that they are invalid. The moment anybody discovers that a real purpose of his is, in fact, invalid, it ceases to be one; the moment anybody is not merely told but begins to feel that a conviction of his is invalid, he loses his emotional commitment to it. He discovers that what he felt to be a conviction was, in actuality, a prejudice, in actuality, a devotion to a mistaken cause or purpose, a devotion not to what was valid but to what was really invalid. (Charlatans, demagogues, and other hypocrites provide seeming exceptions, for they continue to give lip-service to prejudices even when they know them to be false, because it pays them either in pride or in money to do so.)

* * * *

When we look for solutions of the telic problem, when we look for theories and for doctrines and ideologies which deal with the problem of ends and means, we find they all fall into one of three categories: Salvation, Gratification, or Satisfaction doctrines. As in the classification of the solutions of the noetic problems with which Part I of this study was concerned and the classification of solutions of praxiologic problems which will follow in Part III, the classification of axiologic problems is also based upon the only three basic sources of knowledge which I believe exist and which I think of as Supernal, Objective, and Intellectual. Every doctrine and every ideology dealing with problems in values, on this basis, ultimately relies upon one or another of these three sources of knowledge to vindicate itself.

I am, it is true, dealing with the telic problem scientifically, descriptively, analytically, intellectually, and even academically, but the problem is not an academic one. It becomes vividly real when we recognize that the greatest conflict of our times—that between the Marxist revolutionists who are challenging the whole of the old order and those opponents of revolution who utterly repudiate that challenge—is in reality a conflict about what is implicit in all Salvation, Gratification, and Satisfaction solutions of the telic problem. Faith, which is implicit in all Salvation ideologies, accepts mystery in dealing with every individual and social problem; Authority (which provides security) is implicit in

all Gratification ideologies; and Liberty (which accepts contingency, liability, and responsibility) is implicit in all Satisfaction ideologies.

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Salvation Doctrines about the Telic Problem—All these doctrines claim that they are valid because their truth is established by a revelation from on high ("Thus saith the Lord") or by an inspiration from within which the inspired individual equates with such a revelation. The lives of Jesus and Mohammed, of Francis of Assisi in Italy and Ramakrishna in India, provide vivid examples of devotion to salvation as the purpose of life. Millions of humbler devotees of religions have followed in their footsteps. Thomas a Kempis with his *Imitation of Christ* was the classic example of Christian devotion to Heaven as the goal toward which every man should devote his life, and John Bunyan with his *Pilgrim's Progress* was the classic example of devotion to escape from Hell.

Salvationism and Damnationism—The ultimate goal and ultimate purpose common to the Salvation doctrines of virtually all Supernatural religions is a twofold one—the realization of Salvation and the avoidance of Damnation. To realize this state of salvation, they all maintain that sinful activities should be avoided and that life should be devoted to those activities which will assure an after life in Heaven, not Hell (*Christianity*); Paradise, not Hell (*Mohammedanism*); Moksha, not Bandha (*Hinduism*); and Nirvana, not Tanha (*Buddhism*).

Among the means prescribed for assuring Salvation there is, first of all, worship of the right kind. This, according to the religion involved, may call for monolatry⁷, *Monotheism*; idolatry, *Polytheism*; Mariolatry, *Catholicism*; iconolatry, *Orthodoxy*; hagiolatry, *Lamaism*; phalliolatry, *Hinduism*; bibliolatry, *Protestantism*; anthropolatry, *Mythology*.

The antithesis to these doctrines of worship and adoration is the doctrine which I think of as *Antigentilism*—hatred of the Gentile, of those who do not belong to the true religion and who refuse, even when they have the opportunity, to embrace it. *Antisemitism* among Christians and Muslims is a variety of Antigentilism; devout Jews return the compliment with *Antigoyism*. But if possible even blacker pages of history have been written

by the bigots engaged in mutual Antiheresism—the Iconoclasts and the Iconolatrists, the Homocousians and the Homoiousians, the Protestants and Catholics. *Antigentilism*, however, is not confined to the supernatural religions; in the religion of revolution it becomes *Counter-revolution*, and of Communism, *Anti-deviationism*, and in this form has provided history with pages just as black and horrible.

Among the means in contrast to ends, which the protagonists of various Salvation doctrines value highly are *Communion* and *Union* with the Absolute; *Abnegation* and *Non-attachment* as a means of “emancipation from the clutch of matter”; living alone in a hermitage, an isolated hut in a forest or a cave in a mountain, *Eremitism*; living with a group all of whom have like conceptions about the means to be used, *Monasticism*, and for the rank and file and not only *religieux*, *Sanctificationism* and what I think of as *Divine Dependencism*. Sanctificationism calls for efforts to obtain God’s grace in the alienation of the sinner from sin and the purification of impure man so that he is exalted to supreme righteousness and a supreme love of God. *Divine Dependencism* maintains that man is, and should be, dependent upon God, that he should rely upon Him and subject himself to Him for support. The *religieux*, not only Christian but Hindu and Buddhist as well, do this by relying upon alms for their support; the devout layman, by relying upon Providence more than upon anything that might be done by the individual or by collective action. Finally, among means might be mentioned salvation (justification) by faith, which I think of as *Telic Fideism*, and salvation by good works, which in my terminology is *Agatho-Ergonism*. One form of good works which is typical of others is devotion to movements like *Christian Socialism*, which of course has counterparts in other religions—there is such a thing as *Arabic Socialism*, for instance.

The danger of accepting a purpose validated subjectively and supernaturally instead of objectively and naturally is that even though one inspired prophet or another, one mystic or another, one religion or another, may occasionally agree about the ends of life, they endlessly contradict each other about the means to achieve them. Christianity and Mohammedanism are in substantial agreement about the goal of life, but they are in violent opposition about the means for realizing it. There is no way of reconciling

the Christian doctrine that Jesus provided the way, the Christian doctrine of the authority of the Holy Bible (but which interpretation of it?), the Christian doctrine that the Church's creed must be observed (but again, which Church's, Catholic or Protestant?), with the Islamic doctrine that Mohammed provided the way, the Islamic doctrine of the authority of the Glorious Koran (but which interpretation of it?), the Islamic insistence that Mohammed's creed be observed (but which sect's interpretation of it, Shiite, Sunnite, or one of the other seventy-seven variations of Islam?).

And, of course, there are great differences about the nature of the afterlife in spite of the fact that all religions agree that this present life should be devoted to preparation for it. The orthodox and Muslim conception of the afterlife (residence in Heaven or confinement to Hell) is totally different from that of Hinduism (reunion with Brahma) and that of Buddhism (absorption into Nirvana)—so different that orthodox Christian and Mohammedan theologians insist Moksha and Nirvana mean extinction and not salvation. And there is a great deal of substance to the argument, although neither orthodox Hindus nor Buddhists accept it. Both Hinduism and Buddhism agree that "Hell" is not in the future but in this life, and that damnation for living a bad life is reincarnation and continuance in this world, while salvation as a result of a life properly lived means release from "the wheel of life" and either reunion of the soul (Atman) with the divine Brahman or absorption of the soul into the ecstasy of Nirvana. But Hinduism and Buddhism are in total disagreement as to how man has to live to realize ultimate bliss.

Because of great faith in the dogmatic doctrines in which they believe (Fideism) and greater fear of the heresies in which infidels and gentiles believe (Gentilism); because of hatred for those who do not believe as they do (Antigentilism) and even greater hatred (Antiheresism) for those who have deliberately turned away from what they believe about the purposes to which life should be devoted and the means to be practiced to realize them, Catholics have slaughtered countless Protestants, Christians countless Mohammedans, Mohammedans countless Hindus, and *vice versa*. Yet if any two of these doctrines contradict one another, one of them must be invalid, while both may be if they are

contradicted by a third. Out of all the supernatural religions, obviously only one can be the "true religion." And if the very basis of all supernatural religions—revelation—is itself invalid, then all the slaughter and all the persecutions and pain inflicted haven't even the excuse of having been inflicted for any valid convictions but only for sating superstitious, bigotted, fanatic prejudices which represent a regression to a state of civilization infinitely lower than that of the Paganism they replaced.

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Gratification Solutions of the Telic Problem confront us with very different difficulties. Objectively, they base their doctrine of devotion on "wine, women, and song" and justify the axiom, "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die," on two indubitable facts: the fact that man has a body, and the fact that its gratification gives pleasure. Purposes which cannot be validated in terms of pleasure and, in particular, purposes which call upon the individual to sacrifice his pleasures and perhaps even his very life (which according to Materialism is all that he has, there being no afterlife), cannot, therefore, be objectively validated.

The doctrine which seems most clearly to fall into this category of purposes is *Hedonism*, which maintains that pleasure should be the sole or chief end of life. Hedonism maintains that in taking life as it really is and the world as it really is, man's real moral duty is fulfilled in the gratification of his pleasurable sensations and pleasurable desires. *Epicureanism*, which is a satisfaction, not gratification, telic doctrine, is often confused with Hedonism. *Cyrenaicism*, which utterly repudiated Epicurean consideration for future pleasure and insisted that only immediate pleasure was real pleasure, was the most logically Hedonistic of the Greek schools of philosophy.

Hedonism is really a term designating a wide variety of different doctrines and practices, all of which have in common gratification as the goal. All are seemingly egotistic in nature, but if they are all called egotistic, then there are two kinds of *Egotisms*, one individual and one collective. There is such a thing as a whole family, a whole class or caste, or a whole nation or empire being collectively egotistic and collectively Hedonistic. This was true of the class in Feudal societies which considered itself a

Nobility. It is true today of a totally different class which is being made collectively egotistic in the name of *Proletarianism* under the aegis of Communist "dictatorships of the proletariat." And it is also true, ever since the dawn of *Imperialism* and *Nationalism*, only it is called *Patriotism* or *Chauvinism*. No matter what this devotion is called—perhaps "devotion to my country's interests," or "devotion to the privileges of my class"—it is, in fact, a kind of collective pursuit of collective pleasure as the goal.

Ironically there are many telic movements which inspire great devotion and for which the most selfless sacrifices, even of life, are made, yet the goal of which is the realization of a collective state of gratifications of a purely materialistic kind. Two are worth mentioning:

Utilitarianism and Capitalism—devotion to collective, political action to realize "the greatest good to the greatest number"; to create—or to maintain—a social system which makes possible individual gratification through a state of general prosperity, and

Socialism and Communism—devotion to collective political action, including the risks and sacrifices of revolution, to create a social system which will provide collective gratification through collective affluence.

We shall consider these illustrations of telic values and telic movements again, but in connection with Satisfaction and not Gratification solutions.

Among the strictly and purely egotistic doctrines and methods which are Hedonistic in nature, some of the most important are:

Plutolatry and Plutocracy—the worship of wealth; devotion to money-making for the purpose of exercising economic power; the pursuit of money for money's sake (the Fuggers, the Rothschilds, John Jacob Astor, J. Pierpont Morgan, John D. Rockefeller), but also the much more widespread greed for money and pursuit of money to gratify the desires whetted to the *nth* degree by modern affluence, modern advertising, and the worship of the Bitch Goddess Success. Not so long ago nobody had anything critical to say about devotion to money-making; the masses of not only Americans but immigrants hugged to their bosoms the moral of Orison Swett Marden's "Pushing to the Front" (now almost forgotten but in fact translated into most of the important lan-

guages of the world) and of course the ambition for money described in Horatio Alger's books which sold by the millions.

Celebrity and what might be called *Celebritolatri*—the devotion of life to the gratification of the desire for fame, distinction and reputation, is a telic value common to an enormous number of men, particularly those who suffer from what are called inferiority complexes. At its best, it gratifies vanity; at its worst, downright sadistic desires.

Ambition—fanatical and overwhelming dedication to the desire to rule, to exercise the greatest possible power over the largest possible number of people, to which so many great historic figures have devoted their lives (Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini). I know of no really appropriate word which designates this particular telic value; ambition comes nearest to denoting it. And since we have perfectly good words with which to designate ambition in its general signification (the desire for predominance), to designate the desire for great riches (*Plutolatri*), and the desire for great fame (*Celebritolatri*), I see no reason for hesitating about using the word, *Ambition*, specifically to designate inordinate desire for political office and for the exercise of political power.

What biography and history show is that those whose purpose in life was the gratification of political *Ambition* have not hesitated to resort to any means, no matter how despicable and no matter how brutal, to realize their desires. Included in what might be called the mediate purposes (means and methods) to which ambitious men resort are such unlovely activities as sycophancy, chicanery, venality, buncombe, bribery, bombast, demagogery, intimidation, cruelty, and individual and mass-violence, all of which are usually rationalized as necessary to the realization of rationalized purposes (frequently very noble indeed) which gloss over the real nature of the desire involved.

Statolatri, *Sociolatri*, *Demolatri*, *Religiolatri*, *Ideolatri*—fanatical dedication, not to what I have called *Ambition* but to an almost selfless devotion and worship of the State, of Society, of Democracy, of a Church (Catholicism, Lamaism), of a Religion (Judaism, Mohammedanism, Fundamentalism and Orthodox Christianity), or of an Ideology (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity;

Utilitarianism, Capitalism in its earliest stages; Socialism and Communism; Conservatism, Liberalism). Statolatry is not a Gratification but Satisfaction telic value and telic solution of the problem of purpose, but I am describing it here under the heading of Gratification doctrines because it is the millions of Statolaters who make it possible for Ambition-obsessed individuals to gratify their burning itch to exercise power.

Ergonism and *Ergolatry*—fanatical devotion to work, to work apparently for work's sake; *Technology* and *Mechanolatry*—the idolatry of technology and machinery, and *Megalatry*—the worship of bigness, are akin because it is believed that devotion to them will be the "Open Sesame" to affluence and the boundless gratification of desires;

Egolatry or *Idiolatry*, *Egoism* and *Narcissism*,—purposes in life which, at their best, are reflected in *Estheticism*, *Dilletantism*, *Phillistinism*, and *Neophilism*, and at their worst in *Eroticism* and *Bacchanalianism*.

Sexolatry and *Eroticism*—devotion to what used to be called venery and is today called love (Byron's *Don Juan*; D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterly's Lover*; Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*). When Sexolatry is symbolized in Phallic emblems and the emblem actually worshipped, I have called it Phallicism and classified it as a Salvation doctrine. The more extreme modern advocates of a sexual revolution verge very closely upon Phallicism; they consider sex a means to Earthly if not Supernal Salvation.

Phillistinism—the practice of those who get their greatest Gratification in life out of devotion to selfish, commonplace and material interests, and who pride themselves on their contempt for and their indifference to higher artistic and intellectual interests and concerns. (Sinclair Lewis, *Babbitt*).

Neophilism, which is usually defined as a pathologically morbid and excessive desire for novelty, can be used to designate those who get their greatest gratification in life out of the pursuit of the latest fashions and crazes (Fashionolatry?). The "newest thing," the most important thing to have, may be anything from a stylish dress to a stylish automobile.

Theatrolatry and *Athletolatry*—the ancient Greek devotion to drama and athletics, is expressed in its modern form by the

wholehearted devotion of sport "fans" and "TV" addicts. It is usually accompanied by the virtual apotheosis of the most notorious actors and actresses, and the most famous "sports" and "athletes," and by investing them with heroic qualities which few of them possess. Consider the amount of space devoted to sports and "show business" in the modern newspaper, to rock'n roll and Beatle-manias, and it becomes no exaggeration to say that in these fields gratification and spectation rather than participation is the highest end and value of millions of people.

Disteleolatriy—We finally come to what I think of as *Disteleolatriy*—devotion to purposelessness as the purpose of life (self-contradictory though it sounds). It is not too difficult to distinguish two kinds of *Disteleolatrists*, the satiated and the frustrated. The satiated, when they try to explain their distress, tend to criticize life; the frustrated, to destroy it. When they try to rationalize it, the satiated adopt a Pessimistic philosophy of some kind (Relativism, Existentialism), the frustrated, a Cynical and Nihilistic one.

The Nihilists feel and believe that existing society is so bad that it ought to be destroyed; that no matter what kind of society replaces it, it might be better but could not possibly be worse. Many of them feel much the same way about life itself, and take out their frustration in anything from alcoholism to homicide. Many "join the Revolution" not because they are really dedicated to the building of a new society but because it gives them a means for both rationalizing and indulging in destructiveness or escaping boredom.

Modern Cynics (the Beatnik in his "pad" instead of Diogenes in his tub) take out their frustrations in non-conformist behavior. Modern Relativists (John B. Watson, Bertrand Russell) and Modern Existentialists (Sartre, de Beauvoir) are logically driven to believe that all ultimate purposes are meaningless. Illogically, they often work for the realization of a world of sensate affluence; Watson for the world of existing affluent Capitalist advertising; Russell, Sartre, and de Beauvoir for a future Communist world of affluence—both of them Gratification solutions of the telic problem.

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Many of the apologists for Gratification doctrines are Reduc-

tionists; values, they maintain, are nothing but projections of interests.⁸ But what they call interests are themselves values, differing from other values only in that what is valued is tangible, measurable, or both.

Marx never talked about "class values" but only about "class interests"; in his frame of reference, values are a part of the ideological superstructure which, at bottom, consists of "economic (class) interests." Jeremy Bentham, and many naive Utilitarians, tried quite seriously to reduce the principle of "the greatest good to the greatest number" to something which could be measured in the market place (if nowhere else) just as the market place measures the "economic value" of labour and commodities of all kinds. But as we shall see when we consider the problem of economic values (Problem VIII), the "prices" and the tangible "interests" with which economics deal, can be and are valued subjectively just as truly as is an intangible like eternal salvation. Businessmen not only can be but are emotionally attached to their businesses, as are most owners of stocks and bonds, of homes or farms, of automobiles, of jewelry, of property of all kinds. The proof of this is simple: just threaten to confiscate it—as Communists do!

There are countless instances in which devout believers in God have been willing to sacrifice their interests, including their very lives, to further some purpose which they are convinced realizes God's will. But this is true not only of devout Supernaturalists; it is also true of dedicated artists and intellectuals, scientists like Galileo and Darwin, painters like Gauguin and Van Gogh, writers like Koestler and Silone. Gratificationists consider men of this kind the victims of obsessions and superstitions. No really sane man, they believe, would dream of sacrificing his pleasures for the sake of being what cynics among them call "do gooders." What they fail to see is that devotion is not necessarily obsession, nor dedication necessarily superstition. What they fail to see is that men can obtain from such sacrifices not Gratification but what I call Satisfaction.

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Satisfaction Doctrines—Finally we come to the various ideologies and doctrines which maintain that man's purposes in life (and all the means he uses to realize them) should be neither the

Salvation of the soul nor the Gratification of the body but the Satisfaction of the Self. *Self* here means the subjective self, not the objective body; the Self which experiences immediately, not only through the senses; not the Supernatural soul which has to be taken on faith because its existence is indemonstrable but the Self the existence of which can be objectively demonstrated. Those who belong to this school of thought (most of them unconsciously do not think of it as a school much less a solution the problem of telic values) maintain in one way or another that the satisfaction of the Self, through the realization of mankind's highest potentialities, is man's proper purpose in life. Implicitly, this school of thought also maintains that this cannot possibly endanger any worthwhile scheme of salvation (if the Supernaturalists are right and man has an immortal soul). But it also denies that making Satisfaction the goal of life requires the sacrifice of all sensate pleasure. What it does maintain is that the realization of values and purposes which provide enduring Satisfaction should be given priority over those which provide immediate Gratification only.

Satisfaction doctrines are logically Pluralistic. They must logically assume that both values and duties on one hand and interests and desires on the other exist, and they must insist that ratiocination⁹ can be used to determine what purposes and what means for realizing them are valid and justify emotional commitment and devotion.

Some of the Doctrines and practices which fall into this category are *Naturalism*, *Humanism*, and *Euphorism*, which will have to be discussed at some length. The following will have to be very briefly mentioned:

Eudaemonism, devotion to the *summum bonum*, the practice of the greatest good as the goal of life; *Stoicism*, the practice of *apatheia*—not of apathy and of indifference to the tragedies of life but of passivity with regard to personal pains and pleasures; *Epicureanism* (which should not be confused with Cyrenaicism, as it frequently is), the practice of disciplined happiness to realize a state of *hremia*, of tranquility; *Taoism*, the practice of *Tao*, of spontaneity and conformity to nature; *Zen Buddhism*, the practice of *satori*, liberation from convention; *Confucianism*, the practice of *li*, the golden mean; *Vocationalism* or *Hippocratism*, the practice

of dedication and devotion to a calling, to doing as perfectly as possible the work, no matter what it may be, to which one has been called—to practicing Vocationalism (not commercially but truly professionally) in Hippocrates' conception of what a vocation should be, "Life is short, Art is long."

Security and *Venturity* must be discussed together because when either is sought for itself alone they are Gratification and not Satisfaction solutions of the problem of purpose. But when combined in the Vocation to which the individual is called by life, they both become Satisfaction values. Security needs no definition, but *Venturity* does¹⁰. By *Venturity*, I mean those essential and inescapable challenges in certain occupations only (motherhood, farming, teaching) to which the venturer must make adequate responses and in which he or she must take risks for himself or herself (not for others) and personally either succeeds and enjoys them or personally fails and suffers as a result of his failure. To fulfill the duties of a human being (in contrast to merely gratifying human desires), Security and *Venturity* both as ends and means must become one of the highest of telic values.

Finally there is *Heroism*. (*Venturity* is taking all the usual risks, great and small, of what is in the line of duty; *Heroism* is taking the risks which go beyond, and far beyond, the call of duty). *Heroism* belongs in a life aiming at the realization of Satisfaction not because it involves the exceptional in risk and venture but because, in terms of living meaningfully and purposefully, it provides some of the greatest Satisfaction—ecstatic and euphoric—which living makes it possible for human beings to experience.

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Naturalism, as the term will be used in this study, will designate one of the doctrines—in contrast to the many—which it is now used to specify, and that one the Naturalian¹¹ answer to what should be man's ultimate purpose in life. The Naturalian answer can be reduced to a single Telic proposition, that *man's whole life should be dedicated to living naturally*. (There is, unfortunately, an ambiguity in the use of the word naturally in this proposition; if the proper word were to be used it would have to be normally⁵. But it wouldn't sound right to those unfamiliar with my previous writings if the proposition was phrased, man's whole life should

be dedicated to living normally. Yet from a strictly semantic standpoint, normally and not naturally is not only the right word to use but also the less ambiguous of the two.)

But Telic Naturalism is only one of a number of doctrines which in their entirety become the philosophy¹²—and even the religion¹³—of Naturalism. Consistent and systematic Naturalians, as we have seen, have a set of beliefs of their own about the postulates upon the basis of which they live. In their frame of reference they take nature—including man (man being a part of the natural world)—for granted, and move on from there.

Telic naturalians are metaphorically nature “worshippers,” but since they see no call in nature for idolatrous worship, the use of “worship” is a misnomer. More precisely, they feel toward nature the sense of wonder, of power, of reverence, and of ultimate mystery which, in the supernatural religions, inspire worship. Since they do not apotheosize nature (as Pantheists, for instance, do), they find no dictate to worship it. They reverence nature not for nature’s sake but for mankind’s sake.

But the feeling of reverence is not enough. No consistent Naturalian can reverence nature and then despoil it. He cannot mine the soil (as most of our farmers are taught to do and in fact do); he cultivates it, without reducing its fertility a particle, by organically manuring it. He can be a hunter and fisherman, but not the kind of hunter who exterminated the buffalo and has nearly exterminated many other animals for their pelts, nor the kind of fisherman who, with a steam trawler, strips the ocean floor of the organisms upon which all fish life is dependent. He cannot be a strip-miner nor forest-denuder; he can only cut down trees if he provides for their replacement, and when he extracts minerals from the Earth, he must consider the claim which future generations have to those same mineral riches. In sum, he must be a conservationist. He must conserve the water and the soil, the flora and the fauna, the very wilderness itself, even if much of it may have to be transformed by living on it, working on it, and using it. But enough of it must always be saved to minister to the well-being of future generations. He feels morally obligated, having inherited the Earth, and whatever of fertility sinful man has left in it, of bequeathing to his children and his children’s children an

estate the usufruct of which he enjoyed. It was entrusted to him; like a good husbandman, he ought to leave it richer and not poorer.

In the language of the praxiology of our own period, consistency calls for his living in the country or in an open town and not a city or metropolis; he may—but need not be—a full-time farmer, but if he is to practice Naturalism and not only talk it, he must at least “cultivate his own garden,” at the very least a flower garden; he must eat natural whole foods, practice natural birth, rely upon natural therapies, meditate in the natural wilderness, and practice a scheme of living which unconscious Naturalians recognize by calling it “natural.”

The Naturalian feels as Thoreau and Emerson, Burroughs and Fabre felt about nature—as man should feel for that which not only nourishes his body but feeds his soul, which permits and reciprocates cultivation and cooperation by ministering to his mental and physical well-being and inspiring him to realize his highest potentialities as a man. He may never write a line of poetry such as Wordsworth wrote, but he lives poetically, as have countless unknown and unknowing nature lovers.

And at all times he must never lose sight of the fact that he himself—that mankind—is a part of nature, and from the standpoint of man both naturally and normally the most important. Nature, in this sense, exists for man, not man for nature. But nature does call upon him to sacrifice the meretricious pleasures of Urbanism and Industrialism (as it does in calling upon him not to destroy but to conserve its fertility). For this it repays him in two ways, by the satisfaction he feels in doing what he should for his children, and the satisfaction (not gratification or salvation) which doing it furnishes to every properly educated man. There is a kind of ecstasy—of euphoria—which doing it provides with no trace of mysticism in it, a euphoria which is shot through and through with what is good, what is true, and what is beautiful.

Humanism and Humanitarianism—There is no great scientific difference (anthropoic, ontoic, and etiologic) between Naturalism and Humanism, but there is a difference of emphasis. The Humanist can be a Naturalian but neither, it seems to me, can be Humanalatrists. There is something profoundly and disturbingly

wrong with the idea of reverencing and worshipping mankind. Man at his occasional highest, perhaps; but man as he is—as he exists and has existed historically and biographically—has fallen so far below what he should be, that it is easy to understand why intelligent men can be Misanthropes, Cynics, and Nihilists. Mankind's history is shot through and through with such tragic inhumanity and terrifying violence that rationally he can only be considered a subject of amazement—never for reverence and worship.

What Humanism does is to put man in the foreground as Naturalism puts nature. The ethos of Humanism is *man's interests must be served*; the ethos of Naturalism, *man and nature (this being the whole of nature) must be served*. His ultimate goal in life, the purpose to which he should dedicate himself, according to Humanism, is the realization of man's potential as a rational and human being, and any activity of man and of society which makes this possible is for the Humanist right.

Most Humanists, therefore (my guess would be more than nine out of ten), without regard to the school of thought to which they belong, tend to embrace Humanitarianism and to believe in and work for Humanitarian causes. Unitarians and Universalists; the followers of Felix Adler who call themselves Ethical Culturists; the social, political and economic Humanists who call themselves Liberals, Progressives, Welfare Statists, and Socialists, and of course both Materialistic and Religious Humanists per se; all feel the call of Humanitarianism. Even the Christian religions have added to their other-worldly goal, a Humanist goal; sometimes they call it the social gospel, sometimes Christian Socialism. This sort of Humanism has also developed in the new India and in the new Muslim States—Indian Socialism it is called in the first and Arab Socialism in the others.

What is noteworthy is its orientation. It is based upon the new technology, which is Urban and Industrial, with its promises of abundance and promises of an end to hard-labor. It identifies what is not Humanitarian with the old technology, which was family-oriented rather than socially-oriented, with the crafts, with husbandry and housewifery, which not only call for hard labor but make a virtue of thrift.

The implications of all this goes beyond the telic problem; they are considered later in this book in the outlines of mankind's basic praxiologic problems. I have to resist the temptation to inject too much of my own conclusions into this discussion, but this much I think is germane: the great controversy which divides the non-Communist from the Communist world, or more correctly, the exponents of freedom and the proponents of Marxism, is involved. And the question for Humanitarians (which must be answered if reason is to decide what is right), may be formulated in these terms: Granted that the supreme value they attach to humanity is valid, Humanitarians must decide which is to be given priority, the individual, the family, or society?

As this question is usually raised, it is not a trichotomy but a dichotomy: individual or society? Those who plump for Individualism are promptly considered as outside the fold of Humanitarianism, as apologists for competition and Capitalism and its inhumanism: those who plump for Socialism, as Humanitarians. That Familism is Humanitarian in the best sense of the word, is ignored, and no attention is given to the possibility that a Pluralistic approach may be the only scientifically vindicable approach to realizing a genuinely Humanitarian purpose in living. Such an approach calls for taking into account what is basically essential to the well-being of individual and family, society and humanity, and the possibility that, of the four, it is the family which must be given priority.

There are two kinds of Humanitarian movements, and they must be sharply distinguished. One I think of as sentimental and the other as scientific. One premises itself upon a sentimental all-embracing brotherhood of mankind, and the other upon the scientific facts about different individuals, different families, different classes, and different nationalities and races.

The Humanist can afford to be sentimental without doing violence to his ethos—to the ethos of the Equalitarianism implicit in it. But the Naturalian cannot, without ignoring the scientific facts about the nature of the world and the nature of the human beings who inhabit it. The Naturalian must be scientific; he cannot consistently be sentimental. For him, as consideration of the etiologic problem makes clear, nature is neither good nor

bad; it just *is*; it exists, and it is benign or diabolic from time to time with equal indifference to what is good or bad for man. The rain falls and the sun shines, and these are good (for man), but the Earth quakes and the fires and floods, the tornadoes and hurricanes devastate, and these are not good but evil. And just as man must accept all these, so he must accept everything which is inherent and inescapable in what evolution and genetics teaches about the human race, what ecology teaches about the environment, and what anthropoics and etiology teaches about existing social institutions.

There is only one way in which nature provides for the emergence of the fit; that is by the elimination of the unfit. One does not have to be stigmatized a Social Darwinist to accept this. And if a refusal to preserve sentimentally the unfit and to utilize the world's material and professional resources and burden the fit by innundating the world with the feeblest, the stupidest, the most moronic, and the least responsible dregs of the population, is Social Darwinism, then Social Darwinism is Humanism and Humanitarianism of the most far-sighted kind.

There is only one way in which nature has shown that it is possible to preserve a wholesome environment for any particular species of organism, that is by an ecology which makes it possible for the best specimens of the species to survive. To destroy the ecology of the environment in which man has developed most fully, as we are doing today to please the greediest and most shortsighted elements in the population, is a crime against future generations. It is not Humanism to act on the basis of "After us the deluge!"

Finally there is only one way in which the historiography of mankind has shown that the right kind of social institutions can be established; that is by rigorously determining what the problems are that make for both current and future well-being, and organizing institutions which provide time-tested proof that they can solve them.

Scientific Humanitarianism would educate and institutionalize so that the individual remains free and at the same time knows how he should deal with problems of this kind. It would, in all its social institutions, accord priority to the fit, not the unfit,

In dealing with the population problem, it would eliminate all legal obstacles to contraception, to family planning, to sterilization, to abortion (so that no unwanted infants would be born), and to euthanasia. In cases and in situations where voluntary action cannot be expected (with criminals and with the feeble-minded and the insane), compulsion would have to be used. In so important a matter, the Humanist must not shrink for sentimental reasons from doing what is right; like the good surgeon, he must recognize that there are times when a knife must be used.

Sentimental Humanitarianism, on the other hand, is in this respect just as stupid and just as dogmatic as is fundamentalist Christianity, which insists that God's will (be fruitful and multiply) must be blindly obeyed. In this respect, it is not humane but grossly inhuman.

The real problem is how to do what is necessary without outraging normal feelings (not sentimentalized feelings) and how to do it without becoming callous in the process. The real problem is not whether, but how.

In dealing with other social institutions, the same principles apply. The distinction between what is humane and what is sentimental should constantly be kept in mind. It is this distinction which sentimentalists ignore. It is not charity which mankind needs but justice. Charity does no ultimate good. Charity assuages pain, it does not prevent it. Charity dulls and blinds the Humanitarian to the fact that alms and doles are cheap substitutes for justice. What justice demands from us is both abandonment of any statutorily granted special privileges, which we happen personally to enjoy, and joining in the struggle to abolish all the statutorily granted special privileges which now abound.

Euphorism, Euphoriation, and Euphoria—One of those annoying terminological problems which have beset me in the study upon which this book is based has developed with regard to this solution of the telic problem. Euphorism, as I think of this particular telic doctrine, has no generally accepted name. There is a name, it is true, for one kind of Euphorism—Mysticism—but actually there are at least three genera with many species of each: (1) *Mystical Euphorism* or Mysticism, (2) *Narcotic Euphorism* or Narcotism, and (3) *Normal (Natural) Euphorism*. The

characteristic common to all of them is the experience which in medical terms is called euphoria. But with both Mystical and Narcotic Euphorism, entrancement and unconsciousness are involved, while, with what I think of as Normal Euphorism, perfect consciousness is retained. There is another important difference. Mysticism is a Salvation doctrine; it provides a foretaste for man, while still alive, of the delights which ultimate Salvation is supposed to provide. Narcotism is a gratification doctrine, it provides sensual delights here and now so intense that addicts forego everything else in life to enjoy them. Normal Euphorism, on the other hand, is a Satisfaction doctrine.

Mysticism varies somewhat from religion to religion, but in various respects it is the same in all of them. Christian and Mohammedan Mysticism calls for entrancement and communion; Hindu and Buddhist Mysticism for the same thing under different names, *samadhi* and *nirvana*.

Mystical writings, no matter how different the religion of the Mystic, describe the experiences to which Mysticism leads as providing such ecstasy, bliss, rapture, and transports of delight as to justify the long discipline and arduous methods necessary to realize them. Curiously, these writings are amazingly like the descriptions of their experiences provided by those who practise Narcotism, who achieve entrancement through the use of drugs—peyote, mescaline, LSD, and even opium and hashish. But it is only recently that the fact has become recognized that the same rapturous delights can be obtained without recourse to either Mysticism or Narcotism, and without entrancement and unconsciousness.

That this is true is now being recognized by a new school of psychologists who are studying the subject and who insist that these "peak-experiences," as Maslow calls them, are not restricted to those who are mystical and religious but are experienced by those who haven't a trace of mysticism or religion in them and can be experienced by virtually everybody if they set their minds to it.

Some term is needed to designate all solutions of the problem which are in terms of psychology the same, however different in method and intention. All provide ecstatic and euphoric ex-

periences, though each one rationalizes or vindicates its essential nature differently.

* * * *

The questions arise, the first terminologic: what should we call these experiences and this state of being? And the other substantive, should these experiences be cultivated, and should enjoying them become a deliberate ultimate purpose in life (as it already is with Mystics and Narcotists). The first problem I suggest can be disposed of by turning to medicine for a terminology, and by using the term *Euphorism* to designate the theory and doctrine, *euphoria* to designate the practice, and *euphoria* the experience.

Euphoria is a state of bouyant well-being, of heightened consciousness, of intense sensibility. It may range in intensity from a feeling of mere eucrasia and freedom from all dyscrasia and depression, to a state of ecstasy, of engrossing rapture, entrancing joy, and self-forgetful bliss. The after effect of such ecstatic experiences, *when produced by acts or activities which are themselves rationally and humanely vindicable*, make life worth living. When produced by practices which can be morally and esthetically justified—which are in truth both good and beautiful and mentally and physically wholesome—they provide the individual with the courage to face the sort of world in which he finds himself and to endure the worst it has to offer him (of which death—his own death or the loss or death of those he loves—seems the worst).

But the opposite of this is also true. When euphoria is achieved by methods which are neither vindicable nor justifiable (when produced by those who get feelings called "high" from drinking alcohol or using heroin and other drugs; when produced by sadistic or masochistic acts, or by perversions or downright criminal acts), the after-effects and the social consequences are terrible. Obtaining euphoric experiences out of a "bottle" or by using "a needle," victimizes those who become addicted to them or dependent upon them, and degrades and debauches them. But there is worse. That obsessive rapists and killers experience a kind of orgasmic euphoria as a result of their frightful acts is supported by such evidence as we have and by the inferences which can logically be drawn from the frightful risks taken by those

who do these things. Few of them are entirely insane; many of them are not only aware of what they are doing and aware of why they do it but aware of the risks involved in doing it.

What the new psychologists, who are neither exclusively Freudian nor exclusively Behavioristic, are exploring are what I sometimes call the major ecstasies of life. Everybody can enjoy the euphoria these offer, and innumerable souls have enjoyed them from the beginning of time.

It is a minor ecstasy in life which is offered to everybody (to those who particularly cultivate the necessary sensibility for it) by sunsets, by moonlight, by sunshine, and even, (for the countryman) by rain. It is a major ecstasy which has been enjoyed by millions who have seen the Taj Mahal, and by those who have seen other great works of art, heard great music, read great books, watched great drama, and listened to great poetry. Schopenhauer, who was so keenly aware of the tragic nature of life, saw in art man's only solace and in its creation his only euphoria. Kierkegaard was, in this respect, a kind of masochistic Schopenhauer; he wanted deliberately to have human beings experience the most terrible of fears in order that they might obtain euphoria not from art but from faith in Christ. Schopenhauer was, in this regard, the more healthy of the two.

But ecstasy can be produced wholesomely not only by art; it can be produced by almost any kind of useful creative or productive work. *Elizabeth and Her German Garden* is the story of how gardening can produce it. Every craftsman and professional man who aims at perfection experiences and enjoys it. Even what are called "good works" (Albert Schweitzer, Florence Nightingale) and social reform (Robert Owen, Henry George) can provide it. Mothers and fathers can, and frequently do, enjoy ecstatic experiences with their children. There is nothing else to explain why women deliberately become mothers not once but repeatedly. It is dangerous, yes; it is painful, yes; rearing a baby is troublesome. But there is ecstasy when life is felt in the womb; there is ecstasy in natural birth; there is ecstasy in suckling a baby and feeling it clinging to the breast.

As a matter of fact, ecstasy can be extracted out of the most apparently ordinary experiences, and not only out of the sexual

orgasm and the extraordinary experiences I have listed. We are living in the midst of a sexual revolution, and the densest ignorance prevails about what is right or wrong about it. But if sexuality is studied in terms of Euphorism, new light is thrown upon the problem.

An orgasm is physiologically a release from a glandular tension. But in masturbation, in casual conjugation between promiscuous men and women, in conjugation with prostitutes, the release is not very different from that which is provided by emptying the bladder or the bowels. It is an appetite which is satisfied, and the pleasure it provides is not too different from the pleasure which putting food into the stomach furnishes to a very hungry man. This, unfortunately, is also too often true of conjugation between husband and wife. It is only when there is a deep and abiding love between the two participants that wholesome euphoria and real ecstasy is experienced. These are primarily psychological experiences. Since all human beings are not only minds but also bodies, they experience both its psychological and physiological aspects. This duality becomes clear from the fact that, given the right psychological conditions—given the right telic values, for instance—there is such a wide variety of bodily activities and occupations which can provide them. But this recognition of man's duality is the essential element in obtaining the satisfactions which euphoriation (the practice of Euphorism) offers, the meaning it can give to life, and the natural and normal state and climactic experiences it offers to troubled mankind.

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Only in terms of Satisfaction solutions of the telic problem, regardless of religious beliefs, can we understand the satisfaction which a Columbus, a Galileo, a Socrates, took in running risks and making sacrifices in pursuing their goals in life. It wasn't the Gratification of their senses; it wasn't the Salvation of their immortal souls; it was the Satisfaction they received from their work, and not any reward, Earthly or Heavenly, which explains their lives. Millions of humbler men and women who have never heard of Eudaemonism have nevertheless solved the telic problem in essentially the same way called for in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and have devoted their lives to the duties—and made the

sacrifices—called for by the household arts, by motherhood, and by the “sciences” of craftsmanship and husbandry.

* * * *

A choice of one of these three kinds of solutions of the telic problem is made every time any man acts on a conviction or a prejudice. What makes it so important to choose the right way of dealing with the problem is the obvious fact, recorded on every page of history and every page of our daily newspapers, that people have killed and are killing one another because they are moved to do so by prejudices which they believe to be true even though there may be overwhelming evidence that they are not. If this is to be avoided, emotional commitments must only be made to what are, in fact, fully validated convictions. The defense of valid convictions, even when defending them may involve sacrificing lives (as has too often been the case when liberty was being attacked), can be intellectually justified. But resorting to violence—to revolution, for instance—for the sake of imposing even valid convictions upon others is intellectually a contradiction in essentials. Both ends and means must be valid. Countless heroes have lived lives which are demonstrations of the satisfaction which comes from devotion to freedom as an ultimate purpose in life. But if the realization of freedom is sought by means which cannot be properly validated, passion and prejudice and not determination and conviction are at work no matter how valid the ultimate end which is sought.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem V: The Telic Problem

1. *Telics versus Teleology*—The word telic, like the word teleology, comes to us from the Greek word *teleos*, meaning purpose. That is what is meant by it in this study, only it is used to refer to man's purposes instead of, as in the case of teleology, to nature's purposes or the purpose for which the whole world was designed by a First cause or by a Creator.

2. *Purposes: Ends versus Means*—All purposes are of two kinds, either terminal (ends, aims, goals, objectives, destinations) or procedural (means, expedients). Terminal purposes are always something to be obtained, some state or condition to be achieved, some activity to be enjoyed or realized for its own sake. Procedural purposes are, similarly, something obtained, some state or condition, or something done, not for its own sake, but to facilitate the attainment of an intended terminal purpose as efficiently as possible and, presumably, apt and suitable to the end in view.

3. *Ethos*—For a fuller discussion of the concept, see the commentary on the Institutional Problem, Problem XVI.

4. *Inculcation and Dissemination*—For a discussion of these two concepts, see the commentary on the Ethical Problem, Problem VI.

5. *Normalization and Humanization*—These terms are synonyms. In *Education and Living* I used the term normalize to designate the re-education and re-conditioning of the individual so as to make him as close to a normal human being as possible. A whole section of the book (pp. 279-430) is devoted to the definition of the concept of normal as used with regard to man. It is important to bear in mind that the characteristics which make a human being normal cannot be determined by averaging. It is impossible to establish the number of legs possessed by a normal human being by averaging. Since some men have lost both legs, and many one leg, averaging would produce a figure somewhat smaller than two; it would never produce the normal number.

6. *Sensitivity versus Sensibility*—Something more needs to be said about these two concepts, since what they refer to plays so important a part in the inculcation of values.

We need two terms to refer to two quite different characteristics of man, the acuity of his sense organs and the subtlety or perspicacity with which he uses them. The first has to do with the capability of a sense organ of being stimulated; this is a matter of degree and varies with

every species of animal. In man the natural acuity of each of his sense organs varies, it is true, more than among other animals, but in addition he has the ability to train it to a really unbelievable degree. Watch tea-tasters at their professional work and it is a revelation of what training can do to sensitize the sense of taste! This I call sensitivity and the process of cultivating it, sensitization.

The second has to do with the fact that man can and does cultivate discrimination and inject his own values into the use of his sense organs. He adds perspicacity to acuity; he adds quality to quantity. A highly sensibled person discriminates between harmonies and discords, beauty and ugliness, tasty and merely hunger-satisfying food. This I call sensibility, and the process of cultivating it sensibilation.

7. *-latry*—Unfortunately there are too few words which exactly denote the ultimate ends which are telically valued. I have resorted to the use of the Greek suffix *latry* to create such words. *-latry* is an ending form, but in the original Greek it is used not only to denote worship but also fanatical devotion and dedication to something or some idea. As it is here used, it denotes such dedication to some person (God, Allah, Jehovah, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed), some institution or enterprise (a Church, a State or Nation, a Party), or some cause or movement (social—Vegetarianism; economic—Cybernation; political—Conservatism, Liberalism; ideological—Freedom, Fascism, Communism). When words with the suffixes, *-ism* or *-cracy*, suggest the same meaning as *-latry*, I have not hesitated about using them. Since all these “latries,” “isms,” and “cracies” are the names of specific things, I have capitalized them.

8. *Interests versus Values*—These two concepts should not be confused, yet they often are in economics and in other social sciences which eschew consideration of values by making a fetish of objectivity. The prevailing doctrine of Positive Law furnishes a terrible illustration of this kind of Reductionism—justice being defined as a balancing of personal interests on the theory that moral values, being subjective in nature, cannot be used as a basis for making valid legal judgments.

Interests, being tangible and economic in nature, are measurable; non-economic and intangible values are not. The term interests should be restricted to objects and services which provide for utilitarian needs, which provide material commodities, or other measurable monetary advantages. Values other than these should not be called interests; to do so is to evade the real problem involved and to indulge in the sophistication of seeming to take values into account by calling them interests.

Values are not a thing or an activity, an object or a service, but a state of mind and an emotional attitude; they are attached just as often (and probably more often in our monetized world) to things which are of tangible interest or advantage as they are to things which are not. (As a matter of fact, they are often attached to things which, though highly valued, are actually of a measurable disadvantage to human beings

—for instance cigarettes, now that we have statistics about the effect of smoking them. Because some tangible interests are valued does not make all values into tangible interests. Only by the most tortured sophistication is it possible to argue that missionaries like Albert Schweitzer are moved to devote their lives to such work as he has been doing in Africa for tangible interests, or that genuinely patriotic individuals like Nathan Hale are moved by any kind of tangible interests to voluntarily risk their lives for their country.

9. *Ratiocination*—For the definition of and for the justification of my use of this term, see the commentary on Problem IV, the epistemic problem.

10. *Security and Venturity*—I have failed as yet to find any word which designates the concept of venture not as a fact (an undertaking involving risk) nor as an activity (to engage in enterprises or in projects involving risk) but as a value. I have coined the word by doing what somebody must have done with the word secure, adding to it the suffix *-ity*. When an individual feels that achieving Security or practicing Venturity is important and desirable, the words refer to values, to felt-judgments of his about how to deal with the problem of purposes in life.

11. *Naturalists versus Naturalians*—Both denotatively and connotatively, naturalist has come to mean, one versed in natural science, in natural history, and especially in the natural history of plants and animals. But it is also used to designate writers whose works feature a love of nature and natural phenomena of all kinds, writers who are not professional but (at best) amateur scientists. To have a term which refers to anybody who deeply reverences nature in words, in practice, or in both, and which will not denote and connote what naturalist does, I am using the word Naturalian. A Naturalian is a believer in Nature (nature with a capital N), not nature as God (that would make him a Pantheist) but nature as an appropriate object for wonder and reverence.

12. *Religion versus Philosophy*—Naturalism can be equally well designated a religion or a philosophy.

In my present terminology, there are two genera (and innumerable species) of religions, one (1) genus being supernaturally vindicated (by revelation) and the other (2) naturally (by science).

And again in my present terminology, there are three genera of philosophies, (1) wisdom philosophies, (2) speculative philosophies, and (3) scientific philosophies, and of course innumerable species of each genera.

On the basis of this terminology, Naturalism is a natural religion and also a wisdom and scientific philosophy.

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PROBLEM VI

Good and Evil: The Problem of Ethical Values

It is not the life of knowledge, not even if it included all the sciences, that creates happiness and well-being, but a single branch of knowledge—the sciences of good and evil. If you exclude this from the other branches, medicine will be equally able to give us health, and shoe-making shoes, and weaving clothes. Seamanship will still save life at sea, and strategy win battles. But without the knowledge of good and evil, the use and excellence of these sciences will be found to have failed us.—Plato, in "Charmides."

Seven facts create for mankind the problem of good and evil¹, facts which make it clear that Plato was right and that without scientific knowledge of what is good and what is evil, all the other sciences "will fail us":

1. The fact that mankind reacts to human behavior, sometimes with approval (one is greeted courteously); sometimes with disapproval (someone spits near one offensively); sometimes with deep admiration (as for the work of an Albert Schweitzer); sometimes with indescribable horror (as to the slaughter at Auschwitz and Buchenwald).

2. The fact that from time immemorial man has thought of his felt-judgments about the acts of which he approves as "good" and about the acts of which he strongly disapproves as "evil".

3. The fact that not only the individual but society makes judgments of the same kind about various kinds of human behaviour.

4. The fact that these socially made group-judgments become embodied in law.

5. The fact that those who breach the law are penalized for violating it.

6. The fact that the strong feeling about breaches of the moralities and the punitive sanctions attached to breaches of the law are attached not only to ethical judgments which have been adequately validated but also to ethical judgments which have been clearly proved invalid. (Yet, in spite of this, we continue to punish behavior which is clearly not immoral as if, in fact, it were immoral and criminal).

7. Finally, we come to the fact that man cannot rely upon his instincts to tell him how and how not to act; man cannot take the way man behaves for granted. This is the fact which underlies all the basic problems of mankind: because of the plasticity of his instincts, he cannot rely upon them to tell him what is good and what is evil.

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Before exploring what is available for use in dealing with the ethical problem, certain ancillary problems will have to be mentioned. Ten will be briefly touched upon: man's psychologic irritability, the plasticity of his instincts, the validation of his ethical values, the nature of good and evil, the validation of laws, the nature of rights and obligations, the treatment of delinquents and delinquency, the nature of penalization and ameliorization, and the inculcation and dissemination of ethical values.

The Problem of Man's Psychologic Irritability—The nature of what I call psychologic irritability has been discussed at some length in Problem I, but attention must be called to the part it plays in creating the ethical problem.

Animals do not invent religions; they do not write scriptures. They do not enact codes of laws; they do not establish states with police forces, courts, and jails to see that the laws are obeyed. They are not troubled, as man is, by the problem of what to do about sin, about evil, about crime. They are born with instincts which take care of the problem of what to do when any other animal frightens them, including what to do about the most fearsome of all animals, man. Man is not born with instincts which tell him how to react when he is "irritated"; he suffers from (or is blessed with) two kinds of irritability; one biological which he inherits and the other psychological which he acquires. It is this

acquired characteristic of man which makes him trouble himself as much as he does about the existence of good and evil.

The Problem of the Plasticity of Man's Instincts—This has already been referred to but is peculiarly important in dealing with problems in values. Many schools of thought insist that man should rely upon his instincts (his "inner light"—the still small "voice" of conscience) to tell him what is right and wrong—to provide him with a set of *ethical values*; that he should rely upon his instincts (his undisciplined inborn "taste") to tell him what is beautiful and what is ugly—to provide him with a set of *esthetic values*; that he should rely upon his instincts when he is shopping, for they (in reality his impulses) will tell him what to buy and what not to buy—will provide him with a set of *economic values*; finally, that he should rely upon mere instinct to determine for him his goals in life and provide him automatically with answers to the question of the purposes to which he should devote himself and the causes for which he should work—to provide him with a set of *telic values*. Nobody can deal rationally with the ethical problem until he recognizes that not one of these propositions about man's instincts can be true.

The Problem of the Validation of Ethical Values—The ethical problem, like all axiologic problems, is two-fold. It involves *validation*, which is an essential even though ancillary problem, and *inculcation*², which is the ultimate problem in the complex of problems with which axiology deals.

The validation of values, no matter what kind of values are involved, is a noetic and intellectual problem. It is a scientific problem and not a problem in emotional education. It has been dealt with at some length in considering Problem IV, the epistemic problem. But the validation of ethical judgments, while it must be in accord with the general principles applying to the verification and validation of propositions of all kinds, presents peculiar difficulties and cannot be properly dealt with unless both validation and inculcation are taken into account at the same time. To attach strong emotional feelings to ethical judgments, and to penalize their disregard as brutally as some of them are penalized, even today, without first making certain of their validity is to behave irrationally and inhumanely. It is to behave worse than an animal and, least of all, like a human being.

Validation in ethics cannot be dealt with adequately without first disposing of four problems in definition, without defining (1) the nature of good and evil, (2) the nature of variable and invariant law, (3) the nature of legitimate and pseudo-law, and (4) the nature of obligations and rights.

1. *The Nature of Good and Evil*—If our conception of what is good and what is evil is not to remain arbitrary, a scientifically valid, objective definition of both must be substituted for our existing vague conceptions of good and evil in religious revelations (scriptures, sacred creeds, and commandments), not upon the arbitrary definitions of custom and tradition (common law), nor upon the almost equally arbitrary statutory enactments (civil and criminal law) in which the definitions reflect the interests of the State and of the ruling classes in it. If the objective definitions needed are ever to be made and to become scientifically acceptable, the case method and the classification method must be used with great rigor and to a larger extent than ever before.

Botanists have classified about 100,000 species of plants, zoologists about 300,000 species of animals. But there are as yet no ethical scientists; there is not even an accepted word in the language with which to designate them; there is neither a science of ethics nor a science of law. We need to develop a Nomology³; we need thousands of nomologists at work everywhere in the world, as there are now thousands of physicists, for the simple and obvious reason that the problem of good and evil is incomparably more important to human welfare than are any of the problems with which physicists, biologists, psychologists, and social scientists now wrestle.

Hundreds of thousands of human actions of all kinds, performed in the past and in the present and performed in all the different cultures of the world, need to be carefully recorded. The motives and the consequences⁴ flowing from each action need to be recorded (there are plenty of cases in which the facts about these can be definitely established; cases in which this cannot be done should not be used), and finally each action needs to be classified according to whether the consequences flowing from it make for euphoria or dysphoria⁵, for mental well-being or mental ill-being.

If such a classification of a sufficient number of cases based upon objectively observable distinctions is made, moral law will emerge. Another way of saying this is to call attention to the curious fact that it is impossible to make such classifications without finding oneself equipped with an objective basis for making value-judgments. Classifications based upon man's motives are apparently meaningless so far as ethics are concerned; only classifications based upon the probable lineal consequences⁶ of his actions are meaningful. The use of the case and classification method seems to demonstrate that the whole school of thought which bases its resolution of the ethical problem upon man's motives or intentions is mistaken; only the probable results of what men do counts. My very first experiment in a classification based upon probable consequences (made with only a few hundred cases) demonstrated that not two categories of actions (good and evil) but three had to be taken into account (moral, immoral and amoral); finally when I was able to work with about eight thousand cases still a grossly insufficient number—five emerged which I called (1) morally mandatory actions, (2) morally commendable actions, (3) amoral actions, (4) morally censurable actions, and (5) morally prohibited actions.

(1) Actions, the probable consequences of which benefited one or more persons without injury to anybody and the probable consequences of failure to perform them caused positive injury to others, all fell into the category of *morally mandatory actions*;

(2) Actions, the probable consequences of which were beneficial or pleasurable to other persons but failure to perform which did not result in any actual injury to others, fell into the category I called *morally commendable actions*;

(3) Actions, the probable consequences of which neither benefited nor injured any other person, fell into the category I called *amoral actions*;

(4) Actions, the probable consequences of which either injured the feelings of others or had a tendency to demoralize either the perpetrator of the act or others effected by them but which did not result in any actual injury to others, fell into the category I called *morally censurable actions*; finally,

(5) Actions, the probable consequences of which caused unjustifiable injury to another person or unjustifiable damage to the possessions of any other person (but not actions performed in self-defense), fell into the category I called *morally prohibited actions*.

Since these distinctions are based upon consequences which are as observable empirically as any other objective phenomena, these are objective and not subjective distinctions.

2. *The Nature of Variable and Invariant Law*—When the same method was used in classifying different codes of laws and even specific laws, what emerged were two objectively valid distinctions, one between variable law and invariant law, and one between invariant law and pseudo-law.

If every kind of code of law is carefully classified, those laws which vary from time to time, from place to place, from group to group, from state to state, from class to class, and from religion to religion can be clearly distinguished from laws which do not. Variable laws are declared, invariant laws can only be discovered.

Variable laws are declared by a sort of fiat; they are enacted by a state or revealed by a religious prophet. Invariant laws are discoveries, just as natural laws, like the law of gravitation, the second law of thermodynamics, and the law of relativity are discoveries. The sanction of all variable laws is arbitrary; the sanction of invariant law comes from objective observances of the consequences of different kinds of human behavior.

Variable laws are of two kinds, sacred and secular.

Variable Sacred Laws—Some ten different kinds of variable laws are found in all codes of sacred law, and there are variations in all ten in the various highly developed religions (Brahmanism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Islam). The ten kinds are: (1) creedal, (2) ritual, (3) temporal, (4) spacial, (5) hagiographic, (6) iconographic, (7) petitionary, (8) hygienic, (9) exorcistic, and (10) devotional.

These sacred codes of law are of at least three kinds: primitive sacred codes, which of course, vary from tribe to tribe and race to race (compare Eskimo Law with Navaho Law); mythological sacred codes, which vary from one mythology to another

(compare Norse mythology with Greek); and scriptural codes, which vary from one scripture to another (compare the Christian with the Hindu scriptures).

Anybody who takes a good look at a sufficient number of these sacred laws and codes of sacred law, and tries to make rhyme and reason out of them, tends to go mad. In desperation, if he is determined to live by sacred law, all he can do is to let chance (perhaps the chance that he is born a Muslim instead of a Parsee, a Jew instead of a Christian) decide the matter for him—pin his faith, not his reason, in one of them and forget the rest.

Variable Statutory Laws—The statutory and constitutional laws of the states and nations existent and having existed at any time in the past vary from time to time in history and from place to place on Earth almost as much as do sacred laws. They vary not only from State to State, but within each State as statutes are enacted, repealed, or modified legislatively, judicially, or administratively. It is true that the various secular in contrast to sacred codes display fewer incongruities and inconsistencies. Yet the contradictions are so numerous and frequently so serious, that they provide *prima facie* evidence of their essential invalidity. The subconscious recognition of this by people everywhere in the modern world displays itself in the number of statutes which have been reduced to "dead letters" even though they still remain formally a part of "the law of the land."

Both in practice and in theory there are at least eight different kinds of statutory law: (1) common or traditional, (2) constitutional, (3) civil, (4) criminal, (5) military, (6) admiralty, (7) administrative, and (8) positive. All have in common the fact that they are sanctioned and vindicated by the State. But the differences which categories of law of this kind represent are superficial rather than meaningful. They differ for the most part genetically, occupationally, and procedurally. They differ from one another in degree rather than in essence.

A good illustration of this is furnished by the distinction made in all modern codes of law between civil and criminal law. Both, however, consist of rules about what human beings may and must do, or what they may not or must not do. Breaches of civil law are simply considered less reprehensible legally than breaches of

criminal law. Many of them fall into the category of censurable rather than of downright immoral actions. Virtually the whole of the civil law consists of rules which aim at ensuring that one person does not take what is rightfully another's and that, while one person is acting in his own interest, he does not deprive another of that which properly belongs to him. In ethical terms, all breaches of civil, like most breaches of criminal law, consist of overt, covert, or incidental breaches of the prohibition of larceny. In legal terms, every breach of civil law is in fact, if not recognizedly, a tort. The fact that the act of a thief in stealing is called a crime, while the failure to pay a just debt is called a tort, does not alter the fact that both involve the taking by one person of that which rightfully belongs to another. Even the mildest breaches of civil law involve some degree of malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance.

The only classification of statutory law which is truly meaningful is that which divides all of it into three categories: (1) *substantive law*—statutes having to do with violations of the right of every normal human being to personal survival; (2) *derivative law*—statutes which derive their reason for being and their validity from the fact that they have to do with acts impairing, in contrast to destroying, a person's substantive rights, as in damaging or destroying his possessions, in stealing from him, or in deceiving him in such a way as to result in some loss or injury to him, all of which have in common the fact that they in some degree impair his ability to live, and (3) *implementary law*—statutes which are justified because breaches of them impair or destroy institutions which have been set up and which in practice prevent impairment or destruction of substantive or derivative rights—institutions ranging all the way from traffic regulation to judicial procedure, and major institutions such as judicial and police protection of civil liberties, police protection of persons and property, and military defense of the State.

It is true that it is easier to find rules for behavior common to statutory codes of law than common to sacred codes, but not much easier. The fact remains that the variations between the statutory codes of States as different not only as ancient Pagan Rome and modern Catholic Italy, but also as English law (let us say in the

modern Indian Republic) and Roman Law (let us say in modern France) is startling, sometimes staggering.

Invariant Law—There are two kinds of invariant law between which it is necessary to distinguish, *natural law* and what I call *moral law*⁷. Ideally only the moral law falls into the "jurisdiction" of the ethical problem.

Ideally, it ought to be unnecessary to consider the laws of health in connection with the ethical problem. (I prefer to call them psycho-physiological laws to emphasize the fact that both mental and physical health is involved). The laws of health are natural laws and it ought to be no more necessary to consider them as problems in ethics than it is necessary to consider the laws of evolution or the laws of thermo-dynamics. But it is impossible to avoid doing so. For one reason, violations of many of the laws of health are included in sacred law (kosher, lustration, taboo), but what is worse, many practices condemned or insisted upon in sacred law are neither harmful nor helpful from the standpoint of health. For another, because important infractions of the laws of health have been and still are dealt with as violations of statutory laws. (Alcoholism is considered a misdemeanor; killing cows (in India) a crime). For still another, statutory laws make a distinction between the moral and not only legal responsibilities of sane and insane persons, a distinction which cannot be scientifically but only sentimentally justified.

The second kind of invariant law I think of as moral law. (In spite of the fact that there is no substantial difference between what the ancient Roman juriconsults called natural law and what, in this study, I am calling the moral law, I think the original term should be discarded; it is really a misnomer and confuses ethical law with scientific law.) I can afford space for only a single illustration of the dozens which I have studied which justify consideration of the moral law as invariant.

The law prohibiting larceny ("Thou shalt not steal") if properly formulated, as many kinds of larceny are already adequately formulated in existing law, derives its sanction not from any of the kinds of variable sacred or secular laws which I have tried to describe but from invariant moral law. When a sacred law declares stealing sinful or a statutory law declares it illegal, it merely

recognizes what is prohibited by moral law. Stealing is immoral at all times and in all places. It was immoral before the first statute of any kind was enacted; it was immoral before the Ten Commandments were given to Moses; it is immoral because the probable consequences of stealing—ill-being—are essentially the same everywhere and at all times.

3. *The Nature of Legitimate and Pseudo-Law*—We come now to what I think of as the distinction between legitimate and pseudo-law. Whenever the sacred law of any religion declares an act good, pious, and religious, when as a matter of fact the act approved violates the moral law, it is not legitimate law but pseudo-law. Witchcraft violates no moral law; the sacred law of Christianity and of Judaism which condemned witchcraft was not legitimate but pseudo-law. The obligation under the moral law was not the observance of the laws against witchcraft but the exact opposite; every man was *morally* forbidden to expose and deliver witches to the church authorities.

This is true of statutory pseudo-law as well as of sacred pseudo-law. Whenever a statutory law legalizes actions which are in fact violations of the moral law, it is not legitimate but pseudo-law. The statutes of the American States which at one time legalized slavery were all pseudo-laws; there was a legal but not a moral obligation to observe them. On the contrary, the moral law required their violation, and those who were convicted for violating them (operators of the underground railroads for escaping slaves, for instance), were not true criminals but pseudo-criminals. Far from being any kind of criminal, they were not only highly humane but highly moral men and women.

Our scriptures and our statutes are still loaded with pseudo-laws today, but where State and Church are rigorously separated (as in the United States but not as in Israel or Saudi Arabia), sacred pseudo-laws may break people's hearts but they do not break their backs; people cannot be put into jail for disregarding them. But this is not the case with statutory laws which violate the moral law; they are enforced; people are fined and jailed for breaking them. This is the case with secular statutory pseudo-laws dealing with alcoholics, with prostitutes, narcotic addicts, smugglers, abortionists, mercy-killers. Unless a person injures the person or the property of another, directly or indirectly, he does

nothing which breaches the moral law. A person who gets drunk violates a law of health, but unless he acts offensively, unless he annoys or quarrels or attacks another person, he does nothing criminal in nature. If he does any of these things, his criminality is not in the drunkenness but in the annoying, quarrelling and attacking, activities which would be breaches of statutory law even if performed when he was stone-cold sober. Yet our jails are full of mentally and physically unhealthy unfortunates who are the victims of pseudo-laws which are in reality nothing but expressions of human malice and legal stupidity.

Sexual Law versus Pseudo-Law—We are living in the midst of a Sexual Revolution. It is possible to date the beginning of this revolution to Mary Wolstonecraft Godwin and to consider it an outgrowth of the movement for women's rights. But in the form in which our generation has to deal with it, it dates back no further than Sigmund Freud. Nowhere does the issue between natural law and legitimate law on the one hand and both pseudo-sacred law and pseudo-statutory law on the other raise more serious problems and create more cruel situations than in the conflict between sexual law and pseudo-law.

The sacred-laws of our Judeo-Christian culture applicable to the sexual activities of men and women, and the statutory laws dealing with them in Christian nations, pay not the slightest attention to what has been scientifically demonstrated as true about them. A constantly growing number of men and women, both old and young, are paying no attention to either what the Church or what the State has to say about their sexual activities. Some of them (homosexuals) are brutally mistreated by the police, the courts and our penal institutions. Some of them (prostitutes) are shamelessly exploited by corrupt policemen and by courts imposing fines which are equally exploitive. Perfectly responsible men and women who disregard the sexual code prescribed by customary mores, by most religions today, and by prevailing statutory law, live under constant criticism and sometimes savage condemnation.

The recent literature of sexual revolt is enormous. Perhaps one of the most succinct and explicit statements of what it calls for is one made by Dr. Albert Ellis which is entitled *A New Sex Code for Modern Americans*⁸.

What is perfectly clear is that many of the most important prevailing ethical assumptions about sexual behavior are completely wrong, and that virtually all existing law based upon these assumptions is pseudo and not legitimate law. What the laws of physical health (natural laws) call for is pretty clear, but what the laws of mental health (also natural laws) call for is not too clear at all. As to the extremists among the sexual revolutionists, I am as certain that they are wrong about many of the things they advocate (particularly in their indifference to the relationship of sexual practices to healthy family, genetic and economic life) as I am that the Marxists are wrong in what they are doing to realize their political and economic revolution.

What is terrible from the ethical standpoint is that those who should be furnishing leadership in dealing scientifically with the changing values involved—schoolmen, churchmen, and statesmen—lack the intestinal fortitude (the necessary “guts”) to end their conformism and to face those who control both Church and State who are insisting that it is better to let “sleeping dogs lie.”

4. *The Nature of Obligations and Rights*—Rights and obligations have their sanction not in statutes but in moral law. They existed before they were ever embodied in any Bill of Rights, and the obligations exist even though no Bill of Obligations has yet been enacted. Rights and obligations are always corollaries of one another; rights are only achieved by human beings, by fulfilment of their obligations. Man has only one substantive right, the right to life, but this right comes into existence only if two corollary obligations are fulfilled: the obligation to produce his own livelihood and to support those dependent upon him, and his obligation to respect the similar rights of others to their life and their work.

Rights and obligations, however, are not only *substantive* (the right to life and the obligations correlative to it) they are also *derivative*. (Larceny is an example; Shakespeare wrote good poetry but even better law when he said: “You do take my life when you do take the means whereby I live.”) Finally they are *implementary* (the right to sue but with the obligation “to come into court with clean hands”).

The Problem of Delinquency and Criminality—In addition to the four major ancillary problems just outlined, there are two pro-

blems of distinction which have to be taken into account: the distinction between delinquency and criminality, and between penalization and ameliorization.

A delinquent, as here defined, is a violator of a moral law. There may be no statute declaring his delinquency a crime; he will, therefore, never even be charged with committing a crime. He himself may have been so miseducated ethically as not to realize that he is breaching the moral law. The mores and folkways of his whole world may be ethically imbecile in this respect, but the facts with which rational and humane beings have to deal are unaffected by this unfortunate state of affairs.

There is no statute in the United States which declares, "No banker shall profit from the operations of his bank." Yet the banker is a trustee; the depositors in his bank have entrusted him with their money, and he is, in fact, a fiduciary trustee even though no statute recognizes it and draws the necessary inferences from it. It is a breach of the moral law for a trustee to profit from the operations of his trust. That he is entitled to compensation from its usufruct for the work he does in conserving it, is true, but he is entitled to no more. It is a species of misfeasance for him to profit from it.

Yet this is only one of many unrecognized and institutionalized delinquencies with which we ought to be dealing. We have a science called criminology, but we have no science which deals with this problem; a science which I think of as pejorology is desperately needed to illuminate the issues involved.

A criminal is a convicted violator of a statutory law; we have no accepted word with which to designate the criminal who has not been convicted. Add unconvicted and unapprehended criminals to the number who are delinquent because they violate not statutory but moral law, and the number will dwarf the number of convicted criminals. On the other hand we have an enormous number of criminals who have been convicted not of true crimes but of pseudo-crimes and who, even though they languish in jails, are, in fact, pseudo and not true criminals at all.

The Problem of Penalization and Amelioration—Penalization is punishment for the violation of a statutory law. But punishment itself is a violation of the moral law. Punishment neither helps

the delinquent nor helps society; it makes for ill-being, not well-being.

Compulsory restitution, compulsory restraint of the incorrigible, compulsory re-conditioning of the corrigible, are not penalizations; these, and there are many others, are ameliorations. -Amelioration makes for the well-being of society; penalization makes for its ill-being. We have a science of repressive penology; we need a science of restitutive meliology not merely to deal with the criminal but even more to deal with the non-criminal delinquent.

The Problem of Inculcation and Dissemination—When we turn from the problem of validation to that of inculcation and dissemination, we turn from the study of the consequence of human actions to the study of their motivations, we turn from the study of moral judgments to the study of ethical culture, we turn from the noetic aspects of ethics to the crucial axiologic aspects of our problem.

Man can be convicted for breaches of law, but he cannot be made moral by statutory law. If the volume of delinquency and the volume of crime is ever to be decreased, the problem of moral education and re-education will have to be taken seriously, almost as seriously as the effort we are making to put a man on the moon.

Four things are involved: cultivating ethical sensibility, inculcating ethical values about the validity of which there can be no scientific doubt, developing to the utmost the ethical conscience, and stimulating ethical motivation by means which are themselves morally valid. The problem, though crucial to adequate resolution of the ethical problem (as it is with regard to all problems in values) is so largely an educational problem that here only two points which are strictly ethical in nature must be made.

The first is to dispose, if possible, of the feeling, common among those most sensitive to ethical values and most keenly aware of the danger of dealing with moral problems dogmatically, that inculcation and indoctrination in itself is in some sense unethical. What the evidence indicates is that it is not only unavoidable but that it is itself a mandatory moral obligation. Ethical values must be inculcated; what those who feel hesitant about the matter must face is that inculcation is a positive crime in the

absence of adequate validation. But granted that an ethical value has been amply validated (I emphasize amply; there should be little doubt about the matter), then inculcation is justified and necessary. On the basis of the available evidence, no person who has respect for ratiocination on the basis of scientifically established facts can possibly doubt that stealing (larceny) is invalid and that honesty (positive and not merely passive) is valid. To inculcate honesty and to sensitize the conscience about stealing is, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, a moral obligation.

It is only when there is no such ample objective evidence that inculcation becomes a dangerous abuse of influence. This is particularly true of the mistaken tendency to treat mere breaches of custom or manners and of the creedal requirements of a dominant religion as if they were in fact immoral actions. A great many breaches of what custom and religion calls for with regard to sexual behavior illustrate what is involved; in this field every category of action is so much affected by traditional attitudes that inculcation should be limited to what again is amply and indisputably supported by adequate evidence.

A second point is that inculcation is not merely a matter of individual education but of mass-education. If stealing is wrong, everybody must not only be made to know that it is wrong intellectually but must be made to feel that it is wrong. Dissemination must be the end result of inculcation; the whole population must be imbued with every ethical value about the validity of which there is the same evidence as with regard to stealing.

As to the techniques of inculcation and dissemination, among which suggestion and repetition are the most important, their consideration falls strictly into the jurisdiction of Problem XVII, the educational problem.

* * * *

The ethical problem dates back probably as far as the emergence of *Homo sapiens*; it put in its appearance when a primitive of the species first injured a fellow-primitive; it began in the Garden of Eden when Eve violated a *sacred* law (not a moral law), and ate of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil; it reappeared in a different—a moral—context when Cain slew Abel and violated the *moral* law.

Many has always and everywhere done something about the problem which the existence of good and evil creates for him.

When we turn to the myriad solutions of the problem embodied in the practices and prescriptions of mankind, we find that all of them fall into one of three categories (as in the case of all solutions of these problems) on the basis of man's three possible sources of knowledge: Dogmatic Ethical Doctrines which vindicate themselves on the basis of subjective and revealed religious knowledge; Positive Ethical Doctrines which vindicate themselves on the basis of objective knowledge, and Eunomic Ethical Doctrines which vindicate themselves intellectually by the scientific method and the use of ratiocination.

* * * *

Dogmatic Ethical Theories, Doctrines, and Practices—Ethics today, both as it is professed and practised (even though it is considerably diluted with Positivism and faintly diluted with Nomism) is still overwhelmingly Dogmatic. And this is true not only of the sacred law of the various revealed religions, it is also true of secular law. The statutes and constitutions of States, in so far as they deal either directly or indirectly with the ethics of human behavior, ought to be completely secular. In fact, however, in all States, the Dogmatic ethics of the dominant religion is incorporated in secular law to a surprising extent.

The United States, which prides itself upon its religious freedom and in which there is supposed to be a "wall of separation between Church and State," has, in its length and breadth, ordinances requiring the closing of ordinary businesses on Sundays. If these ordinances were truly secular in nature, they would merely require closing on any one day in the week which those in business, or working in them, preferred. In this respect modern Indian law is secular; Indian ordinances require closing one day a week, but the decision about which day is not made by the dominant Brahmanist "Church"; it is made by those in each craft or business. On the other hand, Indian law embodies in innumerable ways the Brahmanic injunction that cows should be treated as sacred—cow slaughter (even when not prohibited by law), is in most places prohibited by custom.

Sunday closing observances in the United States furnish a good illustration of what I have called the dilution of sacred law with Positivist Ethics; most businesses have succeeded in so broadly interpreting the ordinances about closing that it is possible to buy almost anything one wishes on a Sunday.

Ethical Innatism, Subjectivism, and Inspirationism—Three theories are either expressly or by implication used to vindicate Dogmatic ethical doctrines: *Innatism*—which maintains that man is hereditarily endowed with a conscience ("a still, small voice") which provides him unfailing and infallible distinctions between what is right and what is wrong; *Subjectivism*—which maintains that, since what he is admonished to feel and to do by his conscience is subjective in nature, and that, since the religious revelations which are the sources of his sacred scripture are likewise subjective in nature, he can have faith in their validity; and *Inspirationism*—which maintains that there have been inspired individuals (Moses, Manu, Zoroaster, Mohammed, Jesus) who have provided revelations about what is right and what is wrong, the validity of which is absolute.

The trouble with all three theories is that they must be mistaken for one sufficient reason: the lack of agreement about what is right and wrong provided by one conscience and by others, and by one revelation and by other revelations. Yet the believers in the various religions go on believing in their ethical inerrancy with sublime assurance because, providentially, they are nearly all ignorant of what is believed by those adhering to other religions.

Within the limitations of this outline, I shall have to confine myself to three illustrations of the contradictions in which the acceptance of any religion's form of Ethical Dogmatism plunges one.

The Ten Commandments—The strange historical accident which led to the dissemination of Jewish Scriptures throughout the Christian world, gives to Mosaic law, and particularly to the Decalogue, exceptional importance. Both devout Christians and Jews insist that the Decalogue forms and should form the basis of all human law. Students of the development of law in the Western world have called attention to the legal mischief for which the use of these Dogmatic commandments is responsible. Max Radin,

for instance, expresses this when he says that as a result of the Decalogue "the idea has been firmly fixed in men's minds that by an act of sovereign authority a brief series of commands could be given and that an adequate law could be arrived at in that way."

The first contradiction into which the Decalogue plunges one is created by the fact that there are two versions (*Exodus* 20 and 34) which not even the most ingenious exegists have been able to reconcile. The oldest of the two versions, according to the Higher Critics, is in Chapter 34; it contains ten commandments, not one of which has anything to do with morality; all of them are creedal and ritualistic. The version in Chapter 20 actually contains not ten but seventeen commandments; this is the one with which the world has been familiarized. Eleven of the seventeen are creedal and ritualistic. Most of these are in substance the same as those in the older version, though each contains commandments which the other lacks. The most impressive commandment is one of no moral significance whatever—Jehovah's insistence upon His supremacy over all other gods. And the older version includes one command so ridiculously trifling in nature that not one person in a thousand who venerates the Decalogue has ever heard of it: "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk." Christians, in spite of their veneration for the Bible, pay no attention to this explicit commandment; orthodox Jews, however, take it very seriously, even to observing the Kosher laws which requires them to have two sets of dishes and cutlery, and two sets of pots and pans, one for meat dishes and the other for dishes containing milk or milk products.

Finally, of the seventeen commandments, six only have to do with morals. Two deal with subjective "conduct"—with what one is commanded to feel rather than to do. Only four deal with what is strictly objective conduct. As a basis for either a code of ethics or of a code of law, the whole so-called Decalogue is childishly inadequate. But in this respect, the Mosaic and Christian basis for dealing with ethics and law is neither better nor worse than those of the other Dogmatic religions.

Dogmatic Scriptural Ethics—What is involved in evaluating the ethics of the Dogmatic religions (the codes of laws which are based upon the scriptures of various supernatural religions, the

Koran; the New Testament; the Talmud and Torah; the Vedas. Upanishads, and Laws of Manu) if discussed in terms of Mohammedan Law will become clearer to those raised in the Christian tradition than if considered in terms of Christian Canonic Law.

Moslem Law, like other sacred codes, is broader than statutory law; it deals with manners and feelings and not merely with overt conduct. In this respect it is at least an attempt at the framing of a complete ethical code. It regulates every aspect of living, but unfortunately includes, as do the others, a large body of rules which have nothing whatever to do with ethics but only with rites and rituals. It regulates all aspects of life—duty to God, to one's neighbours, to one's self. But it is, in one respect, more logical than the Canon Law; it does not restrict itself to two kinds of rules, one dealing with sins and the other virtues. It is divided into five categories of rules dealing with (1) forbidden actions—*haram*, (2) disliked actions—*makruh*, (3) indifferent actions—*ja'iz*, *mubah*, (4) recommended actions—*mandub*, *mustahabb*, and (5) designated, mandatory, commanded actions—*fard*, *wajib*.

For a time in the early history of Mohammedanism in Medina, Koranic Law was the only law of the land. But from the Omayyad period in most Mohammedan States, there were really two codes of law, one ecclesiastical (like the Canon Law in Christendom) and the other secular in nature (like our civil and criminal law).

There are two ways of evaluating this Moslem approach to the problem of ethics (as there are similar ways of evaluating all similar solutions of the ethical problem), (1) in what the code prescribes and (2) in the manner in which those who believe in it behave. On neither count does the Moslem Code satisfy the requirements of reason and of humanitarianism.

The mere fact that it approves of the waging of *jihads* (holy wars), with all the bestialities which this inspires, is enough to condemn it. And *jihads* have not been mere matters of talk but of practice throughout Moslem history until very recent times, just as Crusades which were equally bestial were practised by the followers of the Prince of Peace.

Dogmatic Atonement—Man, according to the ethical codes of most great religions, is born a sinner and cannot avoid committing

sins in the course of his life. Atonement for sins—their extinction and the abrogation of the penalties incurred—call for propitiatory acts and activities which entitle the sinner to forgiveness (absolution) and make possible his salvation again. These expiatory acts involve two kinds of propitiation, (1) propitiation of the offended deity and (2) propitiation of the Church. Among these expiatory acts are penances, fasts, macerations, flagellations, lustrations, confessions, sacrifices (burnt offerings, candles, donations, etc.) and pilgrimages.

Excommunication and Damnation—Unforgiven sinners are subject to acts or activities, states and conditions (both in this life and in the sinner's after life), which, in their mildest form in this life, consist merely of excommunication (exclusion from fellowship in things spiritual) and, in their most serious form, execution (burning, pressing, stoning), and in the after life range from a mere period in Purgatory, to some such state as eternal suffering in Hell.

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Dealing with the ethical problem on the basis of any of the Dogmatic religious approaches, presents us with numberless insoluble contradictions. First of all is the fact that all the Dogmatic approaches to it vary, both in minor and in one or more major aspects. They vary, therefore, from religion to religion, (it is impossible to reconcile the contradictions between Christian Canon Law and the Brahmanical Shastras). Most of the sins each condemns are violations of ritualistic and not of moralistic rules. The oldest Mosaic Ten Commandments were all ritualistic commandments; the later Ten Commandments were still largely ritualistic in nature. The failure to keep the Sabbath holy is a breach not of the moral law but of purely Jewish and Christian ritualistic law.

Dogmatic Sacred Law is to a terrifying extent superstitious, barbarous, and irrational. The Indian Shashtra which states that the organs of outcasts who cohabit with Aryan women should be cut off, is the purest barbarism; so is the Christian law which assumes that those unfortunates who are mentally deranged are "possessed by devils" and should be punished until the devils leave the bodies; so is the Christian law that sorcerers and witches should

be killed. Yet the authority relied upon to vindicate each of the Ten Commandments is the same authority which includes these almost forgotten laws.

The sheer variability and irreconcilability of Dogmatic solutions of the ethical problem condemns them because those without faith in any one religion have no rational basis for choosing which one to consider authoritative, while those who are fortunate enough to have such faith labor under the handicap of equating faith with morality. (At the very moment that I am writing this, not only the Catholic Church but the Catholic press and Catholic laymen are going through an agonizing attempt to reconcile their faith in God's commandment "to multiply" with the moral law which dictates that nobody has any right to bring a child into the world which is unwanted and rejected, or whose parents cannot give it a decent start in life).

* * * *

Positive Ethical Theories, Doctrines, and Practices—What is common to all the methods of dealing with the ethical problem which I call Positive is the fact that they all assume (whatever their advocates may find it desirable or profitable to say) that mankind acts, and can only act, upon the basis of interests and self-interest. What this assumption, in turn, assumes is that there are no such things as values, that what are called values are in fact nothing but rationalizations of interests, and that individual and mass-delusion is involved in maintaining that man should act upon the basis of disinterested values of any kind.

The Cynics reduce all this to a very simple proposition: "Every man has his price; all you have to do is find out what it is."

Consideration of four distinguishable kinds of Ethical Positivism—(1) individual, (2) group or class, (3) social, customary or traditional, (4) legal or statutory—will make what is involved clear.

Personal Positivism—For the most part the individual actions and practices which I call Personal Positivism have to be implied from actual individual behavior and the actual practices of individuals in dealing with ethical problems rather than from a set of

values which the individual himself consciously recognizes as his ethical philosophy. The personal ethics of individuals cannot be learned from what individuals profess but only from what they practise because to articulate them would make it unprofitable to practise many of them. The practising Personal Positivist in ethics soon discovers that the profession of one thing and the practice of another (let us say the profession of honesty as a means of realizing the exact opposite—the profits from deceptive advertising) is essential to obtaining benefits which, in a dog-eat-dog world, he feels the individual who can get away with it is entitled to enjoy. The only law to which the Personal Positivist pays any attention is that which he believes does not warrant the risk of disobeying it. But while Personal Positivists may not freely admit what they really feel and believe, there are plenty of explicitly formulated doctrines which, as we shall see, rationalize and justify the way in which they deal with ethical problems.

Group Positivism—What I think of as Group Positivism again has to be implied from the behavior of groups and classes rather than from what their representatives profess as the ethics of the group. Some groups have elaborate codes of ethics (business men's associations and labor unions, for instance), but these have only a coincidental relationship to the ethics which they consider valid and which they in actuality practise. There is nothing in the professions of members of the National Association of Manufacturers which justifies conspiracies "in restraint of trade," yet from their behavior it is perfectly plain that they nearly all of them believe that "business is business" and that schemes for fixing prices and for dividing territory are all in the day's work. There is nothing in the code of ethics of unions which advocates attacking strikebreakers, overturning and wrecking automobiles and trucks, and dynamiting mines or railroads against which they are conducting strikes, yet from the behavior of their members it is perfectly plain that they believe such conduct entirely justified.

Social Positivism differs from Group Positivism in only one thing—society as a whole takes the place of the various occupational groups or classes with their various special interests and concerns. What society (custom and tradition) prescribes, how-

ever, is one thing; what the population practices may be another. Social prescriptions for behavior may be avowedly religious (Catholic, as in Rome), but if Roman society cheerfully tolerates crass Commercialism in dealing with ethical problems (as it does), the actual social treatment of the ethical problem is Positive and not Christian and Dogmatic in nature.

Today, Social Positivism is more a matter of custom and of tradition than was the case when the world was for the most part illiterate. Ethics fluctuate as fashions do instead of remaining fixed and dating back to time immemorial. What is professed to-day and vindicated by custom, however, is a conglomerate of scriptural and statutory ethical prescriptions tempered with traces of Eunomic additions. To a very large extent modern statutory law reflects what is prescribed by this kind of Social Positivism, but of the whole body of statutory law, only that part which deals with crime or with interests, is enforced by the police and the courts. This is what provides the foundation for the theory of positive law. By professing values about which nothing is done, the fact that only crime and only interests are dealt with is glossed over.

Legal Positivism—What lawyers call sociological jurisprudence, I think, is better called Legal Positivism. With Legal Positivism, the State takes the place of society. The national interest, or the predominant interests of the ruling classes in the State, take the place of social, of group, and of individual interests. When any of these interests run counter to that of the State (or what the State insists is its interest), the State uses its police or military powers to enforce its will.

The most eloquent exponent of the Positive approach to the ethical problem in our times was Dean Roscoe Pound of the School of Law at Harvard University. Law, according to the Legal Positivism he advocated, has nothing to do with ethics. Ethics enters into the matter only coincidentally. Law has to do with enforceability; what is law and what the police, the jurists, and the penologists make into law, reflects the prevailing and dominating interests of conflicting individuals, groups, classes, and parties. (International law, in turn, is not what is professed but what diplomats and armies make it, and what they make it reflects the national

interests of the dominant nation or nations at any particular period of time). As interests change, the law changes.

The supersession of ethical values by tangible interests may be pleasing to the tough-minded, but to the rational and the humane, it is morally outrageous. Interests, by their very nature, are not only antithetical to disinterestedness (an ideal which the tough-minded repudiate as sentimental) but also to justice (to which even the most tough-minded of Legal Positivists give lip-service). It is impossible for those who enact or enforce law to be just without being disinterested. It is impossible, at one and the same time, to cater to one dominant interest (disregarding lesser interests which are unable to exercise sufficient pressure upon the courts and the legislatures) and then pretend that justice is being done.

In a sense the use of the word, law, in this connection is a misnomer. The law which should be obeyed—the moral law—is invariant and unchangeable. This is not true of the Statutory law to which Legal Positivism limits itself. Statutes can be changed at any time, at the will of the State; they can be enacted, repealed, and re-enacted at the arbitrary dictates of masses and of dictators. But this is true only of Statutes. It is not true of laws. The laws of nature are unchangeable. If the physicists are correct, there is a natural law they call the second law of thermo-dynamics; but this law was never enacted, and it cannot be repealed. This too is true of the moral law; moral laws can be discovered; they can be forgotten and ignored; they can be rediscovered; but at all times the consequences flowing from their breaching are essentially the same.

Positive law may be free from the vulgar superstitions of sacred law, but it vindicates itself on might, which is just as arbitrary, just as irrational, and just as inhumane. It may provide a closer simulacrum to the moral law than to the sacred law, but the fact that it cannot escape from reflecting what is prescribed by the State makes it a semantic travesty to call it law.

Ethical Relativism, Subjectivism, and Amoralism—Three theories underlie the Positivist approach to ethics—Relativism, Subjectivism, and Amoralism.

Relativism in ethics maintains affirmatively that all ethical judgments and moral values are simply conventional prescriptions for behavior elaborated by different groups and in different cultures, and negatively that there are, therefore, no invariant (universal and perpetual) values of any kind. The trouble with Relativism is that it fails to distinguish between the variability of ethical judgments and the invariant nature of the consequences of different categories of human actions. As has already been made clear, the probable consequences of such an act as stealing are everywhere and at all times the same—the victim suffers a loss, the thief profits from it (temporarily if not always permanently), and something is done about it in the primitive world by the victim's family or clan and in the modern world by society and the State.

Subjectivism, on the other hand, maintains that ethical values and judgments, like all value-judgments, are inescapably personal and subjective in nature; they have their source not in anything which takes place in the objective world but only in individual reactions to actions which individuals dislike, and dislike—as Relativists point out, only for a time and only in particular places. Subjectivism, like Relativism, ignores the same facts about human behavior which Relativism ignores.

Finally, there is *Amoralism*, the theory, based upon Relativism and Subjectivism, which maintains that, since there is no substance to the arbitrary distinctions made in ethical codes, the rational thing to do is to ignore them, as most men do, and recognize that no matter what a man does, all he can do is behave amorally. Amoralism disposes of the problem by maintaining that man, regardless of what he himself feels or what society maintains about the goodness or the evil of his actions, just acts, and that human action, like everything which takes place in the world, is Amoral.

Positive Egotism—Upon this set of theories, the doctrine of Positive Egotism rests. Man acts, and should act, as his self-interests dictate. If the statutes of the State make it dangerous and the customs of society painful to steal, then it is in his interest *not* to steal. On the other hand, if the individual can "get away with it," it is foolish to let an arbitrary feeling or prejudice interfere with what is manifestly in his own interest.

Positive Egotism, since it is a rationalization of Ethical Positivism, is like Positivism fourfold. It is individual, gregational, social, and national. It reflects a literal interpretation of William James' famous definition of the self in his *Principles of Psychology*. "A man's self," said James, "is the sum total of all that he can call his." "Myself" may be interpreted to mean not only "my self-interest," but also "my family's interest," "my group's interest," "my nation's interest" until every kind of interest which is in any real sense felt to be "mine" is identified with "myself." The cynical French saying "*Après nous le deluge*" (after me the deluge), is the essence of Positive Egotism.

Evasion and Composition—The doctrines of Atonement and of Expiation both become meaningless if the assumption upon which Ethical Positivism bases itself (that man is by nature a selfish animal and cannot avoid self-interest) is valid. If strictly logical, the Ethical Positivist does not dream of expiating or making restitution (if he can safely avoid it) for any act which Ethical Dogmatists or Ethical Eunomists consider wrong.

What takes the place of Atonement or Expiation is the practice of Evasion or of Composition. If he feels that complete avoidance and evasion is impossible for something which he has done, the Ethical Positivist acts on the principle that fulfilment of debts, obligations, and other liabilities, and expiation for offences (including even violent and criminal offences) should, if possible, be settled by payment to the victim (or the victims' family, if the victim has been killed) of a sum of money or of some other form of compensation. In primitive and early common law, Composition was lawful even for felonies, including murders.

Positivist Pragmatism—Evasion, like other Positivist ethical practices, is based upon what might be called Positivist Pragmatism.

In trying to maintain some semblance of, at least, outward law and order, Ethical Pragmatism maintains that the social apparatus (whatever its forms) should rely upon bribes (avoidance of punishments) and menaces (infliction of penalties) to bridle the self-interest and selfishness of mankind. Positive Law itself is not much more than a system of rewards and punishments which ex-

perience has shown to be efficacious in dealing with what Positivism assumes is a universal human trait.

Confronted with a world in which Sacred commandments, Eunomic laws, and Positivist statutes are facts which he has to take into account, the Positivist instinctively weighs his conduct in terms of its efficacy in producing for him what he wants. He does what he wishes (in fact cannot avoid doing so no matter how much he rationalizes why he does it) if he believes he can do it with impunity.

When he is considering some action which Ethical Dogmatists and Eunomists consider evil or which the statutes treat as criminal, the only questions which concerns him is "Will it work?" Business men, when considering whether or not to engage "in a conspiracy in restraint of trade," or labor unionists on strike and engaged in attacking, and even deliberately hiring "goon squads" to attack those who continue to work, do not ask whether it is right or wrong. The first says, "business is business," the second cries "scabs!" Both believe that their ends justify resorting to any means—which work.

Penalization, Evasion and Retaliation—The logic of Positivism, Egotism, and Pragmatism is for individual evasion of the consequences of acts considered by others (particularly those injured by them) or by custom or law to be offences or delinquencies; it is avoidance of the consequences by guile or artifice, and when these fail, by Composition, to minimize the cost and retain as much of the gains of the offence as possible.

For society as a whole, instead of the individual, Positivism calls for Penalization, for retaliation and the exaction or imposition of penalties. Primitive man's only method of dealing with offenders was retaliation; the Roman jurisconsults called this the *lex talionis*; modern man has dignified it (without changing its essential nature) by developing retaliation scientifically and calling it penology. Penalization maintains that the offender should be punished, and that the gravity of the crime should be reflected in the gravity of the punishment. It is the application of the principle which the cynic in *The Mikado* maintained, "Let the punishment fit the crime." Or which an honored Ethical Dogmatist expressed when he said, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay."

The rationale of Penalization is not deterrence so much as the protection and gratification of individual, of group and class, and of social interests and desires. The Ethical Pragmatist resorts to retaliation and to punishments as he resorts to rewards, on the assumption of their pragmatic practicality.

A world dominated by this kind of resolution of the ethical problem is a rather horrible world to contemplate. It is part of man's tragedy that the world is in fact very largely dominated by Ethical Positivism precisely of this sort.

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Eunomic Theories, Doctrines, and Practices—Those solutions of the ethical problem which I think of as Eunomic call either explicitly or implicitly for the development of a genuinely scientific approach to the formulation of the moral law which is called for by Nomianism. The theories underlying the Eunomic approach to the problem are the antithesis of those upon which Positivism bases itself. Instead of Ethical Relativism, there is Ethical Absolutism; instead of Ethical Subjectivism, there is Ethical Objectivism, and instead of Amoralism there is Nomologism.

Ethical Absolutism, instead of denying that there can be any valid ethical value-judgments because of the relativity of all knowledge as Ethical Relativism does, can logically maintain that the variability in existing law and existing codes can be progressively reduced by ratiocination (as that is defined in Problem IV dealing with the problem of validation and verification), until moral absolutes comparable to mathematical absolutes begin to appear. That it is immoral to steal (as larceny is defined by law) and that it is moral to work productively and creatively (as this is defined in Problem X dealing with the occupational problem) are ethical value-judgments as "absolutely" true as the statement that the Earth is a sphere or the equation that 2 plus 2 equals 4. Ethical Absolutism distinguishes, as Ethical Relativism does not, between the truth sought (which is universal and perpetual) and the limitations upon man's capacity for formulating any truth in words and statements. Formulations of moral law will naturally vary, but as more and more knowledge about it is obtained, the formulations will vary less and less, and, in theory, if the truth is sought long enough, it will finally reflect actuality to such a degree that,

for all practical purposes, it can be called absolute. There is no rational basis for disputing the validity of the propositions that it is immoral to steal and that it is moral to work.

Ethical Objectivism (in complete contrast to *Ethical Subjectivism*) maintains that ethical value-judgments can be validated by evidence which is entirely objective in nature by the simple expedient of refusing to limit the study of ethics to human behavior but by including in it the consequences of various carefully classified categories of human actions. What men feel about human behavior is subjective, it is true, but the consequences of human actions are matters of empirical observation essentially the same as those which are the basis of any of the positive sciences. The discovery of the principles which must guide man's conduct (and not merely those which explain his conduct) are just as truly subject to discovery as are the principles (laws) which operate in the realm of physical, chemical, and electrical energy. The fact that ethics is a normative science, no more vitiates the possibility of its objective development than does the fact that education, being a normative science, precludes its being developed objectively.

Nomologism is the antithesis of *Amoralism*. *Nomologism* maintains that there is such a thing as the moral law, that every human action has some sort of ethical aspect, that the consequences of human actions can be empirically observed, and that it is possible, therefore, to develop a scientific nomology. Instead of maintaining that it is impossible to do so because in the final analysis all actions are amoral, it maintains that in the final analysis all actions are, as has already been pointed out, either moral, commendable, amoral, censurable, or immoral.

But no such "science of good and evil" is possible as long as we persist in thinking of law in legal instead of moral terms. No such science will begin to appear until we recognize that, by its very nature, statute law must cease being arbitrary and its enactment cease being left to lawyers and politicians.

Astronomers did not wait for the State to take the initiative in making a science of astronomy; on the contrary, they created it despite the opposition of the State (Copernicus never made public his pioneer work during his lifetime, because the statutes declared the world to be flat, and it would have cost him his life to

deny it.) Physicists like Galileo, began the work of creating physical science despite the State; Newton could freely publish his work only after the transformation of the stupid State from a savage State into a free State had begun. Biologists like Darwin less than a century ago still threw the State with its politicians and lawyers into a frenzy, and to this day the State of Tennessee has a statute forbidding the teaching of evolution. A science of ethics will begin to appear only after the study and teaching of ethics is no longer entrusted to either the theological seminaries or the schools of law but taken over by nomologists who believe not in mere Scientism but also in Naturalism and Humanism, and who begin with what the ancient Roman jurisconsults called natural law, what Confucius called the moral law, what Gautama called the eight-fold path, and what in this study I shall call Nomianism. What we need are fewer schools of law and at least one school of nomology; as we increase the number of nomologists, we will find that we need fewer lawyers.

Nomianism, predicating itself upon the assumption that there is such a thing as the moral law, maintains that it is paramount as law, that every kind of law—whether called sacred or positive, local or constitutional—is subject to it (and when in conflict with it null and void), and, finally, that the moral law is binding upon mankind everywhere, at all times, and under all circumstances.

Positivism very simply denies this. All the so-called discoveries of universal and perpetual distinctions between good and evil, it maintains, are illusions—failure to see that the distinctions are in reality relative and subjective in nature.

Dogmatism does not so much deny Nomianism as depreciate it. The moral law by itself (what man can learn about morality from observation and discovery and the use of ratiocination) is only a part of the morality which is embodied in the whole of the revelations of God's will, and this revealed part—this sacred and not profane law—is the more important. There is no way, for instance, of establishing by ratiocination the rule embodied in the First Commandment. Rules of this sort have to be accepted on faith. And those who most rigorously accepted this—the Gnostics of the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. have been very appropriately called Antinomians, because they felt that observance of

what faith prescribed enabled them to ignore the prescriptions of not only moral or natural law but also statutory law. Among the doctrines which are Nomian in essence, I include the ethical prescriptions of *Stoicism* and *Epicureanism* (Epicurus himself was no Epicurean as we ordinarily think of the doctrine; he believed in enduring not immediate pleasure as the criterion of behavior); *Buddhist* and *Confucian Ethics*, (though thought of as religious, neither Gautama nor Confucius vindicated their rules of morality by revelation, they were both Nomians); and finally two legal doctrines *International Law* (as Grotius and Puffenberg conceived it) and *Natural Law* (as the ancient Roman jurisconsults practised it). *International Law* is important because it is Nomian in its prescriptions for the control and, if possible, elimination of war (mass-violence), and *Natural Law* is important, because it is Nomian in its prescriptions for dealing with crime—with individual violence.

Expiation—In contrast with Atonement (which is prescribed for the believing Dogmatist who has “sinned”) and Evasion (which is the resort of the Positive Amoralist and Egotist), the Eunomic prescription for offenders is Expiation.

Expiation is two-fold; subjective and psychological, calling for a characterologic change, and secondly objective, calling for restitution and reparation. With Expiation there is no easy forgiveness; it has to be earned by making good the injury done to the victim (if that is still possible—it isn't possible in many cases, as for instance with murder); when impossible, to the family or dependents of the victim; when even that is impossible, by symbolic restitution—“by paying the debt” with social work to society as a whole.

Psychologically and subjectively, misbehavior for the individual who has a sufficiently developed ethical conscience causes self-alienation. Expiation is essential to his self-reconciliation.

This is far more rigorous than Atonement, which in some religions can be achieved by mere acts of propitiation (on the theory that it is the deity who has been offended, putting the victim and society either in second place or out of consideration altogether), and, of course, it is the very antithesis of the Evasion to which the Positivist logically if not always resorts.

Reparation—The Eunomic approach to the social problem created by an offence or delinquency is neither Excommunication nor Damnation (which is the Dogmatic method of dealing with "sins") nor Retaliation and Penalization (which is the Positivist prescription). It is basically that of restitution, reparation and reformation, on one hand, and of the protection of society, on the other. It puts the victim or victims of the injury in first place, the protection of society (if possible by the reformation of the offender) in second. Instead of trying to devise "a punishment to fit the crime," the reparation must be made to fit the injury. Reparation, in sum, is part of what I think of as the doctrine of Meliorism.

Meliorism—The problem created by evil deeds calls neither for vengeance (Retaliation) nor salvation (Atonement) but for amelioration, and this is mainly a personal and incidentally a social problem. The personal problem (as far as it is possible) is taken care of by right Ethical Incultation, Reparation and Expiation; the social problem, by ensuring the protection of society against any repetition of such deeds. Where the delinquent is corrigible, ameliorization calls for his reformation. The imposition of a regimen which aims at this cannot be an arbitrary period of time (thirty days! three years! life!) but must continue until reformation and reparation is a fact. Where the delinquent is incorrigible, and is demonstrably a species of vermin, the problem is how to "get rid of him" in the most humane way possible, how to protect society against him either by his incarceration or extinction. Incarceration has the unfortunate effect of burdening society with his maintenance; execution has the unfortunate effect of demoralizing the executioners even if the problem of how to do it humanely could be solved. To go into the Pluralist approach to this problem would take more space than is justified in this outline.

Humanitarianism and Sentimentalism—This much is true in Christian Dogmatism and Fundamentalism; we all "sin" even if we are not "all sinners." If Reparation is ethically valid, there is an immense fund of obligations upon which society can draw for amelioration. This puts the case for the ethics of Humanitarianism on a somewhat negative basis. There is an even better

case to be made for it on a positive basis—that we are all the heirs of the cultural accumulations of all time. Nearly all of us (there are some who are underprivileged) are in fact indebted to society for innumerable intangible services and goods of all kinds. There is only one way of discharging this obligation, and whatever the form of our contribution to society in discharging it, for want of a better term I think of it as Humanitarianism.

But Humanitarianism should be sharply distinguished from Sentimentalism. There is a real distinction between what I have frequently called scientific Humanitarianism and Sentimentalism, and only the first is properly entitled to be called Humanitarianism—a great deal of Sentimentalism is positively injurious in effect even when motivated by the kindest of feelings. There are Sentimental philanthropies (such as the concern many people lavish upon criminals) which are inexcusable, particularly if no concern is given to the victims of the crimes they have committed. Criminals are entitled to only one thing—justice, and this is the truest Humanitarianism if rendered both to the criminal and his victim.

A Eunomic ethic would transform Humanitarianism. The limitations of space prevent me from spelling the reasons out. But one thing I must permit myself to say. A great many activities which are not thought of as Humanitarian today are, in fact, more truly Humanitarian than many which are given the accolade. The scientist and the statesman who makes the world a better place in which to live, and the teacher and preacher, the writer and poet, the dramatist and the singer who inspire men and women to create such a world are Humanitarians. Most of them, unfortunately, are not; most politicians and technicians and most writers and artists today are positive Pejorists, making the world a worse place than it needs to be, but that is because they are Amoralists if not Immoralists instead of Eunomists.

An Essay in Nomography: The Eunomic Golden Rule— The fetish of objectivity must not be permitted to choke ethical progress to death. Nomology should be, and nomography must be, normative sciences. They must be objective in dealing with facts, yes, but the nomologist must go far beyond the accumu-

lation of data; he must not merely describe what is, he must formulate what should be.

This brief preliminary essay into nomography must, of necessity, leave discussion of the writing of a Eunomic Code of Ethics to a book on the ethical problem I hope some day to be able to finish. But to make clear that the confusion in ethics today (which calls for a "transvaluation of values" in Nietzsche's classic phrase) can be rationally dealt with, a suggested Eunomic Golden Rule is here attempted.

If Nietzsche is right, and I am convinced he is, all our codes of ethics are obsolete. So is the *Corpus Juris Civilis* of every nation and the *Corpus Juris Canonici* of every religion. This therefore is also true of the Golden Rule of the theologians ("Do unto others as ye would others do to you") and the supreme law of the lawyers ("Do nothing which is illegal; do everything which is legally called for, but do anything you can get away with, legal or illegal, and a lawyer will show you how to do it legally") must be discarded. If the theologians are right, the variable religious rules of mankind have to be accepted as if they were moral law, but since the Moral Law is invariant, this is a self-evident contradiction. On the other hand, if the lawyers are right, and what is positive law is considered final, then Thoreau, Tolstoy, and Gandhi are all wrong. All of them insisted that when statutory law conflicted with the moral law, it was the statute and not the moral law which was null and void.

The Golden Rule—There is a rule similar to the Christian Golden Rule in virtually all the higher religions, but of them all I believe the rule as it was phrased by Zoroaster is the best:

"That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self." (*Dafistân-i-dînk*, 94 : 5)

I like this better because the criterion is not "what ye would that men do to you." If the criterion is to be an objective one, it cannot be "what men like," because "what men like" is subjective. Tough-minded and bellicose individuals would be perfectly satisfied with a world in which all men took a posture of aggressiveness similar to that which reflects their own temperament. The criterion of Zoroaster's "not good for its own self" is actually an

objective one. And this must be the foundation for any ethic which can be called Eunomic.

Kant, in spite of his rigorous Intellectualism, did not hesitate to embark on normative nomography; his categorical imperative ("Always treat man as an end, never as a means") is an enormous improvement on the Golden Rule. For one thing, it is objective and not subjective; how one man treats another is a matter of observation, not of intentions. No matter what a man intends, what he does is what counts.

When I tried to formulate a single rule which might be substituted for the Golden Rule (a rule which took into account what historiographic etiology had contributed during the three or four centuries since the Scientific Revolution), I found myself formulating a rule with so many qualifications and modifications that it seemed less a rule than a codification. In desperation I have come up with a three-fold rule which measures up to most of the specifications I framed for writing it:

Do everything at all times, in all places, on all occasions which is necessary to create, to maintain, or to restore harmony in the world; do anything which everybody might do without disturbing this harmony; do nothing which disturbs or destroys it at any time, in any place, on any occasion.

For such a rule to be meaningful, the semantic problem must be faced. What is "an occasion?" What is "necessary?" Above all, what is "harmony?" Finally, to whom is this addressed—everybody, old and young, competent and incompetent?

It is impossible to adequately answer these questions without becoming specific, without in fact writing a whole *Corpus Juris Harmonia*. But a suggestive answer is essential.

To the question about *to whom* the rule is addressed, the answer is everybody, with those who are competent acting as the guardians and disciplinarians of those who are not.

To the question about what is an *occasion*, the answer is any interaction between any two persons; between an individual and the members of his family, between an individual and any group whether as small as a party, as large as a union or as inclusive

as society; or between any two groups—between two teams, two armies, two alliances of nations.

To the question about *necessary* I wish the answer could be equally easy, but it cannot be because this refers to everything from individual and collective disciplinary actions to acts of expiation and reparation. It is necessary to be self-supporting; but it also is necessary to support those for whom the individual is responsible, who, because of age or infirmity, cannot support themselves, and even to support those for whom the individual has a collective responsibility. Only the casuists who wrote Talmuds and Canons know the magnitude of what this question calls for.

I have a whole file filled with pages of notes for the definition of harmony. As used in this whole study, it does not mean mere unity or concord; it does not exclude diversity and forbid disagreement; it refers to a condition of freedom from discord (aggression and belligerence), not from dissonance. (The musical analogy is almost perfect, dissonance being musically defined as a disturbing cord needing consonance to follow for completeness). But a condition to justify being called harmonious means the harmony of humanity as a whole not only in the present but also for the pregnant future. Future generations have rights which the generation to which we belong must respect.

It is, for instance, a breach of harmony to destroy any natural resource to which future generations are also entitled, no matter how much it may seemingly make for affluence at present. Conservation is just as necessary a moral imperative as is production and creation.

It is a breach of harmony to surrender liberties to which future generations are equally entitled because that may enable us to avoid discomfort today. On the contrary, it is a necessary moral imperative that we discharge our obligations for such liberties as we enjoy today. Since we cannot repay those who struggled to bequeath them to us, we must duplicate what they did and bequeath them to our children and our children's children.

* * * *

And it does not mean peace, if by peace is meant complete passivity. The price of true peace may sometimes mean the use

of force in its defence or in disciplining its destroyers. If Emerson is right (and how right he is at this point!), that we must choose between truth and repose because we cannot have both, harmony cannot possibly mean mere repose.

Harmony, in the meaning which I attach to the term, is not just the passive practice of concord; it is the active doing of whatever may be necessary to the maintenance of concord and the restoration of concord whenever discord appears. It is a discipline, not a condition; it frequently calls for acts of enforcement. The members of a competent orchestra do not tolerate discord; they correct or eliminate it. Both the practice of concord and the dealing with discord are the essence of what the practice of harmony involves.

What harmony implies, so far as human behavior is concerned, was expressed in what Confucius said in "The Great Learning": "Those who desire to create harmony in the world . . . must cultivate their own personal lives," and in what Kant said in one of his famous categorical imperatives: "Act according to the maxim which you can, at the same time, will to be a universal law."

When its implications are once fully recognized, two things will become clear, that a Code of Moral Law as complete as Canon Law and Talmudic Law and as specific as the Code Napoleon and our own Code of Civil and Criminal Law has to be developed and formulated, and that the ethical values of the Code must then be inculcated (first in the determining leadership of mankind and through it disseminated to the whole of mankind) before we can hope for a world in which harmony will be a fact and not a hopeless aspiration.

* * * *

Something in the nature of a brief—too brief—but necessary addendum to what has just been said is essential. Golden Rules—even my own—are so inclusive that what they gain in brevity they lose in generality. What is needed, at the very least, is a set of commandments as specific as the Decalogue. But the net result of my studies of nomology and my essays in nomology is not a Decalogue but a Quadrilogue. This Quadrilogue spells out more specifically what the Law of Harmony prescribes.

A Eunomic Quadriologue:

I. Every man must support¹⁰ himself¹¹ with work which is productive¹² or creative¹².

II. No man may do violence¹³ to the person¹⁴ or damage¹³ to the possessions¹⁵ of another.

III. No man may commit larceny⁹.

IV. No man may deceive¹⁶ another to any person's injury¹⁷.

The first is a mandatory commandment; the other three are prohibitory. This Quadriologue leaves out a host of commandments which prescribe for commendable rather mandatory behavior, and another host which proscribe actions which are censurable rather than so immoral as to call for prohibition.

Granted that the key terms in the Quadriologue are adequately defined, the commandments become meaningful in the full meaning of the word.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem VI: The Ethical Problem

My accumulation of material on the ethical problem is almost as large as that on the political problem; it consists of about 1,700 pages of manuscripts, notes, and charts. I think the essence of all this material is suggested in this outline; what is missing are the cases and examples which provided the objective basis for the conclusions to which my study of the problem has driven me. This is unfortunate, because without them, Subjectivists and Relativists are certain to insist that this attempt, like all attempts at creating a scientific ethics, is just as dogmatic as are all existing religious and statutory codes. The question these critics raise is a legitimate one, but the problem of how to answer it in a brief outline is insoluble; to try to answer it would require an appendix running to hundreds of pages. All that I can suggest is that the reader try evaluating his own observations of human behavior in terms of their lineal consequences, and this will, I believe, give him confidence that there is at least one way in which it is possible to deal objectively not only with the ethical problem but with all problems of values.

1. *Good and Evil*—Both good and evil came into the English language from the Anglo-Saxon. *Good* came in from word *god*, meaning that which is fitting or that which is pleasing; it did not come from the word God. *Evil* came from the word *yfel*, meaning transgression. Neither word, unfortunately, is suitable for use in precise discussion. What is needed are not nouns like good and evil but adjectives like moral and adverbs like morally; nouns like morality and immorality provide such adjectives and adverbs while good and evil do not. Hence, in the terminology I have developed for precision in the discussion of the ethical problem, I have discarded the use of good and evil altogether.

2. *Inculcation and Dissemination*—Inculcation is an educational technique the purpose of which is to impress deeply upon the unconscious mind what is to be remembered and practiced. In teaching values, the conscience is conditioned so that the individual reacts with an attraction-reaction to what is valid and an aversion-reaction to what is invalid.

Dissemination, on the other hand, refers to mass-inculcation. The incultation of devotion to a nation (Patriotism), to a religion (Islam, Christianity), to a culture (Pan-Slavism, Pan-Teutonism), or to a social movement (eugenics or euthanasia) unless disseminated accomplishes nothing. Inculcation or insemination, if widespread enough, is the cause of which dissemination and mass-indoctrination with the desired values should be the result.

3. *Nomology*—In spite of the strangeness of the terms, the concept of law as a science has at least been envisaged by those who approach

law not as a vocation but philosophically. The term comes from the Greek word *nomos*, meaning law; in English usage it appears usually as *nomo* or *nomi*. In this form it has been used for a few meanings, to which I feel justified in adding a few more. Here are some of them: *nomology*, the science of law; *nomography*, the writing of laws; *nomothetics*, legislation (political action) on the basis of nomology; *nomocracy*, government on the basis of law; *eunomy*, the moral law—literally excellent as contrasted with arbitrary law; *Nomologism*, the theory that the moral law exists and that every human action has a moral aspect; *Nomianism*, the doctrine that the moral law is supreme and that all law, and all human behavior, should conform to it; *Antinomianism*, the doctrine of several Gnostic Christian sects which maintained that faith relieved the saved of the obligations of moral law.

4. *Motives and Consequences*—Motives and consequences are technical and not colloquial terms in my vocabulary. The word *motive* is a species of which the word *cause* is the genus, and the word *consequence* a species of which the word *effect* is the genus.

Motive comes into English from the Latin *movere* and *motum*, meaning to move. As I use it, it refers to that within man (his emotions and will) rather than something coming from the outside (an inducement) which incites him to perform actions acquiring significance from their ethical aspects. This meaning is in accord with its derivation; it is also, fortunately, in accord with common usage. When a man acts because of an inducement, the cause of the action in my terminology is not the motive but the *reason* for the action. *Reason*, like motive, is a species of which the word *cause* again is the genus.

The word consequence also comes from the Latin, from *consequentia* (*con* + *sequi* = to follow). As used here it refers to a condition which ensues or an action (an effect) which follows from and is the necessary result of the performance by a person of an action.

Space does not permit adequate treatment of the enormous importance of the distinctions applicable to these terms. Motives, for instance, seem to all fall into four sub-species or varieties which I think of as (1) survival motives, (2) genetic motives, (3) cultural motives, and (4) necrotic and destructive motives.

In the case of consequences, the distinction between (1) actual and (2) probable consequences is vital to the theory of objectivity in ethical values to which I have been driven. Only the probable consequences, statistically established, provide a valid basis for distinguishing meaningfully between what is moral and immoral.

5. *Well-Being (Euthenia) and Ill-Being (Dysthenia)*—The terms well-being and ill-being are used not metaphorically but scientifically in my vocabulary. Both terms refer to mental or physical states and conditions. Euthenia or well-being, synonymously defined, refers to a state of happiness and comfort, wholeness and health; dysthenia or ill-being to a

state of distress, misery, wretchedness, anxiety and mental or physical suffering.

The problem in using such terms scientifically is to provide them with objective referents. I know of only one way of doing this satisfactorily, and that is by classifying actions in accordance with the effects, physical and mental, upon human beings which result from them. A person who is the victim of mayhem suffers as a result physically (dyscrasially); he is in a state of ill-being (dysthenia). So is a person who is the victim of blackmail; he suffers from it mentally (dysphorically), and if he pays the blackmailer, he suffers financially and materially as well. On the other hand, a transaction in which the buyer receives the quality and quantity of goods he needs or desires and the seller receives the prevailing price for it in a free and open market, is an action in which both have taken part and the result of which is for both mentally wholesome (euphoric). "Cases" furnish objective and not subjective referents for the distinction between actions which make for well-being and actions which make for ill-being.

6. *Lineal versus Spatial Consequences*—The distinction between what I think of as the lineal (direct) consequences and the spatial (multi-directional) consequences of actions is very important. Spatial consequences are important to the historian and the biographer, but for purposes of classification in terms of the moral problem, they are useless.

By spatial consequences I mean (1) random consequences, (2) remote consequences, and (3) infinite consequences. By lineal consequences I mean the consequences of an action which can be traced, so to speak, along a very clear line marked by six stages which are very clearly observable in the first stages and less clearly observable as we moved along to more and more distant stages. These six stages are (1) the consequences upon the perpetrator of the act, (2) upon the perpetratee or victim of the perpetrator, (3) upon both the perpetrator's and perpetratee's immediate family and associates, (4) upon the group, class, party, denomination, association to which the perpetrator and perpetratee belong, (5) upon the society as a whole to which they belong, finally (6) upon humanity as a whole.

7. *Moral and Natural Law*—I realize that in speaking of the Moral Law and of moral laws, I am using fighting words. In the cynical age in which we live it is not only *démodé* to speak of them, it is in scientific circles *de classe*; it simply puts a person completely out of scientific bounds. But I do not have to go to the analects of Confucius to justify my use of these terms. There is first of all a pragmatic justification for using them. What the ancient Roman jurisconsults referred to when their courts made decisions based upon natural law (*jus naturae* and to a degree also *jus gentium*) is substantially the same thing to which I refer when I speak of the Moral Law.

Because the term natural law has been appropriated by scientists to refer to axioms and principles which describe *what is*, there is an in-

escapable element of confusion in using it to refer not to what is but to *what should be*. The natural law of thermo-dynamics describes the behavior of heat and energy not as they should, but as they do, act; the Moral Law describes human behavior not as human beings do act but as they should act. Moral Law, in fact, is the only kind of law which should be called law; to call a scientific fact a law is to indulge in a misnomer.

Laws are rules which should be observed but which, unfortunately, can too often be disregarded. We have laws against speeding, but it is easy to disregard them; nothing very much happens unless the speeder is unfortunate enough to be caught. But this is not true with regard to so-called natural laws; they operate in the same way no matter what an individual does. The so-called law of gravitation and the so-called laws of health are perfectly clear about what will happen to a man who jumps off a ten-story building; natural laws of this kind simply lay down the axiom that if a human being jumps from such a height he will be killed; it may be foolish of him to do so but indulging in this folly violates no axioms of science. True laws are normative in nature; it is wrong to call a descriptive axiom a law.

8. From the magazine *Pageant*, December 1961, No. 6, pp. 110-116.

9. *Larceny* is defined by law as the taking and carrying away of things personal without consent, with intent to deprive the rightful owner of what is his. Taking and carrying away is defined as the removal of the property stolen from its original position, however slightly, and its complete possession by the thief at least momentarily.

The great British train robbery of 1963 was a case of aggravated *larceny*. About the absoluteness of the immorality of such robbery there can be no rational question.

By the same logic there is equally little question about the absoluteness of the morality of *productive work* (such as that of the farmer in planting corn, cultivating it, and harvesting it), nor about the absolute morality of *creative work* (not only that of Keats in composing *Endymion* and Beethoven in composing the *Eroica* but also that of a wife and mother in creating a beautiful home or a gardener in creating a beautiful flower garden).

If even one value-judgment dealing with good and evil can be demonstrated as "absolutely" and not "relatively" valid, then the fact that absolutes can be validated has been proven.

10. *Support* means the provision of everything essential to something between an average and an adequate scale of living.

11. *Himself* refers not only to the individual but to everybody normally dependent upon "him."

12. *Productive* refers to material goods and services which make for well-being, and *creative*, to intangibles "produced" by the professions which make for cultural well-being.

13. *Violence and damage* are defined in great detail in the discussion of the Political Problem, the fifteenth problem in this whole study.

14. *Person* refers both to individuals and to groups, both to what the law calls natural persons and artificial persons—human beings and corporate entities.

15. *Possessions* refers to both property and trusterty. For a full definition of these concepts, see the eleventh problem in this study, the possessional Problem.

16. *Deceive* means intentional deception; it also means deception by commission (actual lying) and by omission (by failing to say what should be said).

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PROBLEM VII

Beauty and Ugliness: The Problem of Esthetic Values

A thing of beauty is a joy forever
Its loveliness increases;
It will never pass into nothingness;
but still will keep a bower for us,
and a sleep full of sweet dreams, and
health, and quiet breathing.
Therefore, on every morrow, are we breathing
a flowery band to bind us to the earth;
Spite of Despondence; of the inhuman dearth
of noble natures;
of gloomy days; of all unhealthy and o'er-
darkened ways made for our searching:
Yes, in spite of all, some shape of beauty
moves away the pall from our darkened
spirits.—John Keats, *Endymion*.

No philosopher, no scientist, and no art critic has ever packed as much truth about the esthetic problem into a whole book as Keats did into these ten lines from his *Endymion*. We shall see, before we are through with our consideration of the esthetic problem, that what a poet had to say upon the subject not only combined knowledge with wisdom but also said what he had to say so movingly as to stimulate the cultivation of man's much neglected esthetic conscience.

This cultivation is very badly needed today. Never before has there been such a challenge to the classic conception of the beautiful as at the present time. There have been, of course, many periods of artistic decadence, but never before has there been an age dominated by a deliberate movement, promoted by recognised art critics and professors of art, and often supported by technically competent poets and writers, painters and sculptors, composers and architects, in which what seems like inartistic nonsense is being justified. The underlying philosophy and the essential principle of those who are rationalizing abstract formlessness, ugliness in painting and sculpture, atonal music, functionless archi-

texture, pointless poetry and plotless drama (the theatre of the absurd) seems to be that clear communication and clear representation have no place in the arts.

As a result, never before has there been more confusion about esthetic values. If the dominant esthetic movement of our own times is either to be vindicated or revealed as a colossal delusion, it is of the utmost importance that clarity be introduced into the discussion of the esthetic problem¹.

Four facts make the esthetic problem not just a problem for those interested in the arts, but a basic, universal, and perpetual problem for all mankind:

1. The first is that men react to everything they see or hear or sense. Sometimes they react with pleasure (a landscape), sometimes with distaste (roadside litter), sometimes with awe and rapture (Beethoven's *Eroica*), sometimes with deep disgust (a drunk vomiting). In physiological terms these reactions are sensations, in psychological terms perceptions². The first are hereditary reactions to man's biological "irritability," the second his acquired and learned reactions to his psychological "irritability." The polar opposites in his physiological reactions are what have been called pleasures and pains; in his psychological reactions to the arts the poles are beauty and ugliness.

2. The second fact is that men do not react to the same object (a painting) and to the same event (a concert) in the same way. For instance, hearing a first-rate symphony orchestra play the *Eroica* or hearing a popular band play *rock-'n-roll*, one man will be uplifted by the *Eroica* and irritated by *rock-'n-roll* and another irritated by the *Eroica* and transported by *rock-'n-roll*. In other words, they cannot, like mere animals, rely upon their unconditioned instincts to make judgments about beauty and ugliness (because of the plasticity of their instincts and their variability from man to man and in the same man from time to time).

We have startling contradictions to account for: Why does the art of one period move people and the same art utterly fail to move people of a later period, or perhaps move them to consider it ugly instead of beautiful? Why is the art of one culture considered beautiful by that culture and the same art considered ugly by another? Why does the art of one artist, or the art of

one school of art, move some art critics to ecstasy and move others at the same time and same place to disgust?

3. Third, is the fact that all individuals (laymen and patrons of the arts, art critics and art authorities, and artists themselves) make esthetic judgments and cannot help having feelings about what they like and dislike, about what is art and what is not art, about what is beautiful and what is ugly.

4. Finally, there is the fact that man cannot rely upon his "instincts"—upon his "blood" as Lawrence liked to put it—to validate his artistic judgments. Animals can rely upon them in dealing with any of their problems; man cannot remain man and do so. He cannot discard his long inheritance of disciplined self-expression in the arts without abdicating his emergence from animal-like and child-like subjection to caprice and impulse—D. H. Lawrence and James Joyce, Pablo Picasso and Salvador Dali, Constantin Brancusi and Henry Moore, Hindemith, Schoenberg and Schulberg to the contrary notwithstanding.

What these facts create for us is what I think of as the problem of esthetic values—an ultimate problem which seems to me best stated as follows: granted that esthetic values are subjective, and inescapably subjective in nature, is there any objective basis for distinguishing between beauty and ugliness? Is there any objective basis for evaluating both objects of art (clothing and decor, painting and sculpture) and artistic performances (cooking and gardening, singing and dancing?).

* * * *

As in the case of all problems of values, there are two aspects of the esthetic problem which must be distinguished, the problem of the validation of the values and the problem of their inculcation. The first is an essentially intellectual and scientific problem, the second a problem in emotional education.

The Validation of Esthetic Values—Validation involves first of all the definition of beauty and ugliness. If no objective referents for them can be found—if there are in fact, as so many writers about esthetics insist, no such referents—the terms become virtually meaningless. Nobody is then justified in saying, "This painting is beautiful; this one is ugly." Nobody can say anything more about any painting, any poem, any architectural monument

than "I like this one," or "I don't like that one." Saying "This is beautiful" is then a mere ejaculation and means only "I like it."

In trying to find the objective referents which gave rise to the use of the two concepts (both used apparently as soon as man's vocabulary became large enough to provide him with words to represent his most important ideas), I have used the same method as in all the other studies of values. This method involves the consequences of producing different kinds of objects-of-art and of using or consuming them (as with both pictorial art and culinary art) and the consequences of performing and of enjoying the performance of various kinds of arts (dancing, singing). From the classification of a sufficient number of cases of different kinds of art two categories emerge: those which make for well-being and those which make for ill-being. Well-being and ill-being refer to psychological health or physiological health, sometimes to both. Well-being is considered, on the basis of this study, the objective referent for the word *beautiful* and ill-being the objective referent for the word *ugly*. Well-being and ill-being are objective actualities, and the words which refer to them refer to what is objective and not subjective in nature. Four cases will illustrate what is here involved. The first two are judgments about what is beautiful and ugly in nature; the last two about what is beautiful and ugly in man-made art.

The Case of Thoreau—Thoreau gives dozens of cases of experiences of his own in which the "return to nature" or "communion with nature" led to his emotional and physical well-being, to the restoration of well-being when contact with the activities of mankind had sickened him. Every psychiatrist and every physician who tells a patient to do in one way or another what Thoreau describes so eloquently is aware of the objective actuality of the value Thoreau attached to life close to nature.

But nature is not always beautiful. Sometimes it is ugly in the extreme.

The Case of the Earthquake at Anchorage—A recent case in which nature stunned a whole population and made a whole region hideous was the earthquake which almost destroyed Anchorage, Alaska. History is dotted with endless numbers of ugly cases of this kind, fires and floods, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions.

That they made for objective ill-being, both physically, and mentally, is incontestable.

The Case of Adolf Hitler—Oratory is an art; some of the greatest orators of all time were the greatest artists of all time. Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, Gautama's Sermon at Benares, Webster's reply to Foote (the oration on "Liberty and Union"), and Ingersoll's "Eulogy at the Grave of a Child" are all works of art.

Adolf Hitler was a great orator. He moved men and moved them as few other orators have moved those who listened to them. But Hitler's orations, effective as they were technically, were all ugly in the extreme, judged by their actual consequences. They turned the people of Germany by the millions into maddened beasts and, as a consequence, made for worldwide ill-being.

The Case of Michaelangelo's "Pieta"—The *Pieta* is one of the greatest of all sculptures. It is a work of devotional art. It has moved millions of those who have seen it to compassion; it has made for their well-being and for the well-being of those who became the beneficiaries of their compassion. It is in terms of its actual consequences—very pragmatically considered—beautiful.

As a result of very definite cases of this kind, I have ventured upon the formulation of eleven canons of art³, nine dealing with art in general and two with great art. All of the first nine must be present to justify designating any work of art as beautiful, and all eleven if it is to be designated both great and beautiful.

1. *Right-Purpose*—The first canon is that it must have a right-purpose. Right-purposes, however, are not utilitarian in the narrow sense of the term. There is utility, for instance, in an intangible like music. Nevertheless, if an object of art is tangibly utilitarian (clothing, shelter, furniture, china, silverware), then designing such things so that they are both functional and beautiful is a right-purpose.

2. *Effective Communication*—The second canon follows logically from the first; art must not only have a right-purpose, it must also communicate it effectively. If it communicates nothing, it expresses nothing, and it is nothing. If it communicates ill-being, if it stimulates dysphoria, it is not art; only if it communicates well-being (euphoria) is it art.

3. *Sincerity*—The third is sincerity. It must be sincere not only in substance but also in expression; it cannot be either in substance or expression cynical or venal. This does not exclude satire; on the contrary, satirical expression of something which should be criticized can be art and also great art (Voltaire's *Candide*, Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, Butler's *Erewhon*).

4. *Skill*—The fourth canon is technical skill; the work must in execution represent an adequate approach to perfection. Neither communication nor inspiration nor any of the similar canons of art can be fully realized without adequate skill.

5. *Good Taste*—Good taste does not mean restriction of the subject matter or treatment to what is nice and pretty. The subject can include anything, even what in actual life is terrible; but even the terrible can be presented and treated so that the effect is cathartic and not catabolic.

6. *Wholesomeness*—The sixth canon is wholesomeness. The work's effect, psychologically and physiologically, must be life-enhancing (euthenic) not life-inhibiting (dysthenic); it must make for mental and physical health.

7. *Morality*—The seventh canon is that a work's effect must be good not evil; it must humanize not bestialize man. (Tolstoy's *What is Art?* makes this question of the morality of art central to his whole critique of esthetics.) A work of art, performing as well as graphic, may have a definite moral to instill, but it does not have to be instilled in the invidious didactic signification of the term. Art, no matter how skillfully executed technically, if it demoralizes man, is not beautiful.

8. *Inspiration*—The eighth canon is that it must inspire man—literally in spirit; it must revive his spirits, not depress them.

9. *Emotiveness*—The ninth and last canon applicable to all art is that it must move men; it must evoke an emotional response. While this is essential to any work of art which can be called beautiful, beauty must not be identified with emotion. Beauty is not one characteristic of art, it is the aggregate of all of them. There is plenty of art, both devotional and sensual, which arouses emotions but of the wrong kind; and art of this kind, no matter how skillfully executed, is ugly.

If now a work of art (painting, writing, building) or an artistic activity (singing, dancing) is in accord with these nine canons, it is beautiful. If it lacks any of them, no matter how great may be its excellence in some of them, it is not beautiful and cannot properly be called beautiful. If it lacks several of them, it is and should be called ugly. Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* (great as it is when evaluated by those who think sensual art the real answer to the problem of esthetic values) and the famous crucifix in the Neumünster Cathedral in Würzburg (great as it is when evaluated by those who think devotional art the real answer to the problem of esthetic values) are, when tested by these canons, ugly. *Ars Amatoria* in the original was a marvellous sensual stimulator for the Romans who read it, and the crucifix with its incredibly vivid shrunken corpse nailed to the cross was a marvellous devotional help to devout Catholics. But to a Buddhist from Thailand the crucifix is horrible and ugly, and to normal men, *Ars Amoris* is not beautiful but stupid and ugly.

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A meal cooked and served by a culinary artist a great chef may be a *beautiful* work of art; it may provide a gourmet with transports of delight, but no matter how beautiful it can never be properly called *great* art. Two more canons of art are involved, and both must be added to the nine before a work can deserve the accolade of greatness.

10. *Importance*—The first is that of importance. Not important in the sense of immediate utility or necessity but important to mankind as a whole and for an indefinite period of time. A dinner, no matter how great the artistry it represents, can never be important in the sense that Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony, the Taj Mahal, and the Parthenon are important.

11. *Originality*—The second canon calls for originality. If a work of art is important but not original, it can still be considered very beautiful but it is not great. This does not preclude, of course, art which is definitely in a given tradition. The Taj Mahal is definitely in the tradition of Mogul art, but it still is so original in conception, in composition, and in the combination of strictly traditional elements as to fulfill the canon calling for originality.

If art is characterized by importance and originality as defined in these two canons and also meets the requirements of the other nine canons of art, then it is not only art but great art.

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The Inculcation and Dissemination of Esthetic Values—When we turn from the problem of validation to that of inculcation, we turn from the noetic to the axiological aspects of esthetics. Since inculcation is discussed at some length in Problem XVII, dealing with the educational problem, it will be only very briefly outlined at this time.

Three things at least are involved in esthetic education of the right kind: heightening esthetic sensibilities, developing to the utmost the esthetic conscience, and stimulating esthetic motivation. Most people, unfortunately, are esthetic imbeciles not because their sensibilities have been so little cultivated, but because they have been actually perverted; the need for right education of the sensibilities is enormous. If the sensibilities are heightened, an esthetic conscience is developed to censor and monitor the individual's reactions to his esthetic experiences. Finally, if his esthetic conscience has been properly cultivated, his conscience will motivate him esthetically; the realization of beauty and the elimination of ugliness will become something about which he feels compelled to do something.

It is not intellectual education but emotional education for which this calls. All that intellectual and academic study of art can provide at their very best are only preliminary to what emotional education must provide. The individual must feel beauty and not merely know beauty, and this calls for alogical in contrast to logical methods of teaching⁴.

* * * *

The esthetic problem is as old as *Homo sapiens*. The Aurignacian men who painted the astonishing pictures of animals on the ceilings of the caves at Altamira in Spain 20,000 years ago, were, according to those in charge of the museum there, priests of the tribe and the paintings were in effect icons placating the animals which they hunted in the same manner that primitive Animists to this day placate the spirits of the trees they cut down just

before axes bite into them. From the very first, propitiation of the Animistic forces of nature was man's solution to the problem to which art should be devoted. If we use this as the clue to the right method of dealing with the esthetic problem, if we ignore the historical approach in terms of the origin of the arts, and if we deal with the problem in terms of the purposes of those who produce or create works of art (both useful and fine) and the purpose of those who engage in the performing arts (declaiming and singing, acting and dancing), all solutions of the esthetic problem fall into one of three categories, Religious, Sensual, and Inspirational.

Religious Solutions of the Problem—All devout believers, no matter what their religion, if they are strictly logical in testing a work of art or an artistic performance in terms of their esthetic values, would have to say that it must answer affirmatively the question, "Is it devotional in nature?" Similarly, the answer to the question of the validity of every other activity in life must be "To glorify God." Religious Esthetic Ideologies include *Idolatrous Art* (Phallicism, Satanism), *Iconolatrous Art* (Catholic, Lamaistic), *Iconoclastic Art* (Muslim abstract art, Quaker and Pietist non-art), *Devotional Eroticism* (Aphroditism, Devidassism), *Liturgism and Ritualism* (Catholic, Lamaistic).

The justification for Iconolatrous Christian art set forth at the Second Council Nicaea (787 A.D.) in substance is the justification for all forms of Religious art:

We therefore...define with all certitude and accuracy that, just as the figure of the previous and life-giving Cross, so also the venerable and holy images, as well as in painting and mosaic as of other fit material, should be set forth in the holy churches of God and on the sacred vessels and on the vestments and on hangings and in pictures both in houses and by the wayside...For by so much more frequently as they are seen in artistic representation, by so much more readily are men lifted up to the memory of their prototypes and to a longing after them:

* * * *

Sensual Answers to the Problem—All Hedonists, including the Modernists and the Cynics of our cynical era who dominate modern art, if similarly logical, would have to answer our problem by saying that the real purpose of art should be to give man pleasure and to help him forget the especially frightening world in which he

lives, armed to the teeth now with atomic bombs. The attitude of all strictly logical Hedonists should be that described in the classic phrase, "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die." Art which titillates the senses, art which is novel, art which startles and shocks, art which conduces to sensate gratification, is art which to them makes sense. This, it seems to me, is what modern artists for the most part are expressing even in their abstract, nonrepresentational nihilistic art.

Some of the typical Sensual Esthetic Ideologies include *Esthetic Relativism*, *Industrial Art*, *Commercial Art*, *Esthetic Subjectivism* (Instinctualism), *Symbolism*, *Impressionism*, *Futurism*, *Modernism*, *Surrealism*, *Dadaism*, *Esthetic Nihilism* (Non-representationalism, designless *Abstractionism*), *Primitivism*, *Esthetic Eroticism* (Pornographic Art), *Pop Art*, and an apparently unending stream of new ideologies which continue trying to rationalize the irrational. For the most part these are movements having to do with painting, but there are corresponding movements in music, poetry, drama, sculpture, dancing and architecture.

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Inspirational Esthetic Ideologies—Being a Humanist, I believe both the Devotionalists and the Sensualists mistaken. I believe that all strictly logical Humanists must maintain that man's concern in life should be life here and now and not in any possible future life in Heaven, in Paradise, in Nirvana or in reunion with Rama. The concern of mankind ought not to be with what will ensure eternal salvation (that ought to take care of itself) but with what can be done to make life truer, nobler, and more beautiful both for the generation now living and also for future generations which will have to live in a world made better or worse by those who live in it now.

All logical Humanists must be Esthetic Pluralists; they cannot be Monistic about art as are those who deal with it either Religiously or Sensually. They do not have to be "goody goodies" so wrought up by the evils of the world in which they find themselves that a belly laugh makes them feel guilty. Life, as the ancient Greeks decided, can be and should be viewed both comically and tragically. As Pluralists, Humanists can say with Emerson that "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."

But what they must recognize as Meliorists, in contrast to Optimists and Pessimists, is that leadership in art as in everything else in the modern world is divided between Supernaturalists who tell them that their ultimate concern should be with a future life, and Sensualists and Hedonists who see life as Omar Khayyam saw it in his *Rubaiyat*:

Some for the Glories of this World; and some
Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;
Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,
Nor heed the rumble of Death's distant Drum.

Metanoia came to Gautama, upon whom life seemed to have conferred every blessing, when he discovered that in man's life "All things . . . are on fire . . . on fire with passion . . . with hatred . . . with birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair⁵." The debilitating grind of sheer existence in a world of which Lowell⁶ could far too truthfully say, "right forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne," makes inspiration as much as food and drink a necessity of life.

Man needs the inspiration of dawn and sunset, of walking in meadow or in wood, of communion with nature every day. He needs inspiration at every meal before he breaks bread; he needs to be inspired by the decor of the home in which he lives, by the very clothes every member of the family, old and young, wear. But above all he needs inspiration as a member of a community, every week, in a meeting in which all the arts—music and poetry, oratory and rites, floral and decorative—and above all in which fellowship with those with similar values, provide an inspiring end and an inspiring beginning to the week. And seasonally, as the ancients discovered and as the people of every culture unspoiled by urban sophistication discovered, they need to put the utmost talent and creativity into festivals which celebrate the seasons and memorialize the great leaders who in the past contributed heroically to the difficult task of Humanizing man.

Among some of the solutions of the esthetic problem which fall into the category of Inspirational art, I include *Classicism*, *Craftsmanship* (William Morris), *Formalism*, *Functionalism*, *Realism* (*Naturalism*), *Romanticism*, *Abstractionism* (symbolic, as in Arabic art), and *Lyricism* (Musical, Dramatic, Poetic). There are, of course, distinct national and cultural forms in each of these

broad categorizations as there are distinct religious forms for religious art. Sensual art seems to be less addicted to such particularist influences; it evidently grounds itself on such a low level of human craving as to be more universal in the forms in which it expresses itself.

* * * *

I must add parenthetically that in expressing my own bias with regard to esthetics, I am making it possible for the reader to guard himself against it, as I hope I am succeeding in asking him to guard himself against the bias of both Devotionalists and Sensualists. The first are biased in the direction of what they believe is the ultimate truth, that man's first concern should be devotion to God in art as in everything else; the second are biased by what they believe is the ultimate truth about human nature, the truth which Hobbes long ago summed up in his *Leviathan* when he said that man is a "brutish beast," and, on this conception of human nature maintain that the gratification of the beast in him—the provision of sensuous thrills and not devotion nor inspiration—should be the function to which all the arts should devote themselves.

My own bias reflects my deep-felt conviction that art should not be exempt from what should be the test to which every activity of man is subjected: does it furnish him inspiration to live his life as it should be lived? In my own case this is expressed in the arts classically called Humanist; but it should not be confined to them, it should be expressed in every possible form of art, both useful and fine.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem VII: The Esthetic Problem

1. *Esthetics*, which comes to us from the Greek *aesthetika*, meant in the original Greek the study and science of beauty. The Greek root of the word comes from perceiving and feeling. As the term is used in this study, however, it will mean the study and science of both beauty and ugliness and of the arts and artistic activities which create either beauty or ugliness.

Modern speculations about the problem and the extensive literature dealing with it date back to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartner, (1714-1862) who was the first to use esthetics as it is used today in an essay written in 1750 entitled *Aesthetika*.

2. *Sensations vs. Perceptions*—Sensations are not only physiological reactions to man's physiologic irritability; they are also inbuilt hereditary reactions; all men have substantially the same sensations. Eating food always gives pleasure; starvation always gives pain. Perceptions, on the other hand, are learned and acquired reactions to psychologic irritability, and since men never have precisely the same sort of learning and conditioning, their perceptions vary enormously. Animals do not perceive; they react to stimuli with sensations. Man does perceive, even if his physical sensations are not pure but affected by his conditioning and learning. To react to sensations as animals do, man would have to return to an animal state; he would have to shed all his acquired characteristics. Congenital idiots and imbeciles never acquire any to shed; the hopelessly insane can and do frequently shed them; normal human beings cannot and should not.

3. *The Eleven Canons of Art*—These canons gradually emerged from the classification of about two hundred cases of artistic actions and reactions, activities and works of art, going back to the most primitive and including a few from a wide variety of cultures. The cases included such acts as the reactions to the contemplation of a sunset and the judgments of observers of nature like Wordsworth and Thoreau. They included judgments by observers and critics of both artistic performances (dancing, singing, acting) and artistic productions (poetry and painting, sculpture and architecture). They included both cases of fine and of useful arts (cookery, costume, decoration, gardening). In classifying them I relied not only on my own judgment (as classifier) but upon what critics as different as Sainte-Beuve, Read, and Tolstoy had said about them, upon what had been said by the artist himself, and what was recorded about artists biographically. The eleven characteristics emerged because they were the conceptions used to designate what was characteristic of each

case. The canon, I recognize is still not scientifically definitive but the method of formulating it, I think, valid.

I call them canons because a canon—being historically God's law in contrast to man's—is considered (at least by believers) as representing law higher than statutory or even constitutional law.

4. *Alogical versus Logical Methods of Teaching*. For a comprehensive discussion of these methods, see my book *The Education of the Whole Man*, pp. 407-452.

5. *The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha*, edited by Edwin A. Burtt, Mentor Books, 1955.

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PROBLEM VIII

Wealth and Illth : The Problem of Economic Values

Often when Socrates was looking on at auctions he would say; How many things there are which I do not need.—Diogenes Laertius.

When the Gibbon of the future writes the history of "The Decline and Fall of the Free World," nothing will be more ironic than the fact that he will have to date the beginning of the fall from the year in which the first great modern republic was born. He will have to date it from 1776, because that was the year in which the first modern text dealing with economics, Adam Smith's *Enquiry into the Wealth of Nations*, was published. What has been wrong with the long list of economic texts published since that time (which unfortunately have played so real a part in creating the conditions which are destroying the free world), is that having begun with the wrong questions, they came up with wrong answers.

That man has wants they all took for granted. But this is precisely what they should not have done; the question with which they should have begun was not *how the people in a nation satisfy their wants* but *what human beings should want*; with the question not of what to do about economic wants but what to do about economic values. To deal with the question they did ask (within the limitations of pure economics), they assumed that they had to deal not with man as he in reality is but with a hypostatic man, an economic man, a man who always bought as cheaply and always sold as dearly as he could. But *Homo economicus* (Adam Smith's and Karl Marx's man) is no more like man than *Homo sapiens* (the Enlightenment's hypostatic reasoning man) or *Homo sexualis* (Sigmund Freud's hypostatic sex-mad man). True, zoologists continue to call man *Homo sapiens*, but he is actually much more emotional than sapient; it would be truer to fact to call him *Homo emotus*. It is the fact that they ignore man as he is, the most

complex of all living creatures (for me, *Homo complexus*), which vitiates the whole elaborate science which they have built upon half true, half mythological foundations. The root is man, as Dwight MacDonald puts it. If the man they assumed they had to deal with had not been half true, the error would long ago have been recognized. Half-truths are always more dangerous than complete mistakes; it is almost impossible to catch up with them.

True, economists devote endless time to the discussion of value-theories, but here they are not talking about values but about prices, about some thing which can be quantitatively measured. Of all the schools of economic thought, the Utilitarians built their solutions of man's problems upon the most ridiculous caricature of man; Jeremy Bentham and his followers thought that all his needs and desires could be measured in pounds and shillings.

For purposes of analysis, it is valid to consider man, as he was considered in Problem V from the standpoint of his telic values only, in Problem VI, from the standpoint of his ethical values only, in Problem VII from the standpoint of his esthetic values only, and as we shall now consider him from the standpoint of his utilitarian or economic values by themselves. But in dealing with any one of them, we must never forget that all of them are inextricably interrelated.

It is ridiculous to talk about the wants of J. Pierpont Morgan, who came from a wealthy banker's home, and of Jesus, who came from a poor carpenter's home; of the wants of John D. Rockefeller, who came from a poor pedler's home, and of the wants of Gautama, who came from a prince's palace—as if they were essentially alike and could all be measured in dollars and cents. It is just as ridiculous to talk about any man as if all his wants were of a utilitarian nature. All men, even the commonest of men, have non-utilitarian wants, and all of them sacrifice utilitarian wants for non-utilitarian values (sex, religion, patriotism, prestige, art, science). Let us not forget this.

The real problem which has always and will always confront him economically has been created for him by five facts:

1. The first is that mankind has needs. This fact, however, confronts not only man but every animal.

2. The second is that he has not only needs but also desires and that, except in direst destitution, and not always then, he puts his desires ahead of his needs. Needs are inborn; desires wholly acquired. It is a terrible error to forget this. Marx proved with his history of class war that man desires riches first, last, and all the time. Freud proved with his analysis of man's neurosis that he desires sex first, last, and all the time. Jesus proved that he could be made to love God (desire God) so much that he would forget all about both sex and riches. Gandhi proved that he could be made to love his country not only more than he loved riches and sex but even God. Madison Avenue has proved that man can be made to desire almost anything, even things (like cigarettes) which are fantastically harmful to him. The history of man proves that he uses all the ingenuity of which he has such an abundance to obtain and to consume not what he needs, not even what he likes, but what he has been taught and conditioned to desire. Animals take their "likes" and "dislikes" for granted; man cannot afford to do so.

3. The third fact which creates the problem for him is the fact that the production and use, distribution and consumption of some goods (food, clothing, shelter) make for his well-being while other goods (atom bombs, poison gas, pep-pills) make not for his well-being but for his actual ill-being. It is for this reason that it is so wrong for economists to call the production of anything and everything the production of wealth, when so much of it is in fact the production of illth.

4. The fourth fact is that because of the plasticity of his instincts, man cannot rely upon them, as can other animals, to tell him what to want, what not to want, and how much of what he does want, he should want. As a result he produces all sorts of useful things (wheat, corn, sugar, coffee) of which he produces too much, and all sorts of useless things which nobody should call goods (high-heeled shoes, hydrogenated fats) and which should not be produced at all.

5. Finally, there is the fact that in spite of the grossness of his mis-education about what he needs and what he should desire, he, nevertheless, is constantly making felt-judgments—impulsive, emotionally-laden judgments—particularly when he is in a store

or market, about what he wants and how much of it he should want.

The Problem of Validation—The problem of economic values, like all problems in values, is twofold; the problem of the validation of economic values and the problem of the inculcation of right values.

Validation, however, is a noetic and strictly intellectual problem; it is a scientific, not an emotional and axiological, problem. But the validation of economic judgments, while it must be in accord with the general principles of verification and validation, presents difficulties peculiar to economics and cannot, therefore, be properly dealt with unless its nature is considered at the same time as the problem of economic values as a whole.

Validation in economic values (objectively and not subjectively, because what any individual or what any aggregation of individuals likes or dislikes is no basis for rational validation) calls for rigorous observation and rigorous classification of human needs and desires on one hand and on the other of the goods and services human beings use or consume in satisfying them.

Needs and Desires—Needs are invariant, every human being must satisfy them. Desires vary from person to person, from place to place, from time to time; needs do not. If an objective and not subjective definition is to be given to economic wealth and economic illth, economic goods must be classified in terms of the invariant needs rather than the variable desires of mankind.

The only economic goods which are in fact invariant needs, goods which every human being must have to live, are categorizations; tangible as they are, they are invariant only as universals, never as particulars; they exist in essence, but not in form. Every human being must have food to survive, but whether he uses wheat or oats, corn or rice (all of which are foods and all of which will supply the nutriments he needs) is a matter of choice and varies in actuality from person to person and from place to place.

The invariant needs of mankind (the real necessities of life and not those usually thought of) consist of three categories of needs:

Survival Needs—These are needs for a great variety of things, not only economic goods (food, clothing, shelter) but non-economic goods (air, exercise), all of which are essential to man's survival as an individual.

Genetic Needs—These are needs which must be satisfied for the continuance of man as a species, as a tribe or nation, as a family. Most of these needs are for non-economic goods—men need wives, women need husbands, both need children, and except in primitive and in slave societies, these are non-economic goods. But since sexual needs are naturally included in the category of genetic needs and are often gratified commercially, demand is created for economic goods many of which are ignored in conventional economics, (for instance, the services rendered by prostitutes). But even to satisfy strictly genetic needs, demand is created for all sorts of economic goods which in the aggregate create great "industries" and engage the services of great numbers of professional, semi-professional and clerical and factory workers (doctors, druggists, drug and manufacturers, nurses, hospitals).

Cultural Needs—Finally, man has invariant needs which are essential for individual self-expression and for self-realization in the community to which he belongs. Many of these needs are satisfied and can be satisfied non-economically, but again the aggregate demand for economic goods and services which these needs create is astonishingly large in spite of the indifference to them displayed by so-called economic science. Schools of all kinds; libraries and museums, theatres and churches, books, periodicals and newspapers, charitable and philanthropic institutions, social and political movements are all cultural goods—which cost money. The demand for these goods is created by man's cultural needs. Liberty and opportunity are cultural needs; authority and security are not. As Thomas Paine put it, "Society is made for our virtues, government for our vices."

It is true that we tend to think of cultural needs as the luxuries of civilization rather than necessities of life, but this is a symptom of our mis-education. Animals can get along perfectly well without cultural goods, man cannot; the only way he could exist without them would be as an animal, not as a man. Indeed, it

is the fact that in the course of evolution one species of *Hominidae* experienced a mutation and discovered his need for expressing himself culturally that marked the emergence of *Homo sapiens* as a species in his own right.

Necrotic Needs—There is a fourth category of needs of which account must be taken, but these are not invariant. Real as they are, they fall into a sort of no-man's land between needs and desires. These are man's need for destructive goods. (It is a mistake to think only of bombs and bullets in this connection). These destructive goods and destructive activities become necessary to man only when his survival, genetic, or cultural needs are frustrated to such a degree that he needs them to forget life, to destroy life, or to escape from life because his frustrated life is no longer worth living.

In moderation, some of the goods which have to be included in this category satisfy social and cultural needs; this is true of drinking. But when man is tempted—and particularly when frustration drives him into obsessive drinking, even when he falls short of actual alcoholism—the need ceases to be justifiable as cultural and falls into the category of necrotic needs.

Economic Goods and Economic Values—When actual goods and actual services in the actual forms in which they are available are classified¹, what in fact are being classified are not goods in terms of mankind's needs but goods in terms of mankind's desires. Only when the actual goods are classified in high-order abstractions, is it possible to classify them in accordance with man's needs and to determine objectively whether the actual goods in the various categories reflect economic values or economic disvalues, whether they are in fact wealth or in fact illth. What rigorous and systematic classifications of economic goods of all kinds makes clear is that they fall into four categories. It also becomes clear that the different kinds of goods in these categories are, in fact, what man should be conditioned to value when they minister to his well-being (when they are, in fact, wealth) or conditioned to disvalue when they contribute to his ill-being (when they are, in fact, illth):

Staples of Living provide the first of these categories; they provide for the biological needs of mankind. These include not

only *food* (the staple may be rice or wheat) but also *clothing* (the staple may be anything which provides sufficient protection), *shelter*, and every other thing essential to biological survival;

Adequacies of living, which provide the second category, when added to the staples, make possible a more than merely biological existence; things and services which are adequate—fully adequate but not more than adequate—to humane living. They would, for instance, include a car, but not necessarily two cars; they would include books but not necessarily a large library. A shelf-full may be all that even a highly cultured person needs, but without any books at all no man (or rather no family, for a single man might depend wholly upon a library) can live an adequate life in the modern world;

Luxuries of Living, the third category, are those things which are indubitably superfluities and prodigalities (furs, perfumes) and which only the rich can really afford, particularly in quantities and of the highest qualities, but some of which can be afforded by almost anybody who is willing to sacrifice some adequacies or reduce his use and consumption of staples for a time. Furs are luxuries, because staples will provide all the essential warmth needed in clothing, and soap provides all the essential freshness which perfume merely enhances;

Detriments of Living—Finally there is a category I call *detriments to living*, things which are the antitheses of the staples, things which are actually injurious and damaging either to a person or to his possessions. Devitalized foods, narcotics and cigarettes, polluted rivers and streams, poison gas and atomic bombs fall into this category. That man would be better off without them is not a subjective judgment but an objective, scientifically demonstrable fact.

The formulation of objective standards is obviously difficult, but granting that many things will remain on the borderline between these categories, the great bulk of things fall clearly into one or the other of them.

Economic values, like all values, are subjective judgments, but when evaluated in terms of wealth and illth, of well-being and ill-being, of euthemics and dysthemics, they are objectively and not subjectively evaluated. It is this which transforms the

study of values from a purely descriptive science into a normative one.

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Before considering solutions to the problem, one important, if incidental, problem must be considered. Economic value as the term is used by economists refers to something very different from that referred to in this study. Since I am trying as well as I can to observe the principle dealing with terminology which emerged from the study of the epistemic problem ("one word one meaning, one meaning one word"), I am using value consistently to refer only to one thing, a felt-judgment. Only the Austrian school of economists has glimpsed the importance of the subjective aspect of what economists call values, and it developed the so-called marginal utility theory of values as a result of it. As economists generally use the term, it refers to efficiency in exchange; to power which an object confers upon its possessor, irrespective of political compulsion or personal sentiment to command the commodities and services of others; to purchasing power in the abstract; to purchasing power in the concrete; to the specific quantity of another object for which a given object can be exchanged; to a price which can be actually obtained. All these confusing usages have in common the fact that they refer to the price which the possessor of an object can obtain for it if he sells it, and, by the same token, the price which some one who wants the object would have to pay for it. What is gained by calling the price of things their value?

Nothing.

The price of any object is its price, period. Whenever in this study of economic values there is a reference to the value of anything, I will be referring to the same kind of thing as in all the preceding problems dealing with values—the individual's own *felt judgment* about its value to him, a feeling and a judgment which will vary about the same identical thing from individual to individual and in the same individual from time to time and from place to place.

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The Inculcation and Dissemination Problem in dealing with values has already been discussed at sufficient length so that all that remains here is to discuss certain aspects of inculcation peculiar to economic values.

Until relatively recent times the inculcation of economic values came from two sources, (1) clerks and burghers, master craftsmen and master artists whose cultivation of excellence shaped custom, and (2) kings, nobles, and knights whose power and eminence gave them prestige in community and society. All that is left of this in the modern world is the influence still exerted on the masses of people by the rich (who are the only class which can afford to make the fashionable displays which attract widespread attention and set the styles which the masses follow). The real inculcators of values in the modern world—professionally trained for the role they play in our colleges and universities—are the advertising men and salesmen of modern industry. That the actual economic values of modern man (not those he merely professes) are those instilled in him by the endless repetitions of modern advertising and the constant solicitations of salesmen is indisputable. Modern writers and musicians, modern poets and painters, modern dramatists and sculptors, and what is worst of all, modern teachers and scientists, instead of striking a dissenting note, increase rather than decrease the inculcation of sensate values on TV and movie screens, in newspapers and magazines and all the other mass-media of today.

What is terrible beyond words is that both Church and School, in their abject acceptance of the Industrial ethos of our time, not only do not instill any better values but by omitting to do anything about values at all, actually aid industry in inculcating the values which it finds so profitable—values which can be most vividly expressed in three reiterated words:

“Desire! Desire! Desire!”

“Buy! Buy! Buy!”

“Waste! Waste! Waste!”

This is called stimulating plus-obsolescence.

As with all the other basic problems of mankind, answers to the question of what man should want, how much he should want of what he should want, and what he should do with what he should want (not just what he does want, which is descriptive not normative science) have been made from the very beginning, and made in every culture. Some of the answers are reflected in highly developed ideologies, particularly the answers to the problem made

by the higher religions, but some of them can only be formulated from the manner in which people deal with the problem. All of them fall into either Supernal, Objective, or Intellectual categories. The Supernal solutions I think of as Abnegation doctrines, the objective solutions as Affluence doctrines and the Intellectual solutions as Adequacy doctrines.

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Abnegation Economic Doctrines—The prescription which all Supernal answers to the problem have in common, the idea of Abnegation, the idea that renunciation of possessions and of prosperity and affluence, should be practised because of the high value which ought to be attached to otherworldliness in this life.

Some of these Abnegation prescriptions include the doctrines of *Holy Poverty*—the doctrine explicit in the vows made by the members of many religious orders in which they renounce their individual right to own property, and to receive property by inheritance or gift, and at the same time dispose of whatever property they possess; *Holy Mendicancy*, the doctrine that those who renounce individual or collective ownership of property should live on alms (the Franciscans among Christians, the Sadhus in Hinduism, the Bhikkus among Buddhists); *Spartanism*, the doctrine that life should be lived in the spirit ascribed to the ancient Spartans, practised by the Eremites and the Monasticists, and prescribed for laymen by Thoreau in "Walden"—life should be lived frugally, severely, hardily, laconically, bravely; *Eremitism*, that life should be lived as a recluse in solitary retirement in forests or deserts, caves or mountain strongholds; finally Monasticism, which is the antithesis of Eremitism, that it should be lived collectively in monasteries secluded from temporal concerns and devoted to religious practices.

* * * *

Affluence Economic Doctrines—The prevailing answer to the question of what should be most valued economically I think of as Affluence, sometimes as Prosperity prescriptions. It needs no definition. In practice it means what we have at present in America and in a few of the most advanced of the modern nations, namely, enormous riches or power for a few, really bounteous living (materially considered) for a surprisingly large number, and for the

masses of people the high scale of living which is the envy of those in all the underdeveloped nations of the world. There are two categories of prescriptions for it which should be distinguished, the first, I think of as Individual Affluence and the second, as Collective Affluence ideologies.

Individual Affluence Doctrines—In the so-called free world, which is increasingly unfree as it becomes more and more industrialized and urbanized, the ideology of Individual Affluence is dominant. Behind the iron and bamboo curtains, Collective Affluence is the avowed aim of the leaders of Communism, and what they think essential to its realization is being forcibly imposed upon their subjects.

Among the various doctrines which share the idea of Individual Affluence there is what might be called *Predatory Egotism*. The schools in America conduct no courses in Predatory Egotism, but nonetheless they are grinding out Predatory Egotists by the millions, all of them identifying success in life with duplicating the successes of established Predatory Egotists. Implicit in this unavowed doctrine are the assumptions that man is fundamentally and inescapably a self-seeking animal and that no scruples should shackle him in practising self-seeking to the limit. The most successful Predatory Egotists are those who in one way or another latch on to special privileges of some kind, and below them in the hierarchy of Predatory Egotists are those who latch on to the Predatory Egotists who are more successful than themselves. In spite of the fact that it is not a pretty philosophy of life, it is so easy to gloss over its ugliness (fine clothes and fine automobiles and fine houses and churchgoing and respectable jobs in business make this easy) that most of its practitioners are utterly unaware of its ugliness.

Feudalism, in its economic aspects, is also a form of the ideology of Individual Affluence. The feudal landlord, the lord of the manor, was a Predatory Egotist par excellence. What remains of *Landlordism*—and there is a great deal of it in the undeveloped nations, particularly in Latin America and in many of the new nations of Asia and Africa—is not called Feudalism, but economically it is essentially the same.

Next, might be mentioned what I think of as *Plutolatory*, which is really the religion of most of the world upon which church mem-

bership and Sunday worship make not the slightest impression. Indeed, an enormous number of clergymen are Plutolators in their hearts even if they are not Plutocrats in fact; they too are worshippers of the bitch-goddess Success. Not all Plutolators are as successful as Predatory Egotists, for that takes a degree of ruthlessness lacking in most of the worshippers of wealth; but even that doesn't alter their hope (or their faith?) that a miracle will happen and that their prayers will be answered.

What intensifies both Plutolatry and Predatory Egotism is the prevalence of the ideology of Urbanism. Urbanism is not just living in the city; it presupposes economic values which can only be realized in cities, and the bigger the city the better the chance for realizing them. The city is today a gigantic bazaar. It offers every imaginable luxury in addition to the necessities of life, and just being in the city whets the desire for affluence and gives even to those who do not enjoy it a feeling of affluence by association.

Finally, might be mentioned *Ostentation*, which is inadequately described as the flaunting and parading and showing of what wealth can buy. The classic description of Ostentation is to be found in Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class*.

Collective Affluence Doctrines—The answers to the problem of what to value economically which fall into this group of doctrines are the same as those made in all Affluence ideologies, but the means for realizing affluence are different. All the ideologies in this category of economic doctrines substitute, for the idea of devotion to the individual struggle for affluence, devotion to some Socialist State "apparatus" for achieving it. Neither as a doctrine nor as a practice is it confined to Socialist or Communist States. There is a form of Collective Affluence which is widely practised in the Capitalist World which is sometimes called Finance Capitalism (with consummate irony, the apologists for Finance Capitalism call this "People's Capitalism"). In this study it will be called *Corporate Capitalism* because that seems to me to denote more accurately what it actually is. In effect it is the organization of investors in limited liability companies (legally called corporations, and in practice as large as possible) so that anybody can invest in the stocks and bonds corporations issue, and through the exercise of their individual judgment become affluent. Surprisingly, quite a few do.

Socialism and Communism are both Collective Affluence ideologies, and both are avowedly just as Materialistic in their economic values, but both maintain that affluence should be realized by either a peaceful reorganization of the State (*Social Democracy*) or a revolutionary seizure of it (*Communism*) in which everybody is forced to work "together" collectively and everybody forcibly prevented from achieving it individually. In some States where *Socialism* has been established, as in Sweden, affluence is an established fact; pragmatically tested, like Corporate Capitalism, it "works." Where Communism prevails, affluence is immediately realized by the New Class (see Djilas) which exercises power and holds out affluence as a hope to the masses of their subjects. In this respect it is indistinguishable from what many of the apologists for Corporate Capitalism hold out to investors and what apologists for Capitalism as a whole have held out to the masses of people. In practice, at least in some Capitalist States such as the United States, Capitalism has first made the owners (the bourgeoisie) affluent and then made the workers affluent too.

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Adequacy Economic Doctrines—The various doctrines and practices which fall into this third category of solutions of the problem of economic values (prescriptions for ways of living very much neglected at this time) differ sharply from both Abnegation and Affluence doctrines. They differ from Abnegation solutions both in disvaluing the religiously proffered goal of eternal felicity in after life, and in maintaining that a good life, even in material terms, should be valued, and that social reforms which would make such a life possible, should be sought. They differ from Affluence solutions in specifically repudiating the idea that limitless affluence, and the limitless gratifications which affluence makes possible, are valid human values. The ethos—the central idea—common to all Adequacy doctrines and practices is expressed in Confucius' doctrine of *The Golden Mean*. Not Gratification but Satisfaction should be valued.

This value neither excludes the making of material sacrifices for the sake of higher satisfactions nor the acquisition of considerable material possessions to provide the security and ordinary satisfactions of life. It does exclude destitution on one hand (content-

ment with abject poverty and valuing Holy Poverty) and great riches on the other.

Certain practices and formulated doctrines will help make the concept of Adequacy as a solution of the problem clear. The first is *Thrift*, embodied during the eighteenth century in a large literature of which the writings of Samuel Smiles in England and Horatio Alger and Orison Swett Marden in the United States are typical. These advocates of valuing Thrift did not, it is true, recommend Thrift as a means of realizing Adequacy; they valued it as a stepping stone to the acquisition of great riches. But Thrift, as it is naturally and normally practised in good husbandry and good housewifery, and even in saving and investing to provide for future security, need not be practised (and is not for the most part) as a means to acquiring great riches. A thrifty (not niggardly) way of life provides a satisfactory way of living by any rational method of evaluation. Thrift—conservation without waste—is a moral imperative if future generations are taken into consideration and the individual made aware of the conflict between these and devotion to limitless personal gratifications.

*Homesteading*², (not only as I have advocated it, but as it has been practised by great numbers of rural families) is another important solution of the problem which values Adequacy in contrast to Abnegation and Affluence. Living on one's own land, producing for one's own family, no matter how small or how large the homestead, the enterprise, or the "estate" may be, does not have to be romanticized as a way of living; that millions of families everywhere in the world have found it a satisfying way of living is an indubitable fact. And with modern appliances, the use of which I have advocated, much of the drudgery with which it used to be accompanied can be eliminated, while with modern transportation and modern means of communication, the provincialism which it used to entail can be avoided.

Finally, might be mentioned *Distributism*, as this doctrine was developed by Chesterton and Belloc in England, which called for the widespread ownership of property and the organization of social institutions so as to make this possible, and *Decentralism*, as that idea has been discussed in this country—a widespread decentralization of our over-centralized "means of production

and distribution" and the abolition of the economic and political institutions which are responsible for this over-centralization. Distributism will be discussed in Problem XI, the possessional problem, and Decentralism in Problem XII, the organizational problem. Neither need much treatment, therefore, in connection with the idea of Adequacy as a solution of the problem of economic values.

It is too bad that Adequacy—the Golden Mean—is almost never mentioned by the devotees of Affluence who dominate the scene today.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem VIII : The Problem of Economic Values

1. *The Classification of Economic Goods*—The final four categories into which their classification placed economic goods of all kinds—Staples, Adequacies, Luxuries, and Detriments—emerged from the classification of only about 250 different specific items of goods. What is needed is a classification not of only 250 items but 250 times 250. And the items used as cases should include not only goods produced and consumed at present in America, but goods used in the past and goods used both in the past and at present in all the different cultures of mankind. Such a classification, I believe, would vindicate the conclusion to which my own classification came, but if it did produce other basic categories, whether more or fewer than mine, that would be the one which should be used.

2. *The Concept of a Homestead*—For an adequate exposition of the concept of a Homestead, see my *Flight from the City*, and *This Ugly Civilization*.

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PART III

*The Nine Basic Practical Problems
Of Man And Of Society:
An Introduction To Praxiology*

The saying "practice is everything"
is Periander's.—Periander 6.

Nine Basic Practical Problems : An Introduction to Praxiology

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Periander's.—Periander 6.

Praxiologic problems deal with the means to which man has to resort in trying to realize his purposes; they deal with the things which man has found necessary if he is to implement his values.

Praxiologic sciences, when their importance is finally recognized and their development really undertaken, will be normative rather than technical sciences; they will describe how mankind does things only insofar as this is necessary to prescribe how they *should be* done by rational and humane human beings. Praxiologists (we have many scientists who are in fact praxiologists even though they do not yet think of themselves in that way) will not be able to separate what they do in their studies and their laboratories from what their moral consciences tell them they should be doing outside of them.

The primary concern of the practical sciences today is not what human beings should do to live like rational and humane human beings; their primary concern is the development of the techniques which profit the group or class or nation which supports them, without regard to how stupid or how injurious the result in fact is.

We owe the development of poison gas, of bacteriological warfare, of atomic bombs to present day practical scientists, we owe the development of an agriculture which led Paul Sears to write *Deserts on the March*, the development of preservatives for the food industry which led Weston Price to write *Nutrition and Degeneracy*, we owe the invention of the toxic pesticides which led Rachel Carson to write *Silent Spring*, to practical scientists who are clever technicians but moral imbeciles.

They are not all of them by any means as bad as this makes them appear, but the good suffer from the plethora of short-

sighted stupidity and moral indifference and timidity of the majority.

There is an art which ought to be an applied "science" today called the Law, another which is called Criminology, and still another called Penology. The first came into existence because mankind had been driven to create codes of law to try to deal with the problems of its discords, the second because mankind wanted to catch its criminals, and the third because it wanted to punish them. That all three are stupid and injurious pseudosciences is made clear by the fact that Socrates was convicted for a crime under Athenian law; Jesus was convicted of a crime under the laws of the Roman Colony of Judea; Galileo was convicted of a crime under the Canon Law of the Papacy; Thoreau was convicted of a crime under the laws of the State of Massachusetts; Mahatma Gandhi was convicted of a crime under the statutes of the British Dominion of India; and a woman who had all her life lived blamelessly was convicted of a crime under the statutes of the United States, because she had failed to surrender gold coins which were her legitimate property in exchange for paper money in which she had lost her faith.

Untold hundreds of thousands have been convicted throughout the history of mankind, and tens of thousands are now being convicted, for the same sort of pseudo-crimes at the very time when millions who are guilty of serious breaches of the Moral Law are utterly ignored. As the study of the ethical problem should have made clear, a moral order and a sane society calls not for a pseudoscience such as the Law but for a real science of Nomology; not a pseudoscience such as Criminology, but a true science such as Pejorology (which would deal not only with criminal but also with all kinds of delinquents); and not a pseudoscience such as Penology but a real science such as Meliology might become.

What we need are properly organized and properly developed sciences which deal with the real (I call them basic) problems and not with the academic problems of mankind. What we need is to integrate existing sciences around these basic problems (around such a problem as the occupational problem); to create and develop missing sciences (a science dealing with the possessional problem); to revive undeveloped and virtually stillborn

sciences (like Plato's "science of good and evil"); and to discard sciences (like economics) which merely confuse mankind and which should be relegated to the limbo into which thaumaturgy and astrology have been relegated by humane, rational, and scientifically trained human beings.

When the leaders and teachers of mankind begin to recognize this, praxiology as I envision it will come into its own.

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The nine basic problems of man and of society which I think of as praxiologic are listed here. They are numbered to correspond with the chapters in which they are discussed.

Problem IX, The Psycho-Physiologic Problem—Men need to be mentally and physically healthy not merely to survive but to be enabled to realize their highest potentialities. They ought to breed to make this possible, and none should be bred which make this impossible. Medicine ought to deal with the whole of this problem scientifically but it does not; medicine deals only with mental and physical ailments; it does not deal with the real problem of making mankind physically and mentally healthy.

Problem X, The Occupational Problem—Men and women cannot avoid spending time in each of the nine ages in man's life-cycle; what they should do and how they should spend their time in each age is a distinct major problem of its own. But we have no science or group of sciences which deals with the problem in spite of its obvious importance.

Problem XI, The Possessional Problem—Men need to use and to have access to many different categories of things. They need to acquire moral titles to things (not merely legal titles to them); they need to own or to hold things, the possession of which can be morally justified. They need to be able to transfer things and to have things transferred to them in transactions which can be morally vindicated. We ought to have a science to deal with this problem; all the material needed to develop such a science already exists scattered about in ethics, in law, in economics, and in political science, but until it is properly integrated, what is right and wrong in existing solutions of the problem will never become clear.

Problem XII, The Organizational Problem—That the enterprises on which men embark need to be organized if they are to realize their purposes is self-evident. We have a science of business management which concerns itself with the organization of business enterprises, but no science which concerns itself with the principles involved in the organization of all the different categories of enterprises which men need if they are to live rationally and humanely.

Problem XIII, The Production Problem—Like organization, production is a self-evident need of mankind. As it is dealt with today, in part in economics and in part in political science, the most significant aspects of the production problem are lost in the jumbling together of subjects which deal with at least five distinct basic problems.

Problem XIV, The Distribution Problem—Here again a self-evident need of mankind is involved—the need to deal with the claiming and the allocating of shares in the goods and services produced in each enterprise and by the enterprises of nations as a whole. In our modern monetized world we are in desperate need of a clear statement of the problem involved in distributing shares, in the form of money, of the total incomes of each enterprise and of the nation's enterprises as a whole to the claimants who are properly entitled to them. And here again, as in the case of the production problem, modern economics deals with the problem in such a state of confusion that the most significant aspects of it are entirely overlooked.

Problem XV, The Political Problem—The political problem is a basic problem not because of the problem which party rivalry and even international rivalry creates but because (even if there were no political parties and even if there were no States at all) mankind would have to do something about the violence with which individuals and groups treat one another. It is the fact that man has dealt with violence by organizing States which creates the problem in the form with which it confronts us today. Political science takes the State for granted; it usually begins with an exposition of the organization of one particular State, the State to which the political scientist and his students belong. The significance of the problem of violence and counter-

violence tends to be lost in the insignificancies with which both the scientists and the student find themselves preoccupied.

Problem XVI, The Institutional Problem—This basic problem arises because from time to time man finds it necessary or desirable to conserve, to reform, to abolish, or to establish social institutions which will make his survival less difficult, the pursuit of happiness possible, and the maintenance of social sanity a fact. We have no science which deals with this problem today. In the sciences which touch upon the problem, the significance of the problem is obscured. The bits and pieces of knowledge about the problem which belong to such a science are scattered about in sociology and anthropology, in economics and political science, in history, and in the proposals of social reformers of the past and the present. It is high time that the importance of the problem and the need for its systematic study be recognized.

Problem XVII, The Educational Problem—This problem, which should be first as well as last in any analysis of the basic problems of mankind, does not arise because man needs schooling (which is what our schools of education and the enormous literature dealing with education assume). It arises because he cannot rely upon his instincts, as all other animals can, to tell him what he should do and how he should do it. A real science of education would concern itself not merely with intellectual and technical, vocational and avocational education, but with the much broader problem of the education of the whole man; it would concern itself fully, and perhaps even more fully with emotional and axiological education in the home, in society, and in the school, than it now does with equipping the beginners in life with the knowledge and the techniques they will need to earn their livings and "get by" in the society to which they belong. The main concern of education, if this conception of the educational problem is correct, ought not to be juvenile but adult education. For it is always adults and never the young who, in the final analysis, deal with the real problems with which life confronts both old and young.

PROBLEM IX

Mental and Physical Health : The Psycho-Physiological Problem

Health is indeed a precious thing, to recover and preserve which we undergo any misery, drink bitter potions, freely give our goods; restore a man to health, his purse lies open to thee.—Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

Consideration of the basic practical problems which confront mankind—the problems about which man must “do” something instead of just “thinking” about them—might well begin with the psycho-physiological problem, the problem of mental and physical health. Three facts create the problem and make it necessary for mankind to do something about it:

1. The first is that sheer survival—man’s sheer existence individually and as a species—is ultimately dependent upon his health.

2. The second is that real satisfaction with life in a world in which anguish and suffering, pain and death, are inescapable is possible only to those who enjoy mental and if possible physical health.

3. Finally, unlike all other animals, man cannot rely upon his untutored instincts—because of their plasticity—to determine for him how to deal with his psycho-physiological problem. This fact forces him to use his reason in dealing with it, and, if he does not feel equal to the study which this involves, at least to use it in selecting the teacher (or the authority) to whom to turn in dealing with it.

This last fact has an especial significance so far as the psycho-physiological problem is concerned. Animals can rely upon their instincts to tell them what to eat and where to nest, when to mate and how to procreate, how to protect themselves and enable their young to survive; man cannot. Animals when sick can rely

upon their instincts to tell them what to do (if anything at all can be done about it). Instinctively they purge their systems, instinctively they fast, instinctively they slink off to a quiet and secure spot and let nature either restore them to health or kill them off as painlessly as possible. *Homo alalus* was still equipped with inbuilt mechanisms to determine for him how he should live; *Homo sapiens*, however, cannot rely upon the vestiges of them which he still inherits to determine for him what he should do. *Homo sapiens* must decide for himself what he should do to maintain his health and what he should do when suffering from sickness and accidents.

If all that we know not merely in medicine but scattered about in every field of knowledge (including the primitive lore of mankind) is carefully analyzed, it becomes clear that the following facts must be taken into account in dealing with the problem:

Human Life—Like all life, human life manifests itself in alternate discharges of anabolic and catabolic energy¹; it manifests itself in the metabolic¹ pulsations of its cells and organs; finally it manifests itself in man's life-cycle which begins at birth, is followed by growth, and when growth ends is succeeded by decay and death. Every living organism, from the simplest cell to the most complex, pulsates; each cell expands and contracts alternately; every multi-cellular organism consists of complexes of cells each of which pulsates cyclically in a manner analogous to the pulsations of the simplest cells. When man (who should never forget that he is such a multicellular organism) functions normally, he really lives and enjoys living. When for any reason his cyclical activities do not function normally, he is sick. And when any of the cyclical activities which are essential to life (breathing, for instance) cease to function entirely, he does not die, he is already dead.

Euthenia and Dysthenia—In this study, the technical designation of his condition when he is healthy and functions normally will be called *euthenia*; the technical designation for his condition when he does not, *dysthenia*.

The second fact which must be taken into account is that there are two kinds of health, one mental, *euphoria*, and one physical, *eucrasia*, and two kinds of unhealthiness (disease is too

strong a term to designate the opposite of health), one mental, *dysphoria*, and the other physical, *dyscrasia*.

*Physical Health and Physical Disease*⁷ (*Eucrasia and Dyscrasia*)—A man is physically and physiologically healthy as long as all the cells, all the parts, and every one of his organs (including his brain) function normally together. Physical unhealth (*dyscrasia*) takes the place of physical health (*eucrasia*) whenever for any reason any of the parts of his body fail to function in harmony with one another. Restoration of their harmony (*euthenia*) then becomes his problem, and this restoration, the evidence indicates, is always possible unless a physical lesion has damaged some part of his body beyond nature's capacity for restoration, or the disharmony is due to a hereditary impairment such as hemophilia.

*Mental Health and Mental Disease*⁵ (*Euphoria and Dysphoria*)—A man is mentally healthy (*euphoric*) only as long as the activities to which he devotes himself during each stage in his life-cycle fully, appropriately and harmoniously (*euthenically*) utilize all the different kinds of positive or anabolic energy with which he is endowed without exhausting any of them or permitting any of them to be frustrated to a point at which they turn into catabolic energy and become destructive and deadly, and only as long as he sublimates culturally the enormous surplus of survival and genetic energy with which he is endowed.

The moment the behavior of an individual departs from this norm, mental ill-health or disease (*dysphoria*) begins to put in its appearance. If the departure is functional only (without any demonstrable physical lesion) and does not involve insane or psychotic behavior, his *dysphoria* is a *neurosis*; if, with or without physical lesion, the departure from the norm involves involuntary, meaningless, injurious behavior of which the individual is unaware and over which he can exercise no control; if it makes him unable to manage his own affairs and to perform or observe the social duties of a normal person, his *dysphoria* is a *psychosis*.

Man's brain, with which he is born, is a part of his body; his mind, which he acquires gradually after his birth, is a part not so much of his body as of his ultimate Self. Yet the intimacy of the connection between body and mind is such that any dis-

harmony in the functioning of either affects him as a whole. It is this which makes even mild *dysphoria* so important. Mild physical sickness is tolerable, but even mild mental sickness is not; it affects not only its victims, it tends to the ill-being of others. It is easy enough for man to become sick physically; it is much easier for him to become sick mentally. Pessimistic psychiatrists believe that every man is mentally sick. What is certain is that it is very easy to live in such a way as to disturb the delicate harmony which should prevail between the use he makes of his survival and necrotic, and his sexual and cultural energy.

But it is necessary to recognize the importance of the distinction between individual dysphoria and mass or social dysphoria. The first calls only for clinical or individual psychiatry; it is a medical or psycho-physiological problem. Social neurosis and social psychosis, on the other hand, call for non-medical measures (educational and political, social and economic) because no amount of individual medical treatment can possibly deal with them. Both clinical and social dysphoria are important, the first at all times, the second episodically. When a mob, a whole class or religion, a whole party or army, or a whole nation goes berserk, it is obvious that mankind is confronted with fanaticisms (mass manias and phobias) which create problems which cannot be dealt with clinically. But this is not so obvious which more subtle forms of social neurosis, with social alienation for instance.

No better illustration of this can be found than that represented by the growing concern at this time with alienation⁵, with what is, but is not recognized as, a mental disease.

Alienation, it is true, has for a long time been used to designate the condition of individuals otherwise apparently normal but who suffer from a feeling of strangeness or estrangement from the people with whom or among whom they live; at its mildest, these individuals merely feel discomfort and display nothing much more than irritability, but when the feeling is strongly marked and felt continuously—when it becomes obsessive—it tends to express itself neurotically and even psychotically. Today there is growing awareness of the fact that great numbers of men and women are suffering from alienation and that the whole of the modern technologized and industrialized world is showing signs of the infection.

It is important to recognize that there are at least three distinct kinds of alienation, each differently caused. The first of these I think of as minority-alienation, the second self-alienation, and the third social-alienation. While alienated individuals may need treatment no matter what the cause, preventive as distinguished from clinical treatment may call for measures altogether outside the area of psycho-physiological therapy.

Minority-alienation is easy to understand; it is the feeling of strangeness and outsideness of those who belong to readily distinguishable minority groups. In the United States, those who suffer from this kind of alienation include the members of minority immigrant groups (Poles, Irish, Italians), minority racial groups (Chinese, Japanese, Negroes), and minority religious groups (Jews, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses). For the minority suffering this kind of alienation, the problem is rarely psychiatric; for them the problem is one of either absorption or of acceptance, and for the majority a process of emotional reeducation so that they learn to treat those who differ from them rationally and humanely.

The second kind of alienation, *self-alienation*, is very different; it is a feeling of estrangement and of oddness from those with whom (one's own family or social group; one's own class, religion, nationality; even one's own race) the individual should feel at home and at one. If the values, the occupations, and the behavior-pattern—the way of living—of the group to whom the individual belongs and from whom he is alienated, are relatively normal ones, then the conclusion that the victim of alienation is mentally sick follows logically. In cases of self-alienation of this kind, psychiatric treatment is what is obviously called for. Self-alienation is definitely a medical or psycho-physiological problem.

This brings us to the third kind of alienation which I think of as *social-alienation*, because it is the society which is sick and which in effect has alienated itself from its mentally normal members. When the prevailing way of living and prevailing behavior-pattern of a society—the kind of labor it calls for and kind of leisure it provides, the places in which it lives and the means to which it resorts for bodily recuperation—is so foreign to what is normal to human nature that perfectly normal human beings feel

estranged from the masses of conformists among whom they find themselves, they may not only feel estranged and feel themselves "odd balls" but actually be sickened mentally by their feelings. Conventional clinical treatment only aggravates the situation, for it would be a course of treatment aimed at adjusting normal individuals to an abnormal way of working and living in an abnormal community (Wells' *The Valley of the Blind*; Orwell's 1984).

As we shall see when we consider our second basic praxiological problem, the occupational problem, one of the most serious forms of social alienation in the modern world is caused by urbanism—by man's alienation from nature, from the growth of the soil (Knut Hamsun), from the cultivation of the Holy Earth (Liberty Hyde Bailey). Modern man not only attaches the wrong kind of value to city life, he attaches the wrong kind of disvalue to country life.

What emerges from this brief incursion into the dysphoria of alienation is the fact that without some adequate conception of what a normal human being is (not man as he is but as he would normally be if his actions, his values, and his beliefs and the society in which he lived were within the range of the normal), it becomes impossible to determine whether it is the individual or society which needs treatment, whether an alienated individual is sick *per se* or only "sick" because he is unconsciously revolting against the sickness of the society in which he finds himself enmeshed.

If a society is so abnormal that only those who are already infected with the same kind of sickness which has infected society as a whole feel at home and at one with it, the situation calls for much more drastic treatment; neither clinical treatment of the socially-alienated minority who would live normally if they could, nor attacks upon the mass-prejudices of the conformist majority touches the core of the problem. Adequate treatment of such a condition calls for the transformation of society from a sick one into a wholesome one. If in fact it is the institutionalized behavior which society demands of everybody which is alienating perfectly normal individuals (in fact driving them into neurosis and psychosis), a social revolution is called for in which

normal, rational and humane institutions are substituted for abnormal, irrational, and inhumane ones.

*The Maintenance of Health (Euthenia): The Regimen*⁴—The problem of health is two-fold: that of adopting a regimen for each stage in man's life cycle which enables him to maintain his health, and that of resorting to a therapy (or a number of therapies) which restores health when for any reason it is impaired.

But a regimen for the maintenance of health which only prescribes for the body ignores the fact the maintenance of mental health is enormously more important. Its maintenance, at any rate, cannot be taken for granted.

The elements entering into the prescription of the right kind of regimen for the maintenance of health are therefore of two kinds, physical and mental. They can be distinguished, but in practice are inseparable; the belated modern interest in psychosomatic medicine is evidence of the fact that this is true. But there is much more evidence than is furnished by the appearance of this school of medicine. It is furnished by the multiplicity of ailments which are caused by the frustration—the failure to channel properly—the various kinds of energy with which man is endowed. Failure to utilize properly the positive or anabolic energy with which he is equipped not only transforms it into destructive or catabolic energy, but inflicts physiological injuries upon him which it is easy to assume are physically and not mentally caused. No amount of physiological (chemical or drug) treatment of illnesses of this kind can do much more than mitigate their symptoms. To maintain physical health, the mental and emotional regimen is just as important as the physical regimen.

A single illustration will have to suffice to illustrate what is involved. Man is endowed with an enormous surplus of sexual or genetic energy⁴; virtually all organisms seem to be; survival for any species of plant or animal which is not equipped with such a surplus is precarious in the extreme. It is easy for man to misuse this endowment. The intense pleasure which the sexual orgasm provides seems to have been evolution's comic or tragic device for assuring that man will generate offspring. There is overwhelming evidence to establish the fact that in man not only celibacy but restriction of coitus solely to procreation is unhealthy;

the absolute celibate not only develops mental but also physical symptoms indicative of abnormality if not of downright physiological illness. On the other hand the unrestricted gratification of the enormous appetite for sex which man can unleash in himself is equally productive of mental and physical symptoms of abnormality and of sickness. What used to be called venery—Don Juanism—is not a normal but an abnormal pattern of behavior for man. Animals are freed from the temptation to indulge in it, because their instincts take care of the matter for them; the male has no desire for coition with a female unless she is in oestrus, and *vice versa*.

Freud grappled with the problem, and what follows from his work may be summed up in the norm that man must sublimate culturally this surplus of sexual energy, just as he must sublimate the surplus of his survival energy, if he is to maintain health. He should not eat more than is good for him (fatness and other symptoms of gluttony are in fact illnesses) even though gluttony is pleasurable. The really cultivated eater, the gourmet, enjoys a highly developed satisfaction not out of the quantity of food he ingests, but out of eating frugally what pleases a highly sensitized palate.

This too is true with regard to man's sexual energy. Properly channeled, it can not only furnish the ecstasy at which it is normal for man to aim, but also enable him to avoid the degradation of sexuality in endless animal-like gratifications with all their potentialities for causing mental and physical sickness, psychophysiological perversion, social injustice, and often criminal behavior.

*The Maintenance of Physical Euthenia: The Physical Regimen*⁵—The physical and physiological regimen must include a program for behavior effecting health appropriate to each age in the life-cycle and for each sex.

The appropriate food for infants is mothers' milk. They must be breast fed not only to provide them with the right kind of food, but also to furnish them the emotional conditioning they need at that age. Primitive Polynesians prescribe certain kinds of sea foods for women during their pregnancies. That there are appropriate and inappropriate foods for this stage of women's lives is almost incontestable. On the other hand, diets in kind

and quantity appropriate to children are not appropriate for full-grown adults, and those appropriate during active adult life are not those appropriate during senescence and old age. Illustrations do not need to be multiplied.

Among the factors entering into the right kind of physical regimen, there are nine which are probably most important: (1) right nutrition, (2) right drinking—not merely the matter of pure water but of right and wrong beverages of all kinds, (3) right waste elimination, (4) right breathing, (5) right posture, (6) right exercise—not merely when “exercising” but when working and playing, (7) right sleeping and resting, and (8) right temperature—the right kind of clothing and shelter, heating and air-conditioning; finally (9) right sexuality, which (though undoubtedly an important factor in physical health) is much more important psychologically than physiologically.

There is a tenth factor, but it is a part of the social rather than of the individual regimen—the right kind of preventive public hygienic conditions. What man has since the scientific revolution done to eliminate plagues and infective diseases has done more to solve the problem of physical health than what he has done in dealing with any of the other factors involved in the maintenance of health.

Of these factors, right nutrition is probably the most important; only the fact that it tends to equip the individual with means for resisting even infectious diseases seems to justify considering it more important than what is usually called preventive medicine and public health. Man simply cannot, because of the plasticity of his instincts and his credulity and gullibility in dealing with matters about which he knows little, rely upon his instincts—in reality his tastes and habits, his inclinations and impulses and the dictates of his culture—in dealing with such problems as what he should eat and what he should drink. He must either study them himself, or study them sufficiently so as to choose the right kind of teacher (doctor) to guide him.

Physical Ill-Being and Physical Therapy—Dyscrasia, strictly physical and physiological ill-being, calls for the use of therapies which prescribe not only for acquired malfunctioning and acquir-

ed physical injuries (accidents), but also for inherited anatomic and physiological defects.

The prevailing therapy today is Mechanistic and Materialistic in nature. It is not Naturalian in its approach to the problem. It assumes that it is possible to isolate the cause of each particular disease, and to find a drug, or something which functions as drugs do, which will destroy the particular pathogenic germ or virus which causes it. It tends to ignore two incontestable facts: the fact that the body is normally equipped with adequate means for destroying invading pathogenic germs and viruses, and the fact that it becomes deficient in means for self-protection only if the regimen necessary to the maintenance of health has already been seriously breached. It does recognize, as do Naturalian physicians also, that the body may be hereditarily lacking in one or more important means for self-protection, as in the case of hemophilia. But only if there is no natural method by which a disease, whether inherited or acquired, can be corrected, does resort to the use of drugs seem justified. Otherwise, only the symptoms are dealt with, and since the causes have not been corrected, either the same disease recurs or some other appears to take its place.

When sickness is dealt with on Naturalian principles, the breach in the rules of health which is responsible for it is sought. The causes, of which the disease is the symptom, are dealt with, toxins if possible eliminated, and the disease cured by the body itself. There is overwhelming evidence that this "works." It is difficult to become aware of this partly because of the long prevalence of beliefs in the efficacy of *materia medica*, partly because of the ruthlessness with which the medical establishment today attacks all Naturalian therapies and therapists, and partly because human beings are so emotionally and intellectually immature that they are constantly seeking easy and, if possible, magical ways of avoiding the consequences of their own misbehavior.

Among therapies which may be mentioned as typically Naturalian in their approach to the problem are dietetic therapies—the use of whole foods, the use of corrective foods, of organic vitamins and mineral supplements, the elimination of pseudo-foods like refined sugar and white flour, and finally, fasting, exercise

(physical culture) and posture therapy, hydrotherapy, heliotherapy, osteopathy and massage.

The proper way in which both approaches to the problem should be used can be seen best in those cases in which the body has been irremediably injured; in which the illness has passed "the point of no return." Here neither the Naturalian nor the Materialist can do more than to lessen pain and postpone death; neither can restore health. Any artifice, no matter how unnatural, can be resorted to by those who wish to prolong life to the last possible gasp for breath. A sound approach to the psychophysiological problem, since death is as natural as is life, suggests that there are innumerable cases in which wisdom dictates letting nature take its course. The highest morality both to the sick and those who love them calls for euthanasia⁹—the kindness of putting those for whom disease has no longer made life worth living out of their misery.

In dealing with anatomical and muscular defects and injuries of all kinds, both those congenitally inherited and those accidentally acquired, both positive surgery and physical therapy are plainly called for. What the facts seem to indicate is that whenever physical therapies, such as osteopathy, can correct the defect or injury, these should be used, and surgical therapy resorted to only when no other alternative is available. When bones are broken or when an organ which cannot be manually manipulated is injured, or is so abnormal that it cannot be made to correct itself, plainly surgical therapy is called for. To resort to any other method of treatment is to affirm one's faith in the miraculous. When, on the other hand, surgery is resorted to, as it so often is, in irremediable or terminal cases of cancer, misery for both the patient and those who love the patient is aggravated and both the norms of living and the dictates of morality are grossly violated.

*The Psychological Regimen*⁵—The elements entering into the prescription of a regimen which will maintain mental health include:

1. Prescriptions for each of the different emotional states and intellectual potentialities appropriate for each sex and at each of the periods in their life-cycles. These prescriptions.

must include *right-beliefs* (right solutions to their noetic problems), *right-values* (right solutions to their axiologic problems), and *right-practices*, practices which deal properly with each of the basic practical problems which confront mankind (right-solutions to their praxiologic problems).

2. Prescriptions for the vocations, the recreations, and the recuperations (for work, play, and rest) appropriate to each age and each sex.

3. Prescriptions for social, economic and political institutions which, man being not what he is but what he is potentially capable of being, make the maintenance of mental health possible.

The social system—the mores and folkways of society—must make possible the right expression of man's survival, sexual and cultural energy. The amount of mental sickness traceable to the wrong kind of family institutions, the wrong kind of courting, wedding and marriage institutions, the wrong kind of social attitudes towards sexual relations, contraception, sterilization, abortion and euthanasia, is incalculable.

The economic system must provide such freedom from anxiety as to make the maintenance of mental health possible and yet provide such responsibility that man's mental faculties are challenged. A predatory and exploitive economy makes the first impossible; absolute social security such as Communism envisages makes the second impossible; both alienate the individual from himself.

Finally, the political system must make the maintenance of mental health possible. Every repressive political system, like every repressive social system, generates mental ill-health, the wrong kind of political system generating it in its rulers and not only in its subjects. Dictatorship is mentally traumatic for dictators, as subjection and slavery are for those to whom they dictate. If Lord Acton is right, the exercise of power no matter how slight, corrupts, and corruption is a form of mental illness.

Mental Ill-Being and Mental Therapy (Dysphoria and Psychotherapy)—In the treatment of dysphoria it is essential to distinguish between (1) mental illnesses which are physiologically caused (which call for correction of the physical illness of which

they are by-products), (II) those which are socially caused (which call for reform of the social, political and economic institutions responsible for them), and (III) those which are individually caused (truly idiosyncratic).

Only the last calls for psychotherapy alone. The first calls for both mental and physical treatment; the second for both social reform and individual treatment. Mental ill-being which is socially caused (which creates alienation in individuals who but for social conditions would be normal mentally) should not be dealt with merely by trying to persuade its victims to make emotional compromises with insane social conditions but by making at the same time adequate efforts to correct them. Perhaps the most effective way to persuade them to accept such "adjustment" would be to enlist the victims in the fight for social reformation.

But no matter what the cause of the mental sickness, mental therapy must deal with two kinds of mental illness, intellectual and emotional.

Intellectual Dysphoria—This has its roots in irrational solutions of mankind's noetic problems. Religious manias and phobias, for instance, have their roots in mistaken ideas about man and God, in mistaken ideas about this life, and fears and hopes about a future life. What this calls for is plainly the right kind of re-education intellectually. But this is never enough. It would only be enough if man were in fact a really rational animal. Phobias and manias arise not because believers in them *know* them to be true, but because they *feel* them to be true. If the feelings—the emotions involved—are not dealt with, intellectual re-education is futile.

Emotional Dysphoria—The second kind of mental illness is emotional in nature. It calls for emotional re-education. And since the seat of the emotions is the unconscious mind, only those therapies which reach in depth into the unconscious mind can restore emotional health. If a man or a mob, a party or a government, hates Capitalists (or contrarywise hates Communists) and hates them enough not only to want to kill them but to try and do so, it is not enough to teach the individuals involved the truth about Capitalism and Communism. They

will either not listen to it, or, even if they listen to it with their conscious minds, will continue to feel exactly as they did before (and continue to behave exactly as they did before, too). Their emotional abnormalities must be dealt with first of all.

This is true in particular about those mental illnesses, both neurotic and psychotic, which are sexually caused, which have their etiology in sexual frustrations and sexual perversions. They cannot be dealt with intellectually alone, since the conscious mind will merely continue to rationalize the abnormalities for which their unconscious mind is responsible.

The fact that so many men and women have been able to live fruitful and creative, inspiring and satisfying lives in spite of severe physical handicaps and painful physical ailments must be taken into account. It is impossible to ignore the lesson which must be drawn from the lives of men like Franklin D. Roosevelt and women like Helen Keller, and the lives of countless less famous men and women who, in spite of being physically sick or physically crippled, have lived useful lives and enjoyed mental health. In dealing with psycho-physiological problems, as in dealing with all the other of man's basic problems, the establishment of priorities is the essence of wisdom. Mental health, both intellectual and emotional, and not physical health, must therefore be given priority; mind must be considered more important than the body, not only by the physician but also by the patient.

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About one aspect of the problem there is a peculiar urgency at this time. Modern man is confronted not with one but with two fundamental revolutions today. The ideologs of the first one, the Marxian revolution, have succeeded, and their followers are now shaking the traditional world of mankind to pieces. The ideologs of the second one, the Freudian revolution³, are still laboring back in the stage in which the Marxian ideologs labored before the collapse of Czarist Russia in 1917 during World War I. Both ideologies are Monistic; both of them start with what seems to me completely mistaken answers to the problem of the nature of human nature, and both advocate not only grossly over-simplified programs for man and for society but programs

capable of plunging man back into another Dark Age, or even a Bestial Age such as must have prevailed in man's primitive pre-history.

Dealing with either is not purely a noetic problem; it is also a problem in values. The Marxian starts with the notion that man is an economic machine, and therefore assumes that man's highest values call for unlimited gratification and sensual enjoyment of the material and sensual goods of life. The Freudian starts with the notion that man is a sexual machine; that he is to be explained not in Schopenhauer's theory of the dominance of the will-to-survive but in Freud's theory of the libidinal and erotic nature of man. And the Neo-Freudians too come forward with a grossly over-simplified program: complete sexual freedom, complete abolition not of economic exploitation, but of sexual suppression. Man's highest values, the Freudian insists, are not material but sexual; they are not the sensual gratification of the first of John Adam's two universal appetites, hunger, but the sensual gratification of the second of them, women.

The prospect to my mind is doubly dispiriting. For curiously enough, some of the theorists of both classical Marxism (Bebel) and Neo-Freudianism (Reich) long ago became aware of the fact that there was a vital relationship between the two ideologies. Both ideologs consider the family the institution which above all others must be abolished; the Marxians, because those who value family life put such a high value upon private property; and the Neo-Freudians, because they place such a high value upon sexual fidelity. Most Neo-Freudians have already discovered that sexual freedom of the kind they believe in is impossible unless the woman is freed from child-rearing and the State relieves the family of all responsibility for rearing the young. Only if that is done will women become as free (though never quite as free) as men and be able to devote themselves to a life consisting of an endless succession of sexual affairs.

It is at this point that psycho-physiology becomes involved. Both the Freudian ideologs and the sexual revolutionists (there are already plenty of not only "beatniks" but quite respectable people who are practicing sexual revolutionists) in terms of the

problem as here stated, are intellectually confused and emotionally sick.

The shrewdest of the Marxians long ago recognized this aspect of their problem; to this day a belief in Capitalism and attachment to private property as a value is considered a sickness, and what has been called brain-washing is one crude attempt upon their part to develop a therapy for dealing with this sickness. Let us not ignore the fact that the Freudian revolution confronts us with not only an intellectual and axiological problem but also a medical and praxiological problem. Arguing with the Neo-Freudians isn't enough; they ought to be persuaded (compelled?) to take to the couch and let a psychoanalyst try to cure them!

But this is no kind of treatment for mass-manias and mass-phobias; something very different from individual psychoanalysis or individual psychotherapy is needed to deal with this kind of group mental sickness. Adolf Hitler succeeded in infecting the bulk of the German people with a deadly and destructive mass-psychosis. What is called for to disinfect groups of this kind (without waiting for a new generation to replace them) is a contra-Hitlerian technique. The very techniques of mass-conditioning which were used by him to sicken people must be reversed and used to mass-disenthral them.

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When we turn for light upon this age-old problem, we find ourselves confronted with dozens of theories of health and of disease (there ought to be only one if there was a real science of psychophysiology) and, when we come to therapies for dealing with disease, with literally hundreds. Fortunately, if they are all classified in terms of Supernal, Objective, and Intellectual methods of vindicating what they maintain, a certain order in dealing with them emerges.

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*Exorcistic Theories, Doctrines and Practices*¹⁰—The various Supernal approaches to the problem have in common two beliefs, that the maintenance of health calls for the observance of a regimen embodied in religious traditions and prescribed in religious scriptures (tabu, kosher, lustration), and that, since all illnesses and diseases are caused by breaches of these religious laws or by

the invasion or the possession of the body or the mind by malignant spiritual entities of some kind, propitiation and exorcism of the spiritual forces or entities responsible for them is called for. Many primitive tribes believe that death itself is always caused by an invading spirit launched against the unfortunate individual by some one who hates him and who has persuaded a sorcerer or conjuror to kill the victim for him. Along with this common belief in invasion and possession, there is the common belief that the way to cure the sick is to resort to what is in effect counter-sorcery and counter-conjuring.

Exorcism, Propitiationism, Fetishism, and Herbalism are among the methods used to provide this counter-sorcery. Exorcism is used in driving out evil-spirits; Propitiation in placating the forces responsible with prayers, incantations, penances, and sacrifices; Fetishism in using material objects endowed with magical prophylactic powers, and Herbalism in using herbs not for medicinal but for their magical properties.

There is not too much difference between these crude medical beliefs and practices and those of some of the higher religions. Instead of resorting to fetishes, there is the resort to shrines; instead of resorting to magical practices and invocations, there is the resort to personal and priestly prayers; instead of calling in a sorcerer or conjuror (shaman among Ural-Altaians, medicine men among American Indians, obeah doctor among the Ashantis, witch doctor among the Kaffirs, voodoo conjuror among the Haitians, wangateur among the Louisiana negroes, hex doctor among the Pennsylvania Dutch) to treat the patient, a priest (Catholic) or healer (Christian Science) is called in. This is dangerous enough, particularly with contagious diseases; it was incredibly horrible with Christian treatment of insanity until the belief in demonic possession of the insane was finally exorcised from the minds of men. Until the nineteenth century these miserable unfortunates were confined in bedlams; they were beaten, starved, and allowed to live in their own filth on the theory that this would make the devils in possession of them so miserable that they would leave the possessed person. To this day there is an accepted prayer in the Roman Catholic ritual calling for *Exorcism*,

Yoga provides an exception to this. *Yogaism* (or perhaps it would be better to say *Vedantism*) is certainly a higher religion, but there is no trace of the doctrine that diseases are caused by evil spirits in it; they do not therefore need to be exorcised. As a matter of fact, *Yoga* is not a therapy at all. It is not a prescription for dealing with disease, either mental or physical. All the first stages in the practice of *Yoga* aim merely at achieving perfect physical and mental health (eucrasia, euphoria, euthenia), these being considered foundation steps to the realization of its ultimate spiritual goal of *samaddhi* (mystical communion).

There is more than a mere grain of truth in the belief that many diseases are mentally rather than physically caused; psychosomatic medicine and the whole of psychoanalysis is based upon this assumption; and there is indisputable evidence that inexplicable cures have been produced not merely by modern methods of psychiatric treatment but by those used by Christian Scientists and those practiced at Roman Catholic shrines. But in terms of predictability of results, the modern physician has it all over the shamanists and exorcists in dealing with both functional and organic diseases.

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*Medical Theories, Doctrines and Practices*¹¹—Nearly all Medical approaches to the psycho-physiological problem treat man as if he were a living machine. This is true of *Allopathism* (*materia medica*), the school of medicine today in the treatment of dyscrasia (physical ill-being and physical disease), and of both *Psychiatry* and *Psychoanalysis*, the dominant schools in the treatment of dysphoria (mental ill-being and mental disease). It is even true of *Psychosomatic Medicine*, which maintains that medical treatment should deal with mind-and-body as a unit instead of treating them separately. What is even more unfortunate is that all the dominant schools of medicine concern themselves almost exclusively with disease or the prevention of disease (*Preventive Medicine* and *Public Hygiene*), and almost completely ignore the problem of health. To get the modern approach to health, we have to turn from modern medicine to what is called *Physical Education*. But this too is Mechanistic; there is hardly a trace of even psychosomatics in it.

Psychoanalysis and Freudianism—Psychoanalysis is a mental therapy developed by Sigmund Freud to cure a dysphoria he called neurosis. It is not his therapy but the theory from which he developed it—the part played by the unconscious mind in human behavior—which is I believe his really great scientific contribution to mankind. Most psychoanalysts, like Freud himself, accept his Mechanistic interpretation of both his theory and therapy. The Jungian school rejects it.

This therapy has been devastatingly criticized (Dr. Joseph Jastrow, *Freud, his Dream and Sex Theories*), and there is good ground for questioning its clinical effectiveness. Not as much attention has been paid to the fact that, even if it is effective, its costliness makes it an impossible method of dealing with the “neurosis of civilization.” Whether measured in terms of money or in the time which both patient and physician must give to the treatment, it is beyond the means of most of those in need of treatment. Since many psychoanalysts consider nine out of ten individuals in the modern world neurotic, even if it were effective, it would have to undergo some radical change to be able to deal with the problem.

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In spite of the marvelous achievements of modern medicine and its undoubted superiority to the Exorcistic approach to the problem, there is overwhelming evidence that medical methods of diagnosis and prescription in dealing with the problem of health are based upon a mistaken theory of the nature of man. Man is not merely an “adaptive mechanism,” as a noted physician insisted (George W. Crile, *Man an Adaptive Mechanism*). He is an organism, and a much more complex organism than matter-of-fact medicine is willing to admit. No solution of the psycho-physiological problem which ignores this fact can be more than a partial solution, and if it predicates what it prescribes for dealing with his mental life and his mental illnesses on the theory that man is a machine, it can do infinite mischief to him as an individual by damaging the creative aspects of his personality, and infinite damage to society by populating it with robotized instead of normalized (humanized) human beings.

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*Naturalian Theories, Doctrines and Practices*¹²—The Naturalian looks at man as he does at all nature, as he is, as a whole and not as an abstraction; as an organism and not a living machine without any sort of vital, mental, or spiritual attributes. This provides him with a theoretical postulate for dealing with the problem of health very different from that of the clinist, and this difference in turn is reflected both in his criticism of clinipathic methods of dealing with the problem and in the regimen and therapies he wishes to substitute for them.

Both Medical and Naturalian approaches to the psycho-physiological problem can be reproached for failure to deal with the problem of health as a whole in contrast to specific aspects of it. Medicine for the most part is completely indifferent to the problem of the maintenance of health; Naturalian therapies cannot be reproached for this reason (they do emphasize the bearing of regimen on physical health), but they can be reproached for their almost complete neglect of the problem of mental and sexual health. Yet there are psycho-physiological doctrines not usually thought of as Naturalian which do in fact fall into the Naturalian category. *Eugenics*⁶, for instance, is in actuality Naturalian even though its advocates do not think of themselves as Naturalian ideologists.

Logically, since what distinguishes man most significantly from all other animals is his mind, the Naturalian approach ought to consider physical health of little importance unless it is accompanied by mental health in the fullest signification, emotionally and intellectually. It cannot logically interpret *mens sana in corpore sano* to mean that mind and body are equally important; mental health (*mens sana*) is incomparably more important.

Mental and Sexual Health—The sexual problems of mankind are only incidentally (as in seduction and rape) or arbitrarily (as in prostitution) ethical problems; they are in themselves psycho-physiological as that problem is defined in this study. And this in part is also true of the intellectual "health" of mankind; this may be primarily a problem in education but it is also a psycho-physiological problem. The mental and sexual life of the individual should not therefore be considered outside the domain of the physician whose concern today is supposed to be restricted to the physiological and physical condition of his patients. On the con-

trary, because of the enormously important part they both play in the etiology of what often seem to be strictly organic disease, it should be one of the psycho-physiological sciences' most important problems.

There is an extensive Naturalian literature dealing with *Physical Culture* (the maintenance of eucrasia, physical health), and there is also an academic discipline *Physical Education* which is essentially Naturalian, but nothing comparable which is recognized as Naturalian and which deals with the maintenance of euphoria (mental health). Most of the literature purporting to deal with euphoria actually deals with dysphoria, with neurosis and psychosis; with mental disease, not mental health. And in the West there is nothing comparable to Yoga, which is a systematized discipline dealing with the maintenance of both physical and mental health. Yoga however equates mental and spiritual health; its ultimate goal is not health but mystical communion; it represents a Supernal and not a Naturalian approach to the psycho-physiological problem, yet it has many aspects which are Naturalian and not Spiritualist in nature.

One psycho-physiological doctrine which is recognized as Naturalian and which deals with the problem of sexual health is *Nudism*, which maintains that most of our sexual aberrations and sicknesses are due to the fact that the body is turned into a sexual-fetish and sexual mystery by clothing and concealment. The acute sexual sickness which takes the form of prurient prying (peeping Tomism) lends support to Nudism. According to the Nudists, because of clothing, virtually everybody suffers from some degree of this malady.

But the really important theories and doctrines which deal with mental health though in fact Naturalian are not thought of in those terms. These include *Eugenics*⁶—excellence in mating and propagating, *Euthenics*⁴—excellence in living and environing; *Eugerontics*⁸—excellence in aging; and finally *Euthanasia*⁹—excellence in dying.

To this should be added the regimen for the maintenance of emotional health represented by *Conditioning* and *Auto-Conditioning*—techniques which rely upon suggestion to ensure proper functioning of the emotions,

Finally there is the part played in the maintenance of mental health by knowledge and wisdom. The wise man, if genuinely wise, keeps himself mentally healthy, and this ought also to be true of literate men and particularly of intellectuals. It is unfortunate that so much of our knowledge today is utterly divorced from wisdom; this explains the mental aberrations from which not only academicians suffer, who have their heads stuffed with knowledge but have little wisdom to ensure its proper use, but also the widespread stupidity which those belonging to literate masses (who have discarded all traditional wisdom and act upon the basis of what they read in newspapers and advertisements) are constantly acting.

Naturalian Methods of Maintaining Physical Health—The factors entering into any adequate program for maintaining health have already been described; to describe all the various regimens of this kind is beyond the scope of this outline. Many of them seem irreconcilable—*Vegetarianism* and *Omnivorism*, for instance. Yet both are Naturalian in so far as they insist upon the food they recommend being raised organically (without the use of chemical fertilizers and toxic pesticides) and processed so that they remain "whole" and not devitalized, and their denial that man can afford to eat what he likes and live as he likes in contrast with what is demonstrably wholesome in all the practices which affect health.

Naturalian Therapies—The Naturalian approach to the problem of disease, both mental and physical, is logically Pluralistic; treatment calls for not one but a plurality of therapies. And this is true in spite of the fact that most of the ardent exponents of particular Naturalian methods of healing are not merely Monistic but often monomaniac to the point of justifying their being called cranks. Not even *materia medica* and surgery are excluded because there are so many cases in which there is literally no Naturalian therapy for dealing with accidents and other morbid conditions adequately. A person suffering from a terrible accident is treated quite naturally if he is given an injection of morphine to ease his pain.

Among the physical therapies which conform to the requirements of Naturalism are *Naturopathy*, *Hydrotherapy*, *Osteopathy*

and the manipulative therapies, and *Dietetic Therapy*; among the mental therapies are *Conditioning* and *Auto-Conditioning*, *Hypnotism*, *Suggestion Therapy*, *Occupational Therapy*, some forms of *Psychiatry* and *Neuropsychiatry*, and some forms of *Surgery*. Reparative surgery should be distinguished from curative surgery; to resort to surgery when a bone is broken is very different from resorting to it for cancer.

It is too bad that the established medical establishment is so hostile to the Naturalian approach to the problem; the existing orthodox medical establishment has all the prestige which being legally and institutionally established provides. Yet the evidence seems to indicate that it should not play its present dominant role in dealing with health and disease but, on the contrary, should play the subordinate role to which it has relegated all Naturalian methods of maintaining and restoring health.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem IX : The Psycho-Physiological Problem

1. *Metabolic, Anabolic, and Catabolic Energy*—These concepts were discussed at some length in Problem I, dealing with the anthropic problem.

2. *Alienation*—There is an extensive literature dealing with alienation, most of it quite recent. The frustrated and disappointed man who feels himself an outsider and at odds with the society to which he belongs or with the society in which he finds himself, is said to suffer from alienation. There is an excellent discussion of the origin of the present usage of the term and the various meanings which have been attached to it in a paper entitled "What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept," by Lewis Feuer, in the Spring, 1962 issue of *New Politics*. The paper was reprinted in *Sociology on Trial*, edited by Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich.

But this paper does not sufficiently stress the fact that up to about fifty years ago *alienation* meant what psychosis means today, that *alienism* was the medical specialty we call psychiatry today, and the *alienist* of those days was the medical specialist we call a psychiatrist today. Since alienation is a mental disease (one form of dysphoria) the bibliography dealing with it will be included in that of dysphoria generally.

The special importance which the problem has acquired at this time is due to the fact that the evidence seems to indicate that not only is mental disease on the increase, but that much of it is socially caused—that many basically normal persons are being made mentally sick (alienated) by the kind of social conditions and social institutions in which they find themselves enmeshed.

3. *The Sexual Problem and the Marxian and Freudian Revolutions*—A reading of August Bebel's *Woman and Socialism*, first published in 1879 by this pioneer of German Socialism, shows how completely the theorists of early Socialism anticipated the sexual revolution in the midst of which we find ourselves today. Wilhelm Reich, one of the most forthright of the Neo-Freudians,

like Bebel, advocated in his *The Sexual Revolution* (what many advocates of the sexual revolution are still afraid to do) the abolition of the family and the "take-over" of child-rearing by the State.

There was interest, of course, in the sexual problem long before Freud; indeed, there is plenty of evidence, difficult to dismiss, which indicates that religion itself, particularly its excesses, was sometimes the retrudation and sublimation of man's genetic energy. At any rate, all the religions, from the most primitive to the so-called higher religions, devote endless time to prescribing for man's sexual behavior. But there was an extensive scientific literature, in which Havelock Ellis' work is outstanding, before Freud came and gave it new depth and dimensions.

The following two bibliographies deal only with the sexual (Neo-Freudian) revolution, the first favoring it, the second opposing it. The more objective books are included in the bibliography on homogenetics (human genetics).

For the Sexual (Neo-Freudian) Revolution:

Norman O. Brown, *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History*, Wesleyan University Press, 1963.

Albert Ellis, *Art and Science of Love*, Lyle Stuart, N.Y., 1960; *The American Sexual Tragedy*, 1962.

Ray Anthony, *Teen Ager's Guide to Sexual Awareness*, Seymore Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1963.

Philip Wylie, *Disappearance*, Holt, N.Y., 1951.

Wilhelm Reich, *The Sexual Revolution*, Orgone Institute Press, N.Y., 1945.

August Bebel, *Woman under Socialism*, Boni & Liveright, N.Y., 1918.

Jean and Paul Ritter, *The Free Family*, Doubleday, Toronto, 1959.

Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization, a Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Random House, N.Y., 1962.

Rudolf von Urban, *Sex Perfection and Marital Happiness*, Dial Press, 1955.

Frederich Engels, *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., London, 1941.

Edwin M. Schur, et al, *The Family and the Sexual Revolution*, Indiana University Press, 1965.

Marquis de Sade, *The Complete Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, and Other Writings*, Grove Press, N.Y., 1965.

John Humphrey Noyes, *Essays on Scientific Propagation*, Oneida Community, N.Y., 1875.

Against the Sexual Revolution:

Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia F. Farnham, *Modern Woman, the Lost Sex*, Harpers, N.Y., 1947.

Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The American Sex Revolution*, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1956.

M.K. Gandhi, *Self-Restraint versus Self-Indulgence*, Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1959.

Marie N. Robinson, *The Power of Sexual Surrender*.

F. Alexander Magoun, *Love and Marriage*, Harpers, N.Y., 1948.

Ben B. Lindsey, *The Revolt of Modern Youth*, Boni & Liveright, N.Y., 1925; *Companionate Marriage*, 1927.

Sexology:

Alfred Kinsey, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, Saunders, N.Y., 1948; *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*, Saunders, N.Y., 1953.

G. Rattray Taylor, *Sex in History*, Ballantine Books, N.Y., 1954.

Denis de Rougement, *Love Declared: Essays on the Myths of Love*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1965; *Love in the Western World*, Harcourt Brace & Co., N.Y., 1940.

Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, Morrow, N.Y., 1928; *Sex and Temperament in Primitive Societies*, Morrow, N.Y., 1939.

Otto Weininger, *Sex and Character*, London, 1906. Heineman.

Patrick Geddes, *Evolution of Sex*, W. Scott, London, 1889.

Stendhal (Marie Henri Beyle), *On Love*, Boni & Liveright, N.Y., 1927.

W.F. Calverton, *Sex in Civilization*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1929.

Bronislaw Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, Harcourt Brace & Co., N.Y., 1927; *The Sexual Life of Savages*, Liveright, N.Y., 1929.

Paul H. Gehard, et al of the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research, *Sex Offenders*, Harper & Row, 1965.

Gladys Deenny Schultz, *Society and the Sex Criminal*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1965.

4. *Euthenics*—Academic exploration of euthenics probable first took place at the Institute of Euthenics which was conducted at Vassar College during the Nineteen Thirties. Euthenics—the practices and the conditions which make for good rearing of children and good living for their families, date back, however,

to time immemorial. If a technical term is to be used to designate the concept of a good psycho-physiological regimen for all ages, I know of none more appropriate than eugenics. In a sense, the most comprehensive conception of the term makes eugenics and euthanasia a part of eugenics. The following bibliography is suggestive only of the most general aspects of the concept, since there are special bibliographies following containing titles dealing with the various special aspects of the idea.

Louis I. Dublin, *The Facts of Life*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1952.

Benjamin N. Spock, *The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care*, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, N.Y., 1957.

Frank H. Richardson, *The Nursing Mother*, Prentice Hall, N.Y., 1953.

Norah Waln, *The House of Exile*, Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1933.

Arnold DeVries, *Nude Culture*, Dunlap Pub. Co., N.Y., 1946.

Walter Pitkin, *Life Begins at Forty*, McGraw, Hill Pub. Co., N.Y., 1932.

5. *The Problem of the Mental Regimen*—Most of the literature dealing with the problem of man's mental health, deals not with health or euphoria but with disease and dysphoria, with the problem of therapy rather than the maintenance of mental health, with the problems of neurotics, psychopaths, and psychotics, in fact with almost any kind of trait which represents an annoying departure from what is considered accepted mental behavior. The following bibliography conceives of the problem in its broadest aspects.

Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Norton, N.Y., 1949.

Allan Wheelis, *The Quest for Identity*, Norton, N.Y., 1946.

Elton Mayo, *Human Problems of an Industrial Society*, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, 1946.

Wilhelm Reich, *Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Orgone Institute Press, N.Y., 1956.

Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, Harper, N.Y., 1954; *Man for Himself*, 1947.

Julian S. Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1947.

Franz Alexander, *The Western Mind in Transition*, Random House, N.Y., 1960; *The Logic of Emotion and Its Dynamic Background*, *International Journal of Psycho*—Vol. XVI, October, 1953, p. 399.

Ian D. Shuttle, *The Origins of Love and Hate*, K. Paul, London, 1935.

Carl Jung, *The Integration of Personality*, Farrar & Rinehart, N.Y., 1939.

Ralph Borsodi, *This Ugly Civilization*, Sumon & Schuster, N.Y., 1929.

Stuart Chase, *Men and Machines*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1929.

Raymond B. Fosdick, *The Old Savage in the New Civilization*, Doubleday, Doran Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1928. See Chapter *The Machine and Standardization*.

A.H. Maslow, *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences*, Ohio State University, 1964.

Rollo May, *Man in Search of Himself*, Norton, N.Y., 1953.

Arnold Maddaloni, *To be Fully Alive*, Horizon Press, N.Y., 1964.

Alfred Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*, Moffat, Yard & Co., N.Y., 1917.

Colin Wilson, *The Outsiders*, Victor Gollanz, London, 1956.

Charles D. Brennan, *An Elementary Textbook on Psychoanalysis*, Doubleday, Doran, Garden City, N.Y., 1957.

Joseph Jastrow, *Freud, his Dream and Sex Theories*, World Pub. Co., Cleveland, 1941.

Eric and Mary Josephson, et al. *Man Alone; Alienation in Modern Society*, Duell Pub. Co., N.Y., 1962.

Karl Menninger, *Love Against Hate*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., N.Y., 1959; *The Human Mind*, Garden City Pub. Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1933; *Man Against Himself*, Harcourt Brace & Co., N.Y., 1938.

J.C. Moloney, *Battle for Mental Health*, (infants and mothers), Philosophic Library, 1952; *Fear, Contagion and Conquest*, Philosophic Library, N.Y., 1957.

Walter Pitkin, *The Twilight of the American Mind*, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1928.

William A. White, *Introduction to the Study of the Mind*, Nervous and Mental Diseases Pub. Co., Washington, D.C., 1924; *Principles of Mental Hygiene*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1917; *Mental Mechanisms*, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, N.Y., 1911.

6. *Eugenics*—There are three important aspects of eugenics:

(1) The sexual practices of men and women, important because the wrong kind definitely unfit them for fatherhood and motherhood (the bibliography dealing with this aspect of eugenics will be found under the heading "The Sexual Problem"); (2) mating and marriage, important because it is this which predetermines the

hereditary mental and physical health of future generations; and (3) preventive genetics—contraception, sterilization and abortion—important as means for avoiding the generation both of unfit children, and of children unfit because unwanted by either or both parents.

Mating and Marriage:

L.C. Dunn and T. Dobzhansky, *Heredity, Race and Society*, American Library, N.Y., 1960.

Mahatma Gandhi, *Birth Control: The Right and Wrong Way*, Navijan Pub. House, Ahmedabad, India, 1959.

Paul Popenoe, *Modern Marriage*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1947; *Marriage is What You Make It*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1950.

Clifford R. Adams, *How to Pick a Mate*, Dutton, N.Y., 1946.

G.I. Burch and Elmer Randall, *Human Breeding and Survival*, Penguin Books, N.Y., 1947.

Frederick Osborn, *A Eugenic Program for the U.S.*, American Eugenics Society, N.Y., 1936; *Childbirth Without Fear*, Harper, N.Y., 1953.

Grantley Dick Read, *Introduction to Motherhood*, Harper, N.Y., 1951; *Natural Child Birth*, Heinemann, London, 1933.

C. Anderson Aldrich, *Babies Are Human Beings*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1936.

Edwin Grant Conklin, *Freedom and Responsibility: A Biological Vindication of Some Problems of Democracy*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1935.

Anthony Ludovici, *Truth About Childbirth*, Dutton, N.Y., 1935. *The Choice of A Mate.*

C.B. Blacker, *Eugenics; Galton and After*, Gerald Duckworth & Co., London 1952.

Mark H. Haller, *Eugenics*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.Y., 1963.

H. Robbins, *An Examination of Eugenics*, Burns, Oates & Washburn, London, 1930.

Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, *Crisis in the Population Problem*, Harvard University Press, 1934; *Population, a Problem for Democracy*, 1940.

Frederick Osborn, *Preface to Eugenics*, Harpers, N.Y., 1951.

Edward Alsworth Ross, *Standing Room Only*, Century Co., N.Y., 1927.

Raymond Pearl, *The Natural History of Population*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1939.

Karl Sax, *The Population Explosion*, Foreign Policy Association. 1956.

Margaret Sanger, *Woman, Morality, and Birth Control*, New York Women's Pub. Co., N.Y., 1922.

National Committee on Maternal Health, *The Abortion Problem*, William & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1944.

H.L. Packer and R.J. Campbell, *Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine*, Stanford Law Review, 11: 417, 1959.

G. Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law*, Knopf, N.Y., 1957.

H. Curtis Wood, Jr., *Sterilization. A Prescription for the Alleviation of Welfare Abuses and Illegitimacy*, The Journal of the Kentucky State Medical Association, April, 1963.

7. *The Problem of the Physical Regimen*—The following bibliography provides something more than an introduction to the problem. Naturalian medicine considers nutrition most important in the maintenance of health, while Mechanistic and orthodox medicine officially treats it as quackery.

Right Nutrition:

Henry C. Sherman, *Chemistry of Food and Nutrition*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1937.

Weston Price, *Nutrition and Physical Degeneration*, Hoeber, Inc., N.Y., 1939.

William A. Albrecht, *Soil Fertility and Animal Health*, Fred Hahne Pub. Co., Webster City, Ia 1958.

Sir Albert Howard, *Agricultural Testament*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1956; *The Soil and Health*, Devin-Adair, N.Y., 1956.

Sir Humphrey David, *Elements of Agricultural Chemistry*, Conrad & Co., Philadelphia, 1815.

N. P. Norman and James Rorty, *Tomorrow's Food*, Devin-Adair, N.Y., 1956.

John Harvey Kellogg, *The Natural Diet of Man*, Modern Medicine Pub. Co., Battle Creek, Mich., 1923.

Allen E. Banik, *Hunza Land*, Taplinger, N.Y., 1960.

Adelle Davis, *Let's Eat Right to Keep Fit*, Harcourt, N.Y., 1954.

D.T. Quigley, *The National Malnutrition*, The Foundation for Nutritional Research, November, 1943.

Mahatma Gandhi, *Diet and Diet Reform: Key to Health*, Navjivan Pub. House, Ahmedabad, India, 1948.

Guy T. Wrench, *The Wheel of Health*, Daniel Co., London, 1939.

La Leche League, *The Womanly Art of Breast Feeding*, Franklin Park, Ill.,

Alfred McCann, *Starving America*, F.M. Barton, N.Y., 1913.

Conventional Nutrition:

The following is a defense of the conventional diet of America today.

Frederick J. Stare, *Eating for Good Health*, Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1964; *Sense and Nonsense About the Food We Eat*, Harpers' Magazine, October, 1964.

Right Drinking:

The following books, most of which deal with only one aspect of the problem and many of which are extremely controversial, incidentally throw light on the whole problem. There are titles both pro and contra each one of the major controversies.

Warren Boroson, *The Case Against Coca Cola*, in *Fact*, Nov.-Dec., 1964, Vol. 1, No. 6.

David J. Pittman, *Society, Culture and Drinking Patterns*, Wiley, N. Y., 1960.

Howard W. Haggard, *Alcohol Explored*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1947.

McNeil, *The Fight for Fluoridation*, Oxford University Press, N. Y., 1957.

Exner and Waldbolt, *The American Fluoridation Experiment*, Devin-Adair, N. Y., 1957.

Lorus and Margery Milne, *Water and Life*, Atheneum Pub. Co., N. Y., 1965.

George C. Whipple, *The Microscopy of Drinking*, John Wiley & Sons, N. Y., 1933.

Right Waste Elimination:

John Harvey Kellogg, *Colon Hygiene*, Modern Medicine Pub. Co., Battle Creek, Mich., 1923; *The Itinerary of a Breakfast*, Funk & Wagnalls, N. Y., 1920.

Rasmus L. Alsaker, *Curing Constipation and Appendicitis*, F. E. Morrison, N. Y., 1917.

Right Posture and Right Exercise:

F. Matthias Alexander, *The Use of Self*, Dutton, N. Y., 1932; *Conscious Constructive Control of the Individual*, Chaterson, London, 1946; *Man's Supreme Inheritance*, Chaterson, London, 1943.

Right Exercise:

V. G. Rele, *Yogic Asanas for Health and Vigor, Physiologic Explanation*, Taraporevala, Bombay, 1958.

J.E. Goldthwait, et al., *Essentials of Body Mechanics*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1945.

Bernarr MacFadden, *MacFadden's System of Physical Training*, Hulbert Bros., N.Y., 1895.

Bess Menzendick, *Look Better, Feel Better* Harpers, N.Y., 1954.

Right Sleeping and Resting:

David H. Fink, *Release from Nervous Tension*, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1943.

Sir Charles Sherrington, *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947.

Right Recreation:

Harvey C. Lehman and Paul A. Witty, *The Psychology of Play Activities*, A.S. Barnes, N.Y., 1927.

8. *Eugerontics:*

Edmund V. Cowdray, *Problems of Aging: Biological and Medical Aspects*, Baltimore and London, 1952.

E.J. Stieglitz, *Geriatric Medicine*, Philadelphia and London, 1954.

9. *Euthanasia*—The practice of permitting the hopelessly sick—either physically or mentally—and the hopelessly insane to enjoy a painless death by their own hands, by those chosen for them, or by those acting as protectors of society. It is necessary to distinguish between *natural euthanasia* (permitting terminal cases to die naturally instead of resorting to desperate methods of treatment for the mere prolongation of meaningless suffering and existence) and *intentional euthanasia* (where death is deliberately induced, perhaps, by the use of morphines). And intentional euthanasia in turn needs to be distinguished between *voluntary euthanasia* (where it is self-inflicted or inflicted by others at the request of the sick), and *imposed euthanasia* (where it is inflicted upon the patient, as in the case of the hopelessly insane).

Some forms of euthanasia date back to the beginning of man's history (as among the Eskimo), but only recently has a scientific literature begun to develop. Only a mistaken superstitious morality ignores what true humanitarianism calls for in this field.

G.L. Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law*, Knopf, N.Y., 1957.

Joseph Fletcher, *Morals and Medicine*.

10. *Exorcistic Psycho-Physiological Doctrines and Therapies:*

Hans Hofmann, *Religion and Mental Health*, Harper, N.Y., 1961.

Mahatma Gandhi, *Moral Basis of Vegetarianism*, Navjivan Pub. House, Ahmedabad, India, 1949.

Carl Jung, *The Integration of the Personality*, Farrar & Rinehart, N.Y., 1939.

C.G. Cumston, *An Introduction to the History of Medicine*, Knopf, N.Y., 1926.

Ruth Cranston, *The Miracle of Lourdes*, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1955.

Alexis Carrell, *The Voyage to Lourdes*, Harper, N.Y., 1950.

Samuel Clemens, *Christian Science*, Harper, N.Y., 1917.

Mary Baker Eddy, *Science and Health*, J. Armstrong, Boston, 1906.

11. Medical Psycho-Physiological Doctrines and Therapies:

Justus Liebig, *Animal Chemistry*, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1964.

Ritchie Calder, *Medicine and Man*, Signet Science Library, N.Y., 1958.

Editors of *Consumer Reports*, *The Medicine Show: Popular Ailments for Common Ailments*, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1965.

Emanuel M. Josephson, *Your Life is Their Toy: Medical and Social Service Rackets*, Chedney Press, 10 E. 81st St., New York, 1940.

Paul de Kruif, *The Microbe Hunters*, Harcourt Brace & Co., N.Y., 1926.

12. Naturalian Psycho-Physiological Doctrines and Therapies:

Herbert M. Shelton, *The Hygienic System, Orthotrophy*, Shelton Pub. Co., San Antonio, Texas, 1963.

DeForest C. Jarvis, *Folk Medicine*, Holt, N.Y., 1958.

Hans Selye, *Stress of Life*, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1956.

Flanders Dunbar, *Psychosomatic Medicine*, Random House, N.Y., 1947.

Innes H. Pearce, *The Peckham Experiment*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1944.

Arnold de Vries, *The Foundation of Youth*, Dunlay Pub. Co. N.Y., 1946. *Therapeutic Fasting*, Chandler Book Co., Los Angeles, 1949.

Ernest A. Hooton, *The Twilight of Man*, G.P. Putnam, N.Y., 1939.

Sir Robert McCarrison, *Studies in Deficiency Disease*, (Oxford Med. Pub., 1921), Lee Foundation for Med. Research, Milwaukee, Wisc.

A.T. Still, *Philosophy of Osteopathy*, A.T. Still Pub. Co., Kirksville, Mo., 1899.

Marshall W. Coda, *A Matter of Life*, Devin-Adair Co., N.Y., 1965.

Herbert N. Shelton, *The Hygienic System*, Shelton Pub. Co., San Antonio, Texas, 1963; *Fasting Can Save Your Life*, Hygienic Press, Chicago, 1965.

PROBLEM X.

Labor and Leisure : The Occupational Problem

It was a favorite saying of Theophrastus that time was the most valuable thing that a man could spend.—Theophrastus. 10.

Eight inescapable facts create what I think of as the occupational problem;

1. First is the fact that life inescapably involves the spending of time.

2. Second, the spending of time inescapably involves an occupation of some kind, even when the occupation consists of doing nothing.

3. Third, not only are occupations different (they call for different talents, they gratify different desires) but human temperaments¹ are also different.

4. Fourth, not only do temperaments vary from person to person, but they vary in the same person from age to age (a child has certain needs and capacities, a youth others, an adult still others).

5. Fifth, not only are occupational aptitudes² different, but occupational necessities³ and occupational desires⁴ are also different.

6. Sixth, because of the two-fold variability of aptitudes and necessities⁵, both aptitudes and necessities must be taken into account if physical health is not to be injured by the wrong kinds of occupations, if mental ill-health and alienation are to be avoided, and if the fullest development of the potentialities of the person is to be realized in occupations of the right kind.

7. Seventh, since desires, aspirations, and ambitions vary in the same person from time to time, and training, experience, capabilities, and necessities do not and sometimes cannot vary correspondingly, the need for reconciliation, adjustment, and accommodation of desires and realities confronts every man continuously. This problem is further rendered difficult by the fact that

there are so many solutions of the problem, either prescribed by the culture, the group, or family to which the individual belongs, or chosen individually by him, some of which are individually and socially wholesome and others which are individually and socially destructive.

8. Finally man, because of the plasticity of his instincts, cannot rely upon them to dictate to him what he should do and how he should occupy himself; he can neither rely upon his instinctual impulses nor trust to chance and accidents to solve this problem for him. On the contrary, he is inescapably confronted by the necessity of making choices about the occupations to which he should devote himself from time to time as he goes through the "seven ages of man."

* * * *

Because the manner in which the individual occupies himself, because the practices to which he devotes himself, and the places in which he spends his time are all determining factors in creating the social institutions amidst which he lives, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of what I am calling the occupational problem.

It is true that the way in which he occupies himself is influenced by social institutions, but it is not mechanistically determined by them. That they were the determining influence in primitive homogeneous societies is true. But in our modern heterogeneous societies, while they still exert great influence, they determine individual behavior less and less. And not one of these institutions came into existence of its own accord; they are all the creations of mankind, in effect, nothing but the crystalizations of the manner in which aggregations of mankind act.

Because the full significance of the problem is not recognized, because it has not been recognized as a basic problem of man and of society, because no science dealing with the problem has been developed as sciences have been to deal with much less important problems (problems as trivial as how to put a man on the moon), adequate definition of the central conception involved is essential if the hundreds of solutions of the problem which mankind has tried are to be rationally and humanely evaluated.

Occupations—By occupation I mean anything in which or with which a man engages himself during any defined interval of time, long or short, whether he does something or does nothing, (he does nothing when he is lazying), including what he does both when awake and when asleep. He is occupied in sleeping; he is occupied by his work; he is occupied with thinking, with dreaming, with escaping. Man, in sum, is occupied in some way from birth to death.

To get the full significance of this conception of occupation, it is necessary to classify both (1) the various ways in which he occupies himself, and (2) the characteristics of human beings which call for specific ways of occupying themselves.

I have made an exhaustive classification, based upon my collection of approximately 8,000 cases of human actions, of the ways in which human beings occupy themselves. As the classifications passed from actual cases up through varieties, species, genera, families, and orders, there finally emerged four ultimate categories of occupations. What the classification made clear is that every one of the different ways in which humans spend time and occupy themselves is either (1) inhabitational, (2) vocational, (3) recreational, or (4) recuperational. With the exception of the category of inhabitational occupations, the final result, as I expected, agreed astonishing well with what the common sense of mankind agreed upon long ago, that all the ways in which human beings occupy themselves fall into the classic trinity of work, play, and sleep. Only in my study of the matter, semantics makes it necessary to replace the loose signification attached to these words with categories of occupations which I call vocations, recreations, and recuperations.

Inhabitational Occupations—We do not ordinarily think of the time we spend inhabiting a place or a dwelling as an activity, much less an occupation. Yet it is both. Habitation (inhabiting) is even defined by the dictionary as an act—the act of occupying or dwelling. Inhabiting is something which occupies our time; it is something which we do during an interval of time, and there are few activities and few occupations more important, which contribute more to our well-being or ill-being, both personally and socially. We can live on the seashore or inland: we

can live in a valley, on mountains, on the plains; but in terms of the rational solution of the problem of how to occupy our time and spend our lives, the all-important problem is whether to live in the city or in the country, in a metropolis or a small town; whether to live close to nature or as far away from it as possible; whether to live in a gigantic ant-heap—a monstrous human termitary—or in a normal community. The decision about this aspect of the occupational problem not only affects our family and home-life, it affects our work, our choice of our vocation, and the way in which we practice the craft or the profession of our choice. Finally, it affects the whole of society. The more we decide to live in cities, the more social pathologies we are certain to create; the more we desert small communities and the countryside, the more we undermine the vigor of society as a whole, and ultimately, if the history of city life throughout all time is to be believed, the more certainly we ensure the decline and fall of the society, the culture, and the civilization of which we are a part.

What distinguishes inhabitational occupations from all other kinds of occupations is the fact that inhabiting is a continuum, that it continues no matter what other activities we may be engaged in. Everybody is always inhabitationally occupied; he has to be somewhere always, no matter where and no matter what he is doing. In this sense he is like a snail; he takes his habitation with him. More narrowly and specifically defined, it means the place on the Earth where he, during various intervals in his life, works and plays, sleeps and eats, and spends time with his family and his friends. Some men inhabit the same place all their lives; some are nomads and inhabit a succession of places as they move from one place on the Earth to another. But some place everybody inhabits from birth to death.

Stead and Steading; Steady and Steadfast—Nothing sharpens the issue posed by the problem of habitation more than consideration of the significance of the Anglo-Saxon concepts of *stead* and *steading*. In our times these concepts remain current only on the designation of those farms and homes which are called *homesteads*.

A *stead* is simply a place; a *steading*, a farm on which a farmer and his family both live and farm. A *homestead* is that

little part of the whole world which belongs to a family, on which the family lives, and which is also—if the family is to be most free and independent—the place where the members of it work and earn their livings. Homesteads may be *farmsteads*, if the principal vocation of its members is farming; they may be *fishingsteads*, if the principal vocation is fishing; they may be *art* or *craftsteads*, if it is an art or craft; they may even be *professionsteads*, if the principal vocation of the head of the family is the practice of a profession and if it is practiced from the homestead.

That the kind of place which people inhabit—a city place or a country place, for instance—influences their character development is so obvious that attention must be directed to the fact to make us realize how true it is. Human beings can live in such a place and in such a way that it develops and intensifies in them fickleness and fecklessness, so that they tend to become more inconstant and disorderly in their principles and purposes. Or they can live in ways and places which contribute to the development in them of personality characteristics the very opposite of these—characteristics which are called steady and steadfast. If constancy in feelings and principles, in pursuits and purposes; if sobriety and well-ordered living are excellent in the Aristotelian sense of the term, and fickleness and fecklessness, excesses and dissipation, and a frantic search for novelty and excitement are not excellent, then the manner in which a man occupies himself and the place he inhabits should be such as to develop in him this excellence.

That the ownership and cultivation of a stead has done and does this to the members of a family which lives on them is incontestable. That nomadship, particularly in its modern urban and industrial form, destroys steadfastness, destroys self-reliance and disposes individuals to submission and subjection is equally incontestable. A life of refusing to take on responsibilities by substituting renting and moving from place to place every year for steadying year after year, by depending upon employment by others (of which the very worst is dependence upon impersonal employers such as corporations and bureaucracies), and by relying upon the State to secure the individual against every vicissi-

tude of life from the cradle to the grave is a life which inculcates servility instead of developing intestinal fortitude.

It is high time that the choosing of habitations should be recognized as a matter calling for major consideration, for family planning in the fullest signification of the concept of planning. There is hardly anything which a family can choose which effects its well-being more than choosing the kind of place in which its members are to spend their time.

Vocational Occupations—All the ways in which man “earns his living” (all the activities which have to do directly or indirectly with his own maintenance and the maintenance of those depending upon him) and of course the way *she* “earns her living” and works for those depending upon her, (including the work of child-bearing, child-suckling, and child-rearing); or, if he does not have to work for a living, all the activities in which he works at something regularly because he feels that he should so do, fall into the category of vocations. Even beggary and thievery are vocations (since they are the occupations to which beggars and thieves resort).

Avocations in my terminology are supplementary vocations, supplementary means of subsistence or livelihood; “moonlighting,” which is so prevalent now that hours of work devoted to regular employment have been shortened so much, is an avocation. Avocations should not be confused with hobbies, which are recreations no matter how useful what is done in them or how hard the work involved. I like to do carpentry and joinery, and have produced all sorts of useful things; I like to saw and chop fire wood, and this, heaven knows, is hard work; yet I do it as recreation, not as an avocation and means of subsistence.

Vocations and avocations of the right kind make for euthenia⁶; of the wrong kind, for dysthenia,⁶ not only for the individual but for his whole family.

Recreational Occupations—All the activities and all the occupations which make for the revival of the spirits (playing, hiking, hunting, theatre and concert going, reading, singing, church going, creative and productive arts and crafts [hobbies], entertainment and being entertained, friendship, and loving), fall into the category of recreations—literally of re-creations.

What we now have is the commercial promotion of recreations of all sorts, not because they make for euphoria⁶ but because they are commercially profitable. Whether they make for dysphoria,⁶ as so many do, is a matter of complete indifference to those exploiting this occupational need. The discipline we now have which comes nearest to concerning itself with this is physical education, but it is insufficiently aware of two things, the significance of the distinction which I believe needs to be made between recreation and recuperation, and the fact that the right kind of so-called "physical" education ought to deal with both.

Recuperational Occupations—All the activities and all the occupations which make for the restoration of physical energy (not only sleeping, but eating, exercising, bathing, and many activities other than resting) fall into the category of recuperations.

Recuperational occupations of the right kind would make for the physical and physiological condition medieval physicians called eucrasia,⁶ while those of the wrong kind the condition they called dyscrasia.⁶

* * * *

If the hundreds of different occupations which fall into the four categories described are correlated with those of man's characteristics which call for various ways of occupying himself (discussion of which will immediately follow), solutions of the occupational problem emerge which are normative and not arbitrary. No wonder I see a dire need for a real science dealing with this problem! The development of such a science would check the waste of precious time, the waste of precious lives, and the indescribable misery inflicted upon mankind because this problem is not scientifically studied. Aptitude testing only scratches the surface of one aspect of the occupational problem. Psychologists and psychoanalysts who have developed classifications of temperaments have already some useful material which belongs in such a science. If all this kind of knowledge, including that embodied in the folklore and the wisdom literature of mankind, were integrated, we would have both data and insights to use in creating such a science. Much more is needed. Not even the existing scientific material scattered about in a dozen different sciences has been integrated. But until 8,000 times 8,000 cases have been observed and classified, we shall still have no really adequate science.

What such a science (which would have to be normative and not merely descriptive) would contribute to is individual and social euthenia, eucrasia, and euphoria.⁶ What it would for the first time make possible is a systematic war upon dysthenia, dyscrasia, and dysphoria.⁶

* * * *

Let us now consider the characteristics of *homo sapiens* each of which call for specific ways for men to occupy themselves. There are at least four kinds of characteristics of which account must be taken: sex, age, inborn, and acquired requirements or necessities.

Sex Requirements—Masculine nature calls for occupations and activities for which feminine nature does not, and *vice versa*. There are, of course, requirements which both share and which call for similar occupations and activities, particularly at certain periods in their lives. Feminine nature calls for certain activities (menstruation, pregnancy, suckling), particularly during certain periods of the feminine life-cycle, for which masculine nature never calls. Books galore have been written about male and female nature (more about feminine than male nature), some with real insight into the problem, some of them very funny. Real contributions to knowledge about the matter are to be found in many of them. Custom and tradition about what is man's work and what is woman's work settles nothing; they are as arbitrary and as full of superstition as are most customs and traditions.

Age Requirements—But sexual characteristics and the occupational needs and requirements of each sex vary from one period in the life-cycle to another. According to Shakespeare there are seven ages of man (he said nothing about women!) and described some of the occupations and activities appropriate to man in each of them.

Traditional Hinduism took infancy and childhood for granted, and then described and prescribed four: from 8 to 24 years of age, *bramacharya*, acquiring an education; from 24 to 50 *grahastha*, supporting the household; after 50, *vanprastha*, rendering public service; in real old age, *sanyasa*, retiring to the forest or hills for meditation and preparation for death. How much more rational than the prevailing American cult of youth, which pre-

scribes premature youth (sexiness) for the early teen-ager, and pseudo-youth (and still sexiness) even for those verging on old age!

My own study of the matter indicates that there are nine ages of man and that, while both men and women pass through them, during some of them the vocations called for by each sex are different, and during others they are essentially the same. My nine ages are (1) the embryonic age (though both males and females have an "age" in their life-cycles which they spend as embryos, the fact of the matter is that both of them spend it inside the wombs of their mothers; the embryonic period of children is always a part of the life-cycle of their mothers); (2) infancy; (3) childhood; (4) puberty and adolescence; (5) youth or pre-maturity; (6) majority; (7) maturity; (8) seniority; (9) finally, senescence and death. (For a full discussion of the psychological and physiological differences during each age for each sex, see my *Education and Living*, pp. 338-402).

Inborn Occupational Requirements—Every human being, except during their strictly embryonic and infantile ages (before he becomes fully conscious and begins to speak), has five calls for distinctive activities and occupations; very often all five make their "calls" simultaneously, and the problem of choosing among occupations for them is thrust upon the individual. The first of these is created by the cellular, muscular, physiological, and metabolic energy with which every individual is equipped; it calls simply for the use of his cells and muscles sufficiently for the maintenance of health. The others are much more difficult and call for the full and balanced use of his mind. The first of them can be dealt with simultaneously with any one or all of the others; it differs from them only in that it is the least differentiated. It calls simply for physical activities which will maintain normal, and perhaps even optimum, physiological health. Obviously this call cannot be met if man devotes himself primarily to sedentary vocations and primarily to spectator recreations. He needs to work and play outdoors in communion with nature and to exercise himself bodily, to occupy himself with activities which come naturally to the countryman and which urban man can only provide for himself artificially.

The four remaining forms of energy with which he is endowed and which he is instinctually driven to use are primarily mental or psychological in nature. The first, his survival energy (of which he has a great superfluity), calls for occupations which challenge him and responses to it which absorb it as fully as possible; complete security deprives him of such challenges; man seems to be born to take risks; his intellectual and emotional well-being seems to call for risk-taking. The artist, the scientist, the professional man, above all the self-employed craftsman, takes such risks constantly in the course of his daily work; so of course does a housewife and a mother who treats her vocation as a career—as a craft and a profession.

The second—his sexual, but more properly his genetic energy (of which he also has an immense superfluity)—calls for its use normally both in form and quantitatively. Unfortunately nature seems to attach such enormous importance to reproduction (even more than to mere survival) that it tempts every man to sexual overindulgence rather than to sublimation.

The third, his cultural energy, his drive for self-expression and self-realization, fortunately has limitless potentialities; all his surplus survival and genetic energy can be poured into creative and productive intellectual, artistic, scientific and humanitarian occupations, not the least important of which is what Voltaire called for when *Candide* decided the wisest thing to do with his life was "to cultivate his own garden."

The fourth kind of energy which man displays calls for activities into which to pour his necrotic energy, activities into which he is driven when any or all of any of his first three needs in life are frustrated to such a degree that alienation drives him to try to escape from it. He may escape into activities ranging all the way from neurosis to psychosis, and from mere alcoholism to homicide and suicide. It is, of course, a misnomer to speak of man's endowment of necrotic energy; normally he has none. If frustrations of his occupational needs have resulted in the retrudation of his surplus survival and sexual energy, if he has failed to sublimate them normally in cultural activities, the problem is not how to indulge his necrotic drives but how he should occupy himself to eliminate them and to normalize himself again.

What the evidence indicates, among other things, is that one of the most important inborn requirements of man is habitation. To maintain mental and physical health he needs to spend most of his life inhabiting certain kinds of places and occupying certain kinds of dwellings. The penalty for failure to do so is always psychological, and sometimes also physiological, ill-being if not ill-health.

The *dwellings* he is called by his nature to occupy are those which give him both a sense of belonging and a sense of privacy. He must feel that they are his own (his family's) exclusively, and yet that they do not separate him from his own kind (he is a gregarious animal; his need for privacy came along much later in the course of his evolution), from his clan, his tribe, his city, his people. Yet he must also have privacy if he is to develop a real Self, and his family its uniqueness to the utmost.

The *places* he is, so to speak, called by his own nature to inhabit are those which keep in tune with nature and which rest him from the stresses and strains imposed upon him by the artifices of civilization both in his work and in his play. Nothing expresses this truth more completely than does a famous Greek myth.

Antaeus, a mighty Lybian giant, was the son of Poseidon (the Sea) and Gaea (the Earth). When Heracles was wrestling with him in deadly earnest, he noticed that every time he lifted him off the Earth, Antaeus seemed to lose strength. So he made a mighty heave and kept him off long enough so that Antaeus lost all his strength, and he was then able to throw him and kill him.

Urbanism (always in modern closed cities, but not always in medieval and ancient open cities) is a denial of this two-fold need. And so is Nomadism, not so much when a group or tribe wanders—as primitive herdsmen wandered and modern gypsies still wander—but definitely when a lone family or, still worse, a lone individual wanders about. The individualization and atomization of society by modern Industrialism, like modern Urbanism, make for a denial of this need of man. Both as a result transform his normal energies (his instinctual drives) into negative drives and necrotic energy.

Acquired Occupational Requirements—Human nature, as the discussion of the riddle of human nature makes clear, is always a mixture of two things, the complex of energies with which man is hereditarily endowed, and the complex of intellectual and emotional practices he is taught or acquires from his experiences after birth. For the purposes of this study I am calling the activities, for which his hereditary endowment calls, inborn occupational requirements, and the activities for which his intellectual and emotional acquirements call, his acquired requirements. Our knowledge of how men and women need to occupy themselves at different ages in their life-cycles is grossly inadequate. (We occupy our children mostly with schooling from the time they are fit only to be in a nursery to the time when they are sixteen to twenty, but what scientific evidence have we that this is the way in which they should spend this time?) Yet what we do know plainly supports what common sense long ago insisted upon, that there are occupations and activities suitable and unsuitable for different natures and different temperaments. (For instance, giving birth to and rearing children plainly calls upon women, at least during certain periods of their life, to make the home the principal place in which to occupy themselves vocationally).

I am satisfied with none of the classifications of temperaments which I have studied, not even my own. In *This Ugly Civilization*, I discussed at length three types I called quality-minded, quantity-minded, and herd-minded. I think them almost as ingenious as William James' tough-minded and tender-minded temperaments. I equate his tender-minded with my quality-minded and his tough-minded with my quantity-minded, but he took no account of my herd-minded temperaments. My herd-minded may be either tender or tough, but their herd-mindedness predominates (they are predominantly homodox—they conform to prevailing opinion regardless of their tender or tough-mindedness). If you like neither scheme, try Freud's or one of your own. The folklore of every culture has classifications of what I am calling temperaments (the Hindus have four, but think of them as inborn and not acquired). But inadequate as is existing knowledge in this field, there would be a good beginning for practical application of it if it were properly evaluated and integrated.

Before leaving the subject I must touch upon one idea my

studies of the problem have convinced me is valid. Because man is born with different quantum of each of his various kinds of energy, and because he acquires so many different kinds of temperamental characteristics, he cannot possibly do what he is by his nature called upon to do occupationally by specializing. The price paid for over-specialized work or play is in the beginning boredom and in the end neurosis and psychosis. The diversity of work, for instance, for which human nature calls even among my herd-minded temperaments is denied on an assembly line. Even Charlie Chaplin discovered this in his famous 1936 film, *Modern Times*. The hobby movement in over-industrialized and over-specialized America is a desperate attempt to bring back productive and creative activities as recreations into the lives of American men and women who have been deprived of them vocationally. The hobby movement I think a good contribution, the cocktail-party movement a very bad contribution to the resolution of this problem. Specialization of certain kinds is undoubtedly not merely needed but in accord with the temperament (genius, sometimes) of many persons, but even writers and painters, doctors and lawyers, teachers and engineers—even businessmen—are often seriously injured by overdoing it.

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Primitive man living in a homogeneous culture accepted as the solution of his occupational problem whatever his culture prescribed, without regard to whether it was good or bad for him. Modern man (it is hard for me to call him civilized after World War I and World War II, and after the slave-labor camps in Russia and the extermination camps of Buchenwald in Germany) living in a heterogeneous culture is confronted with an infinite number of antithetical solutions of the occupational problem, among which he cannot avoid choosing, consciously or unconsciously. Additionally his cultural heritage confronts him with one or the other of the three types of solutions of the occupational problem which have in some form been utilized by mankind from the very beginning of his history.

What man has always confronted are, first, solutions of the problem which are Spiritual and Ascetic in nature (most of them religiously inspired and still actively promoted by influential mystical geniuses and monastic movements in many religions all

over the world); second, there are solutions which are objective and Chrematistic in nature (both Capitalistic and Communistic solutions of the problem are of this nature); finally, there are solutions which are Intellectual and Hygienic in nature—the solutions which I like, because I believe they can be vindicated both rationally and humanely.

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Ascetic Occupational Ideologies—All the solutions which fall into the category I call Ascetic maintain that man should renounce those occupations and activities which Hedonistic man calls the good things of life; that he should give none of his time to the material pleasures and to the pursuit of material gratifications; that he should live a life of *Asceticism* on religious grounds (as in Hindu Asceticism—*Yoga* and *Nish Kama*; in Buddhist *Bhikkhism*; in Judaic asceticism—*Essenism*; in Islamic asceticism—*Muradiyahism*, *Rufa'yahism*, *Kalandariyahism* and *Maulawiyahism*; in Catholic Asceticism—*Jesuitism*, *Benedictism*, *Franciscanism*); that ideally man should ignore the occupations of this world and concentrate on activities which prepare him for the bliss of life in the world to come. All these occupational prescriptions are other-worldly. They vindicate, either by scriptural or mystical revelations, the doctrine that all of man's activities and vocations should be those idealized in *Abnegation*, *Eremitism*, and *Monasticism*. The vocational problem which this creates is solved Ascetically either by *Holy Parasitism* (as in Christian Franciscanism, Buddhist *Bhikkhism*, and Islamic *Muradiyahism*) or by *Holy Labor* (as in *Benedictism*).

Ascetic solutions seem to me not solutions of the problem so much as attempts to escape from it, to escape from the intolerable suffering which life inflicts on nearly everybody, and to shut out from consciousness the almost universal fear and horror of death and total extinction.

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Chrematistic Occupational Ideologies—All the solutions of the problem which fall into the category I think of as Chrematistic (from the Greek word *chrema*, meaning money) have in common devotion to the Hedonist doctrine that, living in the sort of world in which man finds himself and being the sort of animal

he is, his activities and occupations should be devoted to what is expressed by the ancient aphorism, "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die." Since it is money, in the modern world, which he must have if he is to enjoy "Wine, women and song," money he must have.

Among the practices and the doctrines which justify, or at least rationalize, this solution so far as means and methods are concerned are *Commercialism, Industrialism, Speculation, Venality, Predation, and Parasitism*; so far as ends and goals are concerned, *Urbanism, Conventionalism, Conformism and Neophilism* (being in the latest style both clothing-wise and culture-wise). The telic values sought by modern man occupationally (as occupations have been here defined) are sought by him not only in food and clothing, not only in furnishings and amusements, but also in the arts—in painting and sculpture, in music and poetry, in literature and architecture. Not what is excellent but what is novel and sensual is what occupies both his time and his thoughts.

The trouble with Chrematistic methods of dealing with the problem is that they are self-defeating; they provide pleasure, particularly novelty, up to a certain point, and then satiation and frustration make their appearance (sometimes with the victim aware of the fact but most often quite unconscious of it). It is an indubitable scientific fact that man cannot live sanely "by bread (sensate pleasure) alone." Most of the modern world, it is true, seems to be trying to do precisely that, but if the interpretation of human nature to which I believe the evidence points is valid, the price paid for this mistaken solution of the occupational problem is alienation and devotion to necrotic escapes—not only narcissistic escapes (*Gourmandism, Eroticism, Sybaritism*), but also sadistic escapes (*Violence and Belligerence*). Mistaken modern man not only destroys himself but nihilistically destroys others. The history of man in the twentieth century—certainly since the First World War when the Austrians and the Serbs, the Germans and the Russians, went on a rampage, and in the Second World War when the Germans in Europe and the Japanese on the other side of the globe started another such rampage—can be explained in terms of mankind's preoccupation with Chrematistic means and ends occupationally. Of course the modern Chrematistic explosion began long before when the

Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French empires began to subjugate the whole world. Today the lunacy continues, only now it is Communist revolutionists who, in the name of Historic and Dialectical Materialism, are conspiring and killing to create a Materialistic world-wide Utopia.

History, it seems to me, has been mainly made by Prophets and Ascetics (Jesus, Mohammed), or by power-crazed Tyrants (Hitler, Mussolini), or by money-crazed Plutocrats (Astor, Vanderbilt, Morgan, Rockefeller), with the Plutocrats manipulating those who ruled for them from behind the scenes. The economic interpretation of history seems to me Monistic and mistaken, but what is recorded on the pages of our histories since the Industrial Revolution does seem to lend itself to such an interpretation. Yet, in spite of this, I find nothing in the long history of mankind to indicate that either the Ascetic or Chrematistic solution of our problem is the valid one.

The contribution to history made since the first seizure of power (nearly fifty years ago in Russia) by Collective Chrematists (Communists) pursuing the ideal of Collective Affluence, when compared to that made during the last century by Individual Chrematists (Plutocrats) pursuing the ideal of Individual Affluence, has been just as ruthless and rapacious, just as bestial and bloody. There is no evidence indicating that Stalin and Mao, Tito and Sukarno, and the other leaders of the program for Collective Affluence, in spite of their professions of high ideals and their hearts bleeding for downtrodden mankind, are in fact any more humane—or themselves any less unhappy—than the Bourgeoisie they loathe.

Finally, there is nothing in the biographies of Tyrants (Alexander, Napoleon) or of Plutocrats (Cecil Rhodes, De Beers, Krupp, Stinnes) which indicates that either the political or the economic means of acquiring the maximum of material goods is a valid solution of the occupational problem.

As for the rank and file of mankind, though it is unfortunate that we have no biographies of the little successes and the little failures who devote their activities to the pursuit of wealth and the use of whatever money they can lay their hands on for "wine, women and song," there is plenty of evidence to indicate that what

it amounts to has been vividly described as "the rat race," the worship of the bitch-goddess Success, and "the life of quiet desperation" which Thoreau excoriated.

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Hygienic Occupational Ideologies—The Hygienic approaches to the solution of the problem (Hygienic, because they call for activities and vocations which make for both physical and mental health) scattered about in many practices and doctrines throughout all times and in all the cultures of mankind are probably most vividly embodied in the Confucian doctrine of *The Golden Mean*. Fra Wagner, on this side of the globe in France 2,500 years later, said much the same sort of thing about the problem in his little book, *The Simple Life*.

Among the vocational doctrines and practices which fall into this category of solutions are *Agrarianism*, *Domestic Economy* (Homesteading and Crofting), *Cottage Industry*, *Craft Production*, *Independence* and *Decentralism*, and *Cooperation*. Among the recreational doctrines are those which advocate such occupations as crafts, hobbies, and gardening, (horticulture, clericulture, viticulture, floriculture), nature and wildlife study and enjoyment (birds, flowers, herbs, mushrooms, valleys, mountains, plains, forests and landscapes, rivers and lakes, shores and seascapes, caves and waterfalls), and finally singing, music and other participatorial rather than spectatorial arts.

The contrast between these essentially Hygienic and Chrematistic vocations and avocations is made vivid when the occupational diseases of the modern industrial world are considered. We think of occupational diseases as only those involving some kind of physical injury (industrial accidents, lead poisoning, poisoning from cutting oils). We think not at all about the fact that hundreds of occupations today produce mental diseases just as bad—in its mildest form, boredom (which if prolonged long enough causes anything from alcoholism to neurosis), and in its aggravated form neurasthenias caused by stress and strain (in the office world, in contrast to the shop world, often causing stomach ulcers). Again, if prolonged long enough, these stresses lead to severe neurotic aberrations, one of the commonest being the kind of frenzied sexuality which so often breaks up modern homes.

There are plainly, if the evidence is carefully studied, normal or Hygienic occupations and abnormal Chrematistic or Ascetic occupations.

If all the knowledge now available, including that embodied in folklore and philosophy, religion and science (for the most part sciences dealing with subjects not remotely connected with occupations), were focussed on this problem, occupational norms would emerge which would free mankind from the blind dictates of occupational convention and the arbitrary dictates of occupational dogmas. These norms would enable us to determine the validity of every kind of labor and leisure, as well as the validity of every economic and political institution which man's occupations create and generate.

Four kinds of norms would emerge:

(1) It would become possible to distinguish between what is normal and abnormal *inhabitationally*.

It would become possible to distinguish between what is normal and abnormal in the occupations and activities loosely referred to as labor and leisure.

(2) In man's *vocations and avocations*—to the productive and creative life-sustaining and livelihood-sustaining activities of mankind.

(3) In his *recreations*—the time which should be devoted to activities which revive the spirit.

Finally, (4) in his *recuperational* "activities"—the time he devotes to eating, sleeping, and other "occupations" which revivify the body.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem X: The Occupational Problem

1. *Human Temperaments*—For a full discussion of this concept and an extensive bibliography dealing with it, see Problem I, the anthropic problem.

2. *Occupational Aptitudes*—As this term is used in this study, it refers to both inborn and acquired ability and capacity for learning and for doing a particular thing or things, both vocational or recreational in nature.

Aptitudes are both potential and developed; they are both quantitative (capacity) and qualitative (ability, skill, talent, genius, etc.); they tend to reflect inherited needs and acquired desires, aspirations, and ambitions.

3. *Occupational Necessities* prompt human beings to occupy themselves and to spend their time doing what they will to fulfill various inherited requirements of man as a species. They are both physical and mental, and reflect each person's limitations (sexual, age, etc.) as well as his potentialities. To fulfill his needs, each person's limitations must be occupationally respected and his potentialities utilized and realized.

4. *Occupational Desires*—In contrast to man's needs, his desires are all learned, conditioned, and acquired, but like his needs they too prompt him to occupy himself in particular ways. They reflect his aspirations and ambitions rather than his needs.

5. *Occupational Aptitudes versus Occupational Necessities*—Aptitudes display themselves in an individual's talents (the things he does with skill), and in the things he likes and desires to do. Since both of these are products of his training and conditioning, his education and his experiences, they can be changed by reconditioning and re-education. But occupational necessities, since they are inborn and inescapable, are unchangeable; they can be disregarded and suppressed, but nature exacts a toll for this in physical and mental ill-being and sometimes deadly morbidity. Every individual is under the necessity of eating, yet he can fast and starve himself to death. All women labor under the neces-

sity, and the limitations, imposed by their femininity; they must menstruate, they must gestate, they must suckle their children; failure to do any of these things has both physical and mental consequences of the utmost importance. The disregard of any limitations and necessities peculiar to either sex, and of those peculiar for each sex at one period in their life-cycle from another, similarly has both physical and mental consequence, the seriousness of which cannot be over-emphasized.

6. *Euthenia and Dysthenia, Eucrasia and Dyscrasia, Euphoria and Dysphoria*—These are essentially psycho-physiological concepts. I have tried to make the context in which they are used self-explanatory, but, for a full discussion of their meaning, see Problem IX, the psycho-physiological problem.

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PROBLEM XI.

Trusterty and Property: The Possessional Problem

For why? Because the good old rule
sufficeth them, the simple plan that they
should take, who have the power, and they
should keep, who can.—William Words-
worth, "Rob Roy's Grave."

Five facts with which every man and every society is confronted create what I think of as the possessional¹ problem:

1. The fact that mankind in order to live must consume things (food, clothing), must use things (houses), must have access to the natural resources of the Earth (fields, forests, land-sites, the seas).

2. The fact that so often two or more individuals or two or more groups or classes or tribes or nations want to use or consume the same thing, or to have access to the same natural resources at the same time to the exclusion of others.

3. The fact that in the effort to eliminate violent conflicts about the possession of things, every society adopts some system for establishing titles to things, some method of defining tenure in them, and some means for the orderly transfer of things from one person or party to another.

4. The fact that the failure to recognize the significance of the distinction between property and trusterty² is responsible for some of the worst as well as the most insidious forms of exploitation of man by man (slave by master), of class by class (the poor by the rich), of subjects by the State (Proudhon, Kropotkin, Tucker, Djilas).

5. Finally, the fact that resentment of exploitation, which has so often erupted into bloody revolution and so often been followed by bloody repression, is based upon a completely mistaken conception of the real nature of exploitation.

Exploitation—There are four conceptions of the nature of exploitation which it is essential to distinguish if the importance

of the possessional problem is to be realized, (1) *Delinquent Exploitation*, (2) *Disaster Exploitation*, (3) *Legalized (Political) Exploitation*, and (4) *Economic Exploitation*. Exploitation itself, as the term is here being used, refers to what the dictionary defines as the act of basely and illegitimately using another person to one's own advantage or profit. This is a good enough description of the process for our present purposes. What this makes perfectly clear is that exploitation, no matter how it takes place, is always a delinquency. No matter how respectable those who practice it, no matter how acceptable to custom, no matter how completely it is statutorily sanctioned, it is a breach of morality—a delinquency as that term has been defined in our statement of the ethical problem. It is always either a personal or an institutional evil, and very often both.

No decent human being excuses exploitation when it is practiced nakedly, greedily, and ruthlessly. But most quite decent human beings favor many subtle forms of it when it is rationalized and its real nature hidden. No form of it is pretty the moment it is stripped of its disguises and the reality they hide completely exposed. What is worse is the fact that so complete is our mis-education at this point that millions of people (and not only the rich) indulge in exploitation without the slightest realization of the fact that what they are doing is morally indefensible.

That a racketeer, who collects tribute from his victims, is engaged in a form of exploitation, everybody recognizes. That an employer, who takes advantage of his workers' fear of unemployment and underpays them, is engaged in another form of exploitation, almost everybody will recognize. That a dealer or a speculator during a time of great scarcity (during a war or a famine) who charges all that the traffic will bear (profiteers) is engaged in still another form of exploitation, almost everybody will also recognize. But that the members of a powerful labor union who take advantage of the monopoly of labor they enjoy and exact higher wages than they legitimately earn, or who furnish less than an honest day's labor for an honest day's pay, are also engaged in exploitation (and engaged not nearly as much in exploiting their employers as in exploiting the consuming public), is much more difficult to recognize. And such is our mis-education that a land-owner who takes advantage of the legal privilege

which ownership of land confers upon him and pays less than its economic-rent in taxes, or a land-speculator who sells his land and pockets the unearned increment this furnishes him, is also engaged in indefensible exploitation, is recognized only by a handful of the followers of Henry George.

The principle of *caveat emptor* is morally indefensible and should in any decent society be popularly recognized as immoral and in any decent State statutorily prohibited. No man has the moral right to sell anything to another and take advantage of the other's ignorance when he does so. If this sort of so-called economic exploitation is justifiable, as Social Darwinists maintain (in the dog-eat-dog world which they accept as inescapable), then stealing is equally acceptable, because that too is merely a form of dog-eat-dog. Neither is it justifiable in the Marxist conception of the world as a class-eat-class world. If taking advantage of the ignorance and gullibility, the weakness and the helplessness of the masses by the classes (the proletariat by the bourgeoisie) is unjustifiable, then wholesale instead of retail Social Darwinism is also indefensible. Yet this kind of Social Darwinism is being practiced in all Communist States as their Planning Commissions systematically exploit the peasantry for the benefit of industry and the whole population to promote the State's interests in destroying its rival Capitalist world. Co-existence by the Communist and the Capitalist world is a stratagem; it is a mere stratagem practiced by Communist States, and practiced by them with ruthless disregard of the economic exploitation of their own people which this makes necessary.

Disaster Exploitation—What I am calling disaster exploitation is, like all exploitation, possible in any kind of society or State, but it differs from other forms of exploitation in that in free economies it seems like economic exploitation. Any kind of exploitation of a personal or a social mishap—of a calamity, cataclysm or catastrophe⁴—in which any person or persons take advantage of the victim or victims of a disaster of any kind, even though it has the appearance of a voluntary transaction or of a contract freely entered into, is not only immoral but should be illegal. Its immorality has been long recognized (the story of Isaac and Esau) and under certain circumstances its illegality has also been quite often recognized—during a declaration of a state

of emergency (as a result of a catastrophe such as a flood), or during a famine or a war (when government rationing or price-fixing is authorized). Statutory law lags for the most part far behind popular recognition of the essential immorality of this kind of exploitation (it has been called profiteering to distinguish it from ordinary profit-taking). Unfortunately, it takes place whenever any individual is greedy enough and ruthless enough to take advantage of the misfortunes of people in emergencies of a disastrous nature.

Legalized Exploitation—Albert Jay Nock is entitled to the credit, I believe, for making a distinction between what he called the political means of making money and the economic. The distinction is a cogent one but its meaning is not clear, because it does not in its very terminology make clear what is meant by "political means" and because his dichotomy omits recognition of the enormous importance of the concepts (and the facts to which they refer) which I call delinquency and disaster exploitation. What he calls the political means, I call legalized exploitation. What he calls the economic means includes not only legitimate means of making money but also delinquent and disaster exploitation.

Legalized exploitation (the political means of exploitation) is made possible, and only possible, by grants of special privileges or monopolies legalized by the statutes or constitutions of States. Not only do States legalize exploitation in this way, but it confers upon the exploiters (along with the legal right to exploit) the right to call upon the State for its power to force recalcitrant victims of their exploitation to "render unto Caesar" what they are legally entitled to receive.

Because it is legal, and because what is legal is identified with what is right, everybody (including the exploiters themselves) are taught by our educational system that these institutionalized forms of exploitation are beyond legitimate criticism.

Economic Exploitation—All profit-takers, all interest-takers, all rent-takers; all those Capitalists (petty as well as mighty) who in any way retain any of what Marxians call the surplus-value of production, are engaged in what they call Capitalist expropriation. This, of course, is nonsense; it has no basis when factually

considered if by expropriation is meant what I am calling economic exploitation. Economic exploitation, as distinguished from legalized exploitation, is not involved in normal profit-taking provided the source of the income is in itself earned and not unearned, (as we shall see when we come to Problem XIV—the Distribution Problem). So-called Economic exploitation begins only when profit-taking is abused, as it is (1) when it comes into existence as a result of the possession of a legal grant; (2) when it comes into existence as a result of non-productive (really delinquent) speculation, (by what used to be called regrading, forestalling, and engrossing); and (3) when it comes into existence by taking advantage of the scarcity created by a catastrophe—by war, famine, by fire and flood.

But the very concept of profit-taking is a misnomer; what is thoughtlessly called *profit-taking* is actually *profit-and-loss taking*. In an approximately free economy, the excess of profits over losses amounts to not much more than what is earned from undertaking enterprises in which entrepreneurial capital and entrepreneurial labor is employed and risked. For this entrepreneurs are entitled to a return (profit) which, in a genuinely free economy, competition limits and prevents from becoming exploitative.

But whether called expropriation or whether called economic exploitation, the conception itself is a mystique; it refers to something which does not exist, has never existed, and cannot exist. It is a fiction taken for fact because exploitation or expropriation of this kind is always in reality either legalized, disaster, or delinquent exploitation. No man can take advantage of another in any kind of economic transaction unless either the law permits or authorizes him to do so, he cheats his victim, or he takes advantage of his victim's ignorance or misfortune. And no class can exploit another class "economically" unless the law again permits it and the State authorizes it to do so. What we have then is not a free economy but a corrupt and servile State.

Exploitation, however, (which is the doing of something which is always immoral but which is not always illegal), takes place in any kind of society and every kind of State, Capitalist or Communist, whether open or closed, servile or free, partly tainted or entirely corrupt. Perhaps the Anarchists are right; perhaps

all States, including Capitalist and Communist States, are like that!

In so-called free economies, exploitation frequently has all the appearance of economic exploitation when in fact it consists of a breach of morals and frequently a breach of law. When there are no statutes which forbid a particular kind of exploitation, it is a mistake to call it economic exploitation; what it is in fact, is the exploitation of a defect in the legal code or the indifference or corruption of public officials. There is, for instance, inexcusable exploitation today here in America in the manner in which people are fooled by business (including the biggest of businesses) and by special interests with advertising and salesmanship about the quality, the purity, and even the quantity of goods they buy, (dairymen in colouring "butter," labor union members in "feather bedding," business in adulterating or in selling positively harmful products cosmetics, detergents, pesticides, chemical fertilizers, cigarettes, drug preparations).

Exploitation and Law—In terms of moral law, exploitation, no matter what its form, is immoral; technically it is what I have called a delinquency. In common and statutory law it is in fact what today is called a tort or delict. A tort is an offence for which the offender can be sued for redress and damages by his victim; it is considered a private, in contrast to a public crime. Perpetrators of torts are not subject to arrest and prosecution as are criminals. But there is often no substantial difference between the damages suffered by the victims of so-called economic exploitation and the damages suffered by the victims of judicially recognized torts.

The fact that the perpetrators of recognized torts are subject to suits at law exerts a definite restraint upon those who are tempted to perpetrate them. If the victims of so-called economic exploitation could similarly sue the perpetrators of such delinquencies, an army of lawyers would begin to sue exploiters and very soon a powerful restraint upon the temptation to exploit would develop. There have been, of course, a few cases of this sort; recently one of the victims of cigarette smoking who was dying of lung cancer sued for damages the cigarette manufacturer whose brand he had smoked all his life. But in all such cases the courts have uniformly held in favor of the exploiters without giving any consideration to the interests of the exploited.

That of course has been due to the fact that the legal concept of torts and delicts goes back to the common law and back to the time when the law was primarily interpreted in the interests of the haves rather than the have-nots. Today it is blind adherence to precedent which prevents courts of equity from recognizing the truism that exploitation of any kind is in fact a tort.

Granted that it may be difficult, as in the case of exploitation of the cigarette smoking public's ignorance, to determine the damage inflicted upon a particular victim. But the fact is that that would be no more difficult than is the case today in determining the damages suffered by women in breach-of-promise cases.

The law, some cynic said, is an ass.

* * * *

Negative versus Positive Possessions—Something in the nature of an addendum is required before leaving the subject of exploitation. And this addendum should be borne in mind in reading the definition of the concept of possession which follows.

There are such things as negative possessions. An individual—a man or an enterprise—may not only possess nothing, but may be the possessor of negative possessions. Debts are the most obvious of negative possessions but by no means the only kind.

Debtors are natural subjects for exploitation. But those debtors (installment buyers, mostly, in the United States) who find themselves possessing negative possessions of this kind because of their own folly are not entitled to much sympathy at our hands. It is the masses of hard-working propertyless peasants throughout the world (including those in the Communist world), who are helpless victims of the institutionalization of negative possessions, who are entitled to sympathy and concern at our hands. There are, of course, many other kinds of institutionalized and legalized negative possessions. It is the exploitation made possible by the legalization of unjust systems of land tenure, unjust money-systems, and usually both, which enables landlords and money-lenders in the non-Communist world and dictators and bureaucrats in the Communist world to exploit both the landless peasant and the landless farm worker. Of course not only the landless farmers and farm workers, but also the landless surplus laborers in our cities (Marx began the business of calling them

the proletariat) are victimized by the fact that they are impoverished by their negative possessions.

In reading the definition of the concepts of property and trusterty below, the concept of negative possession should therefore be kept in mind—the negative possessions of those who have had accidents and disasters; those who are the victims of their own greed, folly, and miseducation; those who are exploited by ruthless business men, bureaucrats, and racketeers, and not only the negative possessions of those who are the victims of legalized and institutionalized evils. All these are handicapped by their negative possessions, as those, in contrast, are advantaged who possess the positive possessions which will now be described.

* * * *

Property versus Trusterty—The possessional problem has a terrible urgency at this time. Two conflicting ideologies about how it should be dealt with, *both of them wrong*, have split the world into two conflicting blocs, Communist and non-Communist, which have already plunged the world into wars and revolutions and which threaten to keep on doing so for an indefinite time. For if the four-fold definition of exploitation which I have submitted is valid—if it fits the realities involved—then the Communist solution is patently immoral, and the solution which prevails in the rest of the world is equally (if not so patently) immoral.

Unfortunately both of them “work.” By the pragmatic test, both of them are valid. But there is nothing new in that. As a solution of the labor problem, slavery we now see is patently immoral, but it worked, for slavery provided the labor which built not only most of the awe-inspiring structures of the earliest civilizations (the Pyramids and Temples of Egypt, the Acropolis in Greece, the Forum in Rome) but also provided most of the labor which sustained mankind until a few hundred years ago. What this proves is only that the pragmatist’s test of what is true and what is valid, by itself, is not nearly as reliable as its proponents believe.

Back of both of these mistaken solutions of this great basic problem is the failure of so-called social scientists and social reformers to make an adequate study of the nature of possessions. Instead of using the scientific method in determining what posses-

sions in reality are, both have taken them for granted and jumped to mistaken conclusions about them, the classical economists maintaining that everything should be treated as private property, and the Marxian economists that nothing should be. Possessions, however, fall into two ultimate categories, one of which has been properly called property, the other of which has not even been named but treated as if it too were property. This second basic category I have for years called trusterty. As long as this distinction is ignored by custom, by law, by education, and by social scientists and social reformers, the present confusion will continue, and the present threat of revolution and war continue to harrow us. When finally the truth about the distinction is recognized, right solutions of the problem too will be recognized.

* * * *

All discussion of the problem as it is at present conducted is rendered absurd by the simple failure to recognize that the problem is not a Monistic but a Pluralistic one; that there is not just one kind of possession, (which economists call wealth) but at least eight kinds, five of which are property and three trusterty. The law nowhere today recognizes this distinction, and economics adds confusion to the existing mischief by its failure to classify possessions of all kinds systematically and scientifically—by its failure to treat scientifically the very thing about which the quarrel between Communists and Capitalists rages.

Property—The five categories of possessions which are clearly property include:

1. *Consumption Goods* (food, clothing, shelter);
2. *Capital Equipment* (factories and machinery, barns and livestock, raw materials, merchandise);
3. *Claims* (coins, paper money, notes, mortgages, bonds, accounts receivable);
4. *Creative Assets*, the intangible assets consisting of inventions, literary compositions, formulas, good-will (created by the satisfactory conduct of an enterprise or a professional practice), and other assets of the same essential nature;
5. *Inherent Assets*, characteristics of human beings which are inherent—strength, skill, diligence, integrity, craftsmanship, artistic and professional ability.

Because all five of these categories of things are basically created or produced by individual human labor, individual human initiative and individual human thrift, they are all things to which it is possible to establish a morally valid title; they are the only things which can be morally treated as property. But this is not true of many things which either come into existence as a by-product of the activities of societies as a whole or are not created by man at all, things which are in effect the gifts of nature to all mankind.

* * * *

Trusterty—The three category of possessions which cannot be morally treated as property and which I think of as trusterty include:

6. *Human beings* (children, wives, husbands, serfs, slaves);
7. *Natural Resources* (land, the atmosphere, rivers, lakes, seas, natural forests, the mineral resources of the Earth);
8. *Legal Grants* (some legitimate in nature, others illegitimate); they include all grants of land and other natural resources (patents and deeds to land, to mines, to forests, to the atmosphere, to the seas); the right to eminent domain (franchises to railroads, power companies, telephone companies and other public utilities); benefices, honors, sinecures, licenses, monopolies, tariffs, quotas, import and export permits, permits for foreign exchange and other special privileges.

Because none of these three kinds of possessions come into existence as a result of human labor, they cannot be morally owned; they can only be granted in trust and held in trust—if they can be honestly granted at all. They remain what they actually are, trusterty, even though treated today as property by law and considered property by people generally. Many of these grants are morally indefensible; the State should neither have made them nor legalized ownership of them; they are acts of malfeasance morally no matter how legal in terms of positive law. In terms of the moral law they are stolen property; the State stole them first (read the history of how the United States acquired title to the land it has been granting by patent to the people of the United States since it originally obtained title to them by “the law of conquest”). No matter how honest subsequent transfers of the

titles to land from those to whom they were first granted, they remain stolen property. The Indians, even when they signed treaties granting title to "their" land at the point of the white men's guns, insisted they had no right to "sell" the land. "Land," they said, "cannot be sold; it is the gift of the Great Spirit given to them and to their children to use, not to sell."

Few things in the sad history of States have been responsible for more shameless inhumanity by man to man than the history of some of these possessions acquired by "discovery" and "conquest."

If the great vision of a free society (Paine's, Jefferson's, Acton's, Gandhi's) finally disappears, as it is fading from the consciousness of mankind from day to day, one of the reasons for it will be the gross mis-education of mankind about the possessional problem.

The problem is really three-fold; it has to do with *title*, the ownership of property, real or personal, and the right to its enjoyment to the exclusion of others; *tenure*, the terms on which property or trusterty can be held; and *transfer* by the owner from himself to another, including the right of donation and bequest. But the clarification of the problem of title, reduces the problems of tenure and transfer largely to questions of technique.

* * * *

Man has had to do something about the possessional problem from the moment the first man found something (nuts, fruit), killed something (animals, fish), captured something (cattle, horses, prisoners), or made something (axes, baskets, pottery, clothing) which other men wanted. If all the solutions of the problem are classified systematically and scientifically in accordance with our only three sources of ultimate knowledge, three basically different types emerge; the Supernal solutions I think of as Covenantal ideologies (covenants between God and man); the Objective solutions as Power ideologies (doctrines of might), and the Intellectual solutions as Probital ideologies (doctrines of right). Some of these solutions can only be implied from the study of human behavior and human practices, many of which have been rationalized in elaborate ideologies; a few of them, but enough of them, can be vindicated by right-reason to make it apparent that

the problem can be dealt with justly and intelligently, if the determining number of people are rightly-educated.

* * * *

Covenantal Possessional Ideologies—Few religions have any very definite doctrine about the problem; many of even the higher religions tend merely to accept the solution prevailing at the time in the culture in which they were first launched or to which they subsequently spread, perhaps for the reason for which Marx condemned them, that they tend merely to rationalize the *status quo* (opium for the people!). This is apparent even from the implications of the teachings of Jesus, who said, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" without raising the question of whether Caesar was rightly entitled to what he called his. When Jesus said, "Sell all thou hast and distribute it among the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven, and come, follow me," he likewise never raised the question of whether the poor, to whom the rich man might transfer his title to his riches, are morally any more entitled to them than the rich man himself.

There are, of course, plenty of exceptions, naturally enough, considering the number of religions and the number of denominations in each religion. Each religion tends to develop a complete ideology of its own. Many include in it some sort of possessional doctrine; most of them are represented as a sort of covenant between God (who created the Earth) and man, who must use and possess it.

The Jewish Doctrine of Land Possession—The basis of such a covenant about land is suggested in the Book of Leviticus: "The earth hath the Lord given to the children of men." It should not, however, be treated as a permanent possession, since it remains in fact the Lord's: "The land shall not be sold forever; for the land is Mine; for ye are strangers and sojourners with Me." To ensure this, all the land should be redistributed every fifty years:

And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto you, and ye shall return every man unto his possession (there should be a distribution of land so that every man receive what every man originally possessed) and ye shall return every man unto his family (every enslaved or bound servant should be freed).

Franciscanism—Acceptance of the *status quo* so far as the law of property is concerned is implicit in what Jesus said, but out of what he explicitly said grew the possessional doctrine I think of as Franciscanism—abnegation and renunciation of property on the one hand, and altruism and philanthropy in disposing of it on the other. But Franciscanism never became the dominating doctrine of Christendom, and Christians continued to hold their possessions (even great possessions) with complete indifference to the doctrine.

Title by Sacred Fiat—The Roman Catholic Church, with its genius for accepting completely irreconcilable doctrines, developed and practiced, in spite of St. Francis, a property doctrine which I think of as Title by Sacred Fiat. In its heyday, it vested in the Pope the power of Paramount Grantor of the whole Earth. It was on the basis of this doctrine that the Pope divided the New World which Columbus discovered into two parts and granted title to what he thought half of it to the crown of Portugal and the other half to that of Spain.

The Reformation did not eliminate the contradiction; Protestantism permitted the accumulation of property but at the same time and in varying degrees accepted—in principle but rarely in practice—the idea of Stewardship. The doctrine has been revived today in an entirely different context in India and called *Sarvodaya*. But unless teeth are put into the doctrine by Statute, property-owners in India will continue little disturbed by its advocates. Only when the sanctity of private property is threatened by changes in positive law are property-owners much disturbed. It is because Socialism and Communism not merely threaten to change the law but either by legislation or by revolution have in many States already changed it that they are so frightening to property-owners.

Sarvodaya—For over a hundred years only one social movement currently important—Socialism—has dealt radically with the possessional problem as a whole. Today only one social movement of importance, in India, is offering a fresh and creative alternative to the Socialist proposal. (Georgism unfortunately concentrates on the land question only). In India, if nowhere else, a dialogue is being carried on about how to eliminate the exploitation for which the prevailing system of dealing with property, in

the Capitalist world, is rightfully being condemned. The Socialist proposal (which I am calling Populism in this study) proposes expropriation of all property now in the possession of private owners (Social Democracy with compensation, Communism with outright confiscation) and ownership of all property by the State, on the naive assumption that the State is identical with the public as a whole. The Sarvodayist's proposal calls for no confiscation, and not even for any legislative action, but merely for the substitution of trusteeship for ownership, with existing owners acting both as settlers and trustees⁵ for the property they own.

Two quite different movements, one social and educational (the Sarva Seva Sangh) and the other political (the Swatantra Party) are promoting Sarvodaya.

The Sarva Seva Sangh calls for a complete conversion of property-owners to what is in substance a perfectionist principle. Typical of this was Vinoba Bhave's movement for *bhoodan* (voluntary surrender of surplus land by the landed to the landless) and for *gramdan* (voluntary pooling of all the land owned by both large and small landowners in a whole village). Gramdan has been realized in a few of the half million villages of India, as something similar was realized voluntarily in some of the pioneer settlements in Israel. Bhoodan developed dramatically for a time, but both bhoodan and gramdan have died down as Vinoba Bhave became unable to provide inspiration for the movement. Mass conversions of this kind take place only as long as there are charismatic figures such as Vinoba Bhave's—sages, saints, apostles, prophets, whatever they be called—to inspire them, though they are also inspired by charismatic events (such as the Zionist re-establishment of a Jewish homeland).

The Swatantra (Freedom) Party, on the other hand, calls for the realization of Sarvodaya by the abandonment by the State of the present movement toward Socialism and the substitution for it of a free economy in which statutory hindrances to voluntary economic action would be abolished. To avoid the sort of Social Darwinism to which reversion to conventional Capitalism would lead, the party has adopted the principle of Sarvodaya.

Sarvodaya has its source in Gandhi's idea that property should not be held for the aggrandizement and gratification of its owners,

but to help those who are either propertyless or have so little that they live below a decent level of subsistence.

Sarvodaya predicates its approach to the problem upon the assumption that human nature is not innately greedy; that existing teachings, customs, and statutes which stimulate greed and gratification should be abandoned and eliminated, and the population generally conditioned to obtain satisfaction in life from other interests and activities than the accumulation of riches.

Cynical modern man, including most modern social scientists, will promptly dismiss this as not only utopian but also as based upon a utopian conception of human nature. But that it is utopian in nature is not to its discredit if to the utopian ideal is added a program of practical change which will make it possible to realize the ideal.

Certainly if most property owners treated their property as if it were in fact theirs only in trust, that would mean a social change so great as to be revolutionary. But the hope for such a conversion seems to me remote unless accompanied by drastic changes in positive law where existing statutes enter into the picture. To make possible the realization of the ideal at which Sarvodaya aims, three possessional reforms seem to me essential—an honest system of land tenure, an honest money-system, an honest investiture system—a system of legal grants free from any and every kind of special privilege.

The concept of social trusteeship, which these reforms would begin to make possible, has been attributed to Edmund Burke. In a speech in 1783 in the House of Commons, he said that "all political power which is set over men. . . ought to be in some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit," and that "every species of political dominion and every description of commercial privilege. . . are all in the strictest sense trusts."

* * * *

*Power Possessional Ideologies*¹⁰—Prevailing solutions of the problem today, both in the Capitalist and the Communist world (which have prevailed almost everywhere from the time the first State was established), are all based upon the practice of title creation by might. They are arbitrary power solutions. A less invidious term for might might be fiat. All are sanctioned by

statutory law, and back of the law sanctioning them is the might of the State.

There is much in the solution of the problem by might, and in the whole idea of action on the basis of might, which appeals to the practical man (What's wrong with it? It works, doesn't it?) But the practical man is usually practical only in the short run and rarely in the long. He isn't much interested in questions of ethics. Yet Henry George, who back in the 1890's said the time would come, if nothing was done about setting up an honest system of land tenure, that the whole property system would be abolished by Socialism, is being vindicated. The trouble with the solution of the problem of possession by might, no matter how apparently practical and no matter how profitable to those who are its beneficiaries, is that it can neither be vindicated in moral terms nor in terms of what is most humane in human nature.

It can only be vindicated, as Wordsworth put it, "Because the good old rule sufficeth them, the simple plan that they should take who have the power, and they should keep, who can."

Privatism versus Populism—Clear and explicit discussion of the two principal doctrines and ideologies dealing with the possessional problem which are at issue during this period of revolution throughout the world is impossible with the terminology now being used. Every one of the terms commonly used (such as Capitalism and Socialism) have been used to designate such a wide variety of theories, doctrines, and practices that no one using them can be quite certain what is being referred to when they are used. To designate the two principal opposed ideas dealing with possessions, it is therefore necessary to find two terms which are not now being used, which by their derivation denote the doctrine to which they refer, and by their connotation suggest it. If no attention were paid to the phonic problem, the two terms ought to be Private-Propertyism and Public-Propertyism, but taking both phonics and linguistics into account, I am suggesting the use of Privatism and Populism. Until someone comes along with something better, these are the terms I will use.

Privatism—To designate the doctrine that possessions should be privately owned, the term *private property* is a misnomer because the term *property* has a distinct meaning at law entirely

opposed to the concept of trusterty or to the presently accepted concept of trusteeship. Capitalism is even a greater misnomer; it not only refers to a whole ideology in which private property is only one item, but it is a misnomer to use the term *capital*, because capital is a technical economic term with a much more specific and a much narrower meaning (wealth used to produce more wealth) than the all-inclusive meaning associated with the term Capitalism. Not only that, but the ideology of Capitalism assumes that no such thing as trusterty exists, and that human beings, land and natural resources, legal grants and privileges are essentially the same as tools and machinery, as coal and other fuels, and corn and other commodities.

The doctrine which needs designation (which I am calling Privatism), maintains that all of every kind of possession (both real and personal property), in fact all the possessions in the eight basic categories I have described, should be owned by private persons, by partnerships, or by companies the members or shareholders of which consist of private persons. To this it concedes that there has to be one exception; it concedes to the public as a whole, organized as a State, the power to own everything it needs, directly and indirectly, to exercise police power⁶.

Privatism is plainly both a Monistic and a Power doctrine. It takes ownership for granted, as a condition given; it not only makes no inquiry as to its moral validity but not even any inquiry as to its economic utility. It is from beginning to end a rationalization (not a ratiocination) of the factors involved. And its Monism makes it absurd. To justify having everything privately owned, including what should plainly be held in trust (for instance, radio and TV licenses, public utility franchises, in fact any kind of grant of any kind of special privilege), its proponents must enact all sorts of qualifications upon ownership, of which regulation by commissions set up by the states and nation, and zoning by planning boards set up by municipalities, are typical.

At best Privatism is based upon a half-truth: most, but not all, kinds of possessions should be privately owned. But much the same sort of thing can be said about Populism: some possessions should be publicly owned (streets and highways, for instance).

This then is the truth about Privatism and all the various doctrines in which it is maintained that possessions should be privately owned; they are half-right, or somewhat more than half-right, quantitatively. And this is the truth about the six different theories, doctrines and practices called *Capitalism—Classic, Historic, Predatory, Privileged, Competitive, and Decentralist*. And it is also the truth about *Distributism* and *Individualism*, about *Patrilinearism* and *Matrilinearism*, about *Helotism* and *Servilism*, about *Consumer (Rochdalist) Cooperation* and *Producer (Owenist) Cooperation*, and about *Feudalism* and *Alodialism*.

Populism—The possessional doctrine, which is the antithesis of Privatism, maintains that all and every kind of property (both real and personal) should be owned by the public as a whole; that this ownership should be vested in a sovereign State, in subdivisions of such a State, or in some other agency (guild, syndicate) able to call upon such a State for the police power essential to its functioning. For police power will have to be used for the acquisition, for the operation of "the means of production and distribution," and for the withholding of the property with which it will be, in legal terms, "seized" from those who would otherwise re-appropriate it. To this sweeping possessional principle, Populism (both in theory and wherever it has been practiced) admits one exception—paraphernalia, consumption goods, and capital equipment purchased and used for the consumption of a family or to provide for its consumption, may be privately owned.

Here are a few of the most important of the multiplicity of Populist possessional doctrines and ideologies: *Municipal Ownership, Welfare Statism, Socialism, Christian Socialism, Syndicalism, Democratic Socialism, Communism, Marxism, National Socialism (Hitlerism); Fascism (Mussolini-ism), Falangism (Franco-ism and Salazar-ism), Collectivism, Communitarianism, Guild Socialism, State Capitalism, Technocracy, Compulsory Unionism*.

Populism, like Privatism, is both a Monistic and a Power doctrine; Populism simply stands Privatism on its head. In place of prescribing that everything should be privately owned, it prescribes that it should all be publicly owned, and instead of using the police power to protect private owners in the possession of

their property, it uses it to prevent anybody (other than the State) from owning any of it.

Being Monistic, it can be criticized for the same error which Privatism makes—it fails to distinguish what is property from what is trusterty, and it fails therefore to distinguish between what can and should be privately owned, what can only be held in trust, and what—since it belongs to the whole of humanity—can neither be owned nor held by anybody.

By the acid test of validity—is it in accord with the facts? is it based upon truth or error?—neither Privatism nor Populism is valid. Neither recognize that no private person can show an honest title to any kind of trusterty no matter how much a statute may declare the title to be legal, and that no State, no matter how powerful, can show an honest title to anything. A private person may buy land or buy a slave (both trusterty) from another person who is the legal owner of such so-called property, and pay for them what they are fully and fairly worth, but this no more provides him with an honest title to them than buying any other kind of stolen goods cancels out the right and interest of the original and rightful owner or owners of it. A State may be “seized” of all “the means of production and distribution” in the territory over which it exercises sovereignty, but no matter how acquired, even if purchased from the present owners without revolutionary expropriation or statutory confiscation (but purchased with the proceeds of taxation), can still show no honest title to it. It cannot, as a matter of fact, show honest title even to the territory and the people over which it exercises sovereignty because these can be only held in trust. And no sovereign State can show a deed of trust properly executed to anything, firstly because it is sovereign (a sovereign State being a usurpation to begin with) and secondly because different kinds of trusterty can only be honestly held by different kinds of paramount grantors (each one specifically limited to the granting of one kind of trusterty).

The basic mistaken assumption which is used to justify and rationalize every kind of Populism was stated by Marx and Engels to be that private persons cannot show title either in whole or in part to any kind of “capital,” because all capital is “socially”

produced. The trouble with all the apologists for Populism, no matter what it is called, is that they know nothing about either general accounting or cost accounting, (as we shall see when we consider problems XII and XIII, the production and distribution problems). And this, for either an economist or a social reformer, is a fatal flaw from which proceeds either the rationalization I have called Privatism or the one I am calling Populism.

Feudalism and Alodialism—The Feudal approach to the problem of the possession of land vests it in fees, feuds, fiefs, or heritable estates which range in size and degree from that of a mere free man's holding to that of a king's. The holder of the fee was a vassal, the grantor of the fee his lord. The vassal was anything from a churl to a king; churls and other freemen themselves could hold a fee but could have no vassals; vassals—from earls, thanes, or barons up to kings—always held their fees from a superior lord; the only lord who had no superior—who was considered the paramount grantor—was supposed to be in (theory) the Emperor of the whole world. In Christendom this was the subject of a great historic struggle between the Ghibelines or Caesaropopists, who maintained that the Emperor was paramount, and the Pontifexists or Guelphs, who maintained that even the Emperor was a vassal of the Pope whose paramouncy as grantor of possession or dominion over any part of the globe derived from the fact that he was the Vicar of God on the Earth. No such issue arose in the ancient Roman Empire, where the Pontifex Maximus knew his place, nor in the Chinese Empire, where the Emperor himself was supposed to be the Son of Heaven.

Feudal tenure in dealing with the problem survives today only faintly even in the most undeveloped regions of the Earth, though in practice it exists even in nations which have in law shifted to alodial tenure. (In Latin American nations, for instance). It has been everywhere replaced either by alodial possession (absolute ownership by individuals) in all so-called Capitalist States, or by nationalization or State possession (absolute ownership by the State with no individual owners) in all Communist States.

Alodialism, if the ownership of the land is widely distributed,

is unquestionably a much more humane system of dealing with the problem, than Feudalism. Yet it remains basically dishonest, since no amount of legalization of absolute ownership can provide honest title to any portion of the Earth. In practice, however, Alodialism has introduced other social and economic evils (land pre-emption and speculation, for instance) which are so subtle in nature that they are unrecognized by most economists. Nationalization or Communization of the land, which is supposed to do away with the evils of Alodialism, is actually worse, because it makes it possible for the State to exploit the whole farming population for the benefit of the urban and industrial population, and this is being ruthlessly practiced by the most contemptible kind of Communist hypocrites who rationalize their tyranny by saying it is all for the ultimate benefit of future generations. With alodial tenure, the evil is at least diluted if the land is held by many owners. But with State ownership, the farming population is reduced to a new and more terrible species of serfdom with the State taking the place of all feudal lords.

Unfortunately the fact that alternative solutions exist, incomparably superior in terms of justice and efficiency to either Alodialism and Communism, is ignored; no consideration, for instance is given to such solutions as the Jewish "year of jubilee"; the Chinese theory of Mencius dating back over two thousand years; Thomas Paine's doctrine for dealing with it, published at the time of the American Revolution; nor to Henry George's solution. George undoubtedly traced the ramifications of the evils of Alodialism more searchingly than any other great social reformer and developed a far more ingenious and far more practical method of dealing with it. What he suggested was simply that, without expropriating existing owners (which would inflict inexcusable injuries upon many innocent owners), the ground rent and the unearned increment be collected by the State in lieu of taxes. Nothing demonstrates more clearly how unscientific the sciences of economics and of politics are than the almost complete ignorance and indifference of the intellectual leadership of mankind today to what George formulated and what his followers have vainly sought to have put into practice.

Free Labor and Servile Labor—Labor, like capital, is property. And the problem with labor, as with capital, is the same:

who is rightfully entitled to own it? In the final analysis, every imaginable answer to this question falls into two categories, one of which I think of as Free Labor and the other Servile. But whether Free or Servile, it remains property; it is in my terminology an inherent asset of every individual human being, and therefore properly ownable.

To those who may find it difficult to think of labor as ownable, it is helpful to bear in mind that slavery was not limited to the ownership of manual workers. Slaves ranged all the way from mere ox-like farm laborers to teachers and artists, housekeepers and mechanics, and even intellectual giants like Epicurus.

All the answers to the question in which the laborer owns himself, fall into the category I think of as Free. All those answers in which either someone else owns him, or some one else in some way qualifies or controls his exclusive ownership of himself, I think of as Servile (the essence of ownership being exclusion, no laborer owns himself if any other person, natural or artificial, in any way qualifies the laborer's exclusive ownership of himself).

In genuinely free States, everybody (except those who are in fact incompetent and therefore wards rather than responsible persons) would be recognized by statutory or constitutional law as owning themselves, including of course all laborers. In States (whether called free or not) in which this is not true, and everybody's ownership of himself, or ownership of some special class of persons (like laborers) is not both in law and in practice a fact, there is not Free but Servile Labor. In principle, if my classification of all human beings as trusterty and all labor as property is valid, every normal and mature person should own his own labor, and his labor be free from any degree of ownership by others. In practice, this has rarely been true; at various times Servile Labor has ranged all the way from those called slaves, to those today called comrades.⁷

For it is ironic that Servile Labor, which was supposed to have disappeared with the disappearance of Feudalism and the final defeat of the proponents of slavery in the United States, is being re-introduced not only in the new Communist States but

also in Socialist and Welfare States. How far this has gone in the United States is shown by the fact that only those states in the union which have expressly enacted "right to work" laws recognize that compulsory unionism involves a denial of the right of the laborer to freely own and dispose of his own labor. The fact that the members of the union for the most part willingly subject themselves to the overlordship of the officers of unions, because they believe it pays them to do so, explains why they do so but does not justify it.

During the colonial period, there used to be something called indentured labor. The colonists would "buy" this labor from the ship-owners who brought it over by the ship-load; it consisted of men who had "sold" themselves for a period of years for the price of passage from England to America. The fact that they thought surrender of their freedom for a period of years worth the price of passage again explains but does not justify indentured labor. Such labor is now forbidden by a statute which forbids the importation of what it calls "contract" labor. Something very much akin to indentured labor is now developing with compulsory unionism, with the unions "selling" the labor of their members, and the employers "buying" it. But where the "right to work" today has been abrogated and compulsory unionism legalized, the "ownership" of their labor by the unions is not temporary, as with the owners of indentured labor, but permanent.

Before the great waves of immigrants engulfed American labor at the turn of the century, even American labor took pride in being independent, self-sufficient, and able to take care of itself in the "land of opportunity." These values are now "dated"; "belonging" is what counts today.

Equally ironic is the fact that the actual effect of the establishment of Communist States upon labor has been the substitution of what is in effect "State-slavery" for what the Communists call "wage-slavery" and condemn as intolerable in the Capitalist world. Calling it State-slavery does not really exaggerate what is involved. With Communism the State becomes the actual if not the titular owner of everything and everybody, including labor. Calling everybody a comrade sounds better than calling him a serf or slave but does not much alter the facts. Since the Com-

munist State has the sole right to employ anybody, since it has the sole right of determining what they are to be paid and what and how much work they are to do, labor along with everybody else loses the exclusive right of self-ownership—exclusion again being the essence of ownership.

Finally the fact that, as with compulsory unionism, it can be argued that labor voluntarily accepts its subjection to the dictatorial apparatus of the Communist State, again explains but does not justify the legal treatment of human beings as property instead of trusterty.

Securism and Venturism—We need two terms with which to designate two distinct possessional doctrines and practices, for neither of which have I been able to find any existing designations. Yet they are both widely taught and widely practiced. I am therefore suggesting the use of Securism to designate the doctrine that every human being should possess security, and Venturism to designate the doctrine that every human being should possess (and perhaps even be possessed by) the spirit of adventure. Different as they are, they have in common the fact they are both methods with which power is expressed, security providing a static form of power, and venture a dynamic. Both of them are inherent assets, characteristics of human beings rather than tangible possessions, though tangible possessions of various kinds contribute and are to a degree involved in their realization.

Securism maintains that every individual, and all those dependent upon them, should feel free from fear and anxiety with regard to immediate needs and desires but also with regard to the future, the future here referring not only to one life-time but their offspring—their children and their children's children; and that the individual should devote himself to acquiring (or maintaining if already possessed) the tangible possessions which will make this possible.

There are, however, three different methods of providing this security, and it is important to distinguish between them: individual, familial, and social.

(1) The first assumes that the problem is providing each individual with individual security. This leads logically to the atomization of possessions and ultimately to the atomization of

society. It assumes that every individual can and should provide himself with security by acquiring assets which he individually owns sufficient to relieve him of fear and anxiety about his individual future. But interpreted in completely individualistic terms, this leads to a species of Social Darwinism in which wives, children, and aged parents are ignored on the theory that everybody should provide for his own individual security and that individuals should not, because there is no necessity for it, concern themselves about wives and children, or about sick members and aged parents of the family which launched the individual upon his individualistic career. The trouble with this is that it is false as to its facts—dependency being at times inescapable for everybody—and false in that it assumes that inhumanity should be accepted as normal;

(2) The second, the familistic provision of security, is predicated upon the assumption that the members of every family can and should cooperate in maintaining or in creating a family estate (not only consisting of insurance, savings, and securities but a home, a farm, a craftsman's shop, a business, a professional practice), and that this should be the material base which will end fear and anxiety for every member of the family. Here in America, the family has been so thoroughly disorganized by urbanism, industrialism, and possessional individualism, that the mere suggestion that a revival of the family might solve the problem of security is certain to be greeted with hoots of derision as archaic and reactionary. But it is interesting to note that in India, in which familistic responsibility for the security of its members is still a viable feeling among those who belong to a family, the Congress Party of India, which has governed since the Republic was established and which is proudly Socialistic and trying to create a Socialistic society, has never found it necessary to establish a Social Security system. The pressure to establish Social Securities comes not in familistic but in individualistic societies such as that which we have in the United States;

(3) The third involves turning to the State, relying upon and depending upon it at all times for assurance of immediate needs and desires, and so making unnecessary any provision or any concern about the future at all.

For the vast masses of people who have no great surplus energy to drive them, a modest estate—consisting of not much more than a home or some savings and insurance—is enough to relieve them of anxiety and to make them feel personally secure. Alternatively, the same masses born with minimal energy, will tend to be relieved of all anxiety if they are assured of State aid in vicissitudes like sickness and unemployment, and a State pension for the final vicissitudes of old age. Social Security, however, not only provides them with a feeling of security (which unfortunately relieves them of responsibility in doing so) but (what is even worse) relieves them of the problem (and responsibility) of doing anything to provide for the security of their dependents.

But for those born with powerful drives and ambitions, this is not enough. They want what riches and power alone can provide, and they exert themselves to keep what they have if they inherit them, and to acquire them if they are born without them. In a free society, they will try to obtain what they want in business; in a Communized society, in politics. Where the lust for wealth or for power is not controlled by values of the right kind (as the discussion of Problem VIII dealing with economic values makes clear), greed and ruthlessness take over, as they have everywhere the moment Individualism supersedes Familism. They have, from the beginning of time.

It is to protect themselves from the strong that the weak in energy and determination turn to the State and call upon it to use its might to guarantee them the security they crave. Unfortunately, other alternatives for dealing with the problem are not being examined today, and the original American doctrine that every family should be in possession of a homestead—a land and a home from which it cannot be dispossessed—has been forgotten in the building of our urbanized and industrialized world in which this is now considered an archaism. The issue, however, is not whether it is or is not archaic, but whether the building of our present kind of a society is in itself right or wrong, and if wrong, as I believe it is, then the resort to the homestead becomes not archaic but right and proper.

Venturism is a very different human asset. Possession of it is only possible if challenges are welcomed, if risks are taken, if one's money or one's prospects, if one's reputation and social standing, if even bodily danger and life itself are ventured in responding to challenges which are inescapable on this Earth. It is less necessary to discuss this in detail than was the case with *Securism* because biography and history are replete with facts which make possible case studies of venturesome men and women, families, and peoples.

The Monist will either emphasize and concentrate upon *Securism* or upon *Venturism*. The Pluralist will refuse to think in terms of "either-or" but recognize that both can be greater assets than either one alone. He will go further and insist that, human nature being what it is, one is doing violence to it to insist upon either all-security or all-venturity.

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*Probitist Possessional Doctrines*⁸—If possessional doctrines of all kinds were rationally evaluated, they would be evaluated not in terms of whether they work but in terms of whether they exploit. And if that were done, the stupid acceptance of what exists instead of what should be, would come to an abrupt end. That what is practised possessional is not right is bad enough, but that what is taught possessional is irrational is terrible. And this is true not only of what is taught by most of those teaching economics, but also by most of those teaching reform. For neither recognize that dealing with it in terms of political expediency or political power means dealing with it in terms of might. If once consideration began not with solutions but with a clear statement of the problem to be solved, it would become perfectly apparent that the substitution of Capitalist might for Feudalist might in dealing with the problem was wrong, and that the substitution of Communist might for Capitalist might is equally wrong. What would become perfectly apparent is that solutions based upon the ethos of might should be discarded, and that what should be substituted for them is a solution which in the final analysis will be a combination of bits and pieces of existing solutions which in combination reflect the ethos of right. These solutions, since I have found no existing term with which to designate them, I think of as Probitist solutions of the problem.

Primitivism and Georgism—What primitive man made or raised, what he acquired by hunting and fishing, was his—it was ownable; it represented prime ownership in contrast to statutory ownership. It was what lawyers call personal property; it could be owned, though sometimes only by a clan or tribe as a whole. But what lawyers call real property and economists land, nobody owned or could own. Both in practice and as doctrine, land was not ownable. It could be used, it could even be possessed, but not exclusively and permanently so that it could be bought and sold. The doctrine was religiously (covenantally) vindicated. As the American Indians put it, land was a gift of the Great Spirit to all mankind. From this premise they very logically deduced the proposition that no one could hold and no one could grant any kind of absolute title to it. Every treaty and every grant of land or of a region traditionally occupied by a particular Indian tribe which white men obtained from them was either extracted from them by bamboozling them with talk, trinkets, and whiskey, or when these did not work, by compulsion (after conquest) at the point of their guns. They knew nothing of political States, political dominion, or political boundaries.

When the first States were organized and boundaries were invented, primitive man's idyllic feeling for the land and the natural resources of the Earth was replaced by civilized man's exclusive and exploitive feeling for them. In all its stark simplicity, Primitivism as a possessional doctrine was simply that the land was to be used but not to be owned.

Georgism—Henry George and his predecessors in the definition of the doctrine which I believe should be named after him (as theoretical Communism should be named after Marx), accepted the indubitable fact which primitive mankind had taken for granted: nobody could show an honest title to any of the natural resources of the Earth. God had issued no such titles (unless such incidents as his giving the land of Israel to the Jews of Egypt can be construed as the grant of a patent, but if so construed, he granted land which was already occupied by a population which, unfortunately for them, did not consist of His chosen people). And if we ignore God (who as Creator certainly could do what he wished with what he created), because we do not believe in Him, then neither did nature.

The problem which George set out to solve was this: how were the rights of mankind as a whole in land to be provided for, and yet private possession regularized and recognized so that two or more claimants to a parcel of land would not resort to violence in acquiring and holding it? Upon premises consisting of a set of truisms, he came up with the solution which was at one time called the single-tax but which I am calling Georgism. The truism upon which he premised his solution were (1) that to avoid violence, exclusive possession of land had to be provided for; (2) that it had further to be provided for because such exclusive possession was essential to its efficient use; (3) that one piece of land, being by reason of its fertility or locality more useful or productive than another, created a differential unearned income (in economics, "ground-rent" or "unearned increment") which belonged to mankind as a whole and not to the possessor of the land, and (4) that nationalization of all land (as with Communism) does not solve the problem, in part because it violates truism number two, and in part because it violates truism number five, (5) that the possessor of the land is the legitimate owner of any houses or other improvements he makes on his land and anything he produces with his own labor from it. George's solution of the problem was simply the collection of the unearned ground-rent and unearned increment as public revenue (in lieu of ordinary taxation). This, he pointed out, would not only take care of the public right and interest in the land as a whole, it would not only make it unprofitable for anybody to speculate in land and withhold it from those who might want it and were unable to pay what the pre-empting owners demanded for it, it would provide the land holder with an incentive for its full use and development and permit him to retain as his own what was, as a matter of right, his and not the public's.

Property and Trusterty—Monistic Georgists (including Henry George himself at times) too often assume that by itself the substitution of Georgism for Alodialism would create a decent social order. That it would contribute to the creation of a better social order I will concede, but most of its benefits would be lost if probity governed in dealing with land, and power in dealing with other possessions. Right and not might, reason and not fiat, must govern in dealing with both property and trusterty. Only then

will the probity of the right to property be vindicated. Only then will it become clear that a free society without the right to property is a contradiction of actualities and not a mere contradiction in terms.

Possessions—Every imaginable possession is either man-made, nature-made, or made-by-fiat. The food man eats is man-made; the land on which he lives is nature-made; the dollar bills which his government prints are made by fiat.

Trusterty—If Wilberforce was right, and human beings are trusterty; if George was right, and land is trusterty (even though neither called either of them trusterty), and if finally I am right in insisting that what is true of every human being and every parcel of land is also true of every legal grant, then legal grants are trusterty (and the treatment of them as private property one of the tragic facts of history) and the discussion of them as if they were property by both Capitalist and Socialist economists an inexcusable error.

Property—What divides the Monistic Capitalist from the Monistic Socialist, and the Monistic Sarvodayist from both, is that the Capitalist insists that everything can be privately owned, the Socialist that everything must be publicly owned, the Sarvodayist that everything must be held in trust. The facts, however, prove that neither by the test of reality nor by the test of probity and honesty can what they insist upon be true. In practice, Capitalists find themselves forced to concede that some things must be treated as trusts (human beings, for instance); in practice Socialists find themselves forced to concede that there are some things (the food bought for consumption for instance) which must be treated as private property. In practice, if any society ever seriously tries to practice the principle for which the Sarvodayists contend, they too will find that they will have to concede that there are things which cannot be dealt with altruistically and must be dealt with as private property.

The consistent Probitist must be logically a Pluralist: certain classes of things, he must insist, are property and can be honestly owned, and certain classes of things are trusterty and cannot be.

Whether property can or cannot be honestly owned can be determined in only one way, by a factual and an objective an-

swer to two questions, (1) how it comes into existence, and (2) who, or what, creates and produces it.

1. The first question (really a question of definition) has already been answered. Man makes it; man raises it, mines it, manufactures it, transports it, distributes it. Property is what man makes; what man makes is property.

2. The second question is more difficult, partly because Capitalist economists say it is made man by man, privately, and the Socialist economists that it is made socially, by not merely a society, but ultimately by mankind as a whole. But mainly it is difficult because what is involved is a matter of book-keeping, and very few people and (I am tempted to say) no economists know very much about book-keeping or (I am tempted to say) punctuation! And as a matter of fact not even the book-keepers have thought of applying book-keeping principles (the principles of double-entry book-keeping) to the problem of answering this question.

In dealing with this problem, the Probitist (since he is a Pluralist) has an inestimable advantage over all the Monists—without inconsistency he can accept the facts which cost accounting establish as true, that some categories of possessions are privately made and others socially.

Probitism—What now does honesty and probity in dealing with the problem as a whole suggest? What the evaluation of all the conflicting doctrines dealing with the possessional problem in these terms indicates can be summed up under four items:

1. The first is the abolition of alodial tenure in land and the substitution of perpetuable leasehold tenure as proposed by Henry George. By its very nature land is entrusted to mankind as a whole. Perpetuable leasehold tenure would continue to provide private possession and permit private utilization and cultivation. But it would substitute trusteeship for ownership with the trustholder obligated to pay the full economic ground-rent year by year (in lieu of taxes) to a public authority. This is not land nationalization; nationalization is as immoral as private ownership; to vindicate nationalization, the nation would have to produce an honest title to the land. It can create a title to it by might, it is true—as it has—but to show honest title to it,

it would have to produce a title deed signed by the maker of the land, a title signed "by nature or by nature's God."

2. The second is the abolition of our present lunatic and dishonest money system. There are dozens of doctrines for monetary reform. Those which in one way or another recognize that the issuance of money is a banking and not a political function are on the right track. Banks-of-issue of the right kind must be established and the State by constitutional amendment prevented from having anything whatsoever to do with the issuance of money.

3. The third is the abolition of our whole devil's den of special privileges, of which the protective tariff is one of the worst. But there are a legion of them, and politicians in their demagoguery are adding to them almost every day.

The vested interests which batten on the existing systems of dealing with trustery have so numbed the intellectual leadership of the free world that today it lives in a state of virtual amnesia with regard to all three of these approaches to the problem.

4. Finally, a choice must be made between two rival approaches to the moral vindication of title to property. One of them I think of as the doctrine of *Individual Manufacture*, the other, as the doctrine of *Social Manufacture*⁹—Locke based his doctrine of "life, liberty and property" upon the assumption that a moral title to property can be created in only one way, by manufacturing it. The maker, by putting his own labor into its production, makes it his. And Locke assumed, as the classical economists did, that it was entirely possible to establish individual title to property, individual by individual. The process can be clearly seen in the creation of title to his produce by a farmer. A single farmer knows that he plowed the fields, sowed the seed, and harvested the crop. If any "hired man" helped him, the helper presumably has been paid (and so has received what he was entitled to for the labor which he had contributed to its production).

But Marx based his solution of the possessional problem on the analysis of industrial, not agricultural, production. He was a child of the city; he knew nothing of country life. He was fascinated, when the factory system was still in its infancy, with

its possibilities, and at the same time horrified by the way the workers in factories were being exploited by factory owners. To him it was clearly impossible to trace title to what was produced in a factory back to an individual producer on the theory of Individual Manufacture. The owner of a factory (who might never go near it) could therefore show no honest title either to the goods or to the profits produced in "his" factory. The fact that it was possible to do so in the case of goods produced by craftsmen or in cottage industries he ignored; the fact that the individual weaver of a bolt of cloth knew perfectly well who had produced it was irrelevant, Marx argued, because with the factory system all small-scale production had been rendered obsolete. Everything, he argued, was socially manufactured, and nothing could be individually manufactured. On the theory that title was an epiphenomenon of Social Manufacture, everything produced by man's labor belonged not to the factory owner for whom the workers worked, but to the whole of society.

The fatal flaw both in the doctrine of Individual Manufacture as it was developed by Capitalist economists, and Social Manufacture as it was developed by Socialist economists, is the failure on the part of both schools of thought to recognize the part which special privileges—Legal Grants of illegitimate property rights by the State—play in creating unearned riches and in depriving the real producers of wealth (not only farmers and laborers but also professional workers, merchants, and manufacturers), of income to which they are entitled. The doctrine of Private Manufacture, as a basis for title to property, will work justly only if behind it the injustices of special privileges are not concealed. The freedom and independence which property makes possible will be completely lost if nothing is done to eliminate them, and we will drift further and further into a Socialized and Communized world because of them. And nothing adequate will be done to eliminate them unless the problem is properly defined and the truth about it taught in our schools from top to bottom.

The disparity between the non-producing rich and the working masses has its source not in a possessional system which recognizes private property, but in a political system which legalizes special privileges. Most of the great fortunes which furnish the critics of a free economy the texts Socialists and Communists use

in advocating its abolition would never have come into existence but for these special privileges. Most of these fortunes would disintegrate if the privileges were abolished. Nothing proves this more conclusively than does study of the histories of great fortunes³. True, some were made without benefit of special privileges (Henry Ford, Thomas A. Edison, Marshall Field, John Wanamaker), but most of the great American fortunes were made by buccaneers who took advantage of the special privileges politicians were delighted to dispense for help in obtaining office and the perquisites office-holding provided. Most of the first great American fortunes were made out of land in the South, or out of both land and slavery. Then came the tariff and railroad fortunes; the coal, oil and mining fortunes; the public utility fortunes, and the banking and financing fortunes.

Of all the Legal Grants and special privileges which made this possible, private ownership (not private possession) of land was probably the most insidious and the most unjust. What made it so bad was the fact that it made possible the depression of wages to subsistence levels (creating what Marx called "wage-slavery") and so enabled even those fortune-seekers who had no special privileges to profit from the exploitation of their workers. Today it is true there is no "wage-slavery," but this the politicians abolished (to garner labor votes by doing so) by conferring all sorts of special privileges on labor unions—the privilege called the "union" or "closed shop" and the privilege of maintaining a monopoly of labor. And this they did without disturbing any of the existing special privileges; they multiplied what the Marxists call "the internal contradictions of Capitalism."

It is a sad thing to realize that in the modern world, with all its sciences and all its institutions of learning, the truth about the possessional problem is not recognized. And it is not recognized, as I have so often insisted, because science and education are subject-centered and not problem-centered, because both take existing solutions of basic problems for granted, and never examine them in the light of the basic problems to which they purport to offer solutions.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem XI: *The Possessional Problem*

Most of my nearly eight hundred pages of notes, charts, and manuscripts dealing with the possessional problem consists of descriptions of the various categories of possessions which should be taken into account in discussing the problem. Eliminating virtually all of this material has made it possible for me to outline the problem in less than fifty pages.

To the extent to which the possessional problem is discussed at all today, it is discussed in only two disciplines, economics and law. But in neither is the problem discussed in its fullness, and without this, it is impossible to distinguish what is valid and what fallacious in the conflicting theories and doctrines by economists and social reformers concerning what should and should not be done about what they call capital and wealth, and what lawyers, legislators, and jurists call real and personal property. To deal with the problem rationally and humanely, all kinds of possessions must be taken into account.

1. *Possession*—A possession is anything which any person owns, occupies, or controls to the exclusion of others. The word can be properly used both to refer to a thing and to the holding of the thing. Possessions should not be confused with wealth, as it is easy to do. Possessions may be either wealth or illth, as these terms were defined in discussing Problem VIII, the law of economic values. Possessions should not be confused with property, as that term is used in this study; property is by definition a possession, but trusterty of all kinds can also be possessed, and most of it is.

2. *Property and Trusterty*—Property is legally defined as the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing, but "things" in law today include all valuable rights (a great many of which are in my terminology trusterty), and they used to include all sorts of things which are not now legalized—wives, children, slaves, serfs. Trusts are legally defined as either an equit-

able right or interest in property distinct from legal ownership or as a property held by one person for the benefit of another.

3. *Earned and Unearned Great Fortunes*—There is no better way to make clear the distinction between these two kinds of fortunes than the reading of a few histories dealing with them. It is because those who defend our own economic and political system (against the criticisms levelled at it not only by Socialists and Communists but by many libertarian critics) fail to make this distinction, that their defense of it is so weak. If this distinction were made, it would become possible to point out that what is being criticized is the abuse of the system and not necessarily the system itself. These abuses call to high heaven for correction and, if they are not corrected, may make the whole system so vulnerable to its critics as to make it for all practical purposes indefensible. Four studies of great fortunes are here listed:

Matthew Josephson, *The Robber Barons*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1934.

Gustavus Meyers, *History of Great American Fortunes*, Charles H. Kerr & Co., London, 1911.

F. Lundberg, *America's Sixty Families*, Vanguard Press, New York, 1937.

Gerald Stanley Lee, *Inspired Millionaires*, Mount Tom Press, Northampton, Mass., 1908.

4. *Disaster*—The political aspects of social disasters are called emergencies; they acquire particular interest because many so-called political emergencies are not caused by real disasters but are fabricated to excuse the use of extraordinary powers by the government. A real disaster is any sudden, extraordinary, and serious mishap. There are at least three kinds: (1) *calamities*, which are personal disasters (blindness, death); (2) *catastrophes*, general or final disasters to a place or population caused either by calamities (war) or cataclysms (tornadoes), and (3) *cataclysms*, disasters caused by an "act of nature" (floods, storms, earthquakes).

5. *Settlors and Trusts, Trusts and Trusterty*—In law, any kind of property can be used to create a trust. In the creation of a trust, the owner of it is called the *settlor* or *donor*, the

property (no matter what it is) is called a *trust*, the person designated to administer and execute the trust, the *trustee*, and the person for whose benefit it has been created, the *beneficiary*. Trusterty, however, is in its essential nature always a trust—even when the law legalizes its treatment as property. The State should, in a decently constituted social system, recognize the existence of trusterty; in recognizing it, it should issue some sort of instrument to the possessor—I think of such an instrument as an indenture. It should also be the settlor of trusterty which must be settled on somebody if it is to be used (as is the case with public utility franchises), but it should never be the grantor or donor of trusterty, because that implies that it has the right to treat trusterty as if it were property. What it has is not the right but the power to make such grants or donations. What the abuse of this power does is to confer upon the “owner” the power to exploit the trusterty, to use it like any property of which he is the exclusive and undisputed owner.

6. *Police Powers*—I am using this term to refer not to the narrow legal definition of police power but much more broadly to refer to every kind of power exercised either overtly or covertly by the State. Everything done, as a matter of fact not theory, by the State is done ultimately by the exercise of either overt or constructive physical force. The overt exercise of force is of two kinds, that exercised by civilian police establishments and its ancillary judicial and penal establishments, and that exercised only during war, during insurrection, or during revolution by the State’s military establishment. The police powers are exercised covertly and not overtly so far as the bulk of the conforming, law-abiding population is concerned—they pay the taxes imposed upon them, they do not smuggle goods across protective tariff boundaries (even though they have the moral right to do so), and they obey not only the statutes but the rules and regulations which officials and bureaucrats impose upon them and now dignify by calling administrative law. The police powers have to be resorted to and exercised overtly only against those who evade taxes or break a statute.

7. *Free and Servile Labor*—The history of the institutions dealing with the problem of employment shows how little attention is paid to the lessons of history, and the history of economics

how little the problem is understood by economists because of their failure to define its nature. Employment—the term really designates the exchange of labor by the employee for payment for it by the employer—is a transaction in which an employer “pays” something to his employee and the employee receives some kind of “pay” (not necessarily money) for his labor. The nature of the approved and legalized method of payment determines whether the labor system is a free labor system or a compulsory one. Among free labor systems may be included (1) self-employment—farmers, fishermen, lawyers, doctors; (2) employment in the family—on the principle of from each according to ability and to each according to need; (3) partnership employment; (4) wage-labor without constraint; (5) piece-work without constraint; (6) profit-sharing employment. Among compulsory labor systems may be included (1) slavery; (2) serfdom; (3) compulsory State employment, as in Communist States in which there is no alternative to employment by the State.

8. Sheer limitations of space make it impossible to discuss in detail the various ways, in practice, in which title to property has come into existence, but to make clear the fundamental nature of the validity of the concept of individual manufacture, it is necessary to at least mention the most important. Two categories can be morally vindicated, (1) *title by manufacture*, as a farmer produces crops, a shoe maker fabricates shoes, and (2) *title by creation*—as in the composition of a song or a book (recognized by copyright), and the invention of a mechanism (recognized by patent). Five categories are vindicated by might, by privilege, by arbitrary fiat: (1) *title by occupancy*—as in so-called squatter's rights; (2) *title by appropriation*—as in finding something or in appropriating what nobody is at the time using; (3) *title by discovery*—as in the discovery of America to which Columbus took title for the Crown of Spain; (4) *title by conquest* as we took title to California from Mexico, Mexico took it from Spain, and Spain took it from the Indians, and (5) *title by privilege*—by the legal grant of a special privilege. Finally there is one category which is supernaturally or covenantally vindicated which I think of as *title by sacred fiat*—as Jehovah, through Moses, gave His chosen people, the Israelites, title to the land of Canaan, and

the Pope divided America between the Crowns of Spain and Portugal.

Some titles are plainly what might be called socially manufactured and should be socially "owned", but the moral validity of title by creation (the use of the individual's creative assets or characteristics) and by manufacture (the use of the individual's inherent characteristics and assets) is self-evident. Only when a considerable number of persons take part in production or manufacture, as in shoe manufacture in a factory instead of shoe making in a craftsman's own shop, does a problem arise, and this, as I have already pointed out, is a problem which the right kind of accountancy solves fairly and honestly and not, as Marx assumed, a problem which can only be solved justly by having the State take over the ownership and operation of the factory.

9. *Covenantal Possessional Doctrines*—I have found great difficulty in preparing a bibliography on what I think of as Acceptance Possessional Doctrines, mainly because the doctrine is to such a large extent implicit in the sacred scriptures of most religions. Three items which have been rather recently written in effect advocate acceptance of possessional institutions as they are presently legalized but would have them transformed by imbuing the possessors with the concept of trusteeship.

Vinoba Bhawe, *Sarvodaya and Communism*, Sarva Seva Sangh, Benares; *Bhoodan Yasna*, Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad.

Jayaprakash Narayan, *A Picture of the Sarvodaya Social Order*, Sarvodaya Prachuralaya, Tanjore, 1961.

R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., N.Y., 1926.

10. *Power Possessional Doctrines*—Defense of possessions in terms of power are not as numerous as the widespread practice of the doctrine might suggest, mainly because it is a little difficult even for those who "believe" in the doctrine to put into words what they believe. Many of the following books defend the doctrine by implication rather than directly and explicitly.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1933.

E. Parmelee Prentice, *Hunger and History*, Harper, N.Y., 1939.

Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, Harper, N.Y., 1936.

F.W. Taussig, *Principles of Economics*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1939.

Bertram D. Wolfe, *Marxism; One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine*, The Dial Press, N.Y., 1965.

The Population Problem and World Depression, Foreign Policy Association, N.Y., 1936.

Friedrich Engels, *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., London, 1941.

James Burnham, *Suicide of the West, the Meaning of Liberalism*, John Day Co., N.Y., 1965.

Herbert Agar, *Who Owns America?* Houghton, Mifflin & Co., N.Y., 1936.

Louis Brandeis, *Other People's Money and the Bankers' Use of It*, Stokes Co., N.Y., 1932.

11. *Probitist Possessional Doctrines*—The following books are indicative of the wide variety of reforms dealing with the possessional problem:

Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, Garden City Pub. Co., N.Y., 1926.

George R. Geirger, *The Theory of the Land Question*, Macmillan, N.Y., 1936.

F.H. Hayek, *The Pure Theory of Capital*, Rutledge and K. Paul, London, 1952.

Hillaire Belloc, *An Essay on the Restoration of Property*, The Distributist League, London, 1936.

Gilbert Chesterton, *The Common Man*, Sheed & Ward, London, 1950.

Frederick Soddy, *Wealth, Virtual Wealth, and Debt*, Dutton, N.Y., 1933.

Lewis Corey, *The Crisis of the Middle Class*, Covici, Friede, N.Y., 1935.

Frederick C. Howe, *Denmark, the Cooperative Way*, Coward-McCann, N.Y., 1936.

Pierre J. Proudhon, *What is Property?* Humboldt, N.Y., 1898.

Silvio Gesell, *The Natural Economic Order*, Crusade Publishing Co., Denver, Colorado, 1895.

Edna St. Vincent Millay, *Ario do Capo*, Harper & Bros., N.Y., 1920.

Francois Quesnay, *Oeuvres Economique et Philosophiques*, Dr. J. Baer & Co., Frankfort, 1888.

M.K. Gandhi, *Trusteeship*, Navajivan Pub. Co., Ahmedabad, India.

Jayaprakash Narayan, *Picture of Sarvodaya as a Social Order*, Sarva Seva Sangh, Benares, India; *From Socialism to Sarvodaya*, Sarva Seva Sangh, Benares, India.

PROBLEM XII.

Enterprise and Adequacy : The Organizational Problem

What is organization but the connection of the parts in and for a whole, so that each part is, at once, end and means.

—Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

Three indisputable facts about living make the organizational problem a universal problem:

1. It is impossible now, and has always been impossible, to adequately and effectively satisfy man's needs and desires (both those of a material and those of a spiritual nature) without organizing enterprises to provide them.

2. Man has certain basic inborn needs, and failure to provide adequately and effectively for them is not only destructive of his happiness but, when the deprivation is great enough, destructive of his very will-to-live.

3. Man alone in the animal kingdom transforms these basic needs into highly complex aspirations, and failure to provide for his aspirations and desires as effectively and adequately as for his needs are similarly destructive of his happiness and ultimately of his will-to-live.

* * * *

Because the full significance of this problem has not been recognized, because it is now and has always been a basic problem of man and of society, and because no science of organization has been developed (as sciences have been developed to deal with much less important problems such as shooting men out into space), the definition of the principal factors involved in organization is essential. Without adequate definition of (1) purpose, (2) enterprise, (3) constitution, (4) operation, (5) transaction, and (6) control, the justification for attaching such importance to the conception does not become clear.

Purpose—Man has four basic inborn drives and an unlimited number of acquired aspirations into which he pours them. It is impossible for him to embark upon any project or any enterprise without finding that its purpose reflects one or more of these basic drives. No matter what the ostensible and the particular purpose for which he organizes his enterprises, they all fall into one or the other of these categories: *survival purposes*—homes and homesteads¹, farms and factories, buildings and highways, communities and States⁵, police and military establishments,—the United Nations survival enterprise⁶; *genetic purposes*—homes, families, marriages, obstetric services and maternity hospitals, pediatric and psychoanalytic services, (in a real sense sexual undertakings of all kinds are genetic purposes); *cultural purposes*—schools and churches, libraries and theatres, artistic and scientific undertakings of all kinds; finally, if he is frustrated in satisfying the deep needs these enterprises are supposed to supply, he finds himself patronizing enterprises devoted to *necrotic purposes*—bars and narcotic dens, indulging in crimes and riots, wars and revolutions, and, when life is sufficiently frustrated, resorting to suicide and patronizing cemeteries and crematories.

Man cannot organize any enterprise, and cannot even conduct the enterprise represented by his life, without a purpose, a purpose either implied by the way he lives and the sort of enterprises he patronizes, or expressed in the charters of associations and corporations he organizes to realize them.

Enterprise—To clarify what the organization of enterprises involves, it is necessary to distinguish between projects and enterprises. A project is a unit of activities undertaken to produce or satisfy a need or desire, but limited in duration to the production of a particular product or the performance of a particular service. The cooking of a particular meal is a project, the maintenance of a home an enterprise¹; the construction of a particular building is a project, the operation of a contracting business an enterprise. An enterprise is a continuing unit of activities (in effect, a sequence of projects) producing or distributing products or services for an indefinite period of time. In a sense, every life is an enterprise; all the factors found in an enterprise and all the principles applicable to the conduct of enterprise are found either potentially or actually in every individual life. A humble manual laborer working for

wages conducts an enterprise. A home is an enterprise, a church is an enterprise, a farm is an enterprise, a factory is an enterprise, a State is an enterprise, the world as a whole is an enterprise.

As the term enterprise is ordinarily used, it refers only to business or commercial enterprises. But as it is used here it refers to any kind of activity engaged in for the purpose of fulfilling any need or desire of mankind.

All enterprises fall into one of two basic categories: voluntary and compulsory. These are so different and create such different problems that they each become a distinct basic problem of its own—the organizational problem and the political problem. The underlying practical problems in both are substantially the same, but the issues are more serious and factors more numerous and complex in political “enterprises.”

A voluntary enterprise is an enterprise no one is compelled to belong to either by the use of overt violence² or the threat to use it. A privately owned home, farm, or business is a voluntary enterprise; so is a free or disestablished church, a private school, a philanthropic foundation.

A compulsory enterprise, on the other hand, is an enterprise to which its members are compelled to belong, or which its patrons are compelled to patronize. Every State is a compulsory enterprise; it really has no members, it has only subjects; every State-owned and operated enterprise, no matter what its nature, is a compulsory enterprise; and every apparently private enterprise to which the State grants by charter or franchise, by license or merely by statute, some of its powers, is a quasi-compulsory enterprise.

In the all-embracing concept of enterprise I am using, social movements of all kinds—religious and political, educational and artistic, scientific and philosophical—must be included; they are in effect informal and unorganized enterprises. Political movements are voluntary enterprises in free societies, even when what they advocate is Socialistic and involves the promotion of the idea of increasing the number of compulsory enterprises conducted by the government. As organizations they may consist only of leaders and followers, but many of the principles of organization are nevertheless involved. When they stimulate the organization of parties and associations, the parties and the associations become full-fledged

enterprises with all the problems of other kinds of enterprises. Social movements create institutional (Problem XVI) and not only organizational problems; if their leaders organize them properly, their chances of succeeding, or at least of receiving a real hearing, are greatly increased.

Constitution—If enterprises are to be adequately and efficiently operated they must be constituted. When enterprises of all kinds are studied, it becomes clear that there are at least ten factors involved in their constitution.

1. *Leadership* is the first factor. In business the leader is the promoter; in religion, the prophet; in politics, the "founding father" of the State. The leader is the proposer of the enterprise, the formulator of its purpose, the namer, the placer, the decider of how it should be controlled (a sole proprietorship, partnership, company). He chooses the initial participants in its organization, its lawyer, its partners, its directors, its members or stockholders, its manager, perhaps some of its first employees.

Initial leadership, which is furnished even before the formal organization of an enterprise can take place, should not be confused with management and subsequent continuing leadership. After an enterprise starts operating as originally planned, experience almost invariably suggests to the leader or manager either minor or major changes in its organization. This is re-organization; in States it means reform or revolution;

Purpose, which has already been discussed, is the second factor involved in constitution;

Identification is the third. Whether an enterprise is Jones himself (as a mere jobholder), the Jones home, the Jones farm, store, shop or factory, the school which the Jones children attend, the church to which the Joneses belong, the clubs, unions, associations, cooperatives and corporations of which he is a member or stockholder, each of these very different kinds of enterprises must be identifiable by name;

Membership and Participation constitute the fourth factor. It involves the definition of the relationship of the leaders, owners, workers, suppliers, and customers to the enterprise;

Management is the fifth factor. Because of the role it plays

in every phase of an enterprise's activities, it is, so far as the success of an enterprise is concerned, of crucial importance;

Equipment and Materials constitute the sixth factor;

Operations make up the seventh.

An enterprise is adequately organized if its operations enable it to fulfill its purposes. Efficiency, however, goes far beyond adequacy. In utilitarian enterprises, efficiency is realized when purposes are fulfilled without waste of labor or material—in non-profit enterprises, when purposes are more than fulfilled with a given amount of expenditure.

If day-to-day operations are to be efficiently conducted, certain constitutional problems acquire special importance. The importance of leadership and management has already been mentioned, but two other factors in operating are so important that some reference to them must be made, stimulations and transactions.

The first is the *stimulation* of the workers and the staff from top to bottom. The subject in its full significance has hardly been explored, in spite of the fact that there is an enormous body of knowledge concerning it scattered about in various sciences and subjects of study. Stimulation embraces the whole field of rewards and penalties; in my study of the subject in *The Education of the Whole Man* (pp. 424-428), I list fifty-five kinds of stimulations under three headings, (1) physical compulsions (the cheapest way of stimulating slaves, impressed seamen, convicts, children), then (2) menaces, and finally (3) incentives. (*Transactions*, the eighth factor in the constitution and conduct of enterprises will be discussed in detail in Problem XIV, the distribution problem. Here it will be discussed only enough to make clear its significance).

What is here involved is the purchase, sale or exchange of goods or of labor by the enterprise from, to, or with another person or enterprise. These transactions are both internal, with those employed by the enterprise, or external, with other persons or other enterprises. There are six kinds of expenditure transactions: (1) with the owners, members or stockholders when profits or dividends are paid to them, (2) with its managers when salaries are paid to them, (3) with its workers when wages are paid to them, (4) with its suppliers for goods, (5) with its creditors for loans, and (6) with the

State and its sub-divisions when taxes are paid. There are really only two kinds of income transactions: (1) transactions with its customers, patrons, clients, and members, and (2) transactions with other enterprises in which it has an investment of any kind. In a genuinely free State all these would be voluntary transactions; in imperfectly free States such as the United States, most of them are free, but a host of them are constrained or compulsory; in a totally Communist State, none of them are free, all are compulsory.

Public Relations—It is at the point of public relations that the distinction between what might be called intra-organization (organization within each enterprise—which is what for the most this discussion is concerned) and inter-organization (organization of the relations between enterprises) enters the picture most definitely. (It should be borne in mind that enterprise, in the sense in which I use it, does not refer merely to what it connotes to nearly everybody—a business enterprise—but includes every individual, every family, and every kind of enterprise of which business enterprises are only one kind). Public relations, as I am discussing this factor in our problem, is not only that of treating the public and saying to the public what will “profit” the enterprise; it embraces the whole field of the relations of the enterprise to the whole economy, the whole polity, and the whole of society.

In this area of our problem, the chief contending ideas about the public relations of enterprises are: (1) that each should profit as much as it can from the public, (2) that each should serve the public, and (3) that the public should be compelled to do and to be satisfied with what those in control declare to be the social—as against the individual—interest. It is a gross mistake to assume, as so many thoughtlessly do, that these three ideas are identical with three apparently antithetical inter-organizational ideas, (1) competition, (2) cooperation, and (3) compulsion.

1. If competition is predatory, the public is not merely used as a means of making profits, it is ruthlessly exploited. But if the competition is fraternal, as it is when it is genuinely professional, then the public is served, even though the enterprise incidentally profits from it. The only difference is that the priority is service, not profit.

2. This likewise is true of cooperation. Consumer coopera-

tion is by its very nature intended to serve not only its patrons but, by making membership open, the public as a whole. Producer cooperation, on the other hand, can be just as ruthlessly exploitive as predatory competition. Farmers have set up such cooperatives; labor unions are such cooperatives; business corporations when they enter into cartels or when they merge are also cooperating exploitively and predatorily. The purpose in the organizational activities of such cooperatives is not to serve, but to enable the members of the cooperating enterprises to profit.

3. Finally, compulsory inter-organization of the relations of enterprises to one another, when the State takes over or intervenes and regulates, is always ostensibly intended to serve the social, not the individual interest; the social interest is given the priority. In practice, however, so demoralizing is the exercise of compulsion (political power) to those who exercise it that it tends always to be used to serve the State's interests or, what is even worse, the interests of the ruling class or party or oligarchy or dictator in control of the State.

The manner in which these three methods of dealing with the problem of inter-organization actually work is discussed in some detail in Problem XIV, the distribution problem.

Control—Finally we come to the crucial last one, *Control*. Here we enter, in Nietzsche's terrible phrase, "the tarantula's den." It ought not to be such a den, but in most enterprises (even in many families) it unfortunately is. For it has to be lodged somewhere, and wherever it is lodged, there the risk that it will be abused is possible. Control is therefore crucial; it should not be confused with management. Management is immediate, control is ultimate. In voluntary (private) enterprises, control is in theory and in law in the hands of owners; in compulsory (public) enterprises, no matter what the kind of State (democratic or absolutist), control is invariably in the hands of a ruler or ruling class³.

The essence of control is the power of determining who gets what. Where this power is exercised, there actual control is; where it only in theory resides, the control is titular, not actual. The voters of a nation have only titular control; actual control is in the hands of those who determine what the government shall or shall not do. It is the distinction between reigning and ruling, between executing and issuing directives, which is involved.

Study of the facts about ownership and control make it clear that no single method of organizing enterprises is either possible or desirable in a free society; some enterprises should be voluntary and some compulsory in nature; some should be profit and some non-profit enterprises; some ownable by private persons (homes, farms, professional practices); some by partnerships; some "ownable" by private corporation (large commercial enterprises), and some "ownable" by non-profit membership cooperatives (churches, unions, social clubs). The fatal flaw in the Marxian solution of this problem comes at this point: real freedom is impossible in a State in which every enterprise is owned by the State and in which no enterprises of a voluntary nature are permitted. Civic freedom is not enough; civic freedom without economic freedom is not freedom. True freedom is not the freedom to say "yes" but the freedom to say "no", and in any State in which everybody is dependent upon the State for his livelihood, saying "no" is equivalent to committing suicide.

Freedom has a price, and the price is risk-taking; the price is, in the order of man's priorities, putting freedom before security.

Alternative forms of Control—The number of people involved in the ownership of an enterprise help determine the type of control for which provision should be made. In practice human nature takes precedence over theory; control goes wherever there is an individual or a group strong enough to take control, and where those who in theory should exercise it fail to do so. The smaller the enterprise, the more certain is theory and practice to be one and the same; the larger the enterprise, the more certainly will practice ignore theory.

Arranged in the order both of size and of the degree in which theory and practice tend to be one and the same, we have:

Sole proprietorships, in which an individual owner in theory and almost invariably in practice exercises control;

Partnerships, in which, in theory, each owner should exercise equal control, and in which (if the partnership consists of only two owners) practice tends to fulfill theory;

Membership Corporations (in reality cooperatives), in which, in theory, control is vested in the membership, but which in prac-

tice, particularly when they are large, is exercised by the management or by a controlling group.

Stock Corporations, in which, with a multiplicity of owners, control is in theory in the hands of the stockholders, and in practice almost always in the hands of the management. It is necessary to bear in mind that there are two kinds of stock corporations which differ not in degree, but in kind: limited liability corporations and joint stock corporations. Joint stock corporations are in effect partnerships with large numbers of partners (called stock-holders), each of whom has the same sort of liability for the debts of the corporation as partners have for partnerships. When the State conferred the power of limited liability (and non-assessability) upon chartered or registered stock corporations, it conferred upon them a special privilege which is indefensible in terms of equal freedom. What it did was to encourage a shift from optimally-sized to megalopolean-sized enterprises; it encouraged the needless concentration of capital and the uneconomic mergers of corporations (though financially profitable to Wall Street) which has in fact taken place. Without it the oligopolies and monopolies which now dominate the business world would never have come into existence. Abolish this special privilege, and these wasteful forms of enterprise would tend to disappear; they would have been deprived of the legal device by which they are given easier access to capital than partnerships and proprietorships.

The asserted greater efficiency which this is supposed to have made possible is just that—an assertion. As we shall see when we come to the production problem, the equation of magnitude with efficiency is a part of the mythology of not only Finance Capitalism (for which Wall Street is the symbol) but of the representatives of the so-called science of economics.

Finally we come to *Compulsory Enterprises* or those enterprises which are State owned and operated; here, as in the case of the State itself, control is in theory vested in the citizenship (in reality the subjects of the State); in practice it is almost invariably exercised by a ruling group or class. The larger the State, the truer this is; only in the very smallest sub-divisions of the State—in a township in which the people themselves assemble in town meeting to make decisions—can control be exercised by them, but even

here, human nature too often permits control to drift from where it should be in theory to where in practice it should not.

* * * *

A cursory reading of what I have said so far about the problem may seem to indicate that I think of the organization of business enterprises as the most important problem which needs attention at this time. But this is not true.

In terms of living like rational and humane beings, the most important enterprises calling for right-organization—which present the greatest challenge and the greatest need for re-organization during this period—are not businesses (producing and distributing goods), but homes and families. These are not only the most important—at all times—but today actually the most neglected.

Second in importance I rate the right-organization of education as a whole—in the family, in the school, in all our cultural institutions (including the arts), and in the culture as a whole.

Third I would put that of the right-organization of the community and of the State.

Fourth I would put the right-organization of all other non-profit enterprises (in my classification of enterprises I call this category cooperatives; it includes such non-profit enterprises as labor unions and professional and trade associations).

Only after all these have been given adequate consideration, in my opinion, does the problem of the right-organization of business arise.

As is obvious, if I am right in my fixing of priorities, we are today putting the least important first, and the most important last—we are paying virtually no attention to it at all. Here in America (and for that matter in most of the economics-obsessed rest of the world) we have put the means by which most of us live (business) first, and the ends for which we should live (our families and the members of our family) last.

* * * *

In trying to evaluate not the minor “means” and minor problems involved in the organization and operations of enterprises of all kinds, but the principle reflected in all the means resorted to, it is the principle which has its genesis in the animating purposes

of each kind of organization which calls for study. What, in other words, is the principle which guides and motivates those who organize and conduct various kinds of enterprises? When the theories and the practices of various kinds of organizations are classified on this basis, all methods of organization tend to fall into one or the other of three categories which I think of as Sacred, Maximal, or Minimal.

* * * *

*Sacred Organization*⁷—Perhaps the least attractive aspect of religion is its organization; preoccupation with organization seems in some way antipathetic to preoccupation with its avowedly spiritual aims. A religion may elect to see no need for concern about organization, it may follow Jesus' injunction to "take nothing for your journey, neither staff, nor wallet, nor bread, nor money"; it may leave the mundane problem of organization to those who are concerned only with the mundane world ("Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's"). Yet no religion seems able to avoid the problem, in trying to deal adequately with even its spiritual aims in this very selfsame mundane world. None of the churches, none of the seminaries, none of the monasteries, and none of the missions of a religion can be conducted with any degree of efficiency without doing something about their organization. To realize a religion's evangelical purposes, to spread its doctrines so that as many human beings as possible might benefit from them, leadership must be provided and leadership must be trained; means—money, to use the crass word for which "means" is a euphemism—must be obtained to support those who devote themselves exclusively to the work of the church, to provide buildings of various kinds, and to equip them with the multitude of different things which those who go to services in them, study in them, retreat in them, conduct missions and live in them, need.

Try as they would, neither Francis of Assisi nor Gautama the Buddha could avoid the problem. Jesus died before his followers had to wrestle with it.

In a sense the history of Christianity illustrates how important the problem is even in a religion. The Protestant Reformation began not with a theological dispute, but an organizational dispute (Rome's desire to make money for the hierarchy out of the sale

of Papal indulgences, and Luther's excoriation of the practice). To this day the conflict between the two branches of Christianity continues, with Protestantism utterly opposed to Papal domination and Rome insistent upon it.

The history of Protestantism in turn is dotted with schisms which had their roots in differences about how Christians should organize their churches, or schisms which were aggravated by such differences. Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Methodists organize their churches on one principle (ecclesiastical control), while the so-called Free Churches, the Quakers, the Anabaptists, the Menonites, the Baptists, the Congregationalists, the Unitarians, the Universalists on another (congregational lay control).

In theory, salvation is the end, organization merely the means for realizing it. In practice the Roman Catholics, who have consistently given their organization precedence, are the largest Christian denomination in the world, while the Quakers, who have almost no organization at all, are one of the smallest.

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*Maximal Organization*⁸—With what I think of as Maximal Organization we enter a world much more familiar to modern man. The problem of nomenclature here is a trying one; in desperation I have been driven to the use of Maximal to designate the principle animating the organization of most enterprises today. This intensifies the antithesis between the Objective and the Intellectual approaches to the problem; in Objective terms, the ethos of organization is quantitative, in Intellectual terms it is qualitative. Maximal organization appeals to those whom William James called "tough-minded" (I called them "quantity-minded" in *This Ugly Civilization*, pp. 203-261); Minimal organization appeals to those he called "tender-minded" (I called them "quality-minded").

Enterprises organized on the principle of Maximal Organization consider success in quantitative terms the end, the men employed in them or patronizing them, means to that end; in those organized on the principle of Minimal Organization, success in qualitative terms is the end, the organization itself a mere means to that end. Success in any enterprise Maximally organized is measured in the number of sales made, the quantity of products manufactured, the amount of money earned.

Business enterprises and political enterprises (executive departments and administrative bureaus, legislatures and commissions, military and police forces) are for the most part organized Maximally. In business every element is evaluated in terms of how much it contributes to profits; in politics, how much to power. Business enterprises, however, operate enormously more efficiently than political enterprises, because they can concentrate on one problem, how to maximize profits, while political enterprises cannot avoid being bedeviled at the top by cut-throat ambitions, at the bottom by deadening bureaucratic routines, and at all levels by corruption, sometimes venal, more often spiritual.

The only real studies made of organizational problems have been in the field of business, in our great Schools of Business Administration; the broader conception of the problem which I am calling for has not been envisaged. Yet Frederic Winslow Taylor, who was the founder of all present day studies of business organization, recognized the broader implications of organization in the introduction to his classic *Principles of Scientific Management*; the principles of scientific management, he said, should be applied not only to the organization of business, but to the organization of homes and churches, schools and governments. It is an ironic aspect of this development in education that our schools of Business Administration devote their studies and their instruction almost exclusively to the organization of big business, big unions, and big government. There is not a single course in the catalogs of these schools which I have studied which is especially devoted to the study of the efficient organization of small enterprises, independent enterprises, and individually owned enterprises.

In practice, the larger a commercial enterprise, the easier it is to identify the end—money—with organization. (A craftsman who is concerned with the quality of his products does not get his satisfactions in life out of the quantity he sells.) In contrast to this, the larger a State, the more important becomes the State apparatus, and the less important the public service. The proof is that no practical politician will say a single good word for Anarchism, which wants to abolish government entirely, while all of them have now discovered that Socialism is a gold-mine (but not under that name in America), since the more Socialism, the more govern-

ment, the more power to exercise, the more contracts to distribute, and the more jobs to parcel out among their followers.

* * * *

Minimal Organization is based upon an entirely different approach to the problem. It is not quantity of profit and quantity of power at which Minimal Organization aims but the quality of the goods produced and of the services rendered. When enterprises are organized on the primacy of this principle, and all the elements entering into organization and management dealt with in the light of what is good both for the man in the enterprise as well as the man patronizing it, the basis of operations are different not in degree but in kind.

Until this is recognized, the trend toward the dehumanization, materialization, and the barbarization of mankind will continue. The so-called Capitalistic world is indifferent to this trend; but so are the ruthless opponents of Capitalism who are building their Communistic Utopia on the even more systematic and ruthless application of the principles of Maximal Organization than have the bourgeoisie whom they so bitterly excoriate.

To the extent to which *Professionalism*—in the sense in which Ruskin used the term in *Unto this Last*—survives; to the extent to which *Art and Craft*—as William Morris used these terms—survives; to the extent to which *Husbandry* and *Housewifery* and *Agrarianism* survive, Minimal Organization will survive. But mere survival as vestiges of a way of living which at one time was at least as important as Commercialism, is not enough. An enormous segment of enterprise which is today industrialized calls for *Decentralization*. It simply is not true, as I believed I proved in *This Ugly Civilization*, that bigness is always identical with efficiency. Deprive big business of its special privileges, and its inefficiency in many areas of production and distribution will not only become evident, but make it vulnerable to the competition of smaller (and more efficient) enterprises.

Finally, de-commercialize and de-vocationalize education; make consumer-education as important as producer education (it should be more important) and teach the public sales-resistance—in effect inoculate it against the “hidden persuaders” of bigness—and Minimal Organization will come into its own. Excellence and

quality will take the place of novelty as consumer values. Enterprises will once again be as they should always be, no larger than what I have called a human (in contrast to a dehumanized) magnitude.

* * * *

The essential problem is neatly summed up in what Coleridge said (which I quoted at the beginning of the discussion of this problem), *end and means should be one and the same*. This problem hardly exists for tough-minded Materialists; if an organization does not produce profits (or put him in power); if, on the contrary it is a losing venture or does not put him or his party in office, he abandons or liquidates it. It would never occur to him to keep on with the "means" once he was convinced that there was no hope of realizing the tangible "end" which led him into it.

But for the tender-minded and quality-minded individual, supporting or taking part in an organization is always a problem. Those who administer an enterprise are constantly tempted to consider it a vested interest⁴ of their own; as long as they manage it or it supports them, they are psychologically handicapped in dealing with it objectively; they resent critics and resist dissidents who refuse their contention that abolition of the wrong kind "means" may be necessary to make realization of the right kind of "ends" possible. In the historic (and blood-stained) debate over this issue between Protestants and Catholics, sincere Catholics were convinced and venal members of the hierarchy insisted that abandonment of the Papacy meant abandonment of Christianity, the sincere Catholic because he was victimized by the sophism, the venal Catholic because he was a beneficiary of it. Ironically, each Protestant Church subsequently developed similar schisms over conflicts about means and ends.

The man who supports or takes part in an enterprise because its purpose is an ideal to which he is devoted (a value⁴ to which he accords primacy over any material benefit which he may receive from it), must abandon it the moment he is convinced that reform and reorganization is impossible or that the very nature of the enterprise itself is destructive of the ends it purports to realize. To continue to support it after that is to indulge in the subversion of his ideals.

This is the problem of problems in all non-monetary, non-profit organizations. Monetary organizations exist not to realize values but to promote interests. In both Church and State, placing the interests of the enterprise or of its leaders ahead of the values involved is a kind of moral treason; it is the kind of corruption which Lord Acton condemned as unavoidable in the exercise of power. It is similarly moral treason in all enterprises, the purposes of which are to realize a qualitative value (a school or college, an art, craft, or profession). The moment interests replace values, these cease to be Minimally Organized in all but name; they may continue to be Minimally Organized in name but become Maximally Organized in fact.

Appendix and Bibliography on Problem XII: The Organizational Problem

1. *The Home as Enterprise*—The mere reference to the home as an enterprise, without any amplification, may seem strange, yet the fact remains that Homes are not only the most numerous but also the most important of all enterprises. Even in sheer monetary terms this is true; if the capital investment they represent is added together, and if their incomes and expenditures are totalled in money terms they reduce those of all the other enterprises in society to small dimensions. Yet almost all our thought in economics is given to business enterprises and almost none to the greatest enterprise of them all.

For an extensive discussion of this, I refer the reader to my book *Education and Living*, in which the organization of the home is discussed in connection with the subject of "The Nature of the Family," pp. 410-534.

2. *Overt and Constructive Violence*—Compulsion means the use either of overt violence, or of the threat to use it (which is called constructive violence in law). It is still compulsion no matter how indirect the violence. For a discussion of the justification for the use of this strong language, see Problem XV, the Political Problem.

3. *Controlling and Ruling Classes*—In a free society there is justification for distinguishing between controlling and ruling classes. Those who exercise ultimate economic power in the various enterprises in a society constitute its controlling class, those who exercise ultimate political power over its government, its ruling class. In a totalitarian society, whether Communist or Fascist, this distinction becomes meaningless, because its ruling class exercise not only political but also economic power.

4. *Values versus Interests*—The distinction between values and interests was discussed in Problem V, the Telic Problem.

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PROBLEM XIII.

Efficiency and Waste : The Production Problem

Bad work follers ye ez long's ye live.—
James Russell Lowell

Five facts create what I think of as the production problem:¹

1. The fact that mankind cannot satisfy its needs and desires without producing the goods and providing the services which fulfill them. Not even the lowest of all unicellular forms of life can avoid this problem; they have to find what they eat. Primitive man had to hunt and fish and herd and gather fruits and nuts and roots and grubs; modern man with his multiplicity of wants has the same old problem multiplied a thousandfold.

2. The fact that man discovered long ago that it was possible to produce many things and provide himself with many services more easily and more efficiently if two or more men cooperated in their production. Adam Smith called this the division of labor, but primitive man discovered it long before Adam Smith was fascinated by the factory system.

3. The fact that because this proved to be true in the factories which began to appear in the 18th century, all of Smith's followers have assumed that because it was true of the production of some things (pins, for instance), it was also true of the production of everything.

4. The fact that virtually everybody today assumes that since large-scale production always seems more efficient than small-scale, production on the largest possible scale would be the most efficient way of producing everything.²

5. The fact that they assume, since centralized production also seems more efficient than decentralized local production, that if all the production in a nation (and ideally in the whole world) were centralized in one planned and controlled enterprise (a world-State owning all the means of production and distribution), goods could be produced and services provided most efficiently and at the lowest possible cost.³

There are three aspects of the production problem calling for consideration: (1) the ultimate problem, that of selecting and adopting methods of production which are in fact the most efficient; (2) an ancillary but enormously important problem, that of proper cost accounting, and (3) a direct problem, the question of which scale of production (local or centralized) is most efficient.

1. *The ultimate problem* is that of the selection and adoption of proper methods of production; this is so obvious that elaborate discussion of it is unnecessary. Rational and humane human beings will all agree that the method of production which should be adopted is the method which will provide the best in quality, provide all the goods and services wanted, provide them without waste of labor or of materials, and provide the most wholesome working conditions for those producing them.⁴

Something, however, must be said about the quality of goods and conditions of labor, because these are subjects which economists and apologists for things as they are have swept under the rug. I discussed them at length in *This Ugly Civilization* and *Flight from the City*. Here it is necessary to make two flat and positive statements about both, since the wealth of evidence available to establish the truth of them cannot be included in this condensed study. The first is this: It is not true that industrially produced goods are always or necessarily better than custom-made or home-made goods. Some unquestionably are—I would hate to use home-made electric wire; I hate to think of the fire hazards that would involve. But most (this is the fighting word) of the goods and most of the services we consume can be better provided home-made or custom-made than factory-made. When any factory will make as good and as wholesome pies as my wife bakes, I will retract these words.

There is an addendum to this. As we shift from home-production and custom-production (they both mean local production and face-to-face relationships between producer and consumer), we shift from a situation in which the consumer determines not only the quality to be produced but also what is to be produced, to a situation in which the factory (with its advertising and salesmanship) creates the demand for the goods it wishes to make. In shifting the initiative from the consumer to the manufacturer, it is the factory which determines the quality which is most profitable to

it (with many foods, for instance, the quality is deliberately damaged, because preserving food for indefinite periods of time makes it necessary to use chemicals); but the factory also decides what things are to be produced, things which already include many which should not be produced at all no matter how profitable to the factory nor how numerous the jobs created (cigarettes and poisonous pesticides, for instance, as well as atomic bombs and moon-shots).

The second flat statement is this: the conditions of labor in the industrial world (and the urban world which industrialization creates) are inferior to the conditions of labor which would prevail if production were made truly efficient. In terms of production this means a world in which everything which should be home-made is home-made (including both goods and services); everything which should be custom-made on a small-scale in a local shop, is made that way; everything which should be produced or raised on family-farms is produced that way (including dairy products, poultry, live-stock, fruits and vegetables, hay and grain), and only those things which should be factory-made (iron and steel, electric wire and electric light bulbs) are in fact factory-made.

2. *Cost Accounting*—Though only ancillary to production, an understanding of the part which cost accounting should play in determining the relative merits of the conflicting claims about the efficacy of large and small-scale production is essential. All the costs, and not merely those recorded directly in the books-of-account of enterprises, must be taken into consideration. There are two kinds of these costs both of which must be taken into account: immediate costs, and social costs. There is still another kind, the distribution costs, but this we will consider later.

Cost accounting deals not with the operations of a specific industry or of the economy as a whole but only with the operations of specific enterprises. It divides the aggregate cost of materials, of labor, and of overhead—enterprise by enterprise—by the number of units of the goods or services each produces (in technical terms, by the number of units of time, or place, or basic or form utilities an enterprise produces).

Social cost accounting, on the other hand, is a concept of cost accounting which includes, in addition to the direct or immediate costs of the units of an enterprise's products or services, the costs their production creates and shifts from the enterprise to others outside the enterprise. This cost is never recorded on the books of enterprises, Communist or Capitalist. The reason privately owned Capitalistic enterprises do not take them into account is obvious. Not so obvious is the reason why Communist enterprises do not—they do not because the Communist enterprises would have to include among their social costs the cost of maintaining their "iron" curtain, their "bamboo" curtain, and in East Germany their infamous "Berlin Wall" to prevent the escape from their enterprises of technicians and workers into the freer world.

The whole debate between Decentralists and Distributists on the one hand, and Megalorean⁵ Capitalists, Socialists, and Communists on the other, hinges on the distinction between direct and social costs. Moreover, the bloody and terrifying war which the Communist World has been waging on the non-Communist World has its roots in the fact that Karl Marx was no cost accountant; economists of all kinds, including professional and academic economists, are notoriously poor at book-keeping; perhaps they have their minds on more important things. For that matter, neither Scientific nor Utopian Socialists, both of whom are determined to socialize everything either cooperatively (voluntarily) or compulsorily (by revolution), know anything real about the importance of cost accounting. About direct costs they know almost nothing; about the social costs their knowledge is at worst sentimental and at best humanitarian; in either case they do not know enough for them to speak with scientific authority.

Capitalist cost accounting is better than Socialist or Communist cost accounting (for one reason, it pays Capitalists to keep accurate cost records; there is no real incentive to keep such records in enterprises where no individual can profit from them). But it is not inclusive enough; it leaves out too much; it was what the early Capitalists excluded from their costs that enabled them to rationalize the horrors of the Industrial Revolution. It is their ignorance of what is involved in the right kind of cost accounting which prevents Capitalistic economists today from seeing what is economically wrong with modern industrialism.

The criterion to use in deciding whether or not large-scale production is in fact more efficient than small-scale, *should not be* any of the following:

"Does it enable business men and business corporations to make more profit?" (This is the businessman's criterion).

"Does the multiplication of factories help to build up the city and raise land values?" (This is Chamber of Commerce criterion).

"Does it create more jobs?" (This is labor's criterion).

"Does it enable the politicians and the public officials in the non-Communist world, and the Commissars and Party leaders in the Communist world (the New Class), to exercise more power and to enjoy it more fully? Does it enable the State to collect more taxes? Does it enable more politicians and public officials to enjoy the perquisites of office, and in the non-Communist world does it enable the vested interests which put them in office to get and to keep the special privileges on which they thrive?" (These are the politician's criteria.)

Instead of any of these criteria (which are those which "practical" men use), the criteria should really be: "Does it lower costs? Does it provide better goods? Does it supply goods in adequate quantities? Does it improve the conditions of labor?"

* * * *

What must be included if all the costs, and not only the obvious and immediate costs, are taken into account?

The total costs of large-scale production fall into three groups: social costs, distribution costs, and direct costs.

To the first two of these groups of costs—the social costs and the distribution costs—neither the advocates of large-scale production nor the economists, without regard to whether they are Capitalistic or Communistic in their orientation, pay attention. No wonder the reviewers of my books (*The Distribution Age*, *This Ugly Civilization*, *Prosperity and Security*, and *Flight from the City*) which called attention to this, said over and over again I was a voice crying in the wilderness. Let me discuss each of these groups of costs as briefly as possible.

Social Costs—The social costs shifted in large-scale production from the producing enterprise to others, are of three kinds: (1) costs of *unemployment* peculiar to large-scale enterprises, (2) costs of *occupational diseases and accidents* peculiar to large-scale production, and (3) *unnecessary wastage* of human and natural resources.

1. The costs of unemployment peculiar to large-scale enterprises include the following: seasonal declines in employment; declines in employment and complete unemployment caused by style changes; declines in dying industries; unemployment attributable to mass-production, automation and cybernation.

2. The costs of occupational diseases and accidents for which no compensation is paid or for which the compensation is inadequate.

The importance of ordinary occupational diseases and accidents is well recognized. But of all the social costs perhaps the most serious, but certainly the least well recognized, is the occupational disease caused by the boredom and stress and strain of working on assembly lines (see Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times*⁶), by the shattering effects of large-scale (giant) farming (John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*), and in the upper echelons of big-business the nerve-racking strain at home of "keeping up with the Joneses" (Sloan Wilson's *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*) and while at work the fear of losing "cushy" prestige jobs, (H. L. Whyte's *The Organization Man*). No wonder alcoholism and similar escapes (including the cocktail party) are endemic among the victims of modern life!

None of these large-scale production costs are included in the cost accounting of big business. They do not appear in their books-of-account; they are borne by charities which pay for part of them in the help they give to those rendered destitute either temporarily or permanently by industrialism; relief payments (doles) and unemployment compensation (social security) paid for from general taxation either in whole (relief) or in part (social security); union dues, paid for by the employees to enable their unions to bargain with their employers and to use this bargaining power to eliminate their exploitation; and finally costs of occupational illness paid for either in part or in whole by the employees themselves.

3. The unnecessary wastage of human and natural resources peculiar to large-scale production, much of which is irreplaceable, includes two kinds of wastage:

First, in industry, wastage of natural resources like coal and oil (much of it for unnecessary transportation); in large-scale farming, mineralization of the soil with chemical fertilizers and mining of its fertility (*Deserts on the March*, Paul Sears), and poisoning of the soil and of crops with toxic pesticides (*Silent Spring*, Rachel Carson); finally pollution of the atmosphere, of rivers and harbors, and, to a degree, the high sea itself with oil wastes, chemical and industrial wastes, and now atomic wastes.

Secondly, and most importantly, the wastage of human lives in stupid and meaningless work. A great deal of repetitive work is a prime factor in this wastage (*Human Aspects of Industrial Civilization*, Elton Mayo). But the enormous increase in office and clerical workers necessary in large-scale enterprises (most of them doing work as repetitive and boring as that done on assembly lines in factories), and the even greater increase in the numbers necessarily engaged in the sheer distribution of goods when centrally produced on a large-scale, really represents the wastage of whole human lives. It is much better, no matter how little he may be noticed, for a man or woman to "cultivate his own garden" as Voltaire suggested, than to waste his life in such stupid occupations.

Neither classical nor liberal economists pay any attention to these social costs of large-scale production when they call attention to its alleged efficiency; Marxians and Socialist economists, on the other hand, are more aware of their significance but only think of them as an inevitable by-product of bourgeois exploitation of the proletariat. Marx himself spoke of them, at least in large part, when he described the horrors of exploitation during the early stages of the industrial revolution. He rather oversimply attributed this exploitation solely to the greed of the bourgeoisie. Insofar as there is any validity at all to his concept of surplus value, it amounts to this: the bourgeoisie did use their power to the full to shift the social costs of the factory system (large-scale production) onto their workers and the charities supported by the general public. The unearned profits thus made possible for factory-owners, as compared with the craft-producers, might be called a surplus-value which not only Marxians but everybody ought to con-

demn. But Marx's surplus value was in large part a pseudo-surplus; in the long run it is doubtful whether profits much exceeded losses, particularly if the unearned exploitation profits realized from the shifting of their social costs were first deducted from the profits.

Distribution Costs—We come now to what I shall here call distribution costs (for which the buyers cannot avoid paying, since they cannot go direct to the factories to buy what they want). These costs must be included when the cost of large-scale production is compared with the cost of small-scale production, and they become particularly important when compared with the cost of production on the smallest of all scales, in the home by members of the consumer's own family. Here distribution costs disappear altogether, because the place of production and the place of consumption is one and the same.

In *The Distribution Age*, I summed up my studies of this matter in an economic law: *distribution costs have an inverse relationship to production costs*. The larger the factory, the lower (usually) are the production costs, but the larger the factory the higher are the distribution costs which must be added to them. (With centralized production goods have to be shipped greater distances and more elaborate and expensive warehousing and merchandising arrangements are necessary; with local small-scale production, distribution costs are small and transportation costs almost nil; with the smallest scale of production, production in the home and on the farm for family consumption, both entirely disappear.)

Direct Production Costs—Finally we come to the consideration of direct production costs—whether large-scale production is in fact most efficient (social costs and distribution costs for the moment ignored, but quality of goods and conditions of the workers taken into consideration). There is almost nothing in the way of really systematic and scientific study of this problem—the superior efficiency of large-scale production being taken by everybody for granted. But to get at the truth of the matter, at least nine different kinds of production and nine different sizes of the enterprises engaged in them (which might be called scales-of-production) should be taken into account:

1. Costs with individual production for the individual's own consumption, (see Thoreau's *Walden*);

2. Costs with family production for family consumption, which should include farm production for the family's own subsistence, (see my own *This Ugly Civilization* and *Flight from the City*);

3. Costs with general farming for market production;

4. Costs with specialized large-scale one-crop farming;

5. Costs with custom and craft production of goods and services;

6. Costs with the production of a variety of related goods and services in one factory (which can all be manufactured with the same kind of machinery and equipment);

7. Costs with horizontal factory production (mass-production) specializing on one type of goods and services;

8. Costs with vertically integrated factory production, including ownership and operation of mines for fuel or other sources of power and such transportation facilities as would prove profitable in the transshipment of its own raw materials and fabricated parts among its own plants;

9. Finally, costs with totally integrated production and totally planned production of every kind of goods and every kind of services; this is what Marxism by implication logically calls for; it can only be provided, of course, in totalitarian States.

If a study of this kind is ever made (which I doubt; nobody is interested except voices like mine "crying in the wilderness") I predict that it will show that most of what is consumed can be most efficiently produced on the smallest scale in the home in which it is consumed; that most foodstuffs can be produced most efficiently and of the freshest quality on local farms by local farmers; that if the whole cost of conserving soil fertility is included, the crops now produced on giant farms can be more economically produced on family-sized general farms; that most products in which integrity is important can be most efficiently produced in local shops by local craftsmen; that most products which lend themselves to factory production can be most efficiently produced in small and medium-sized establishments; and that very few products can be most efficiently produced in the largest factories now used in our various industries. But the concept of production as made in these

predictions includes both monetary and non-monetary production; it includes the cooking of meals and providing shelter (two of the biggest of all "industries" in terms of numbers engaged and of man-hours involved). If this kind of production is included, the home can provide it far more economically than the biggest restaurant or the biggest hotel engaged in producing and providing the same kind of goods and services.

There have been, it is true, some investigations of the efficiency of bigness, particularly by those interested in fighting against monopolistic and oligopolistic big business. The most exhaustive study of this sort made by the Temporary National Economic Committee⁷ showed what none of the economic apologists for big business expected, that in no industry was the biggest factory and the biggest corporation the most efficient. In some industries the smallest and in others the medium-sized establishments were much more efficient than the largest establishments (though both the smallest and the medium-sized were probably already too large—at any rate, no comparisons between really small factories and large factories were made). So far as I have been able to discover, studies of the kind I am calling for, which include every scale of production, have never been made.

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In making comparisons of the kind I am calling for, particularly when the comparisons are made between custom-production and family-production on the one hand and factory-production on the other, it is of the utmost importance that technological progress be taken into account. Before the Industrial Revolution, custom-producers and cottage-industries could use neither modern power nor modern tools and machines. A very few used wind-power, more used water-power but most of them relied upon muscle-power (human and animal) and nothing else. There were hidden social costs too, but they were of a quite different kind and of a very different magnitude. The guilds, for instance, enabled the masters to exploit their journeymen and apprentices; unions of journeymen and apprentices were forbidden by statute.

On the other hand, some of the conditions of labor were incomparably better than today. The largest part of the labor-force consisted of self-employed masters and self-employed yeoman farmers. The prospects for apprentices and journeymen were such that

the majority could look forward to the ownership of establishments of their own. With modern industrial production, the overwhelming majority of both office workers and industrial workers can never look forward to the management of an enterprise of their own; they are doomed to be deprived of the character-building responsibilities of independence, self-reliance, and ownership. They have virtually no prospect for what used to be called the elevation of labor and can look forward only to today's prevailing degradation of it. The man who makes a pair of shoes, a chair, a table, or any other product, who selects the materials for it, the tools he will use, and then fabricates it step by step and is able when it is finished to say, "I made it," (even if he only says it subconsciously to himself), is a far superior person to the simulacrum of a man who repeats the same mechanical operation on an assembly line endlessly for years on end, who can take no satisfaction from it, and who has reduced himself to a living-machine, simply because he gets a paycheck for it once a week. In our industrial and urban society the great masses, both in factories and offices, (even though they never think about it) are in fact humiliated by their work. In an Agrarian and Distributist society pride in craft and husbandry and housewifery was a fact, even in spite of the manner in which commoners were exploited by kings, by nobles, and by landlords.

For such comparisons to be scientifically made, the technologies used by both the small-scale producer and the large-scale producer should be those of the same technological period. If the small-scale producer uses small electric motors to drive the highly efficient small power-tools now available, his costs of production are lowered in precisely the same manner that costs of production in a factory are lowered by the use of large motors and factory-size, automated machines. In my own studies of family-production, I had the kitchens, the sewing rooms, and the laundries equipped with the most efficient appliances available. All the costs, including interest on the investment, repairs, and maintenance, depreciation and obsolescence of the equipment, were taken into account. The home-baker could bake bread for about half the price which she had to pay for bread produced in the most modern automated giant-bakeries (none of it really fit for human consumption because of the chemical preservatives added to it to keep it fresh). These principles must be observed in making such com-

parisons if they are to be made impartially without loading the dice so as to be sure to vindicate the existing faith in mass-production and automation.

My own studies (*This Ugly Civilization, Flight from the City*, above all the Homestead Bulletins of the School of Living) dealt only with comparisons between the costs of family production and factory production. They came out with a Pluralistic conclusion, with what I venture to predict would also be the conclusions if studies of the same kind are ever made of all scales of production. Most products capable of being produced at home (and actually still being produced at home in many old-fashioned farm homes) can be produced at lower costs (labor and everything else taken into consideration) than they can be purchased; other products (shoes, furniture, hardware, electric light bulbs) can be most efficiently produced in shops and factories of different sizes.

In making studies of this sort, one thing is vitally important: the comparisons must be made not between the costs of production in the home and the costs of production in the factory, but between the costs of production in the home (which are total costs for what is consumed by the family) and the prices charged at retail for the same goods, quality taken into consideration. This is because distribution costs, as I have already pointed out, are ignored by economists when they talk about the efficiency of the division of labor, mass-production, and automation.

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The production problem is as old as mankind. From the moment primitive man began to hunt and fish, herd and gather, he began to deal with it. Some sort of solutions for the problem there have always been. If these solutions are carefully classified, using the scheme of classification which I have used throughout these studies (based upon the three possible ways man has for obtaining knowledge), supernally vindicated solutions produce Thaumaturgic Production Theories; objectively vindicated solutions, Quantity Production Theories; and intellectually vindicated solutions, Quality Production Theories.

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Thaumaturgic Production Theories—The supernal approach to production, insofar as the shamans and saints, the prophets and

scriptures dealt with the utilitarian enterprises of mankind at all, was *Thaumaturgic*, (magical and oracular). Efficiency and success, whether a hunt or a fishing trip, the construction of a hut or of a canoe, were dependent upon the observance of the rites and the taboos of the tribe and recourse to shamans and oracles when difficult and strange problems had to be dealt with. About all that we find left of primitive Thaumaturgic theories about production in a few of the higher cultures of Asia, India and China, is the insistence that no enterprise be launched without the blessings of pandits or sages and the cooperation of astrologers, geomancers, and other masters of esoteric lore. The higher religions, for the most part, have considered whatever mankind did here on Earth, including what they did about the production of goods and services, of little importance. Only what men do to provide for their future felicity after they were dead has been considered all-important.

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*Quantity Production Theories*⁹—The Objective approach to the problem, the approach of tough-minded, practical men, is Quantitative, Materialistic, Mechanistic, and Centralistic. Management in both Capitalistic and Communistic enterprises takes centralization of production and centralization of control for granted. In the so-called Capitalistic World, "practical" men devote themselves to building bigger and bigger factories, destroying or buying out their smaller and weaker competitors' plants without necessarily rationalizing the process as centralization, while promoters, (now called investment bankers), encourage this by financing both horizontal and vertical mergers in larger and larger corporations. The end result is the present-day centralization and cartelization of production in oligopolic and monopolistic corporations, a result achieved by concealing the bribery of public officials and the corruption of political parties with contributions to obtain the special privileges and differential advantages which makes this possible.

Centralization—The production of goods and services is centralized in two distinguishable ways, both of which have in common the fact that operations are conducted in a single plant or a number of centrally controlled establishments (factories, farms, mines, offices, etc.). (1) *Vertical Centralization* (which has also been called Rationalization and Integration), which centralizes the production of all of the parts of a product (sometimes from the raw material

to the finished product) in a single plant or series of establishments controlled as one whole, and (2) *Horizontal Centralization*, which centralizes the production of the one kind of raw, semi-finished or finished goods in one large establishment or a number of large establishments all producing the same thing in different sections of the nation. (Corporate ownership and centralization are discussed in Problem XIV, The Distribution Problem).

It should be borne in mind that the term, *production*, is being used in its strictly economic meaning—the production of not only form utilities as in manufacturing, but basic utilities as in mining and farming, place utilities as in shipping and transportation, and time utilities as in wholesaling and retailing, insurance and banking. Mining is centralized when large numbers of small mines are deliberately shut down and replaced by a few large mines (as was the case when the United States Steel Corporation was originally organized, when dozens of small mines were bought out solely to shut them down—ostensibly to increase efficiency but in reality to eliminate their competition). Farming is centralized when giant corporate wheat farms are substituted for raising wheat in small fields on thousands of family-sized farms. Merchandising is centralized when department stores or chain stores are established to bamboozle the public with what are called “loss leaders” into thinking their prices are lower. And of course manufacturing is centralized when mergers of independent manufacturers are effected to reduce the number of competing manufacturers of the same product, (as was the case when the American Woolen Company was organized). But this merger, like dozens of others, eventually failed because of the lower efficiency of centralized production in the weaving of woollens.

The simple truth of the matter, as my own investigations have clearly proved, is that while there are some things which lend themselves to centralized production, most things can be more efficiently supplied to the public by relatively small establishments if the special privileges showered upon big businesses were withdrawn and the special handicaps imposed upon small businesses were eliminated by the stupid and often corrupt legislators who have lent themselves to quantity-minded business tycoons and legalized these perversions of law.

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Marx and his followers were as quantitative as the Capitalists they condemned. Marx was an Historical Materialist ("everything that takes place is ultimately a reflection of the material modes of production"). When the Bolsheviks took over in Russia, the first thing they did with the factories and the farms they expropriated was to begin centralizing ownership and control in the State; this has been repeated in all subsequent Communist takeovers.

What is coming out of it everywhere in the world is the present-day movement toward centralized, large-scale production, the difference between the Capitalistic and Communistic World being a difference of ownership not of production. One practices centralization, the other total centralization. One limits centralization to preserve the appearance of competitive free enterprise, the other centralizes all "the means of production and distribution" in the State and tries to rationalize the procedure with a centralized Planning Board. Both of these are Monistic approaches to the problem. What the facts seem to show, as far as I have been able to assemble evidence, is that Quantitative Production will not guarantee, as its advocates assume, that production will be most efficient. On the contrary, the costs of the top-heavy overhead and the increase in transportation, warehousing and distribution costs, wipe out the reduction in large-scale production costs, if any, in so many industries (including most agricultural crops) that good sense calls for the abandonment of the existing dogmatic insistence upon the large-scale, centralized production of everything. What the situation calls for is decentralization⁸.

*Qualitative Production Theories*¹⁰—There remains for consideration the Intellectual approach to the problem; in the case of production I think of this as approaching both the product and those who produce it qualitatively—the aim in the production of the product being not how to produce mediocre products by mass-production, but the best possible product on the scale of production which is optimally efficient, and the aim in dealing with those employed in producing it, how to develop in them their highest potentialities as craftsmen. The quantitative approach, both in the Capitalistic and the Communistic world, is equally indifferent to the degradation of labor as it is to the degradation of the product. Only mass-production counts,

Significant criticisms of the quantitative approach began to appear in England almost as soon as factory production began to replace craft production, predatory competition began to replace guild (fraternal) competition, and the first true labor unions (composed of journeymen or apprentices) began to appear and revolt against exploitation under the guild-system. William Cobbett's writings (his *Rural Rides* at the end of the 18th century) I consider the most significant of these criticisms, but similar criticisms were made by the opponents of the Enclosure Acts (1776 to 1785). They reappeared later in the writings of Ruskin and Carlyle, both of whom stigmatized the economic apologists for the rapacity of early factory-owners by calling their science the "dismal science." Their last appearance in England came in the writings of the English Distributists, (Belloc, Chesterton, Eric Gill); in America in the writings of the American Decentralists, (myself, Baker Brownell, Frank Lloyd Wright, Elmer Peterson, Ralph Templin, Willis Nutting), in the writings of the Neo-Homesteaders, Back-to-the-Landers, and other proponents of the Green Revolution (myself, Mildred Jensen Loomis, Louis Bromfield), in the writings of the Southern Agrarians, (John Crowe Ransom, Donald Davidson, Allen Tate, and others in *I'll Take My Stand*), and curiously enough to most people in India, in the writings of Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave, and Jayaprakash Narayan.

Most of this criticism of large-scale, and advocacy of small-scale production, was on artistic and humanitarian grounds, on the ground of vulgarization of taste, degradation of craftsmanship, exploitation of labor and waste of soil, forestry, fishery, and mineral resources. To this I added criticism on economic grounds, on the grounds that it involved pseudo-efficiency; that in fact small-scale production and particularly home-production was more efficient than large-scale production for the bulk of all goods and for most kinds of services. Curiously enough Cobbett in one of his *Rural Rides* anticipated this and called attention to the fact that the shift of production from the cottages of England to the factories of England could not be justified with regard to most products on the alleged ground of greater efficiency and lower cost.

The Quantitative approach is that not only of the proponents of Predatory Capitalism, but also of its critics. When Samuel Gompers, then the President of the American Federation of Labor,

was asked by a business man what would satisfy the labor unions and end their antagonism to business, he replied with one word, "More." The Marxists, both Socialists and Communists, are equally quantitative. In theory they want to substitute for maximization of profits by the hated bourgeoisie, maximization of wages for labor; in practice, as Milovan Djilas pointed out (*The New Class*), they substituted maximization of the interests and powers of the Commissars and the New Bureaucracy. Perhaps the most significant evidence establishing the fact that the approach of both Capitalists and Communists to the production problem is the same, is their common devotion to the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor, the founder of scientific management ("In the past man was first, in the future the system will be first").

If all the implications of the ideology of Qualitative Production, as I think of the complex body of ideas involved, are consistently and logically developed, they are Pluralistic and not Monistic in nature. No one scale of production is most efficient (some things should be family-produced, some things mass-produced); no one system of production (some home, some craft, some factory production); no one organization and locale of production (some centralized, some decentralized); no one kind of ownership of production (some individual, some cooperative, some corporate, some private, even some public—streets and highways, the police and military establishments). In a genuinely rational and humane society, both human values (freedom, pride in craft, conditions of labor) and economic values (prices to the consumer) must be taken into account.

The issues involved call for the establishment of a priority: Which should come first, quality or quantity—quality in its broadest signification, quality of goods and quality of life—or quantity of material goods without regard to the consequences for life?

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem XII: The Production Problem

Since the only material in my files dealing with the production problem deals with the theory rather than the technology of production, I had an easier job to prepare this outline from the less than a hundred pages of my notes than any other problem. The only difficulty I found was that of how to distinguish sharply enough the nature of the problems created by the existence of basically different ways of production—of making things (producing basic and form utilities) and rendering services (providing time and place utilities) from the nature of the problems created by the existence of basically different ways of distribution—of distributing the money received from the sale of what is produced among those who have contributed to its production.

1. Production here refers to the actual growing, fishing, timbering, mining and manufacturing of both raw commodities and finished goods of all kinds; to the transportation, storage, and merchandising of goods of all kinds; to the provision of services of all kinds, from banking to laundering, from medical services to diaper services.

2. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that this issue applies in the same way to farming as it does to manufacturing. The family farm which produces a wide variety of products—fruits and vegetables, eggs and milk, chickens and pork—are the analogs of small-scale shops and factories, while giant one-crop farms are the analogs of manufacturers engaged in mass-production. This acquires additional importance because of the necessary degradation of quality which comes with large-scale farming; mass-produced chickens, for instance, are far inferior nutritionally to chickens which have been raised by smaller, more natural and more wholesome methods; many dietetic authorities are agreed that the use of chemical additives and stimulants in raising not only chickens but all kinds of livestock on a mass basis is downright harmful.

3. Obviously total centralization is impossible in a free economy; it is approximated in imperfectly free economies such as

our own by the merging of enterprises in gigantic corporations; in either event, to the degree that centralization is practiced by either big business or by a big State, freedom is sacrificed for it.

4. In a free economy, the adoption of methods of production is left to the individual entrepreneur; in a socialized economy decisions about this are taken over by State officials along with the taking over of "the means of production and distribution."

5. *Megalorean* is a term I feel justified in coining to designate the quality of "bigness." The root comes from the Greek *megale*, meaning great. The word big, unfortunately, does not lend itself to use with suffixes. *Megale* makes possible *Megaloreanism*, the doctrine that bigness should be valued, and that the bigger a thing, the better; *megalic*, big, huge, gigantic; *megalorist*, one who tries to make his projects and enterprises as big as possible; *megalo-mania*, an obsessive admiration or desire for bigness; *megalopolis*, a city which is a combination of metropolise; and *megalogy*, dedication, deification, devotion to bigness as a goal.

6. "*Modern Times*" This was one of the most famous of Charlie Chaplin's silent movies; it was a satire on "mass production." It was released in 1936.

7. *Temporary National Economic Committee*—The TNEC, as this joint organization of the Senate, House, and Executive Department came to be known, began the most exhaustive analysis of the American economy in 1938. The survey cost more than a million dollars and lasted two years. Its report was published in 31 volumes, 17,000 printed pages, 3,300 exhibits of technical data, and 43 monographs by 188 monographs. The report was so devastatingly critical of what was happening to the economy that, as a result of Administration and newspaper propaganda, it was virtually ignored by both the general public and the academic world. Industry was condemned as too centralized and too big; even centralization in farming was being encouraged by financial institutions and the government itself. Unfortunately from my standpoint, it made no studies of the smallest scales and most decentralized production; it made no studies of the economy of domestic (home) production or of custom production.

8. *Decentralization*—The doctrine that enterprises in the modern world have been over-centralized; that they should be divid-

ed into smaller, independent and autonomous units, and that institutions which encourage and favor centralization should be replaced by institutions which encourage the limitation of enterprise to normal, humanized, and optimally efficient units. Over-centralization calls for decentralization, because for one reason it involves a waste of human and natural resources. The really rational in projects and enterprises is the human, the normal, and the optimal size. For a full discussion, see my *Education and Living*, Chapter VII, pp. 198-276.

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PROBLEM XIV.

Acquirers, Claimants, and Apportioners: The Distribution Problem

Now after a long time the Lord of those servants returneth, and maketh a reckoning with them.....

And he.....that hath received one talent came....and said "Lord....lo, thou has thine own talent back."

But his Lord answered him and said unto him, "Thou slothful servant, thou knowest that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I did not scatter. Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the bankers, and at my coming back I should have received back mine own with interest.

"Take away therefore the talent from him.....

"For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away."—Matthew 25:19.

Economics is still a pseudo science, or perhaps I should say a bastardized science. It was born a bastardized science when Francis Quesnay in France and Adam Smith in England laid the foundations for the science which was first called political economy; then it was a mixture, apparently dealing with two problems, economics and politics. But today, what we call economics is a much worse mixture than that; it actually shuffles together at least six basic problems in such a way that the significance of each is completely lost. The problems, so unfortunately mixed into a hodgepodge, are the problems of values, of possessions, of organization, of production, of distribution, and of politics. Finally some of the most influential of all economists (Adam Smith a little and Karl Marx a great deal) mixed in the institutional problem so as to make the muddle even worse.

(I say all this about this so-called science in spite of the fact—or maybe because of the fact—that I practiced in New York City as a consulting economist for some of the largest corporations in the country for a long part of my life).

What we shall now consider is one problem in the economic soufflé, the distribution problem, probably the most “economic” of the basic problems with which economics as we know it today deals.

* * * *

The distribution problem is created by two facts:

1. The fact that every enterprise, no matter how small (a single laborer earning his own living) or how large (the whole economy of a nation), acquires an income, and
2. The fact that the distribution of this income among those who claim a share in it has been from time immemorial a matter of dispute between the apportioners of it and the claimants for it.

* * * *

It is necessary first of all to distinguish between income, the acquisition of income, and the distribution of it.

Income—The concept of income must not be over-simplified; it does not consist only of money. Ultimately real income consists of four things: (1) the use of the natural resources of the Earth—the land and sea and everything on and in the land and in the sea which has been entrusted to man and to his descendants for use (entrusted and not given, as we mistakenly assume); (2) the consumption of goods—both goods like food and clothing which he consumes rapidly and goods like furniture and houses which he consumes slowly; (3) the utilization of services—the services rendered by doctors and lawyers, by engineers and laborers, by singers and ministers, by plumbers and cooks; and finally (4) the enjoyment of experiences—experiences which I think of as the major and minor ecstasies of life—sunsets and seascapes, a garden in bloom, a ride on a horse, foliage in autumn, songs and dances, poetry and books. For the most part experiences lie outside of the area with which economics concerns itself, but it is an indubitable fact that they are income and that some enterprise provides them—a country home, for instance—as by-products if not as main-products (though in the case of the right kind of country-home it is an injustice to call it a by-product).

What is important is to recognize the distinction between monetary and non-monetary income. An enormous part of all income even in our monetized world today is still non-monetary. In one of my books I tried to estimate its magnitude, and it looks to me, taking the world as a whole, as if it might be well over half of everything mankind produces.

Every meal produced in a home, in fact every bit of food and clothing produced and every service rendered in the home, from that of washing clothes to that of rearing babies, is non-monetary income. When to this is added what remains of barter in the most primitive regions of the world, the aggregate amount becomes enormous. Yet it is almost wholly disregarded by economists, just as are those experiences which for every truly cultivated person are often the most highly treasured of all forms of "income."

But the distribution of non-monetary income almost takes care of itself. Within the family, each contributes what the family expects him to contribute, and each receives (is apportioned) what the family thinks he needs.

Like the apportionment of non-monetary income, the distribution of experiences also takes care of itself; no apportioner at all is needed, except in so far as they are dependent upon "self-apportioning." Most of them are free, of course; only when some entrepreneur can shut off access to some wonder of nature does economics enter into the picture. Perhaps because these kinds of experiences are for the most part free, most of mankind consider them far inferior to the meretricious delights to be purchased in the big bazaars of modern metropolises.

The distribution problem is a problem for economists only insofar as they differ about how and why the money-income of the whole economy of the nation⁴ is allocated among the basic factors contributing to its production. The real problem—how it *should* be allocated and not just how and why—they leave to social reformers as outside the scope of science. As the problem will be here discussed, it will deal with the actual problem with which actual human beings find themselves wrestling—the problem of how the money-income of actual enterprises of all kinds, including the whole economy of which they are a part, should be allocated among the actual claimants for it. The problem in this monetized form

probably dates back only to the Industrial Revolution, though it is true that even when most of the income of mankind consisted of agricultural produce and most of it was distributed in kind, not money, the problem of how it should be apportioned was nevertheless there.

* * * *

Acquirers—The dictionary defines acquire as to gain by any means. An acquirer is a person, then, who gains by any means; one may gain honestly, another dishonestly; both are acquirers. This fact requires exploration in some detail; it calls for distinguishing between incomes which are justly and honestly acquired and those which are unjustly or dishonestly acquired *even when the practices which produce such unjustifiable incomes are legalized*. Dollars are no respecters of persons; they do not change color nor do they buy any less because those who acquired them did not actually earn them, did not deserve to receive them, or did not actually obtain them honestly. A really staggering proportion of all the income of the nation's enterprises is obtained by enterprises and by means so dishonest and so predatory that such enterprises ought not to be permitted to exist at all. What is just as distressing is the fact that a similarly staggering proportion of the income of honest and legitimate enterprises is unjustly acquired by those who receive it. This becomes obvious the moment a clear distinction is made between equitable and inequitable income.

Equitable Money Incomes—There are at least nine important categories into which equitable incomes fall :

1. Incomes from wages, salaries, bonuses;
2. Incomes from thrift and saving—interest on savings deposits, dividends on securities;
3. Incomes from the sales of products having basic utility—food, fish, fibres, timber, coal, oil, copper, iron ;
4. Incomes from the sale of products having form-utility—semi-finished and finished products ;
5. Incomes from the sale of products and services having place utility—from the transportation of products and people, from the wholesaling of goods to retailers, from the retailing of merchandise to the consuming public ;

6. Incomes from the sale of products and services having time-utility—from storing and warehousing commodities and merchandise of all kinds ; from the investing and lending of money and granting of credit ; from the renting of buildings and appliances ; from the holding of land and other trustery ;

7. Incomes from the dues for the services rendered by non-profit economic associations—by labor unions, trade associations, farmers' unions, professional associations ;

8. Incomes from dues and tuitions, from donations and endowments for services rendered by non-economic and non-profit enterprises—by churches and charities, schools and colleges, libraries and museums, and other cultural enterprises ;

9. Incomes from taxes for police protection and military defense, streets and highways, and from ground rents and mineral land royalties, by the State as representative of the public as a whole ;

10. Incomes from illicit services rendered by prostitutes, gamblers, smugglers. In spite of the cloud under which these unfortunates labor, these are earned incomes; the incomes of politicians and policemen who furnish protection to these victims of social ignorance are, of course, unearned.

Inequitable Money Incomes—There are at least ten kinds of unearned, unjust and dishonest money incomes to which consideration should be given:

1. Incomes by paupers and parasites from relatives, from beggary, from charities, and from State Welfare agencies ;

2. Incomes obtained by criminals and their protectors from thefts, from swindles, from embezzlements, from "fences" for stolen goods ; from blackmail and from racketeering, and by politicians and policemen for protecting violators of the law ;

3. Incomes, or rather that part of the whole income of enterprises, which consist of the "differential" profits made possible because they are favored by special privileges of various kinds—subsidies and protective tariffs, import quotas and export licenses ;

4. Incomes, or rather that part of the wages of individual workers, that consist of the differential wages⁵ which they realize

in industries protected by a tariff and in unionized establishments because of the legalization of the closed shop ;

5. Incomes from differential interest rates⁵ made possible to those who benefit from them only because of a stupid and dishonest money system ;

6. Incomes from differential rents and unearned increments made possible for land-owners and land-speculators only because of an equally stupid and dishonest land-system ;

7. Incomes from the differential profits of oligopolies, of monopolies, and of enterprises belonging to cartels ;

8. Incomes of private utilities from differential profits made possible by the granting of franchises and the right of eminent domain to them ;

9. Incomes in the form of taxes levied by political States and political sub-divisions of the State for alleged "services" which they should not render (maintaining customs guards and services ; arresting, prosecuting and imprisoning alcoholics and drug addicts ; granting franchises to private utility corporations which should either be operated by non-profit cooperatives or by the State itself ; licensing enterprises which should not be required to pay anything at all for the right to conduct their business) ;

10. Incomes in Socialist and Communist States from those industries owned and operated by the State in which differential and monopoly profits are realized (there are always some which earn a profit even though most of them lose money and have to have their deficits made good by subsidies from the proceeds of general taxation).

In a rational and humane society—in a genuinely free State—there would be no enterprises at all (either individual or corporate) with unearned, unjust, or dishonest incomes. All such enterprises, including the State itself with its numberless sources of inequitable income, would either have been abolished or would be "withering away."

The Claimants—Two factors in the distribution problem are mainly responsible for its complexity and difficulty—the claimants to income and the apportioners of income. What makes the part played by the claimants complex and difficult is the fact that there

is always more than one person⁶ either with claims upon the income of an enterprise, or who appropriates a part of it (often without making a formal claim of any kind for it !). Among the claimants some of the most important are :

Productive Claimants:

1. Self-employed farmers, storekeepers, shopowners, etc., (with claims for goods produced or services rendered) ;
2. Self-employed professional claimants—lawyers, doctors, dentists, architects (with claims for fees for services rendered) ;
3. Gainfully employed workers (with claims for wages, salaries, bonuses) ;
4. Employed managers (with claims for salaries, bonuses) ;
5. Large-scale farming, manufacturing and mining, transportation and merchandising enterprises (with claims for raw materials, semi-finished products, finished products, merchandise, etc.) ;
6. Manufacturers of machinery and building contractors (with claims for construction or for capital equipment) ;
7. Public utilities (with claims for gas, water, electricity, telephone services) ;
8. Investors (with claims for dividends on their investments and for their principal) ;
9. Bankers (with claims for interest on their loans and for their principal) ;
10. Labor unions, farmers' unions, trade associations, professional associations (with claims for dues from their members).

Social, Charitable, and Cultural Claimants :

11. Members of families (with claims for their needs) ;
12. Paupers and parasites (with claims for whatever they can get) ;
13. Charitable institutions (with claims for donations) ;
14. Cultural Institutions, churches, schools, libraries, (also with claims for donations).

Non-Productive Illicit, Illegitimate and Unjustifiable Legal Claimants:

15. Burglars, embezzlers, pickpockets, etc., (who take what they can) ;

16. Racketeers and predatory financial promoters (who take what they can get away with);

17. Monopolists, cartelists, oligopolists (takers of unearned differential profits which they do not distinguish from earned profits);

18. Subsidized and statutorily privileged bankers, manufacturers, ship-owners (takers of subsidies and unearned differential profits on tariffs, quotas, franchises and other privileged legal grants);

19. Privileged classes: privileged farmers (takers of unearned differential "parity" prices); privileged union members (takers of unearned differential wages);

20. Land owners, mine owners; and owners of and speculators in other natural resources (takers of unearned increments);

21. Political insiders: politicians and party contributors; contractors specializing in public works; lobbyists and fixers; grafters and bribe-takers (takers of all they can get legally or illegally);

22. Finally, official takers: public officials and bureaucrats, the military and police forces in Free States and in Communized States, and the "New Class" of dictators, commissars, party functioners, and managers of industries (takers from the total economy, though not always the largest takers).

This is by no means a complete list of the claimants to shares in the income of enterprises and of economies of different kinds, but it is sufficient to show how absurdly over-simplified is the treatment of the subject by classical economists (who list only four claimants: land owners for rent, capital owners for interest, enterprise owners for profits, labor owners for wages). A still simpler treatment of the matter was offered by Henry George (three claimants: land, capital, and labor), and the even still more simpler treatment of it by Karl Marx (two claimants: the bourgeoisie [capital] and the proletariat [labor]).

The Apportioners—We come now to the part played in the distribution problem by those persons I think of as apportioners⁷. The apportioners are, of course, claimants also. But as claimants they differ from all the others in one all-important respect. *What they are able to avoid apportioning to the other claimants, they can keep for themselves.*

In the over-simplification of the distribution problem in which economists from the inception of the science have indulged, the apportioners came to be called Capitalists. The fact of the matter is that in reality there are at least a dozen important and quite different kinds of apportioners, all of whom must be taken into account :

1. *Individual Apportioners*—The largest number of apportioners are individuals who act as apportioners when they spend their own incomes (however obtained). Most individual apportioners today are salary- and wage-earners. Most of them earn their incomes, and even in the most regimented of Communist States are free to spend and "apportion" it as they wish. But the individual apportioners in every economy include large numbers of individuals who obtain and spend and apportion unearned-incomes—paupers and parasites who obtained their incomes by beggary or from gifts from relatives, from charities, or from welfare agencies; criminals who obtain their incomes illegally (burglars, embezzlers), and finally some of the biggest of all "criminals" who obtain their incomes extra-legally (labor union racketeers, financial buccaneers). When these last two groups who live on criminal and extra-legal incomes distribute what they obtain, a surprisingly large share is distributed to corrupt policemen for protection and to civil, criminal, and corporation lawyers for the purpose of keeping them out of the clutches of the law;

2. *Families* constitute a second class of apportioners, and "apportion" as they spend their monetary and distribute their non-monetary incomes (distribute what they produce in their own homes or on their own farms among their members, old and young). They apportion as they pay rent and taxes, as they pay for social security and insurance, for water, electricity, and transportation, for food, clothing, and everything else they buy;

3. Third come *owners*, but these owners do not consist only of those who operate privately owned enterprises (sole proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives, corporations) but also the public officials who in effect "own" government operated enterprises like the post office and public utilities ;

4. Fourth are those who might well be called *monopolists*; these apportioners include not only oligopolistic, cartelized, and

monopolistic enterprises, but also all those apportioners who enjoy differential incomes made possible by special privileges granted to them by the State;

5. Fifth is that institution called *the market* which, to the extent to which it "fixes" wages, interest, rent, and the price at which goods and services are sold, is a major factor in apportioning the income of the whole economy among those who receive parts of it. Markets, however, are themselves of many kinds: few of them are really free markets; most of them are what I think of as constrained markets in which sometimes the buyer and sometimes the sellers are constrained by interference from the State, by monopolists, and by other special interests (labor unions, for instance). The nearer a market approximates to complete freedom, the more effectively it ensures the apportionment of income in accordance with the amount of what each claimant to it contributes to its production;

6. Sixth are the *public officials* of Political (in contrast to Economic or Socialist) States. Though the United States is supposed to be merely a Political State, that doesn't alter the fact that it plays a tremendous part in distribution, partly by the unfairness with which it levies taxes, favoring particular interests at the expense of the general interest, but even more by its grants of special privileges to certain interests at the expense of others by means of tariffs, quotas, import and export restrictions, subsidies, and so on *ad infinitum*. The marvel is that the market is able to play any part of the role it theoretically should play in apportioning income to the various claimants for it ;

7. Finally there are the *dictators* (the real planners) in Communist States who are able to apportion the income of the whole economy, since the State is the only enterprise legally permitted to operate any enterprise at all.

This description of apportioners as they are, in contrast to what the theorists of economics say about them, is already, I recognize, an over-simplification, but it will serve for the purpose of outlining the nature of the problem.

It is impossible to look at this list of apportioners and at the list of claimants without understanding why it is that Marxist theorists insist that the internal contradictions of Capitalist society will eventually destroy it. The conditions in the Capitalist world, in

all truth, are bad enough; they call for drastic and radical reform. But they call for no such revolution as that of "expropriating the expropriators" on the theory that only two classes are involved, the bourgeoisie (who own everything and are entitled to nothing) and the proletarians (who own nothing but are entitled to everything). What the situation calls for is the re-education of the mis-educators of mankind, not only the Marxist economists but the Welfare State and classical economists, who so grossly oversimplify the realities and who, in mis-educating the public, make it impossible for the determining number in the population to act intelligently in dealing with the situation.

* * * *

It is at this point that the proponents of Sarvodaya make a major contribution. Jayaprakash Narayan expresses that contribution in language much more sweeping than pragmatic Americans consider within the realm of the practical. Nevertheless, the contribution is there.

Self-interest, according to Sarvodaya, is the root cause of all conflicts in the world today. Otherwise there is no reason why, with all our scientific advancement, there should be so much poverty, hunger, misery and exploitation. In Sarvodaya, however, one has to be solicitous of others' interests. Man's nature will have to be changed; values of life will have to be revalued.

The key word here is "solicitous." The apportioner is expected to consider not only his own but the interests of all other claimants. And a much more modest demand than Sarvodaya—if realized—would nevertheless transform society. We do not need to wait until "man's nature" is changed; it will be sufficient to create a climate of public opinion in which apportioners are honored not for what they keep (and add to their wealth) but for the justice with which they apportion and discharge the trust they administer.

In the final analysis no statute and no system for dealing with apportioning will automatically ensure that justice is done. The notion that some mere rearrangement of economic or political institutions can ensure this is one of the most fantastic notions that has ever captured the imagination of those aware of the enormous importance of social reform. Both the ardent defenders of Capitalism and the proponents of Communism are confident that their system

represents "the philosopher's stone." Yet it ought to be clear that no matter how good the system, in the final analysis it is not the system, but the controllers of the system, that count.

It is the character of the apportioner alone, in the final analysis, which determines whether justice or injustice is done.

If the apportioners take all that they can get away with, if they act as if their position entitled them to do what ownership legally entitles owners to do, it is fantastic to expect that any system will work justly—there are too many ways in which the apportioners can monkey with it, no matter what it may be. Only if they act like trustees in dealing with the responsibility and the power which apportioning confers upon them, will justice be done.

A bad system will make it easier for bad men to take advantage of their fellow men; a good system will make it easier for good men to deal with bad men, but no system will ever be able in the final analysis to guarantee that bad men, because of the system, will apportion justly. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Unless the custodian needs no custodian, we are pinning our faith on an endless regression and, like kittens, frantically circling in a futile attempt to finally catch our own tails.

* * * *

Transactions—The culminating act in the distribution of income is always a transaction⁹, a transaction in which the enterprise is permitted by the apportioner or apportioners to pay a claimant what they decide is his share in it.

If transactions, as they actually take place both in so-called open and so-called closed economies, are carefully analyzed, they fall into four categories, (1) free, (2) constrained, (3) regulated, and (4) compulsory.

1. If a transaction is a free one, both the parties to it must have been not only free to accept it, but what is much more important, free to reject it. The essence of freedom, when two parties begin the negotiations which may finally culminate in a transaction, is not that both are free to enter into it, but that if either does not like the terms of the transaction, he is free not to enter into it at all. This is the ideal toward which a society organized around the ethos of freedom should aspire. It is the antithesis of the ideal of a society organized around the ethos of authority.

2. If a transaction is a constrained one, it is one in which one of the parties to it is forced by economic pressure (not political pressure), to accept the terms of the party who exerts the economic pressure. In a badly organized open society (as ours is badly organized in this respect), the pre-emption of land deprives the masses of the population of any alternative to the acceptance of employment on whatever terms employment is available. In such a society, those seeking work act under constraint whenever business conditions create what is miscalled a "surplus of labor." Only when business conditions are very good, and the so-called "surplus of labor" disappears, is the worker freed from constraints of this kind.

Instead of correcting this in a rational manner and providing the natural alternative by adopting a just system of land tenure, what the worker has done is to join a labor union and to rely upon it to provide him with a counter-constraint. Now that unions have been statutorily privileged to create a monopoly of labor, constraint in most instances has been completely reversed, and labor is able to exert sufficient economic pressure upon the capital for which it is working to dictate the share of the income which it receives. Ideally, of course, neither party to a transaction should be able to exert constraint at all. With the new constraint, it is the consumers who are exploited; with the old it was the workers who were exploited. Under the old, only the employers got rich; under the new, both employers and union leaders get rich.

In mis-educated societies (which is to say in almost all societies today), overpopulation aggravates this condition (failure to practice birth control and ignorance and hostility to it) and "surplus labor" greatly increases because of the failure to teach human beings not to breed like maggots—not to breed without rhyme or reason. The so-called population explosion, unless checked by right-education and right-practice, can undo anything which may be done to rationalize the land system.

The horrors inflicted upon the workers through economic constraints in the early days of Capitalism fired Marx and Engels and led them to write *The Communist Manifesto*. These same horrors (even though they had by then begun to show signs of being mitigated) fired Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, and led to the Bolshevik take-over in Russia.

There is no excuse for smugness in considering what the intrusion of constraints into a so-called free economy has done and is still doing. What it has done is to prepare the ground for revolution. The motives of revolutionists who would completely expropriate those who were the beneficiaries of these constraints under the old regime are truly humanitarian; the question is how rational they are, whether (because they involve the denial of freedom) they do not introduce evils greater than the evils they aim to eradicate.

3. If a transaction is State-regulated, political pressure replaces economic pressure in the apportionment of income. As the freer societies shift from the ethos of freedom to the ethos of welfare, statutes limit the freedom of one and sometimes of both the parties in consummating their transactions.

Usually intervention begins where it is seemingly justified, as when the power to regulate railroad freight and passenger rates was conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, a power which need never have been used had not private railroad companies been granted franchises they should never have received; but to go into this aspect of the matter would require embarking on a long digression.

What has been said about this kind of intervention applies also to the regulation of public utility rates generally. But it does not apply to the kind of intervention involved in controlling rents and controlling prices, both of which interventions were seemingly justified in the United States during World War II but still continue in many forms in spite of the fact that the war ended twenty years ago. It does not apply to milk prices; it does not apply to so-called parity prices on a half dozen agricultural crops; it does not, and has never, applied to interest rates which have been perennially regulated by statutes. Interest rates would drop close to zero if we had an honest money system; instead of resorting to the regulation of interest rates, we should long ago have abolished all need for it by establishing a decent money system. But that would have made the bankers howl, and just as prices are regulated to keep labor quiet, and to keep farmers quiet, and to keep the public generally quiet, so nothing fundamental is done about the money system, to keep the bankers quiet.

Other forms of intervention include tariffs, import quotas, exchange controls; they include minimum wages statutes and statutes legalizing the closed shop.

It is difficult not to sympathize with some of these measures; they seem to be humanitarian in nature. And this is rendered particularly difficult for me, because I am keenly aware of the extent to which the State in the past has "loaded the dice" in favor of the rich (who are usually employers) and against the poor (who are usually employed). But again, rather than repeal the statutes which favor employers (who are usually, but not always, the rich), what our politicians are doing in the noble name of welfare is to pass new statutes which favor employees by intervening into the distribution process with new kinds of price regulations. Instead of abolishing the original evil, "compensating" evils are introduced!

4. Finally, in those societies in which Communism has taken over the economy, the State eliminates every vestige of freedom from transactions. In theory all transactions are between the State and its subjects. With the State the sole apportioner, we have compulsory distribution and allocation of the entire economy's income. Whether the new State apportioners who exercise both political and economic power will use it in the interests of the workers (as they nobly insist that they will, even if they are not immediately after the revolution able to do so) is the question. It should not be confused with the question of whether there will be as much income to distribute; this is a production and not a distribution problem. But even if the efficacy of State production was the same or even greater than that of private production, the distribution problem would remain. If Milovan Djilas is right, The New Class will exploit the workers even more shamelessly and inhumanely than the Capitalist Class (the bourgeoisie) which it has expropriated.

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At least seven enormously important ancillary problems must be taken into account in all attempts to solve the distribution problem:

1. *The Political System*—That what the political system permits the apportioners to do enormously affects what the various claimants receive is self-evident, but since the political problem is a distinct basic problem of its own, discussion of it need not be

duplicated at this time. It is sufficient to call attention to what the intrusion of the political system into distribution means in an open and non-Marxist economy, and what it means in a Communized and compulsory economy. In the so-called free economies, intrusion takes five forms: (a) statutes intervening in or regulating trade—this has already been discussed in making clear the significance of transaction so far as the distribution problem is concerned; (b) statutes dealing with the property system, particularly with regard to land; (c) statutes dealing with the labor system; (d) with the money supply and the money system, and (e) with markets and the price-making system. In Communized and compulsory economies the political system itself includes "all the means of production and distribution" and becomes the sole apportioner of the income of the economy and determiner of what each claimant and each class of claimants is to receive.

2. *The Property System*—This has been dealt with in considering the possessional problem; as is obvious, what the claimants get and what the apportioners keep is affected by ownership institutions; whether what claimants get under a Capitalist property system, such as our own, with its plurality of owners and apportioner, comes closer to being what they are justly entitled to receive than under a Communist property system, such as Russia's, in which the State is the sole property owner (and of course the sole apportioner), could only be determined if somehow or other it became possible to compare what they receive with what they would receive in a "free" State, free from the contradictions and the prohibitions which prevent apportioning by a truly free market.

3. *The Labor System*—This too has been dealt with, both in the possessional problem and with the organizational problem; it is perfectly plain that what labor gets and what the apportioners keep is very different under a slave labor system, a feudal labor system, a free labor system, and a unionized labor system. As a matter of fact, in some industries today the unions are so strongly entrenched statutorily that the role of apportioner has been reversed, with the unions determining what the employer is permitted to keep. In a Communist labor system, there is a sort of reversion to a feudal and slave labor system, but with the State and not a feudal lord or slave-owner acting as apportioner. What labor then gets is very different from what labor gets with a free labor system, where the

worker is free not only to work for whom he wishes and on such terms as he wishes, but free also to organize in unions if he desires to do so.

4. *The System of Land Tenure*—This too has been dealt with in Problem X in the discussion of the possessional problem; all that it is necessary to point out now is that under either our own system of land tenure (in which land is pre-empted by a multiplicity of private landowners), or under the system of land tenure in Communist Russia (where the land has been nationalized), the masses of workers are deprived of the natural alternative to accepting employment on whatever terms they are offered. Henry George proposed a system which would provide them with this alternative in its fullest form without any abandonment of freedom and private possession of land; Mencius in ancient China proposed the same sort of land system two thousand years before George.

5. *The Price-Making System*—With the problem of price-making we will have to deal at length; it falls strictly into the jurisdiction of the distribution problem.

What is here involved is making a choice between four alternative solutions: (a) price-making in which the prices are freely and voluntarily established by agreement between buyers and sellers¹¹—with this kind of price-making the prices tend to reflect the equation of supply and demand; (b) price-making which is disposed of by custom—in this case the prices are those which custom arbitrarily dictates; (c) price-making administered monopolistically (by large oligopolies or monopolies, by labor unions with a substantial monopoly of the labor supply), in which case the prices tend to reflect all that the traffic will bear; and finally (d) price-making by compulsion—in which the State enters into the process either by regulating prices by fiat or decree (price control and rationing in war, minimum wage statutes, regulation of prices charged by public utilities), or if the State itself is the sole seller of what is produced and the sole buyer of all labor (Communist Russia and China), in which case the prices are fixed by what a planning board decides in accord with State policy.

Markets—Markets of some sort are essential, of course, in the modern world, no matter what the economic or political system of the nation. But if the State takes them over and declares all other markets than its own illegal, the incomes of enterprises will be very

differently distributed from its distribution in States where all kinds of markets are permitted.

If markets of all kinds are taken into account, at least five kinds can be distinguished, (a) open markets, in which anybody can sell on terms mutually agreeable to buyer and seller; (b) organized markets in which only members (brokers) belonging to an organized association can buy or sell for themselves and for the general public, (our stock markets, cotton markets, grain markets); (c) constrained, or managed and manipulated markets, which describes most of our markets better than calling them open markets; and finally (d) closed markets, in theory the only kind permitted in Communist States. "Black" markets (really free markets), of course, come into existence even in the most totalitarian Communist States because of the gross inadequacies of the legal markets. When the State marketing system completely broke down in Russia in 1921, Lenin launched the NEP and legalized all the black markets. Now with its closed markets again, the State has again become the sole apportioner, and every claimant must accept not only what the State charges for what he buys, but what the State decides to pay him for his labor.

Planning—What happens when we begin to shift from price-making in open markets to price-making in closed markets is that planning boards and public officials take the place of markets as price-makers. Instead of a multiplicity of competing apportioners who have to take into account what is happening in the labor market, the commodity markets, the retail markets, the money markets and all the other multiplicity of markets, a central planning board determines how much labor shall receive, and in fact how much anybody and any enterprise shall receive in the way of income, and what everybody shall pay for what the State's own markets decide is to be sold.

In theory, planning boards serve the public interest; in practice, it is what those in control decide should be called the State's interests which is served. If Lord Acton was right when he said that "all power corrupts" (and all the evidence indicates that he was right), no one should be surprised that it is the ruling class (the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat) which is first served, then what the ruling class decides is the State's interest, and finally the interests of the various segments of the population. Typical of

Communist abuse of this is the manner in which the industrial and urban proletariat is favored over the rural and farming peasantry.

6. *The Money-System*—We come now to the sixth of the ancillary problems which must be taken into account, the problem created by the abandonment long ago of barter and the substitution for it of monetized economies—economies in which the income of all enterprises is monetized and in which each of the claimants to income are paid in money.

Money, which plays so important a part in distribution, is in fact a possession. It is in principle and often in law a promissory note, issued sometimes by a statutorily established bank of issue (central bank), sometimes by a private bank or even a private corporation, but usually by the State.

There are several Scottish banks which have proved so much more honest than the State itself that, perhaps out of sheer shame, the politicians of Great Britain have never statutorily forbidden them the right to issue money. In Basle, Switzerland, the cooperative society there began to issue paper money before the Swiss State itself issued it, and Switzerland has never by statute forbidden the society to issue this money. This society too proved so much more honest than most States that its history is a shining light in a long history of shame in the issuance of money by the State. (When I become most pessimistic about the human race, and most ashamed of being a member of it, I think of these purely utilitarian institutions and the integrity of those who have conducted them, and take hope).

But since money is a possession, it has already been dealt with in considering the possessional problem; consideration of it again is unnecessary.

7. *The Problem of Mensuration*—We come now to the last of the ancillary problems which we must consider, the problem of mensuration. Five factors are involved in its consideration: money, which we have already discussed; value; utility; cost; and price. Without an adequate method of mensuration, obviously price-making loses all relationship to reason and becomes arbitrary purely and entirely.

Value—The feeling and desires of an individual for any object or service, the purely personal and subjective satisfaction which he

obtains or believes he will obtain from it is what in this study is called its value. That people have desires and feelings of this sort, intangible as they are, is a fact. Common usage of the word "value," except for the special usage which economists make of the word, justifies referring to these feelings and desires as values.

No matter what the utility, cost, or the price of anything, no matter how much individuals may be influenced by the value others attached to it, the value which a person himself personally and subjectively attaches to a thing is his own; its value may vary from time and place for him; it may be very high under certain circumstances and under others become very low, but since it is in fact subjective in its nature, it is incommensurable.

Utility is the objective and effective attribute of anything or any service or activity in the realization of a desired or needed end. What economists call subjective utility is in the terminology of this study a misnomer; it should be called its value.

Utility can usually be measured very accurately. The utility of coal and wood and oil can be measured in B.T.U.'s; the utility of electricity in watts, volts, and amperes; the utility of structural steel and wooden beams in tensile strength per inch; the utility of corn and wheat, pork and beef, and other foods, in nutritional units of various kinds—calories, vitamins, minerals.

Many things which are absolutely essential to life (air, water), no matter how useful, are costless, while others (food, shelter), even though just as useful and just as essential, are costly. These things in the study of economic values I have called wealth. Some things have no utility from any standpoint whatever; some of them are positively harmful, having only disutility (cigarettes, poison gas, pesticides, infected foods) and these things, as Ruskin insisted, should not be called wealth but illth.

The utility of things has, of course, nothing to do with their value (a cigarette addict may value his cigarettes highly), their cost, or their price. Utility and disutility are attributes of things which may affect their value, cost, and price, it is true, but they are in themselves different and should under no circumstance be confused with them.

Finally, the measurable utility of a thing may not be its only utility; it may have utilities which are as incommensurable as its

value. The flavor, aroma, and texture of food is a quality of food which has nothing to do with its utility nutritionally; to enterprises for which food with these qualities are profitable, they have utility even if man has not yet become ingenious enough to measure them in units as definite as thermal units, nutritional units, or power units.

Cost—The word, *cost*, is used to refer to so many different things that it is the source of endless confusion. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between (a) the actual cost of producing things and (b) the cost in units of money.

Let us dismiss the consideration of (a) actual cost of production for the moment, because as we shall see they are of no use in dealing with our problem. Let us concentrate on (b) the money-cost. The fact that the money-cost is never and can never be the total cost of producing anything is made plain in the discussion of the production problem, for cost accountants (and economists too) omit social and other costs of the greatest importance. Prices can never be rationally based upon the costs of producing anything, not only because some costs are omitted and others cannot be computed, but because costs fluctuate from enterprise to enterprise and within the same enterprise from time to time. This is particularly true of the costs of agricultural produce; in agriculture it is the weather which is frequently the biggest factor in determining costs, and two adjoining farming regions, in one of which there was ample rain and in the other a drouth, the costs of producing the same crop would be totally different.

There are really only two valid approaches to any sound conception of the nature of costs: (1) the truth-seeker's approach, and (2) the cost accountant's approach. Conventional economists and social reformers in general pay no attention to either of them.

1. The truth-seeker faces the fact that the ultimate cost of producing any thing or any service is the aggregate quantity of materials (raw, semi-finished, and finished), and the aggregate number of man-hours of labor (of different kinds and qualities) used in its production in a given establishment from time to time. While the quantity of each kind of material and each kind of labor can be measured, they are as whole incommensurable; it is impossible to add together, as even the most elementary arithmetician knows, four pounds of coal, five kilowatts of electricity, six yards of cloth,

seven hours of labor, twenty minutes of the foreman's time, and ten minutes of the manager's time, and say that the total (total what?) is the cost of producing it. Since total actual costs cannot be measured (even if it were possible to add the social and other costs to these prime costs), it becomes ridiculous to take seriously Marx's insistence that prices should be based on costs.

2. The cost accountant resolves this problem very simply. To establish costs on the things produced in the establishment which employs him, he simply adds together the total price paid for labor, for supervision, for management, for fuel, for all materials and supplies, and everything else which enters into its production (including rent paid, taxes paid, insurance paid) for a given period of time, and divides the aggregate by the number of units produced in that establishment during the period.

The cost accountant's "cost" of anything is thus seen to be in fact simply the costs of producing it in a particular enterprise for a particular period of time. The accountant's cost is extremely useful to the producer for whom he works, because it enables him to know whether his costs of production are too high, and where too high; but as we shall see, no amount of averaging of costs such as Marx hoped for, is of the slightest use as a basis for price-making.

When, therefore, Socialists and Communists propose the establishment of a social order in which consumers obtain what they want at cost, they ignore the fact that there is no valid method by which this can be done. No matter how much in practice the fact is glossed over in such States, what happens when this is attempted is that prices are fixed not at cost but arbitrarily by fiat.

Price—We come now to the center of the tarantula's den. There are two kinds of actual, in contrast to market, prices: (1) barter prices, which exist today only in the most primitive and remote places left in the world and which consists of the quantity of one thing which is exchanged by the two parties to a transaction for a quantity of another; and (2) monetary prices, which are simply the amount of money which is paid by the buyer to the seller in exchange for the thing (goods, labor, rent, credit) which he has bought.

Market prices, so-called, should not be confused with actual prices; they are hypostatizations, not actualities; they come into

existence by averaging prices paid in current transactions in a given market at a given time. They are important, nonetheless, because they tend to affect the actual prices buyers are willing to pay and sellers willing to accept in specific transactions.

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What is most important to the understanding of how distribution in fact takes place, and realization of how it should take place, is that in every actual transaction between a specific buyer and a specific seller the price paid between them falls into one of three categories, (1) free prices, (2) constrained prices, and (3) imposed prices.

1. *Free Prices* are the prices which buyers and sellers are free to agree to pay and free to accept in consummating transactions with one another.

The crucial factor in this definition is the meaning attached to the word, agree. Agreement, and free agreement by participants who have the freedom not only to enter into transactions with one another but also the freedom to refuse to do so, is the essence of free prices. For if the parties to a transaction merely accept the price fixed for everybody by fiat, there is no agreement between them in any rational meaning of the word; there is acquiescence, not agreement.

.... Nor is there free agreement, even if to some degree there is agreement, if one of the parties is constrained, or one of them is more constrained than the other, by any of the institutionalized abuses already discussed.

2. *Constrained Prices* are those prices at which buyers and sellers consummate their transactions when either one or both of them are handicapped by monopolistic constraints, or favored by special privileges of some kind. Theoretically, if the handicaps of both were exactly equal and the favors each enjoyed similarly equal, or if their handicaps and favors exactly compensated each other, the prices at which they would arrive would be the same as if both were entirely free. But if the State doled out special privileges which equally favored every individual, and if the constraints with which it handicapped each individual were similarly equal, they would become meaningless. The essence of a special privilege is that some individual or some class is specially favored, or that

if all individuals and all classes are given special privileges, some are favored more, and often much more, than others. And the essence of constraint is similarly that some individuals or some classes are handicapped and others favored. Special privileges would become valueless if they did not confer differential favors and create differential handicaps.

Constraints are of three kinds: those created by monopolies, those created by the State, and those created by nature. In a really free State, neither of the first two could exist, because the State would neither create constraints itself nor tolerate the existence of private (monopolistic) constraints of any kind. Part of the normal functions of a free State would include the abolition of both business monopolies (oligopolies and cartels) and labor monopolies (unions permitted to impose the closed shop and to deny the right to work to non-union members). Finally there are constraints imposed upon individuals and classes by nature (the blinded and crippled), by social conditions (Negroes in America, low castes in India), and sometimes by individuals or their families, unconsciously or thoughtlessly, upon themselves (when they fail to study, to be diligent, to be reliable, to be honest).

Plainly, in a just and humane society every constraint which can be abolished (as special privileges can be) should be abolished, and every effort should be made educationally to minimize the handicaps which nature imposes, or which individuals unconsciously impose upon themselves.

3. *Imposed Prices* are of two kinds: those fixed by public officials in more or less free States in regulating rents, interest, wages, and prices generally, and those fixed in Communized States by proclamation. Imposed prices, however imposed, whether by regulation or proclamation, are fiat prices. They are of necessity arbitrary, and all the solemn hocus-pocus through which public officials go in fixing them, and finding so-called principles upon which to base their decisions, cannot alter this fact.

With free prices, the governing principle is that of the equation of supply and demand in a free market. With constrained prices, it is that of charging all that the traffic will bear. With imposed prices, neither principle applies. In resorting to imposition, the motive is not to maximize profits, as in the case of con-

straints, nor to maximize sales (and incidentally production) as in the case of free prices. Whatever the motive, the consequences are the same. If the imposed prices are too low, in free States production declines or stops altogether; in Communist States the segment of the economy suffering from them has to be subsidized to cover its losses. If prices are too high, in free States profits become outrageous, but sales decline; while in Communist States the consuming public declines to buy, or buys as little as possible. No regulating board or planning board can possibly keep up with the variations for which provision must be made from time to time and from place to place.

In a Communist State, in which the State is the only employer and the only purveyor of goods, enforcement of imposed prices is relatively easy; public officials fix the wages at which everybody is employed, and public officials fix the prices at which the State sells what everybody buys. (But even in these States, free but mis-called "black" markets develop). It is almost equally easy to enforce prices in Welfare and Social Democratic States, in those industries which the State owns and operates; and in more or less free States, in those public utilities in which the State regulates the prices charged. But it is almost impossible to enforce them in non-Communist States, even in time of war, in industries and in stores which are privately owned and privately operated. In such States they become sources of corruption and scandal; they become the playthings of demagogues.

If prices are to be just, they can be determined for any thing or for any kind of labor at any particular time and place in only one way: finding out in a free market what free men, individual by individual, and enterprise by enterprise, are willing to pay for what they want.

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This grossly over-simplified statement of a very important problem, I believe, has made two things clear: the essential nature of the distribution problem (its distinction from other basic problems), and its complexity. Yet the problem has existed and confronted mankind from the moment barter was instituted and market places began to put in their appearance, and from the beginning mankind has adopted some sort of solution for it. For the most part, because of its complexity, it has been dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis, and

again, since the advent of the Scientific Revolution with scientists intruding into the problem, it has been dealt with not as a whole, with any real appreciation of its complexity, but as specialists deal with such problems. Land has been dealt with in one way, labor in another, trade in a third, money in a fourth, and so *ad infinitum*. The result is the unhappy mess with which we are today confronted, which the devotees of Marx would completely sweep away and replace with State ownership and operation of all the "means of distribution."

Yet if the essential fact is recognized, that there are always only two parties involved, claimants on one side and apportioners on the other, it becomes plain that some sort of over-all philosophy of distribution might be adopted which would not only be rational and adequate but also just and humane. If the theories, doctrines, and practices dealing with the problem are classified on the basis of the philosophies by which they vindicate themselves (Supernal, Objective, and Intellectual), three categories of solutions emerge which I think of as Altruistic, Avaricious, and Equitable.

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Altruistic Theories, Doctrines, and Practices—Solutions of the problem which I call Altruistic appeal to religious idealists and secular perfectionists; many of them reflect the famous injunction of Jesus to the rich young man, "Go, sell that thou hast, and give to the poor."

In 1209 a rich, proud, and profligate young man in Assissi in Italy (Giovanni Francesco Bernardone) suddenly took this injunction to heart and began to practice it literally and not just metaphorically. He launched an Altruistic Christian movement (*Franciscanism*), was finally canonized for it, and became known as St. Francis of Assissi. Seven hundred years later—in India, not Italy—Mahatma Gandhi launched another Altruistic doctrine which his followers have developed with extreme subtlety in their ideology of Sarvodaya (trusteeship), and Vinoba Bhave put it into practice in what he called *bhoodan* (land-giving), his movement for the distribution of land to the landless by donations of land made by land-owners, and *gramdan* (village-giving), in which all the land of the land-owners in a whole village is donated to the villagers as a whole.

More tough-minded reformers (George Bernard Shaw) embodied the Altruistic approach to the problem in what might be called *Equalitarian Distributism*, in which everybody would receive an equal income, and the toughest of them all (Karl Marx) embodied it in *Communism*, "production according to ability, distribution according to need." Neither Equalitarian nor Communistic Distributism have ever been practiced on anything much larger than a village scale (and then only rarely) for any long period of time. Only in religious monasteries has it worked for long periods, and then not on its own merits as a solution of the distribution problem, but as an attempt to live up to the credo of a religion. The reason is fairly obvious to anyone who takes what has been set forth in our study of the problem of human nature into account—it goes counter to man's inborn drive to be himself, to develop his own individuality to the utmost.

Milder forms of the Altruistic approach have been and are being practiced and can be carried on almost indefinitely. *Social Security* is one of these milder solutions of the problem; minimum wage laws another. Yet the fact that only these limited approaches seem to have any practicality at all has never precluded the development of movements which are wholly Altruistic in their solution of the distribution problem. The latest which has received considerable publicity here is the proposal called the *Triple Revolution*. Yet in spite of the fact that its essential idea, that everybody should be automatically given a "comfortable living", was broached about thirty years ago by Tugwell in *The Industrial Discipline*, its proponents treat it as if it were a new idea.

All proposals of this sort run afoul of the most obvious evidence available to anyone who makes a thorough study of the facts bearing on the anthropic problem, the psycho-physiological problem, the occupational problem, and the ethical problem. It has worked only in monastic communities in which religious zeal makes all the members of the community indifferent to its inequities; in countless secular attempts at community-building on this basis by groups of Perfectionists, it has always broken down, usually in a very short time.

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Avaricious Distribution Doctrines—I confess to a great difficulty in finding an appropriate label with which to designate what

is common to objective approaches to this basic problem; Avaricious will seem too strong a word to designate what is common to them, but I do not think the term too harsh to call attention to practices dealing with distribution, apportioning, and appropriation of money which are unconsciously rationalized on the theory that man is by nature a selfish and greedy animal, and that when he acts selfishly he acts as it is natural for all men to act.

The pursuit of riches, no matter how glossed over, even if called merely the pursuit of affluence or of success, is still avarice as a practice even if not publicly professed as a faith. And this is not altered by the fact that the men who practice these distribution-doctrines are some of them generous in a lordly fashion, as generous as were their feudal counterparts who, on the one hand, ruthlessly accumulated lands and offices, and on the other, endowed the building of the cathedrals and other mausoleums of Christendom. This is well illustrated in the lives of financial Predators like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller. Their philosophy of living can be summed up in the dictum: "Get as many millions as possible and make the process respectable by giving a few millions to a foundation."

Of the practiced, in contrast to professed, solutions of the distribution problem, the tawdriest are those I think of as *Venal* (as much as each individual can by hook or crook obtain—the antithesis of the ideal of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay") and the most ruthless as *Predatory* (as much as each can ruthlessly get, legally if possible, extra-legally if necessary). There is plenty of *Venality* and plenty of *Predation* in distribution as it is practiced today, but much more common is *Chrematism* (from the Greek word for money-making).

Chrematism—Avarice is a practice, *Chrematism* its rationalization; it equates avarice with success and with progress. On these grounds, it justifies not merely devotion but inordinate devotion to money-making, not only in business but in every occupation. Nobody feels ashamed; nobody feels it necessary to apologize; everybody is relieved of guilt-feelings even though engaged in consuming transactions without regard to any consideration other than money-making.

But when Chrematism is organized, avarice is compounded. Yet distribution today is more and more determined by the activities of associations organized chrematistically ("unions" of farmers and of workers, associations of businessmen and manufacturers, of doctors and lawyers, and other professional men). Ostensibly organized to protect and promote their values and protect their interests, these organizations in reality devote themselves to using their collective power to obtain higher prices, higher wages, salaries and fees, higher interest rates, higher rents, and greater profits for their members than they could obtain if they operated individually and consummated transactions as individuals rather than as prescribed by their associations or unions.

When organized avarices of this kind compete, as in the classic competition between organized capital and organized labor, the doctrine of "devil take the hindmost" is practiced and eloquently rationalized.

When *Organized Chrematism* uses its political power to obtain special privileges (organized farmers get the State to guarantee them a high price for their crops, organized manufacturers to raise the tariff on what they manufacture, organized labor to legalize the closed shop and to prevent the enactment of "right to work" laws), avarice should not be permitted to clothe itself in respectability but should be unclothed as *Exploitation*.

Exploitation—Communism in theory is distributionally non-exploitive; in practice, if Milovan Djilas is right, a "New Class" emerges just as exploitive and avaricious as the bourgeoisie Communism condemns.

Man is a greedy animal, if not by birth at least by conditioning. At birth he is thoughtlessly self-seeking so far as survival is concerned; if properly conditioned in a loving atmosphere, he becomes humanized; if improperly conditioned, as he too often is, not only in his home but even more outside of it, "on the streets," in the schools, in competitive sports, above all in the sort of predatory competition which prevails not only in business but in seeking jobs and striving for promotion, he becomes more and more greedy, and conceals behind a veneer of civilized respectability what is in fact the unpleasant principle on which he really acts,

What makes the situation seem so dark is the fact that the State continues to legislate, and the School and Church to educate, with no adequate conception of the part they should play in dealing with the problem. As a result, what is done to stimulate avarice by omission is compounded by what is done by commission. The Jeffersonian principle that the State should act on the principle of "equal rights to all and special privileges to none" has been abandoned in favor of the Franklin D. Roosevelt principle of "special privileges to all and equal rights to none." The result is that instead of a gradual amelioration of this inhuman method of dealing with the distribution problem, we have a steady degradation of man's relationship to man in their transactions with one another.

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Equity Distribution Theories, Doctrines, and Practices—Before considering the completely antithetical solution of the problem represented by what I shall call Equity Distribution Ideologies, the distinction must be made between Unionism and Predatory Competition on one hand (which are both Avaricious in theory and practice though not in doctrine), and on the other, Fraternalism and Fraternal Competition (which are in theory, in doctrine, and in practice Equitable).

Unionism versus Fraternalism—Common usage provides us with the word *union* with which to designate those organizations which not only laborers but employees of all kinds have come to join to raise their wages and reduce their hours of labor, and Unionism can therefore be used to designate the purpose for which they have been organized. I have unfortunately been forced to coin the word Fraternalism to designate the purpose of those "unions" which they join to work together at the task of improving the quality of the service they render or the quality of the goods they produce.

Ostensibly organized to end exploitation of labor by capital, modern unions have gradually come to practice a kind of counter-exploitation, occasionally of the capital which employs its members, but most frequently, in tacit cooperation with capital, of consumers as a whole. Samuel Gompers, who led the American Federation of Labor when Unionism was still in its feeble infancy,

anticipated this development when he reduced the purpose for which Unionism was struggling to one word, "More!"

But this kind of Unionism is not only practiced by employees. It is also practiced by employers, and not only by employers, but also by farmers (as far as their devotion to their rugged independence permit them to do so) and even by the members of the so-called higher professions. It is an interesting speculation as to why it is that the teaching profession has embraced Unionism so slowly (it has not embraced it wholly, particularly in its higher branches) and why the clergy is the only profession which has not embraced it at all. I have a strong suspicion, based upon some evidence but perhaps not enough, that this peculiar fact is due in part to the true estimate which the public attaches to the value of their services and in part to the public's perfect willingness to take advantage of their soft-heartedness.

There is, therefore, not one kind of Unionism but at least four: *Labor Unionism*, *Farmer Unionism*, *Professional Unionism*, and *Business Unionism*, and no matter what they call themselves (a labor union, the Bar, the Medical Profession, the Retail Dry Goods Association, the National Manufacturers Association), they are in fact "unions", organized to enable them to obtain, as Gompers put it, "More!"

Yet there are and have been associations of individuals and enterprises which, in spite of the fact that they too are claimants from the standpoint of distribution, have neither in purpose nor in practice been avaricious, and which, therefore, must be classified as disinterested and either Altruistic or Equitable in nature. The medieval guilds, for instance, were more like our fraternal societies, such as the Masons, than like present day labor unions; and unlike labor unions, one of their principal concerns was the quality of life their members lived and the craftsmanship they provided to the public. In fact it is not exaggerating the difference to say that the pride in craftsmanship which prevailed among guildsmen has been replaced by labor-union restrictions on the amount of work performed per hour and by inferiority engineered into products (a process called "built-in" or "plus obsolescence") by manufacturers. Yet even today there is plenty of what I am calling Fraternalism in many associations—our learned societies, our cultural societies, our societies of flower gardeners, bird lovers, lovers

of the wilderness, and conservationists and nature lovers of all kinds. None of these are organized to increase the claims their members can make upon the national income for the work to which they devote themselves, but instead to cooperate in increasing the sort of income which everybody might get from what I have called the enjoyment of experiences.

And this disinterestedness is true, in theory if not in practice, of professional associations today. Ostensibly bar associations exist to ensure that justice shall be done; ostensibly medical associations exist to improve healing of the sick. But what all these professional associations ostensibly exist to do is largely belied in practice. Some of them are more interested in the lobbying they do in Congress and before Legislatures in order to promote their own interests (their hold and their share of the Gross National Product) than to learn the newest discoveries which might improve the nature of the professional service they render.

So far as strictly business associations of all kinds are concerned, they are indistinguishable from labor unions in their devotion to the pursuit of "More!"

Unionism I therefore define as the doctrine that individuals in particular trades and professions and enterprises of each kind should unite to enable their members to promote their interests—higher wages and higher prices, larger profits and larger shares of the G.N.P., and *Fraternalism* as the doctrine that they should cooperate in developing their values—increasing knowledge and increasing beauty, producing or fabricating better products, and rendering better service to the public as a whole.

Predatory versus Fraternal Competition—A parallel distinction must be made between the practices I call *Predatory Competition* and *Fraternal Competition*. Both, it is true, are practiced in the competition between individual claimants for shares in the incomes of the enterprises for which they work (shares in the Gross Enterprise Production); between enterprises for shares of their national economies (shares of the G.N.P.); and between nations for shares of the income of the world as a whole (shares of the Gross World Production). In the all-inclusive sense in which I insist it is proper to use the word *competition*, it includes even this last form of sanguinary competition in which most

nations indulge and which used to be called Imperialism but is now called Nationalism. Because most of the competition practiced (particularly that which is most in the news) has in fact been the practice of Social Darwinism, it is very easy to overlook the fact that this is not the only kind of competition which mankind has practiced since *Homo sapiens* in the course of evolution emerged into sapiency.

The essential difference between the two kinds of competition, one properly classified as Avaricious and the other as Equitable, is just this: in Predatory Competition no rules are observed—rules exist only to be circumvented; in Fraternal Competition, competition is practiced but rules are observed. Rules such as “No misrepresentation,” “No adulteration,” “Honest measure,” “Free market prices,” which Predators ignore, Fraternal Competitors observe. A long time ago it was discovered that in spite of many exceptions and many short term successes, “Honesty is the best policy.” A society in which Predatory Competition is practiced too widely and too long ends by destroying itself.

Predatory Competitors believe in “devil take the hindmost”; Fraternal Competitors in “live and let live.” Predatory competitors believe in the survival of the fittest and in the fact that the most aggressive and greedy are the fittest; Fraternal Competitors deny this *in toto*. They too believe in the survival of the fittest, but they insist that those who are the most humane and most human are not only more fit to survive than the most inhuman, but that in the long run, they do survive precisely because they are more human than the Predators.

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The essential underlying principle common to all the distribution doctrines which fall into the category I think of as Equity distribution ideologies may be stated as “distribution of the proceeds of enterprise in accordance with what each claimant contributes to their production.” The value common to them is justice (Equity) in contrast to self-interest (Avarice) on one hand, and self-sacrifice (Altruism) on the other.

Unfortunately, only a few of those who have labored to realize justice so far as distribution is concerned have realized adequately the complexity of what is involved in making the principle work in fact as it seems to be desirable in theory; mostly they have

labored at reforming some one evil of which they have become aware. To transform our own distribution system into a really just system for apportioning the income of our enterprises, to ensure that the claimants receive what they are justly entitled to receive, every one of the essential institutions in our economy must be organized on the principle of justice. Not only to transform ours into a just system, but to save the degree of freedom which it still provides, radical changes must be made in our land system, our money system, our property system, and finally our marketing and price-making system.

Structurally the American political system is marvelous; it is not perfect, but in spite of that it will do; those who would substitute an authoritarian system for it in order to abolish the evils in our distribution system do not know what they are talking about. It is not our political system which needs complete transformation; what needs transformation are the politicians and the people who have shamelessly misused it. If even two or three of the most important of the evils in our present system were corrected, the deficiencies in the others would become so apparent that they would gradually be corrected. But as it is, there is confusion among both practical men and idealists. Our social reformers work busily at the particular reform which they see as the evil of evils and fail to see that even if their particular reform was realized, Utopia would continue to evade them.

Among the reformers of whom I believe this can be said, I include both money reformers and land reformers.

That the money system is in need of radical revision cannot, I believe, be disputed; the issuance of money is a banking not a political function, but even if such a reform were realized it would not by itself do much to lessen the evils in distribution.

That our land system is a grossly unjust one, as Henry George pointed out, is, I believe, perfectly true; but even if we transformed it as we should, it would improve but it would not assure justice in distribution.

The distribution doctrine which was discarded with the emergence of the modern world, the medieval doctrine of the just price and the just wage, was avowedly an Equity solution of the problem. But it proved grossly unjust in practice because of the equation

of justice with custom and tradition. Since customary and traditional rents and wages, profits and prices, were themselves grossly unjust, enforcement of them by law simply compounded the injustice.

The solution which replaced it, which was based upon wage-making and price-making by competition in the labor-market and the commodity market, proved no more just in practice; it proved so horrible, in fact, that its evils inspired Marx and Engels with their program of socialist revolution. What the followers of Adam Smith failed to see was first of all the distinction between what I have called fraternal and predatory competition, and then the fact that no really free market could be established if a bad money-system or bad land-system or bad labor-system made it not a free, but a constrained, market.

Finally might be mentioned Marx's theory of price-making on the basis of the social cost of production. But this, as we have seen, is impracticable, even if it is just in theory.

The concept of Equity, at which all these solutions aimed, can only be realized if somehow all the elements essential to the realization of "distribution of the proceeds of enterprises in accordance with what each claimant contributes to production" are provided, including the creation of a moral climate in which the apportioners find it natural to strive to maintain a genuinely free market so that market prices can be used to measure what each claimant contributes to production. No such moral climate exists today, and neither Church nor School nor State are making any effort to create it. The economists who ought to provide the scientific basis for it have not the remotest notion that, until they define the problems involved clearly, economics will continue to add to the confusion, not lessen it.

Social reformers who want to substitute a just system for the system we now have, have not the patience to face the complexity of what is involved. So they concentrate upon some one idea; at present upon the idea that substituting Authoritarianism in economics for Libertarianism (they prefer to call it Planning or Socialism or even Communism) will produce an economic Utopia (yet most of them haven't even the remotest notion of what the distribution problem is). That is what the Abolitionists thought when they concentrated upon the idea of substituting free labor for slave

labor, and, desirable as the abolition of slavery was, it has not produced the Utopia envisioned—least of all for the descendants of the slaves themselves. The problem is a Pluralistic, not a Monistic one. Instead of discarding the ethos of freedom, it seems to me better to face the hard realities that only reformation of all the institutions involved, as rapidly as possible, one after another, will produce a truly just system of distribution. And this would call, first of all, for a revolution in education, because without right-education the determining number of people in the nation, no matter how intelligent, will neither know what to do nor care enough to furnish the leadership which is needed.

The proponents of the creation of a genuinely free economy have two almost insuperable difficulties with which to cope. The first is the general assumption that a free political society means *ipso facto* a free economy. Since we in the United States are free politically, whatever our economy may in reality be, it must be a free economy. But as a matter of fact it has always been a constrained economy; it has never been a really free economy; it is becoming more and more constrained and less and less free all the time.

The second difficulty is that discussion of what is needed to create a really free economy so that the distribution problem can be properly dealt with involves consideration of too many humdrum subjects. (Who can get very mad about the principle on which price-making is practiced in the super-markets he patronizes, particularly at a time when he has plenty of money in his pocket?) As a result, almost no one can be fired with enough enthusiasm to work for the radical reforms needed if our nascent free society is to be stopped from sliding all the way down into the abyss at the bottom of which lies the barbarian materialism of the Marxist Utopia.

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It is at this point that the ultimate issue between economic liberals (who believe in Welfare Statism and Sympathize with Socialist and Communist economics), and economic conservatives (who believe in free enterprise and the free market), emerges. In terms of the distribution problem, the liberals believe in a system of State intervention and regulation of price-making, in contrast

to the conservatives who believe that price-making should take place in a free market.

That the market system works, and that it works constantly toward more and more justice as the market is made freer and freer, is indisputable *when there is a deficit of goods* and demand is greater than supply. But the question is how it will work when there are surpluses of goods (in an economy of abundance), and particularly how it will work *when there is a surplus of every kind of goods* (which is what the apostles of the factory system, of mass-production, and now of automation, insist is coming). That it will not work is plain. Prices in the free market on everything would tend to fall toward zero. Long before that there would be wholesale bankruptcy; farmers would be ruined and dispossessed; most of the labor supply would be unemployed.

There are several ways of considering this challenging question. The first would be to call attention to the fact that there has never been such a surplus market; that even during the great depression of the thirties, when it seemed that surpluses of everything were being produced, what actually was true was that there were shortages of demand for everything. The first market to break down in 1929 was the stock market. Why? Because there was a surplus of stocks? Nonsense, it broke down because there was a shortage of demand. Then came the collapse of the wheat market, the cotton market, the automobile market, and so on down the line ending of course with the labor market. Because there was a surplus of any of these things? Again the answer has to be nonsense; there were no surpluses, there were only shortages of demand. And the shortages of demand were caused by just one thing, a lunatic money system.

On the face of it today, there is in the United States an enormous overproduction of wheat; there seemed to be a similar overproduction of wheat during the great depression. But it is doubtful today, after mechanization (and automation) has increased the production of wheat as it has of automobiles, of washing machines, of cotton goods, of shoes and other manufactured goods, *if there were world-wide free trade, and if there were an even fairly decent international money system*, that there would be any surplus of wheat because of the demand for grain in the underdeveloped nations of the world.

A second way of dealing with the question would be to grant, what I think might be true, that there is a surplus production of some things (wheat, sugar, coffee) in some regions. But to grant this does not make it necessary to grant that even with the utmost automation there will ever be surplus production of everything. That would be like taking for granted something as impossible as the notion that ice is hot, and then arguing about what sort of world we would have to create if that were true. The conception of an economy of universal surpluses is a contradiction in terms. Human desires are unlimited. Human desires for certain things at certain times and in certain places it is true are limited. Human desire for certain things which at one time were considered highly desirable (horse-and-buggy transportation, for instance) may completely disappear. When this happens, the only rational thing to do is to stop producing surpluses of horses and buggies.

The desire for wheat behind the tariff barriers of the United States is limited ; that there is a surplus of wheat being produced here as a result is indisputable. What do we do about it? What we do could not be bettered in the biggest lunatic asylum filled with the maddest lunatics in the world. We continue to produce surpluses ; we tax everybody to provide subsidies to those who produce them ; we make it highly profitable for wheat growers to continue doing so, because, when the subsidy is added to the price they would otherwise receive for wheat, they realize fabulous profits. What we then do is store the surplus wheat ; encourage rats to live upon it; hope that it will mold and rot; sell what we can abroad, even at a loss; finally, give away as much as we can to underdeveloped nations clamoring for foodstuffs.

To a consistently logical believer in justice and freedom, what should be done is plain ; establish an honest money system both in the United States and for international trade ; abolish all tariffs and all hindrances to world wide free trade ; re-establish a free market, *and let prices fall (if they will; they may not) until wheat growers turn to the growing or production of something else.* Since the State itself is responsible for the present situation, the State may morally be called upon to cushion the impact of such a change upon those who would suffer most acutely from it.

But a certain ruthlessness must be exercised; otherwise the surpluses will continue to be produced. This apparent ruthlessness

can not only be rationally but also morally justified. No man or no industry has the right to say to the State, "I want to produce what I am producing and obtain a profitable living from it even though nobody wants what I am producing." Why shouldn't the manufacturers of wagons, of buggies, of horses, of harness, of whips, the breeders of horses and mules, and the farmers producing hay and feed have banded together into a gigantic voting bloc, demanded that the nation provide parity payments and other kinds of subsidies so as to enable them to continue producing these unwanted commodities even though the shift of demand to automobiles had rendered what they are producing obsolete, with precisely the same justification as the growers of surplus wheat and corn, coffee and sugar today? But it didn't occur to them, because it seemed an absurdity too great to even imagine. As a result, however painful the process of adjustment, everybody in the industry eventually shifted to the production of other things.

To this the protagonists of the economy of surpluses will reply, in the new automated world there will be no alternatives to turn to for either business or employment; there will be surplus production of everything in every industry. But this would merely repeat the fallacy already exposed. The simple truth of the matter is that human desires are, thank heaven, unlimited. If the desire for food and clothing and shelter is fully gratified (even making allowances for a shift in desire from the consumption of inferior to superior products, from rice and grain to meat, vegetables, and fruit, from beef to caviar, from potatoes to artichokes, from apples to mangos, from Coca Cola to champagne), then the desire for other products—particularly the products of the arts and crafts and the dramas and the concerts of the performing arts—things of a cultural rather than utilitarian nature—should be developed to an unlimited degree. All that would be necessary is for the artists and the craftsmen, and for the teachers and preachers, to learn how to create the desire for what the arts and crafts have to offer with a fraction of the efficiency with which advertising men and salesmen now create desire for endless quantities of mass-produced rubbish of all kinds.

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I was once asked by Harold Rugg, then in the heyday of his career at Columbia University, to take part in a panel discussion

on industrial art versus the arts and crafts. I was asked in desperation because Dr. Rugg could find no one at the university who would take up the cudgels in the defense of the handicrafts. During the discussion period one of the teachers in this class of six hundred raised her arm and waved in the air a plastic imitation of the famous three monkeys of Nikko ("I see no evil, I hear no evil, I speak no evil!"). She said she had just bought it in a five and ten-cent store, and asked in a crushing tone how people like herself could afford to buy such objects of art unless they were industrially manufactured.

I thought for a moment and answered, "I'm going to play a Yankee trick on you, and ask you a question. Will you please tell us all why it is that the miserably poverty-stricken people of China have been able to buy original hand-carved sets of monkeys for hundreds of years, while we in prosperous America, with all our wealth, can only afford to buy miserably cheap plastic imitations of them?"

She dropped her arm, stood silent for a moment, and then sat down.

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In a world in which the teaching of asthetic and economic values was considered half as important as we consider the teaching of the techniques of producing corn and wheat, cigarettes and toxic pesticides, and of course missiles to the moon, there would be no shortage of desire for the products of the arts and the crafts, and those now employed in producing what no one wants could shift to the production of what everybody could be persuaded to want—to want, not quantitatively, but qualitatively.

The simple truth about the matter is that, so long as we are not willing to envisage the fullest possibilities of what free and creative spirits might contribute to the resolution of the problem of human wants, we will continue our present lunacy of producing unwanted surpluses, training young men and women to produce them, and blighting every tendency on their part to cultivate their creative potentialities on the ground that there isn't a sufficient demand for the arts and crafts of a more highly cultivated world.

What is involved is nature's own scheme of evolution. Evolution has a place even in the production of commodities of all kinds.

Why not think in terms of evolving what is better and more beautiful than the goods now being vomited from our machines and which they will vomit forth in even greater profusion when all machines have been automated?

If we are to have a really better (and not just more affluent) life, to surround ourselves with an environment which makes such a life possible, to consume only those things which in themselves are natural to such a life, and finally, to enjoy the music and drama and all the other performing arts which are part and parcel of such a life, what is really called for are three things:

First, a free society; secondly, a free market—a market which will reward these who produce what is wanted and penalize those who insist upon producing either what is unwanted or producing surpluses of things which are wanted; and finally, a creative system of education which will take the initiative in creating demand for qualitatively better goods and services, both utilitarian and artistic, and for qualitatively more beautiful surroundings, both in the natural and architectural environment. What is called for is a system of education of the sensibilities which would create an unlimited demand for goods, services and surroundings fit for those whom Aristotle called aristocrats—for people who had been taught to aspire to excellence.

I am not joking. So long as farmers, manufacturers and businessmen in what is left of the free world keep their eyes glued on their profits and hire not only Madison Avenue but enlist gratis all the schools and colleges and universities in the creation of demand for cheap machine-made substitutes and imitations of really good things, there will be surpluses to seemingly justify the destruction of a free society and substitution of a planned and regimented one. The moment tastes are changed, first the tastes of style-leaders and then the tastes of the masses who imitate them, from mass-produced newness and cheapness, flashiness and ugliness to goods into which character and good taste have been patiently designed and inbuilt by artists and craftsmen of integrity, a limitless demand for artistic products of all kinds would develop. Old crafts would be revived and new crafts created, with both using not only the old but also the new materials and the new techniques now available. All the surplus workers in industry and agriculture would then find employment not on assembly lines but in the arts and crafts.

Let our educators begin to paint for the coming generation the vision of a utopia for which they should equip themselves, and in which quality not quantity, beauty not novelty, variety and not uniformity was sought by all. Let them stop gilding the present utopia of unlimited quantities of shoddy, flashy goods of all sorts; let them stop preparing their students for the boring and repetitive jobs which is all that our present utopia has to offer them. Let them take away from Madison Avenue the role of creators of values; let them take to heart what Nietzsche said, "Around the creators of values revolveth the world, invisibly it revolveth!"

This was the vision of John Ruskin and William Morris, Eric Gill and G. T. Wrench. This is the vision which would both inspire and be inspired by a revival of the liberal arts. And this is my vision, the vision of a Green Revolution.

It has one great merit, apart from its own peculiar merit. It would make the preservation of freedom possible.

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And what is the alternative to this which we are presently embracing and which the protagonists of the Triple Revolution and the Great Society here, and the Communist Utopia behind the Iron Curtain, are promoting? A society planned, with goods and services designed by bureaucrats, who, if they ever had any creative impulses, have had them ruthlessly eliminated first by their training for their routine bureaucratic jobs and then by grinding away year after year at their repetitive bureaucratic routines.

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Unless we, who believe, in equity, in liberty, in the humanities and in the liberal arts envisage the development of such a society as I have in my feeble fashion tried to suggest, we might as well shut up shop and let the Authoritarians take over.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem XIV : The Distribution Problem

My notes, charts and manuscript on the distribution problem consist of less than a hundred and fifty pages; this outline is much longer than any of the others in this book partly because of the incompleteness of my original material but mainly because, in the present critical period of world transition, a clear understanding of the problem is essential to the evaluation of what is being said in defense of things as they are and in criticism of them, particularly the thundering criticism of them from behind the Iron Curtain.

1. *Economics and Chrematistics*—The Greeks distinguished between *oikonomia*, by which they meant the art and science of household and estate management, and *chrematistike*, the art and science of trafficking and money-making. The distinction is still a valid and important one. Actually I distinguish between four kinds of economics, (1) social economics, which deals with the utilitarian activities of whole economies—that of a society, a nation, or of the whole world; (2) private economics—which deals with the utilitarian activities of individuals; (3) domestic economics—that dealing with the utilitarian activities of a household or homestead, and (4) commercial economics—that dealing with the utilitarian activities of agricultural, industrial, mercantile, financial, and other enterprises organized and conducted for commercial purposes. This last kind of economics is wholly chrematistic—wholly monetary in nature.

2. *Income Consisting of Experiences*—In economics what I am calling income consisting of experiences is technically what is called *imputed income* in contrast to *realized* or *actual income*. It is what I have in my previous books called non-monetary income. In trying to estimate the money-value of non-monetary income, the market price has to be imputed to the items of which it consists. The owner of a house, if he leases it to a renter, receives actual income from it in the form of money; but if he lives in it himself, he receives imputed income from it to the amount of the rent he would have received had he rented to another. So with all of man's en-

joyable experiences; they have value to him, but because most of them are what economists call "free goods," their importance is ignored. Perhaps until a money value is put upon them they will continue to be ignored. A very unusual illustration makes what is involved vivid: that the sexual activities of prostitutes have a money-value is obvious; men pay for them, and the prostitutes have a money-income from the vocation to which they devote themselves. But some of the most ecstatic of all of both men's and women's experiences are the sexual embraces of husbands and wives. That these experiences are part of their real or actual incomes in life is indubitable, but because they are "free goods" this fact is not recognized.

3. *Distribution of Income versus Distribution of Goods*—The word *distribution* has been used in two senses, (1) to designate the process by which goods are made available to consumers (transporting them, storing them in warehouses, having them on hand in retail stores when consumers want them), and (2) to designate the process by which modern man gets the money with which to buy them (the allocation of the income of enterprises to those who have claims against it, and the allocation of the income of whole economy among the various claimants to it). In popular usage, the first meaning is designated when the word is used, (I myself used it in this sense in a book entitled *The Distribution Age*); but in technical usage in economics, it is the second meaning to which the word refers. It is this last—the distribution and apportioning of income—which creates a basic problem. The process of distributing goods is a part of the basic production problem—the production, not of the material and form utility of goods but of time and place utilities.

4. *Total Income (Gross Production)*—As a matter of fact there are four distinct kinds of total incomes, not just the total national income, which should be considered in a comprehensive study of the distribution problem. Space limitations makes me restrict this exposition to national income or national production only. The four are (1) total incomes of individuals, or rather of individuals considered as enterprises (each one's G.I.P.); (2) the total incomes of families, both monetary and non-monetary (each family's G.F.P.); (3) the total incomes of national economies (each

nation's G.N.P.); and finally (4) the total income of the world as a whole (the Gross World Production).

5. *Differential Income*—The concept of differential income is absolutely essential to any clear discussion of economics; without it, much of what is said is loaded with bias and emotion, and frequently is nothing much more than indulgence in epithet-mongering. In the mouth of a Marxist, income from profits is like saying income from stealing, while in the mouth of a Capitalist, the word profit takes on a sacrosanct character, profits being the dynamic which stimulates production. The real issue is whether the income is earned or unearned, and without the concept of differential income it is impossible to discuss this intelligently. Differential income of any kind, whether it consists of profits, wages, interest or rent, is that part of all the profits or wages or interest or rent received which is in fact unearned, which comes from exploitation or from abuses made possible by special privileges of some kind.

6. *Person versus Party, and Natural versus Artificial Person*—Since one of the "parties" to a transaction may be more than one person (a partnership, a corporation, a whole State), the use of the legal term "party" avoids the suggestion that single persons are the only ones who can be parties to transactions. If both the parties are corporations, no single person at all is involved. In law, a living person is called a *natural person*, while a corporation or State is called an *artificial person*. For legal purposes, the law endows corporations with the attributes of living persons.

7. *Apportioner and Apportioners*—The literal meaning of apportion—to distribute or parcel out in portions to each person or party involved—is the sense in which apportioner is here being used. An apportioner is that person, and apportioners the class or group of persons, who decide or control the decisions made about the distribution of the income of an individual enterprise or of a whole economy. In practice there is always a paramount apportioner (in an enterprise usually the owner or manager, and in an economy, usually a controlling or ruling class), and all subordinate apportioners distribute income as the paramount apportioners or apportioners permit. In terms of Mosca's concept of society, economies are always controlled by what he would have called a controlling class, and these are then the paramount apportioners. But in such

a dictatorship as Stalin's, even the economy is controlled by a single apportioner.

Apportioners are, it is true, claimants, but they differ from all other claimants in that they not only decide what the others shall get but what they themselves shall keep. The persons who make this decision are the paramount apportioners no matter what their relationship to the enterprise or economy. Up until the time that labor unions became as powerful as they are in many industries today, the classic assumption that owners were the apportioners was true, but now the paramount apportioners are often the labor unions, and the management in fact even though not in name is a subordinate apportioner.

8. *A Picture of Sarvodaya Social Order*—Jayaprakash Narayan, p. 51, Sarvodaya Prachuralaya, Tanjore, India, 1961.

9. *Transactions*, as the term is used throughout this study, consist of those actions in which two or more persons (each of whom is pursuing an interest of his own), come to an agreement about something which each wants to obtain which the other has or can furnish, and then execute the agreement entered into. Preceding the transaction are acts of either free negotiation by the persons proposing to enter upon it, or of the imposition by one party of his will and the acceptance of the imposition by the other. Because imposition so often takes place without conscious recognition of it by the persons entering into the transaction, many apparently free and even more often only partly free negotiations, but in reality imposed or constrained negotiations, take place of which both participants are unaware.

10. *Over-Population*—Since the excitement about the population explosion, the literature dealing with over-population and its relationship to distribution has enormously increased. A few of the books both old and new which deal with this problem include:

Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on Population*, Dutton, N.Y., 1933.

Jasper M. Jones, *Does Over-Population Mean Poverty?* Center for Economic Growth, 1962.

Edward Alsworth Ross, *Standing Room Only*, Century Co., New York, 1927,

Raymond Pearl, *The Natural History of Population*, Oxford University Press, 1939.

Karl Sax, *The Population Explosion*, Foreign Policy Association, 1956.

William Peterson, *The Politics of Population*, Doubleday, Doran Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1964.

11. *Buyers and Sellers*—Like the word “sale,” the expression “buyers and sellers” is meaningful only in a monetized transaction. In barter both persons are parties to the transaction, but neither is a buyer or seller. In a monetary transaction the person who pays money is the buyer, and the person who receives money for what the buyer buys is the seller.

It is important to capture the breadth of meaning I attach to these two concepts; it must be applied not only to what are usually called sales but to employment, to loans, to investments, to rentals, to any and every transaction in which money is the nexus. (In barter there is no actual, there is only a theoretical nexus; this theoretical nexus is what lawyers call “a meeting of minds.”) Wages are simply the amount of money paid by an employer when he buys and the worker sells his services; interest, the amount paid by a borrower when he “buys” or “rents” the use of the lender’s money; rent, the amount paid by a rentor of a house when he “buys” (for a period of time) or leases the use of a landlord’s house; profits (dividends), the amount paid by an enterprise to its owner, its partners or its stockholders for their investment of capital. Wages are the price paid for labor; interest the price paid for loans; and rent, the price paid for the use of land (economic rent), or for the use of houses or equipment of any kind (colloquial rent).

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PROBLEM XV.

Violence, Counterviolence, and Nonviolence : The Political Problem

Medicine, to produce health, has to examine disease, and music, to create harmony, must investigate discord.—Plutarch.

We are about to enter the Augean stables; we shall have to prepare ourselves for something like the dirtiest of the labors of Hercules, for we are now to explore the problem created for mankind by politics and politicians.¹

* * * *

It is possible to say that one fact, human violence, creates the political problem. But this oversimplifies the matter. Four facts at least must be taken into account if the actual nature of the problem is to be understood:

1. The first fact is violence;² the fact that man's treatment of man, individual by individual, individual by group, and group by group, is so often violent.

2. The second fact is that from the time the first State³ was established, man began to substitute organized counterviolence—the use of military, police, or civil power⁴—for impulsive and improvised retaliatory violence.⁵

3. The third fact is that counterviolence⁶ at its very best produces outer and never inner order. It can regiment; it cannot harmonize human behavior.

4. The final fact which creates the problem seems to me to be the fact that the State (the enterprise mankind has come to accept as the only one authorized to counter illegal violence with legalized counterviolence) cannot avoid abusing its authority, because that authority always has to be exercised by human beings, and human beings cannot avoid abusing it because of the corrupting nature of power itself. According to two schools of political thought which we are ignoring at our peril (the *Libertarians*:

Jefferson, Thoreau, Acton, Bastiat; the *Anarchists*: Tucker, Kropotkin, Proudhon); we cannot afford to take the State for granted; we cannot afford to assume that because *it is* (just because it exists everywhere), it must be considered a good.

So the problem remains for us as it has remained with each generation of mankind from the beginning, "If not counterviolence, what?"

* * * *

The wars for which warriors and dynasts, theologians and ideologs, special interests and nationalists have been responsible prove only this, that no solution of the political problem tried so far has been adequate. That there should be differences and therefore contests—serious contests and deep differences—between individuals and between nations is to be, and should always be, expected. But that resort to war is necessary to resolve them would be to assume that man is an animal which cannot humanize itself.

Counter-war, however, should not be confused with wars of belligerence and aggression. There is a real difference between defense and offense, between the maintenance of order and the resort to violence. Police action—even if it involves the use of counter-violence—is one thing, criminal violence is another.

The wars which dot the pages of history, and the wars which we continue to wage today, have either been struggles between two sets of criminals or madmen, or between madmen and criminals on one side and men on the other who are trying to defend themselves and trying to stop criminality and madness. Political science ought to be the study of how to deal with this kind of criminality and madness.

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If the actual nature of the problem is to be understood, at least seven aspects of it must be discussed.

1. *The Problem of Formulation*—The first of the seven has to do with the formulation of the problem itself, with the frame of reference in which it has to be discussed. This calls for the definition of the four basic concepts—violence, authority, liberty, and harmony—without which the problem cannot be properly formulated at all.

Violence—Violence is not a simple but a very complex concept. Though all violence involves individual or gregational use of physical force (or the capacity and the willingness to use physical force) to injure or kill persons or to damage or destroy property, there are eight enormously important kinds of violence based upon four distinctions which must not be confused: the distinction between *illegitimate violence* (rape, mayhem; rioting, belligerence) and *legitimate violence* (self-defense, national defense); the distinction between *individual violence* (murder, burglary) and *gregational violence* (war, revolution); the distinction between *overt violence* (arson, war) and *constructive violence* (extortion, exploitation, taxation, confiscation); and finally the distinction between *legal counterviolence* (policing, imprisonment, execution), *justifiable (disciplinary) violence* (self-defense, defending others). *Nonviolence* is in theory a substitute not only for revolutionary violence, but also for what I have called legal and justifiable violence.

By nonviolence I mean (as Gandhi meant) the resort to measures which involve no violence of any kind in dealing with problems ordinarily dealt with by resorting to violence or counterviolence—that is, by resorting either to war, to violent revolution, or to police or military counterviolence. Nonviolence in this sense does not refer to mere non-action but to action; to actions resorted to to solve problems created by war and the threat of war, by exploitation (as for instance in both chattel slavery and wage slavery), and by oppression by governments or by government officials. As the concept has come to be used since it was vivified by Gandhi, it refers not only to measures which are legal (marches and demonstrations) but also to measures which are illegal (refusal to obey laws prescribing segregation, tax evasion to avoid supporting war, gold smuggling—in fact smuggling of all kinds—to evade protective tariffs, and other forms of both commercial and conscientious civil disobedience).

The issue which resort to nonviolence creates is both moral and political. Morally it raises the question of whether each particular kind of illegal nonviolence is a breach of the moral law (some kinds may be, some undoubtedly are not); in fact, whether the prevailing doctrine that it is not only criminal but also immoral to break any kind of statutory law, is true or false. If Thoreau was right, and I believe the evidence indicates that he was, the true

doctrine is that it is obligatory to breach any statute which prescribes what is a violation of moral law. The issue politically considered raises the question of whether it is efficient enough—whether it may actually be impractical—as compared with the efficiency of resorting to violence (as in revolution) and of resorting to counterviolence (as in police and military action in dealing with war, with revolution, and with crime).

All legalized official violence, without regard to whether it is morally legitimate (as in suppressing a riot) or morally illegitimate (as in suppressing the teaching of evolution), is by law justified; any kind of violence can be made legal by statute. A staggering amount of all legal violence has been, and is, immoral and illegitimate. Slavery is an example of the legalization of immorality in the past; the suppression of sterilization, abortion, and birth control are modern examples of the same thing.

Authority—Authority is a much simpler concept than violence. The essence of political authority in dealing with individuals, in the absence of submission, is the willingness and ability to use physical force for coercion and compulsion; in dealing with other nations, to use it for the defense of the nation or for the conquest of other nations. Authority and power are like Siamese twins. The State has authority if it has power and is willing to use it. If it is unwilling to use it, and this becomes known, it not only loses authority, it ceases to be a State. So long as violence is used by the State to police and to protect individual freedoms or to defend the nation when attacked, its exercise is legitimate; the moment it is used to curtail the liberties of individuals or to subjugate other nations, it becomes illegitimate and immoral, despotic and tyrannic, and its dictates morally null and void.

Liberty—Liberty is a much more complex concept than is generally realized. There are three readily distinguishable kinds, civil liberty (which we are presently considering), economic liberty (see the Distribution Problem), and social liberty (see the Organizational Problem). In spite of the differences between them, the characteristic essential to them all is the right of every man and every group, small or large, to do anything which every other man and all other groups can do without creating violent discord between them.

Liberty is not an inherent right, but a right which arises from the fulfillment of the individual's duties and obligations. Civic duties may be defined as the obligation of every man and every group to do anything and everything essential to the maintenance of the liberty of all. Civic duties include the obligation to support oneself and all dependents and the obligation to join with others in any legitimate and necessary activity or enterprise essential to the preservation of the rights of all. Those too young, too incompetent, too unable or too unwilling to fulfill or discharge their civic duties may have privileges conferred upon them (as parents confer privileges on their children or the State upon the indigent), but they are not entitled to the rights of responsible men. The essential conditions which characterize all free States are institutions which recognize man's rights to any kind of voluntary and responsible action and deny them to those who fail to respect the equal right of others to such action.

Harmony—Peace is an inadequate conception of the purpose which alone can justify the State in the exercise of authority; peace is too passive a state; it is a state simply of quiet and tranquility within and between States. Harmony should be the State's animating purpose, a condition in which people treat each other as justly and properly related members of the human race, and in which States treat each other as properly related parts of one world.

In these definitions, just as the antithesis of liberty is authority, so the antithesis of harmony is violence, but only that kind of violence which creates discord; disciplinary violence does not make for discord; on the contrary (man being what he usually is and not what he is at his best), disciplinary violence may be needed to maintain or restore harmony when it is disturbed. Harmony, therefore, is no passive state. It is a state in which not only the leader (authority) but each member of the orchestra (each subject) is actively contributing to the correction or elimination of discord.

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2. *The Problem of Purpose*—States come into existence, and States exist, for purposes of some kind. Some of these purposes, unfortunately, do not justify their existence; some are illegitimate, and some legitimate. The problem is to determine what sort of purposes (if there are any) justify the use of organized and legalized

counterviolence. The purposes for which States function actually is one thing, the purposes for which they ought properly to function is another.

What the history of States shows is that there is no imaginable purpose which some State at sometime has not tried to fulfill and tried to conduct. If all these purposes are carefully classified, eleven at least must be considered:

Belligerence—Wars waged by one State upon the subjects and the territory of another State for the subjugation of its population and the seizure of its possessions. For bellicose and inhumane States, this subjugation (conquest) is perhaps their most important function; it has no place at all in any decent State;

Defense—Wars conducted by a State in defense of its territory, its subjects, and their possessions when attacked or invaded by another State, or when attacked from within by revolutionists seeking to seize power and exercise the State's authority. About the legitimacy and morality of the defense function, granted the legitimacy of the State's jurisdiction, there is no question;

Protective Services—Protection of the persons and the possessions of its subjects from criminals by police action (the maintenance of law and order); protection in natural catastrophes (floods, tornadoes, earthquakes); protection in social catastrophes caused by its own mal-administration, mal-legislation, or mal-adjudication (monetary inflation or deflation, failure to provide just and equal access to land, usurpation and oppression, abuses of police and military power, and other forms of nonfeasance, misfeasance and malfeasance); protection of its subjects from destitution until they are again able to provide for themselves; protection when suffering from natural catastrophes. About the legitimacy of protection, granted that it is in fact protection and not the granting of privileges, there is again no question;

Investiture Services—Functioning as paramount grantor of titles to land and other natural resources; as the grantor of eminent domain to public utilities (natural monopolies); and as the grantor of copyrights and patents, franchises and licenses, and other legitimate indentures. About the necessity for providing investiture services, there is no question; nor is there any question about them so long as they are confined to the making of grants which

are legitimate. It is only when, under a false assertion of necessity and justification, it grants special privileges (monopolies, "protective" tariffs, subsidies, sinecures) that the grants it makes become indefensible because illegitimate;

Providing Public Utilities—Providing streets and highways, water supplies and electric power, canal and railroad transportation. The provision of public utilities by the State itself when they can only be provided by the State (as in the case of streets and highways) is legitimate, but their provision by the State when they could be provided by cooperatives composed of the users of the services, is not; whenever cooperatives can be organized to provide them, without subsidy and with their own capital, State operation is an invitation to political exploitation. But to grant to private corporations the right to exploit eminent domain, as is accepted practice in most of the world today, is an indefensible abuse no matter how much the abuse may be "regulated";

Production—Production of goods and commodities (agricultural, mineral, manufactured); production of services (money and banking, medicine and law, laundry and plumbing). This is an unjustified activity; no activity involving the use of compulsion, as is the case with all the activities of the State, is justified if an activity like production can be provided by the people for themselves by their own voluntary activities in free enterprises of their own organized either competitively or cooperatively;

Distribution—Apportionment of the income from the productive activities of the population among the claimants for it. Like production, this is no function calling for or justifying the use of compulsion;

Insurance Services—Life insurance, fire insurance, accident and casualty insurance; social security, employment security, medical security, old-age security. Insofar as these can be provided by the voluntary activities of enterprises, competitive and cooperative, set up by the people themselves, or by families living on homesteads or which can create estates of their own, it plainly justifies no use of compulsion in providing them. The State might legitimately compel its subjects to provide themselves with an adequate amount of insurance of various kinds (as it has in the case of auto-

mobile insurance), but to go further than this is in fact to indulge in a usurpation and to indulge in oppression;

Enculturation Services—Religious indoctrination in theocratic States; patriotic indoctrination in secular States; instruction and cultivation in all kinds of States. This is an illegitimate use of compulsion. The State can justify the granting of scholarships to all its young on the ground that its own safety and the ability of its subjects to participate intelligently in its control requires that all have a minimum standard of education, but this does not legitimize its own organization and operation of schools and other educational enterprises, because it cannot provide these without resorting to compulsion, without compelling attendance in them, and without compelling everybody (through taxation) to contribute to their maintenance;

Monetary Services—The setting of standards for currency and money, as in the case of the setting of standards of weight and length and other measures, is one function, and the issuance of currency and money another. The setting of standards is properly a function of the State; variability in what is meant by a dollar is as provocative of fraud and exploitation as is variability in what is meant by a yard or a pound. But the issuance of money and currency is properly a banking and not a State function; chartered banks should all be fiduciary trusts, should be administered by trustees, should be owned not by stockholders but cooperatively by those who patronize them, and a federation of all the banks in the State should be invested with the power to issue currency and money. Banking is properly a profession; a bank is trustery not property, and if the State enforced standards of professional integrity in banking as it should in all professions (preferably through the agency of professional associations), there would be neither need nor excuse for the present intolerable abuse of the issuance of money and currency by States. Until that time comes, it will remain a means by which the State exacts tribute from everybody, alternately (by inflating the currency) enables debtors to exploit creditors, and alternately (by deflating it) enables creditors to exploit debtors;

Conservation—The conservation of natural resources is legitimately a function of the State both insofar as it is necessary to withdraw certain natural resources (like the wilderness) from any

use or exploitation whatever, and also insofar as it is necessary to use the police power to prevent the present generation from destroying the natural resources it uses (like the soil) to which future generations are as much entitled as those who are living today.

* * * *

Socialists will insist upon the legitimacy of all these State functions except that of belligerent (imperialist) war; Revolutionary Socialists (Communists) will even insist upon the legitimacy of waging war from within (and from without too) upon so-called Capitalist and Imperialistic States.

Anarchists, however, will insist upon the illegitimacy of all of them.

Libertarians will accept most of them, perhaps reluctantly, until the time comes when the determining number of people in the State will have been educated so as to make it possible to dispense with most of them. When that time comes, the State, in Marx's famous phrase, will begin to wither away.

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3. *The Problem of Ancillary Operations*—The ends (purposive operations) of a State are one thing, the means (ancillary operations) essential to realizing them another. Of the activities of States, not more than a dozen are purposive in nature, but of their ancillary activities it would be possible to list hundreds. Some of them, however, are so important that they must be at least briefly discussed, while some require exhaustive consideration, because in practice they are actually more important than the purposive operations to which they are ostensibly auxiliary. Some of these important ancillary operations include:

Administration—A legitimate ancillary activity in all States;

Legislation—A legitimate ancillary activity insofar as it does not involve the enactment of any invasion of the liberties of its subjects;

Adjudication—A legitimate ancillary activity whenever composition or arbitration fails in civil disputes, and an unavoidable legitimate activity in dealing with delinquents and criminals;

Evaluation—Evaluation in its most obvious and in its most prevalent form is represented by accounting; more episodically and

dramatically by legislatively and sometimes judicially authorized committees of investigation. Evaluation is a necessary and indeed vital ancillary activity if the tendency to political corruption is to be tempered;

Affiliation—Communicating with other States diplomatically; entering into agreements, treaties, and alliances with other States; federating with other States. A legitimate and in fact morally compulsory ancillary activity of all States. No State is legitimately sovereign so far as relations with other States are concerned. Every State is a part of the whole Earth, every people a part of the whole of humanity;

Promotion—The promotion of the special interests of labor and agriculture, commerce and industry, either through the maintenance of special departments and bureaus for that purpose, or through legislation such as that establishing protective tariffs or import quotas. The promotion of special interests of any kind involves the use of the power of the State in a peculiarly indefensible manner; it is from beginning to end an illegitimate and immoral ancillary activity of the State. There is only one interest that the State can legitimately and morally protect and promote, that is the general consumer interest. Every particular producer interest is a special interest; only the interests of consumers, since everybody is a consumer, is a general interest;

Planning—Planning is of many kinds, political, economic, and social. Political planning (planning of its own activities by the State) is a proper ancillary activity in every kind of State. Economic and social planning, essential as they may be in Socialistic and Fascistic States, are as illegitimate as is the operation by the State of the productive and distributive enterprises which make economic planning necessary and as is the regimentation (*gleichschaltung*) of various classes which make social planning necessary.

It is the inability of free States to engage in total planning (determining what should be produced, what targets should be set for producing it, and what should be charged for it) which is most severely criticized by all schools of Socialistic thought today. Economic planning of a sort, it is true, does take place, but it is indirect (subsidizing favored producers of particular crops, legalizing labor monopoly and wage-fixing by labor unions, subsidizing

and protecting favored industries with tariffs, legalizing cartelization and price-fixing by favored services [shipping for instance], inflating and tampering with the money supply). But these are so scandalously exploitative of the consuming and tax-paying public that they are morally indefensible and defensible only in terms of cheap (demagogic) or stupid (chauvinistic) political expediency.

Yet it is untrue (as critics of the idea that economies should be free maintain) that free States are economically planless. In free States economic planning is a function, firstly, of the consumer, secondly of the entrepreneur, and finally of the investor, the stock market, and the investment banker. In all highly developed free States today, it is the investment bankers who decide which industry (and which enterprise in which industry) is to be expanded, which is to be newly established, and which is to be left alone. They, it is true, make these plans, but it is the investors and the consumers who finally determine where capital shall be used (plants erected or expanded) and in which industries production shall be increased and in which decreased. The process, however, is continuous; it does not move arbitrarily with five-year plans and arbitrary yearly targets; at all times with free economic planning, a process much akin to voting is taking place. The bankers vote to promote a new industry; the investors vote about investing in it; the consumers vote about whether to buy or not to buy what the new industry offers them.

Because it is not called economic planning, and because it is not centralized in a government bureaucracy, the advocates of State economic planning indulge in the absurdity of saying that it does not take place. Their trouble is that they cannot conceive of planning except in terms of dictation by planning boards; they cannot conceive of a system (which is yet operating before their eyes) in which free men plan, and then freely either accept or veto what the free planners have planned. And yet in spite of all the contemptible exploits and the stupid constraints incorporated in the system by greedy business men and demagogic politicians, it works and has worked well enough to raise the scale of living for the masses of people in these "planless" economies higher than ever before in all history.

Succession—Provisions for succession in the political offices of the State is an essential ancillary activity in every kind of State,

Succession in any organization is an important problem, but in a State, where revolution with all its horrors often hang upon it, few things are more important than making provision for orderly and peaceful succession for the exercise of political power. States have not solved this problem very well. Here in the United States, and in all States which have inherited English traditions, election has worked quite well, because along with the tradition, the partisans to the election have inherited a willingness to lose peacefully, even if not always graciously, and to try to win next time. In States whose people do not have a long tradition of team-playing, it works abominably; it provides a mere facade behind which other methods, revolting and bloody methods ranging from assassination to revolution, are used.

But election is not the only available method, and for succession to other offices than those in which policy-making is involved, it is not at all suitable; succession for bureaucrats and permanent civil servants cannot possibly be provided for properly by election. In dealing with this problem, there are a variety of means which have been and are being used, and all of them should be considered. Merely to suggest what is involved, there is succession by lot (sortition); hereditary succession; succession by election; succession by examination; succession by usurpation (coup, assassination, revolution).

This over-simplifies the picture but makes perfectly clear that there are some methods which should be incontinently rejected by all rational and humane persons and that some methods are suitable for some offices and other methods for other offices.

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4. *The Problem of Jurisdiction*—I am borrowing the concept of jurisdiction from legal terminology and using it here in the consideration of the political problem. It is possible within this broader conception to distinguish at least five distinct kinds of jurisdictions: judicial, gregational, territorial, sovereign, and concurrent.

Judicial Jurisdiction—The legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine causes of action, both general and particular. For different courts these are called original and appellate; civil and criminal, common-law or equitable and statutory law; *in rem* or *in personem*, exclusive or concurrent, etc.

Gregational Jurisdiction—Primitive tribes or so-called tribal-States exercised gregational jurisdiction; no matter where a member of the tribe went, the tribe still exercised jurisdiction over him. Some modern dictatorial States (Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany) have tried to reassert it. Gregational jurisdiction creates the problem of how it is to be exercised when the subjects of a State live in another State which claims jurisdiction over all those who reside in it. Primitive tribes had no such problem; land belonged to no State; land belonged to no individual; land was the gift of the Great Spirit to all mankind; there were no boundaries to create the problem. Modern States, with their claim to absolute sovereignty over the territory within their borders, cannot enforce gregational jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of their own States.

Territorial Jurisdiction—This is jurisdiction over everybody within the boundaries of the State's territory, and jurisdiction over the State's subjects when abroad with the consent by treaty of other States (as in extradition) or when they return to the territory of their own State, and over those of their subjects who reside in States which have been forced to grant extra-territorial rights to another State.

Constitutionally there are some six kinds of States:

1. Tribal-States (but these are not true, only potential, States);
2. City-States (as in ancient Greece);
3. Village-States (as proposed by Jefferson and Gandhi);
4. Nation-States (as rationalized by Bodin);
5. Imperial-States (Empires, really Nation-States which have extended their jurisdiction over other States by belligerent warfare), as rationalized by Kipling in Britain and Hitler in Germany.
6. Theoretically envisaged World-States (Alexander the Great's "East-and-West" Empire, the ancient Chinese "World" Empire). The conception of a World-State or paramount World-Government is really a contradiction in terms; no such World-State can come into existence unless the prevailing patriotic insistence upon the continuance of Nation-States is abandoned. This is not true of a mere World-League (the League of Nations, the United

Nations). It is, however, true of the conception of a World-Federation; no such Federation can come into existence without the abandonment of national sovereignty. The actual realization of a World-Federation is increasingly being recognized as necessary to the maintenance of international peace; the realization of a World-State exercising absolute sovereignty, even if it were possible, would be undesirable; the danger of creating a world in which there was no escape from the possible tyranny of the State is very real.

Of these six kinds of States, only tribal-States (merely incipient States) in a world of tribal-States, and a World-State (which is merely envisaged), can exercise gregational jurisdiction; all the others whatever they may try to do, can exercise territorial jurisdiction only.

Sovereign Jurisdiction—This is jurisdiction as it is in theory and in practice exercised by sovereign Nation-States today. Any State which exercises jurisdiction of this sort exercises limitless power and authority. The Sovereign State is itself the final arbiter of the nature and extent of the power and authority it exercises over those subject to its jurisdiction. It is jurisdiction which is independent, exclusive, autonomous, ultimate, supreme, absolute, and from which there is not only no legal appeal but not even any appeal to the moral law, because the existence of any such a moral law is still legally unrecognized today. This has been true for centuries, ever since the decline and abandonment of the Ancient Roman practice of treating what the Roman jurisconsults called natural law as higher than the statutory and positive law of particular nations. All that is left is appeal to public opinion (in free and open societies) which operates, if it operates at all, far too often "too little and too late." There is, of course, a somewhat stronger recourse in civil disobedience, which failed when Thoreau tried it in this country, but succeeded when Gandhi tried it in India. When civil disobedience fails, nothing is left but revolt and revolution.

Sovereign jurisdiction, which is now taken for granted, is ethically, pragmatically, and intellectually indefensible.

Concurrent Jurisdiction—This is jurisdiction as it was in theory to be exercised between the States of the United States and the Federal Government, and as it still to a considerable extent is

exercised both by the Federal Government in its relations with the States, and by the States in their relations with their minor sub-divisions (townships, counties, and incorporated cities), each of which exercise a limited jurisdiction within its own boundaries. With concurrent jurisdiction neither nation nor State, neither State nor sub-State, is sovereign in relation to each other.

Between sovereign Nation-States concurrent jurisdiction involves a contradiction not merely of terminology but of substance. Sovereignty is the denial of any kind of sovereignty by one State over another. Concurrent jurisdiction is only possible when absolute sovereignty is abandoned. Yet the evidence is overwhelming that the whole idea and certainly the practice of sovereignty involves a breach of the moral law; it is, it is true, an institutional rather than a personal immorality, but that makes its consequences none the less horrible, as the history of international warfare makes clear.

Imperial-States impose concurrent jurisdiction of a kind upon the States they have conquered when they do not find it practicable to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. No World-Government or World-State, for which some enthusiasts are calling, can possibly be established unless the great Nation-States voluntarily surrender their sovereignty, or unless all nations are compulsorily deprived of it. No World-Federation, and no such league as the United Nations, can possibly function effectively in maintaining world-peace unless the whole world abandons territorial jurisdiction and is willing to substitute concurrent jurisdiction for it. Concurrent jurisdiction would make possible the organization of a world police force (an army, navy, and air force) which could legally go anywhere in the world at any time to destroy armaments capable of being used for aggression and do whatever else is necessary to prevent war and to maintain international peace. As Imperial-States in these days surrender their colonies, the colonies are being transformed into Nation-States each exercising territorial jurisdiction and each proudly acclaiming its sovereignty. And the existing dangers of international conflicts between the Communist and the Capitalist nations of the world is being multiplied by this proliferation of Nation-States.

5. *The Problem of Polity: Constitution and Organization*—In theory the polity of States with written constitutions, such as the United States, is made manifest in their constitutions. In actuality, the polity in all States, both those with written and those (like Britain) with unwritten constitutions, is made manifest pragmatically in the organs of various kinds (departments, bureaus, commissions, even corporations) which States organize and operate.

Organization for States presents all the problems discussed in Problem XII, the Organizational Problem, but it presents an enormously important problem peculiar to States only. The State is a compulsory, not a voluntary, enterprise. Membership in it—subjection to it—is compulsory; some States do not permit alienation; this is true of the Communist States of today; each is surrounded by some sort of “Berlin” wall (“Iron Curtain,” “Bamboo Curtain”) with armed guards patrolling boundaries of barbed-wire. But emigrants even in the States which permit alienation find that when they surrender their subjection to one State, they are compelled to become the naturalized subjects of another. In the nationalized modern world, there is no provision for the existence of Stateless persons.

This factor of compulsion dominates organization of the State. The subjects of the State may be able to force their rulers, sometimes by voting peacefully, sometimes violently by rioting, to do what they want (to provide them with “doles” or social security for example); the State, on the other hand, is constantly forcing its subjects to pay taxes, to obey its statutes, to support it, and to actually fight its wars.

All the departments needed for a voluntary enterprise are needed by a compulsory enterprise, but in addition special departments are needed to provide compulsion. It is this which makes the problem a distinct basic problem of its own. Compulsory enterprises (States and sub-States) must not only have police, military, and penal departments, they must create by statute “crimes against the State,” and in some cases these crimes, as in the crime of treason, are considered much more heinous than crimes involving the grossest violations of the moral law.

Traitors are frequently idealists, men who betray their own nations because of selfless devotion to the ideology of a nation

with which their own is at war. It is ironic that only in Czarist Russia were political criminals considered entitled to different treatment from ordinary criminals. In Communist Russia this humane penology has been replaced by the most bestial penalization and treatment of political prisoners; they are treated infinitely more harshly and brutally than ordinary criminals. In our own presumably idealistic State political prisoners are treated the same as the most debased criminals: conscientious objectors, even though moved to commit a "crime against the State" by the deepest of religious convictions, are subjected to the same callous penal treatment as those who commit rape and murder.

In free States, purposive operations are few. Ideally there should be only two, "maintenance of law and order" and "defense of the State." The fewer the purposes, the smaller and simpler, the easier it is to fulfill its primary purposes efficiently.

In welfare and partly socialized States, purposes are many, the problems complex, the bureaucracy enormous; efficiency in realizing purposes is correspondingly low.

In totally socialized or "communized" States, purposes are unlimited, departments and bureaus numberless, efficiency impossible, and its realization in reality a matter of indifference to its ruling class. The bigger an enterprise, the greater the overhead; the greater the overhead, the more paperwork; the more paperwork, the more bureaucrats; bureaucratic work is more pleasant than real work; giving orders more pleasant than carrying them out; wearing white-collar clothes more pleasant than wearing blue shirts and blue overalls; keeping one's hands clean more pleasant than letting the soil touch them.

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6. *The Problem of Operation*—The crucial problem in the operations of a megalomaniac enterprise such as a State is decision; how are the decisions to be made when so many people are involved? The problem here is one of difference of degree, not kind, from that in large voluntary enterprises. That problem has been explored in considering the organizational problem. Here just one point needs reiteration: the fact that there are basically only three methods available for making decisions.

The first is decision by sortition (by lot, by oracle, by the arbitrament of chance). This should not be belittled; the ancient Greeks embodied it in the constitutions of their remarkable States. Taking elections by and large, it is quite possible that sortition would provide us with public officials better (they could hardly be worse) than those we now elect to office.

The second is by delegating decision to a single person.

The third is group decision, delegation of the decision to a committee, to an assembly, to the whole electorate. In connection with group decision, a host of new problems emerge: how is the group to decide? Just to suggest the difficulties involved, there is unanimity, which we use when a decision is referred to a trial jury; there is plurality, there is majority, there is consensus, which we do not use at all.

What the facts plainly indicate is that no one method of making decisions is best; a Monistic approach to the problem should be ruled out, Pluralism is called for. Some kinds of political decisions should be left to a single person, particularly when time is of the essence; others, when sufficient time is available, to one or another kind of group decision, and when unlimited time is available, to some sort of plebiscite.

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7. *The Problem of Political Control*—If the State is to do what it should and to be prevented from doing what it should not, it must be controlled. If the State is to use but not abuse its powers, control is crucial. A thousand different schemes for control have been advocated, and hundreds have been tried. But it is important to distinguish between formal control and actual control, between reigning and ruling. In practice, no matter who reigns and who in theory is supposed to control, actual control is always in the hands of an individual "ruler," a "ruling" group who know each other and work together, or a "ruling" class, the members of which may be too large to know each other. The real "rulers" control; legislators enact what the "rulers" consider to be in their interest; reigning officials (no matter how august their titles) see to it that what the "rulers" wish is done; the bureaucracies under them actually do what the "rulers" wish done; the judges adjudicate in accordance with what the "rulers" consider

the ruling interest which is to be protected. Sometimes the rulers also reign and hold offices; often members of the ruling class hold offices of various kinds, but there is no necessity for them to do so as long as control is in their hands. (The expression, "the establishment," has sometimes been used almost as the equivalent of "ruling class".)

What now is this control which enables them to rule even when not reigning?

The essence of political control is paramountcy in deciding whose claims and demands are to be recognized by the State (whether justified or not) and what or how much they are to be granted to satisfy them. Where this power resides, control resides; where this power is exercised, there actual control is; where it is only in theory exercised, the control is formal, not actual. In great republics and huge democracies, the people exercise only formal control; actual control is in the hands of those who decide what the State should grant to the various claimants for its favors, and the various claimants for the revenue it collects. From this dilemma there is no escape, and there is only one road to its mitigation, keeping the size of the State down to a human magnitude. If the State is small enough, as small as a New England Township or one of the smaller Swiss Cantons, the ruling group and the subject group can conceivably become one and the same.

Classification of the various kinds of "rulers" or "ruling classes" which have actually controlled various States (or the same State at different times), and of various proposals about who and how the State should ideally be controlled, makes crystal clear what is involved. In the following classification of some twenty-five species of such schemes for dealing with the problem, at least four genera of schemes can be distinguished which I think of as (1) quantitative, (2) usurpatory, (3) economic, and (4) qualitative.

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1. *Quantitative Schemes of Control*—These are schemes for constituting and operating States in which control is provided for by some designated number of persons. The designated numbers range all the way from one person (monarchic control) to the whole—100%—of the populace (democratic control).

Monarchic Control—One person controls; he may or may not at the same time reign or officiate. He may be anything from a

political "boss" to a hereditary king or emperor; he may be a pope, caliph, or dalai lama; he may be a dictator like Franco or Mussolini, Stalin or Mao Tse Tung; he may even be an elected dictator like Hitler or Salazar, but the essential fact is that he must actually rule and actually control. Theories rationalizing monarchic control are plentiful; Hitler and Mussolini called it "the leadership principle"; Hobbes maintained that only a monarch could be ruthless enough to impose order and defend the State's interests. With monarchic control, the reigning officials and bureaucrats do what the monarch wants done.

Oligarchic Control—A few control, visibly as in rule by a *junta*, or invisibly as by a *cabal*, with the State apparatus⁹ doing whatever the controlling oligarchy wishes.

Factional Control—A considerable number, large enough and cohesive enough, organized into what I think of as a faction, actually controls. The faction may be religious (Guelph or Ghibeline, Protestant or Catholic); it may be purely political (Andrew Jackson, "To the victors belong the spoils!"; Vladimir Lenin, "All power to the Soviets!"); it may be ideological (Marx and Engels, "Dictatorship of the Proletariat!").

Factional control can be just as arbitrary and despotic as monarchic or oligarchic control. On the other hand, just as there have been benevolent monarchs (Ashoka), so there have been benevolent factions (the Gironde). With factional control, the State apparatus does what the ruling faction wants done. The only difference between factional and oligarchic control is one of numbers.

Proportional Control—What I am calling proportional control is what is usually mis-called democratic control, and States in which the problem of control is dealt with by conferring control upon a proportion of the people should be called proportionocracies and not democracies.

Derivatively and denotatively, democracy means rule by the people. Connotatively, it may mean anything from the kind of electoral government in present day Switzerland to the kind of government they have in the Communist "People's Democracies."

If the term democracy is to be used with anything remotely similar to scientific precision, it must mean a government in which

all the people rule, not a plurality or a majority of the people, not a faction (as in one-party Fascist, Socialist, and Communist States), and not even parliamentary or other representatives of the people.

Proportionalism should be sharply differentiated from democracy for scientific reasons of the utmost importance, as we shall see. In proportionocracies like the United States, a plurality or even a majority of the voters is often smaller than the "minorities" if to the minorities are added to those who do not have the right to vote or have failed to vote. Upon these "minorities," the wishes of the majority is imposed just as arbitrarily as it is with factional, oligarchic, or monarchical control.

With proportional control, to the extent to which the majority actually and not just formally controls, the State apparatus tends to do what it believes will satisfy, or at least placate, the majority.

Republican Control—This is control by designated numbers and designated kinds of representatives elected by designated proportions of the voters (John Adams). With republicanism, the representatives are in theory free and obligated to do what they themselves decide should rightly be done; in practice, they usually do not what is right but what they believe necessary or desirable in the national interest.

Democratic Control—There is only one method of control which is genuinely democratic and about which it can be said that with it the people as a whole really control, and that is when decisions are made by consensus in meetings in which everybody can participate. Impractical as this method seems, it "works", as the Quakers have shown in their meetings, and as it has worked for aeons of time in primitive tribes and in quite highly developed autonomous agricultural villages (Java, Mexico) before their incorporation into modern nations. But it works only under one condition: the unit of population involved—the "State" must be small, small enough to make face-to-face meetings possible (Thomas Jefferson, Jayaprakash Narayan). In all large states, democracy is a misnomer; consensus is impossible. In any kind of larger political entity, republicanism or some even less democratic scheme of providing for control must be resorted to.

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2. *Usurpatory Schemes of Control*—If the concept *usurpation* is used in its literal signification of possession by force without right,

and the concept *right* is used to refer to moral and not merely legal right, then usurpation is a characteristic common to many schemes for dealing with the problem of control, most of which can be considered varieties of one of the following four species:

Dynastic Control—This is control exercised by a king, or other royal person, belonging to a family whose oldest sons (and sometimes daughters) are considered entitled to the crown and throne of a State. To control, he must be a king who not only reigns but also rules; otherwise his control is only formal, and the actual control of the State is exercised by others. With Dynastic control, the State apparatus does what the king, what his favorites, and what those upon whom he depends for his support, want done or consider to their interest. Modern Monarchies for the most have kings who reign but do not rule.

Genearchic Control—A hereditary class controls (a "nobility"), and a hereditary class is subject to their rule (the commoners); the territory and population subject to such control vary in size from a mere Manor or Barony (the Manor of Hampstead, the Barony of Borsod), a Principality or Kingdom (The Principality of Wales, the Kingdom of Castile and Aragon), to an Empire (the Holy Roman Empire, the Mogul Empire).

Ochlocratic Control—Rioters, mobs, demonstrators, crowds control; the State apparatus does what the mobs and the crowds demand.

Ochlocratic control has never, to my knowledge, been formally recognized in the constitutions of any State, but it is a historic fact nonetheless. Whenever democracies degenerate into demagogies, or the officials of other forms of government acquire power or become dependent upon the good-will of mobs and crowds in its capital city for their power, ochlocratic control becomes a reality. Ochlocracy is a danger implicit in the mass civil disobedience movements in this country started by the agitation among Negroes for equality. So long as civil disobedience is restricted to disobedience it is morally vindicable, but when it is transformed into interference with the rights of others, it becomes morally indefensible. And the more successful it is, the more certain it is, to transform the State into an ochlocracy.

Dictatorial Control—Dictators, despots, tyrants, without regard to the office they formally hold, actually control. With dictatorial

control, the State apparatus does what the dictator wants and believes to be in the interest of those who keep him in power. The Fascist leadership principle is really a rationalization of dictatorial control.

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3. *Economic Schemes of Control*—Schemes of control in which it is assumed that promoting and protecting the interests of a particular class of some kind should be the dominant objective of the State, I think of as economic. All of them tend to be rationalized with ingenious arguments which indicate that what is in the interest of the controlling class is also in the interests of society as a whole. Perhaps one of the most famous of all of these rationalizations was Aristotle's defense of control of the State by a slave-owning class—slavery, he said, was not only in the interest of the slave-owners but also of the slaves themselves!

Clerical Control—Control by a religious bureaucracy.

Secular Control—This is really a kind of negation or denial of clerical control; it is more like assertion of a political principle than the vesting of control in any particular secular group; it asserts that control should be secularly and not religiously oriented.

Stratocratic Control—The military control.

Plutocratic Control—The rich control.

Bourgeois Control—The business men control.

Financial Control—The financiers and bankers control.

Feudal Control—Large land-owners control.

Agrarian Control—The farmers control.

Ergocratic Control—The laborers control.

Proletarian Control—The poor control.

Bureaucratic Control—The permanent officials of the State control.

Ethnocratic Control—One race controls.

Androcratic Control—The males control.

Gyneocratic Control—The females control.

In the actual history of States, one class and one interest rarely exercised exclusive control; in most States, several classes com-

peted or cooperated. Basing his theory upon historic facts of this kind, John Adams thought that control should vest in a plurality of interests which balanced each other. This, unfortunately, is predicated upon the assumption that *Homo sapiens* is in reality *Homo economicus*, which, if our study of the riddle of human nature is right, simply is not true.

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4. *Qualitative Schemes of Control*—Finally we come to a variety of methods and proposals for dealing with the problem which I think of as qualitative. In these, control is vested in some class with characteristics which are qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, and in which the quality or characteristic selected is supposedly in the interest of the whole of society and not of that one class only.

Hagiocratic Control—Control by the holy; the State apparatus does what holy men say God wants done. (Roman Catholicism, Mohammedan Caliphatism, Tibetan Lamaism).

Aristocratic Control—Control by the excellent (Aristotle).

Philocratic Control—Control by philosophers (Plato).

Intellectual Control—Control by the intelligentsia. (Julien Brenda).

Technocratic Control—Control by engineers (Howard Scott).

Managerial Control—Control by executives (James Burnham).

* * * *

Theories and doctrines—answers—dealing with technical and even constitutional questions (including executive, legislative, and judicial problems), and the answers to the problem considered in the beginning of this outline, the problem of purpose, the question of "What should the State do and what should it not do?" are important. But they pale into insignificance when compared with answers to the problem we have just considered, the problem of control: "Who shall rule?"

1. *Who shall rule?*—Who, in society, shall be the ultimate determiners of resort to violence and the exercise of counterviolence? Who, through the agency not only of statutory and constitutional law, and who through the use of extra-legal measures (nepotist, personal, factional, venal, demagogic, riotous and revo-

lutionary), shall be the ultimate determiners of resort to illegal violence, and of the exercise of legal counterviolence by the State? Who as a result, shall be the ultimate apportioners (determiners of appropriations) not only of the State's revenues and the incomes in its public sector but, indirectly, the income of all individuals and enterprises in the private sector of the State's whole economy?

Aristotle's genius is typified by his answer to this question, by his famous trichotomy that only three possibilities exist, (a) rule by one, Monarchy; (b) rule by a few, Oligarchy; (c) rule by many, Democracy. But great as was Aristotle's genius, it over-simplified a problem much more complex than he realized. He recognized that more important than the constitutional problem—the problem of Monarchy, Oligarchy, or Democracy—was the problem of choosing between a dichotomy of rulers, (a) rulers who were good, and (b) rulers who were bad. If people are not good, no kind of ruler is any good, and whether the constitution is Monarchic, Oligarchic, or Democratic makes no difference. That the people are good (all of them and not only the common people of Lincoln's famous dictum) and therefore entitled to rule; or that one class is good and therefore entitled to rule (the Aristocrats in Aristotle's famous dictum); or that the Proletariat but not the Bourgeoisie are entitled to rule (in Marx and Engel's famous but equally romantic dictum) are all of them very dubious propositions indeed.

But what is much worse than Aristotle's over-simplification of the available alternative answers to the question is the fact that he took for granted what he should not have taken for granted at all—that no alternative to rule of some kind existed. For the polar extremes which should be taken into account are not *rule by one* or *rule by all*, but *rule by one* or *rule by none*, the doctrine represented at one extreme by Monarchism, and at the other by Anarchism. For if the Anarchists are right, there is in fact no problem of *Who shall rule?* nor of *What shall those who rule do?* but only one real problem, *How to get rid of rulers altogether?*

Marx, unlike Aristotle, did envisage this possibility. At the time Marx and Engels were hammering out the details of the ideology which has come to be called Marxism, a dialog was being carried on between the Scientific Socialists (as the Marxists called themselves) and the Utopian Socialists (as they called the

Anarchists, the Robert Owenists, the Cooperative Rochdalists, and the Guild Socialists). Though Marx never hesitated at castigating the Anarchists with the invective which made him infamous, he paid a romantic tribute unconsciously to the ideal of Anarchism. Under Marxism, the State, he said, would eventually wither away! If Marx is right (and about this he is as wrong as he has been about so many of his other predictions), then Lord Acton is wrong, and absolute power (if it is absolute enough) will no longer corrupt absolutely. On the contrary. Once the Marxist State and its officials exercises absolute power—once what he calls Communism and I call Panarchism becomes an established fact—absolute power will make the officials good; they will voluntarily cease to rule, voluntarily refuse to use violence and counterviolence to enforce their rule, and voluntarily surrender power and office!

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2. *What should the State be called upon to do, and what forbidden to do?* We come now to the second of the two categories of political problems, each of which exceed in importance political problems of a technical or constitutional nature.

In dealing with these problems, again the same dichotomy and the same polar extremes are involved. At one extreme is *Anarchism*, which maintains that the rulers shall not be permitted to do anything; that there is nothing which justifies calling upon anybody or any group for rulership at all; that there should be no State, and therefore no rulers to quarrel about what the State should and not do. At the other extreme is *Panarchism*, which maintains that the rulers should be permitted to do anything and everything, and that they should be called upon to do it.

Since the Bolshevik takeover of Russia in 1917 during "the seven days which shook the world," Panarchy has become a fact and has ceased to be a theory. Panarchies govern a third of the world. Some are still total as of this writing (as in Russia and in China); some have been watered down (as in Yugoslavia and in Poland). But Anarchy is still a utopian vision realizable only when human knowledge, human wisdom, and human nature, both among the masses and the intellectuals, both among the leaders and the followers in society, will be immensely greater and immensely better than it is at present. What actually calls for consideration are at least six distinguishable categories of answers,

theoretical and practical, some envisioned and some expressed in actual practice:

Panarchy—A State in which government is total, in which everybody is employed by the government, in which no private sector exists.

Megocracy—A State in which the public sector is the biggest sector and growing bigger at the expense of the private sector; a state in which most of the people are employed by the government.

Mediocracy—A State in which the public and the private sector is just about the same in size and in which neither is growing at the expense of the other; in which the population is equally divided into private and public employment.

Minarchy—A State in which the functions of the public sector are reduced to a minimum; in which only a small minority are governmentally employed.

Anarchy—No State at all, in which nobody is governmentally employed.

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As we go briefly through the following highlights from the mass of material I have accumulated dealing with political doctrines and ideologies of all kinds, I suggest we keep our eyes on how they deal with the two questions we have been analyzing, the question of *who is to be "it" politically*, and *what is to be "done" politically*, and forget the questions with which our political scientists (really political technicians) are so often absorbed to the exclusion of everything else, the question of *how to do "things" politically*.

The fact that States exist, and that so many kinds exist and have existed, proves that solutions of the political problem also exist, and exist in abundance. They have of course existed from that day in the remote pre-history of mankind when the first State came into being. The only question today as we look back at man's long, sad political history is the question of which solution is the least undesirable one.

If it is true (as our study of problem V, the problem of telic values, indicates) that all of man's purposes in life ultimately fall into one of only three categories, salvation purposes, gratification purposes, and satisfaction purposes, then this must also be true of the purposes for which he organizes all the enterprises upon which

he embarks, including those enterprises with which we are concerned politically. There are then only three ultimate categories into which the purposes for which all States are organized can fall. If salvation is the purpose, Theocratic organization is logically called for, and this rationalized by the tenets of the Supernal doctrine—the religion—of its ruling class. If gratification is the purpose to which the State is to minister, Hegemonic organization is logically called for and the State's polity and practices vindicated in terms of national interests. And if satisfaction is the purpose, Libertarian organization is logically called for and the constitution and institutions justified in terms of human rights and obligations—of human values.

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Theocratic Political Doctrines and theocratic States all have in common the fact that they prescribe that the ruling interest of the State shall be the promotion of its established religion and that the ruling class shall be a hagiocracy. Vatican City, the tiny City-State which is all that is left of the great Holy Roman Empire, is of course a Roman Catholic theocracy; so are Ireland and Spain. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and England in theory, if not in practice, are Protestant theocracies; Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are Mohammedan theocracies; Israel is a Jewish theocracy. All these are existing Theocracies; all the nations of Christendom and of the Saracenic world used to be; Lamaistic Tibet was until recently. We have even had Theocracies in America; Puritan Massachusetts was a Congregational Theocracy and the Republic of Deseret was a Mormon Theocracy.

Today what remains viable of theocracy in most secular States, though very feebly in many of them, is support of the doctrine that the State should "support" religion, usually by granting statutory privileges to Churches, religious schools, seminaries, charities, and other religious enterprises, quite often with outright appropriations from the public revenues of the State.

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It is utterly impossible, if I am to limit myself to a single volume in this outline, to discuss what each of even the great religions maintain should be done about the political problem. But it is possible to touch upon three great controversies about how it should be dealt with which have developed in the histories of

all of them. These are the controversies between what I think of as Pontifexism and Caesaropapism, between Pontifexism, Episcopalianism, and Congregationalism, and between Clericalism and Secularism.

Pontifexism versus Caesaropapism—Pontifexism, as I have designated this doctrine so as to avoid the invidious term Papism, is the doctrine that the supreme power (both sacred and secular) should be vested in a high priest (a Pope, Caliph, Mikado, Dalai Lama). The sanction for each Pontifex differs fascinatingly. With the Dalai Lama, it is the discovery of the infant reincarnation of the Buddha; with the Mikado, descent from the goddess Ametarasu Omikami; with the Caliph, descent from Mohammed; with the Pope, ordination as the successor of Peter.

The political pretensions of Pontifexism are all-embracing—Panarchic—and vest in the Pontifex, whatever he is called, ultimate power. Even when the civil power is delegated to a King, an Emperor, or a secular State, the Pontifex retains ultimate authority in matters of faith, morals, and whatever it may be that he decides is essential to realize God's will on Earth.

Caesaropapism makes a claim to political power almost equally Panarchic; it does exclude matters of faith and morals, but it does not exclude control over the ecclesiastical apparatus, at least in the territory under the monarch's jurisdiction. Caesaropapism in Christendom was vindicated on the basis of the divine right of kings. In practice, it amounted to nothing much more than recognition of their legitimacy by the Pope. And certainly up until the Reformation, it was the conflict between the Sacred and the Secular power which marked perhaps most conspicuously the history of those times.

Almost from the beginning, certainly in Christendom, bitter and bloody conflicts between the two marked the relations of the two rival claimants to ultimate political power.

Pontifexism, Episcopalianism, and Congregationalism—In the history of almost all the great supernatural religions, Pontifexism has been challenged by those who maintained that the government of the Church and its paramountcy over the State, was not properly centralized in a pope or caliph, but belonged, according to *Episcopalianism*, in a body of bishops or of ordained clerics; or, according to *Congregationalism*, to the individual congregations of

the faithful. In Christendom, this was responsible for the breach between Byzantium and Rome, and later between Catholicism and Protestantism. In Islam, this was responsible for the differences between Shiahitism and Kharijism.

Clericalism versus Secularism—So far as the modern world is concerned, neither the conflict between Pontifexism and Caesaropapism, nor that between Pontifical and Ecclesiastical Centralism and Congregational Decentralism, has anything much more than an academic interest. Not even in theocratic and authoritarian Spain and Portugal do either Franco or Salazar make any pretensions to Caesaropapism, even though they do not recognize Pontifexism. Clericalism is, however, a burning issue in some States, in Israel, in most Mohammedan States, in many predominantly Catholic States (Spain, Italy), and in predominantly Protestant States such as the United States. In present day Turkey, for instance, the Secularist State with which Ataturk replaced the Caliphate (Sultanate) is still challenged by clerical parties determined to re-establish Theocratism and Caliphatism. In the United States, Clericalism manifests itself in education (prayers in public schools), in censoring books and plays (as in the interdiction of obscenity and even blasphemy), and in imposing religious moralities (as with contraception and euthanasia).

An ironic recent development is that stemming from Roman Catholic ecumenism—from the tendency of the two great conflicting divisions of Christendom to unite—which has already greatly weakened Protestant insistence upon the separation of Church and State. In the free world, the domination of all States by politicians makes it politically profitable for them to cater to the forces of Clericalism; only in the Communist world is there a militant secularist movement, and this has gone so far in the opposite direction that it is correctly described not as Secularism but as "established" Atheism. The Communists have jumped not only from Supernatural into atheistic Dogmatism, but also atheistic Fanaticism.

Finally, note should be taken of the difference between Hagiocracism and Clericalism, the first vesting power in holy men—in prophets and mystics, the second in Clerics—in ecclesiastical bureaucrats. In practice, Hagiocracism is today nothing much more than a rationalization of what in fact is Clericalism.

The ultimate difficulty with all Theocratic approaches to the political problem is the utter impossibility of determining which Church is the true one. Each Church claims that its holy men are the only ones divinely ordained; each insists that its Pope is the only Vicar of God on Earth; each insists that it is the only one divinely commissioned to rule over "the City of Man" and that its Church should be the only recognized and established one. From this dilemma there is no escape.

If Theocracy as a solution of the political problem is to be illustrated at its worst, the Witchcraft Mania in Europe, the Crusades of Christian nations, the Jehads of the Muslims, the Spanish Inquisition, and Calvin's Genevan Theocracy with its murderous slaughter for heresy of Michael Servetus would have to be cited. To furnish two recent examples which demonstrate the inhumanity of Theocracy, there is the War Over Partition waged between Theocratic Pakistan and Secular India which resulted in the slaughter of millions, and, on a smaller scale, the wars between the Arab States and Israel.

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Hegemonic Political Doctrines—The second basic category of solutions and practices dealing with political problem I think of as Hegemonic, because they all have in common the belief that the State must exert its authority ruthlessly on the ethical principle that "might is right"; and on the biological theory of the "survival of the fittest." These doctrines appeal to tough-minded personalities, to conquerors who practiced *Bonapartism*—Alexander and Caesar, Charlemagne and Napoleon; *Social Darwinism*—Cecil Rhodes, J. Pierpont Morgan (Josephson's *Robber Barons*); *Communism*—Karl Marx, Josef Stalin; *Practical Politics*—Bismarck and Clemenceau, Boise Penrose and Mark Hanna, Huey Long and Franklin D. Roosevelt; *Fascism*—Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler. They embody the Fascist and National Socialist belief in the "Leadership principle." Machiavelli is the prophet of the idea of Hegemony as the solution of the political problem, though Hobbes and Hegel might dispute with him for the title.

Hegemonic Political and Social Movements—Very few people realize how many political and social movements are essentially Hegemonic in nature and have ultimate objectives which call for the use of coercion, compulsion, and force (overt or constructive

violence) to achieve purposes which are not purely Hegemonic, some of which are considered progressive and liberal and others oppressive and reactionary. They would include:

Imperialism (British, Dutch, Spanish, French) and *Nationalism* (Pan-Teutonism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Arabianism).

Ethnocentrism (race supremacy) in all its various forms—*Caucasian*, as in the Ku Klux Klan and the Southern White Councils in the United States, *Nazi Teutonism* in Europe, *Apartheid* in South Africa; *Negro Ethnocentrism* as in Black Muslimism in the United States and Negritism in Africa, and *Colored Ethnocentrism* (Mongolian, Malayan, Negro) as in the Bandung movement.

Social movements such as *Communism* (Russian, Chinese); *Socialism* (Swedish, Indian, Burmese); and *Welfare Statism*, as it has developed in the United States and other nations since Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Prohibition movements seeking or enforcing sumptuary legislation dealing with alcohol, gambling, narcotics, nudity, obscenity, blasphemy, frequently calling for censorship enforced by statutory law.

Imposition movements with regard to religious observances (Sundays); patriotic observances; vaccination, fluoridation, etc.

Prohibitions and impositions which deal with actual disorderly or criminal behavior should not be confused with these; drunkenness which creates a nuisance for other people should not be confused with the manufacture, sale, and drinking of alcoholic beverages.

Interventionism—One political activity, which I think of as State Interventionism, is definitely Hegemonic in nature; it calls for the use of the State's police powers and the State's powers of investiture in matters which, upon analysis, justify no such use of power and can only be rationalized by maintaining that whatever those who have the power wish to do falls properly within the functions of the State. Intervention which breaches the moral law, for instance, is used in regulating, controlling, and even in confiscating property and enterprises. Typical of such *Intervention* is the granting to one school of thought of a monopoly to practice medicine; typical of such *Regulation* is the setting of fixed or administered prices for commodities (agricultural crops), for services (shipping rates and passenger fares by sea and air); and typical of such

Investiture is the granting of special privileges such as tariffs to "protect" favored industries.

Bellicism versus Pacifism—The distinction between belligerence and defense has already been discussed. Hegemonic movements and States are nearly all of them belligerent; opposed to movements for disarmament both in whole or in part; usually opposed to movements to promote arbitration and to set up international agencies to abolish war (world courts, world leagues or unions); and utterly opposed to *Pacifism*.

Two kinds of Pacifism, however, should be distinguished, one of which I think of as sentimental, and the other as humane, rational and scientific. What is usually called Pacifism (total opposition to war, even to defensive war; total disarmament; total substitution of arbitration even when it includes mediation between right and wrong) is what I think of as Sentimental Pacifism. Rational Pacifism distinguishes between belligerence and defense, justifies revolution and tyrannicide when there is no other alternative to ending intolerable oppression and despotism, justifies defensive armaments so long as no effective means of maintaining world law and order are established, advocates arbitration but not when it involves the acceptance of injustices or the compromising with evil on the basis of expediency, advocates adequate international agencies to maintain peace, and considers these police and military measures as unavoidable and as "necessary evils" under present conditions.

The Hegemonist (a pessimist and peyorist with regard to the abolition of war), justifies his belligerence on the ground that all nations, like all human beings, are naturally bellicose, and that, in such a dog-eat-dog world, survival makes belligerence necessary.

Nationalism and Imperialism—There is no essential difference between Nationalism and Imperialism, and it is ironic that the new nations which have come into existence (as the old empires have been broken up and their colonies have become independent) all embrace Nationalism as if it were a great virtue and hail it in exact proportion to their antipathy to imperialism.

Nationalism is the promotion, policy, and practice of promoting the national interest, and the interests of nationals and their enterprises both domestically and internationally, by achieving

national independence and consolidating, unifying, centralizing, and solidifying the nation. Imperialism differs from it in degree rather than in kind; it is the policy, technique and practice of promoting the national (or imperial) interest by forcibly incorporating independent or partially autonomous regions adjacent to the nation; by occupying, conquering, and incorporating colonies and dependencies outside the nation's "natural" boundaries; and by extending its trade and commerce by "protecting" it with the imperial flag.

These Hegemonic doctrines have in common the belief that the ultimate basis of the sovereignty of the State is a matter of might, that the ruling interest of the State should be Materialistic Gratification, and that the ruling class should consist of those with an economic interest which the State can promote.

It has been and still is an approach to the political problem which appeals to those who take pride in being "practical men." It is difficult for me to be patient with those who wrap themselves in their country's flag and shut their eyes to the lunatic consequences when two Hegemonisms come into conflict. Religious wars, which have their political justification in Theocratic political doctrines, have caused enough slaughter and destruction to condemn them. Yet in spite of the slaughter and destruction for which Hegemonic solutions of the political problem are responsible, they are practiced more widely now than ever before. If Capitalistic Imperialism is declining, Communistic Imperialism is not, and Nationalistic Imperialism is flourishing as new nations, each with its own Nationalistic and Hegemonic policies, come into existence year after year.

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Libertarian Solutions of the Problem—There remains last in these three categories of political doctrines the ideology which I find myself unfortunately forced to designate Libertarianism.⁷

Libertarianism predicates its approach to the political problem upon an objective fact, not upon a subjective feeling. In this respect it is more rationalistic than moralistic; it premises itself not upon what is supposed to be an "inalienable right" of man, but upon an indisputable fact about his human nature. Every man is not born free. But every man is born with an instinctual drive for self-realization and self-expression. The vast majority tend, however (because they are only feebly endowed with this

kind of instinctual energy), to be submissive to those who are richly endowed with it.

But even in the mildest of men the drive is there nevertheless, and when it is sufficiently outraged, it begins to build in the submissive masses an antipathy and resistance which, under the right circumstances and with the right leadership, breaks out with terrifying violence against those the masses believe to be responsible for their oppression.

It is upon this universal and indisputable fact about man that Libertarianism premises itself. Politically as in every other institution, society must therefore recognize this drive, and organize so as to give every man an opportunity to realize himself to the utmost of his potentiality. Ideally, it ought to do more; it ought to encourage and in every way stimulate self expression, not merely to enable the individual to make the most of his own life but also to create a world which would become (because everybody would be free to develop his talents to the utmost) an infinitely better world for everybody.

Anarchism versus Panarchism—In an ideal, perfect, utopian world, either everything would be done by the government or there would be no government at all. In such a world, we would either have Panarchism or Anarchism. In the real world, no matter what political ideology, no matter what political movement, and no matter what political party we embrace, we cannot avoid encouraging movement in one or the other direction: And in that world—in which we live—no matter what kind of government we have had, we have never, so far as I know, had anywhere in the world a nation which was not moving toward Panarchism; which did not in fact result in more and more government than at the time it began its rule over us. There seems to be, as Acton insisted, something in the very nature of the exercise of power which leads those who exercise it to solve all problems by providing for the exercise of more and more of it.

As I write, I know of no political party anywhere in the world that has the remotest chance of governing which believes in the classic American Minarchic conception of government. Everywhere, in free States (Britain, the United States), in Socialist States (Sweden, India), in Communist States (Russia, China), in Fascist States (Spain, Portugal), the world is busily engaged in doing what

Plato advocated in *The Republic* in the fourth century B.C., setting up Panarchies. Yet the irony of all this can be illustrated with the historic fact that in Plato's own time, the Panarchic State in Greece was Sparta, one of the least civilized of them all, while Attica, a Minarchic State, was one of the freest and most civilized. And the paradox in all this can be illustrated by the sublimest of all the asinities ever indulged in by any intelligent man, Marx's prediction that with Panarchy (Totalitarian Communism), the State would wither away!

The Humanist, the Intellectual, and Libertarian must, I believe, logically be a Minarchist. He cannot, without doing violence to his values and to what he knows of man and of society be a Panarchist (human nature being what it is and not what Plato hoped it might be), nor can he be an Anarchist except as to an ideal toward which to strive (conditions being what they are with bellicose States outside the boundaries of his own and with delinquents and criminals abounding inside them). To be anything other than a Minarchist, he would have to give up his Libertarianism and embrace either Hegemonism or Theocracy.

Minarchism as a solution of the political problem calls neither for the immediate abolition of government (Anarchism), nor for the extension and expansion of government (Mediocratism) for which Statists and so-called Liberals call; least of all Megocratism, for which Socialists and Social Democrats call, nor Panarchism, for which Communists call. Minarchism calls for less and less government. It calls for reduction of the functions of the government, and for the transfer of every function which can possibly be performed voluntarily by the people themselves in free individual cooperative enterprises from the public to the private sector.

Unfortunately, the Minarchist in the United States, and in most nations, is partyless. He cannot keep his face straight and join any existing Conservative party; so-called Conservatives today are probably the most politically confused of all political thinkers. If he is to be consistently Minarchic, he cannot be for conserving the political institutions we now have, nor even for conserving what is left of those which existed in America before the Roosevelt revolution; he must be for a return to what is left of the original classic conception of government in free America;

he must in fact be for a reaction, only he cannot possibly call himself a reactionary without immediately being thought of as a Fascist.

What he believes the present crisis calls for is the reduction of the number of functions, the operations, and the jurisdiction of the State. He is not after the sort of State in which Hamilton and the Federalists believed; he is after the sort of State in which Jefferson two hundred years ago and Gandhi in our time believed. And moving toward such a State—a world composed of and dominated by Minarchies—would make possible the freedom in which man could realize his highest potentialities, ensure all the prosperity and affluence to which each man is entitled, reduce and not increase the number and seriousness of acts of violence, both warlike and criminal, and so reduce the need for both counterviolence and for governments to provide it.

Atomism versus Familism—Among the doctrines which have been mistakenly considered Libertarian, *Atomism* (Individualism) is the most important, and among those which have been mistakenly ignored, the most important I think of as *Familism*. Individualism, the evidence indicates, is a Hegemonic and not Libertarian doctrine. To the extent to which it is recognized in law, it results in the atomization of society, and the more society is atomized, the greater becomes the tendency to make the State (as the objective expression of society) the institution to which the individual accords primary devotion, the greater becomes the temptation for him to look to it for the solution of his problems, and the greater is the certainty that he will become dependent upon it.

The facts, however, indicate that the individual is by nature a part not of the State but of the family. Familism is a recognition of this fact, and if the logic of the matter is accepted, it is the family, not the individual, which is the natural unit of both economic and political society. Familism as a doctrine, because of the mistaken belief that freedom requires Individualism, has been grossly neglected in the thinking of social and political scientists.

Villagism versus Nationalism—What is true of Familism as a doctrine is also true of what I think of as Villagism—both of them doctrines virtually ignored by social and political scientists today. And both of them, of course, are ignored by our politicians and political parties, neither being matters of "practical politics" ex-

cept insofar as they lend themselves to use for sentimental political buncombe, political speeches about "home and family", like flag-waving, being too often, to paraphrase Samuel Johnson, "the last refuge of a scoundrel."

The central political idea of Villagism is found in its assumption that not the Nation-State but the Village-State should be the basic political unit in the framing of a polity which does not disregard man's real nature. Until the small community, and not the big nation, becomes central to political science and political thinking, politics will continue to stink and the political problem continue an Augean stable.

What Jefferson, a little less than two hundred years ago, and what Gandhi a little over two decades ago, said about the political importance of the doctrine I am calling Villagism are worth quotation.

Thomas Jefferson:

"Divide the country into wards of such size that every citizen can attend when called on and act in person. Ascribe to them the government of their wards in all things relating to themselves exclusively. A justice, chosen of themselves, in each; a constable, a military company, a patrol, a school. the care of their own poor, their own portion of the public roads, the choice of one or more jurors to serve in some court, and their delivery, within their own wards, of their own votes for all elective officers of higher sphere; this will relieve the country administration of nearly all its business, will have it better done, and by making every citizen an acting member of the government, and in the offices nearest and most interesting to him, will attach him with the strongest feelings to the independence of his country, and its republican institutions. These wards call themselves townships in New England, are the vital principle of their governments, and have proved themselves the wisest inventions ever devised by the wit of men for the perfect exercise of self-government and for its preservation.... In government, as well as in every other business of life, it is by division of duties alone that all matters, great and small, can be managed to perfection. And the whole is cemented by giving every citizen, personally, a part in the administration of public affairs."

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi:

"My ideas about village government (gramraj) is that it should be a complete republic, independent of its neighbors for its own vital wants, and yet interdependent for many others to which dependence is a necessity....The village should have a reserve for its cattle (pastureland and forestland), a recreation and a playground for adults and children,.... maintain a village theatre, school and public hall. It should have its own

waterworks....There should be a compulsory service of village guardsThe government of the village should be conducted by a panchayat of five persons annually elected by the adult villagers, male and female, possessing minimum qualifications. These will have all the authority and jurisdiction required. Since there will be no system of punishments in the accepted sense, this panchayat will be the legislative, judiciary and executive combined to operate for its year of office....Here there would be perfect democracy based upon individual freedom. The individual is the architect of his own law. The law of non-violence rules him and his government. He and his village should be able to defy the whole world. For the law governing every villager is that he should suffer death in the defense of his and his village's honor."

That metropolis and megalopolis are facts today is true; that they should be deliberately decentralized before man is completely demoralized is also true; it is folly to encourage their growth as we are doing today; all that that will do is to make more certain the day when degeneration begins and the whole sick and corrupt civilization they have created begins to collapse. So far as society as a whole is concerned, the big city is just a cancerously enlarged social cell or village community; internally, instead of consolidating the communities of which they are composed more and more, each city should be broken down into more and more autonomous community units, and externally, in the relationship of cities to one another and the rest of civilization, they should (like the village community) set up federal and not national authorities to take care of functions which no one community can by itself properly fulfill.

Politicians and political scientists talk glibly about democracy—it is on everyone's tongue, even when that tongue is in cheek, as in the case of the Communists and their "People's Democracies." But only in a territory and population no larger than what Jefferson called a ward, Gandhi a village, and New Englanders a township, is democracy possible. And its practicality, once the principle of federation replaces that of sovereignty, is incontestable. Villagism is as practical and as necessary today as it was two thousand years ago. Urbanism and Industrialism may have changed man and society profoundly, but what is essential to the development of man's highest potentialities has not changed a particle.

Regionalism, Continentalism, and Cosmopolitanism—The ideas of those who would substitute Regionalism for Nationalism,

Continentalism for Imperialism, and Cosmopolitanism (One World) for World Nihilism, even though they do not think of them in the terminology I am using, and of those who recognize that Sovereignty is obsolete (in my opinion it was obsolete from its beginning) and should be abandoned, are predicated upon a number of all-important political concepts. Most of them have already been discussed. These concepts include harmony as against violence, liberty as against authority, Federalism as against Nationalism, and limitation and specification of functions at each level of government from the basic village unit to the regional federation, the continental federation, and finally the federation of the world.

Federalism—The concept of Federalism almost from the time it first began to be used, has suffered from deliberate political sophistication and unconscious semantic confusion. Our Republic was supposed to be a federation of thirteen autonomous States, but it was called a union, not a federation (the *United States of America*). What were called "state's rights" were based upon the theory that it was a federation; the opposition to this (beginning with Alexander Hamilton, who was an arch-Hegemonist, who called himself a Federalist but was really a Nationalist and so helped to make the term *federal* meaningless), was based upon the theory that the "federal" government was a union and was sovereign in its own right.

The idea of Federalism has never been adequately explored. Here in America, it has been used mainly to designate certain historic political entities (the Articles of Confederation, the Federalist Party, the Confederate States of America). If federation is to be distinguished from union or nation on one hand, and league or alliance on the other, what is distinctive in the idea must be isolated.

There are three kinds of political entities which must be distinguished: (1) permanent political entities organized to perform certain specific functions only (conduct foreign relations, maintain internal peace, conduct war, etc.) which their constituent members assign and surrender to them—these I consider *federations*; (2) more or less temporary arrangements entered into by sovereign States with no surrender of any of their individual rights and functions, the members of which agree to do certain specific things under certain specific circumstances—these I consider *leagues* or *alliances*; (3) permanent political entities which can perform any function,

and can even create subordinate political entities (variously called provinces, dominions, states) assigning to or leaving to them such functions as it wishes them to perform but reserving final authority in all matters to itself—these I consider *unions* or *nations*.

Hegemonists consider leagues or alliances too weak to deal with important matters—matters which must be dealt with “with a strong hand”; they consider federations not strong enough; only sovereign nations are in their opinion capable of dealing with these matters in a world in which ultimate reliance must be placed upon might. Hegemonists can logically believe in nations; they can logically believe in empires, but they cannot logically believe in a world-entity unless it has the absolute power and authority of an empire and becomes in fact a World-State.

Libertarians, on the other hand, can be Pluralistic; they can grant to a federation full and complete authority and power to deal with certain matters without necessarily denying to their constituent members equally full and complete authority and power in others. They can logically entertain the idea of a world in which full authority and power to perform basic functions vests in the smallest of all political entities (a village, town, or canton), and specific regional, continental and world-wide functions are vested with equally full authority and power in federations of various kinds, each exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

Harmony—Politically considered there are two kinds of harmony which must be provided for: internal, within States, and external, between States. The problem of maintaining at least a tolerable state of internal harmony—of what is called “law and order”—has been solved; at least there are solutions of a sort, not perfect, but viable solutions nevertheless. But external harmony—peace between nations—has never in recorded history existed as a world-wide fact. And even when in some areas there was no war, each of the nations involved were in such postures of belligerence and defense as to make the state of peace between them nothing which could possibly be called harmonious.

Today the situation is intolerable. The Great Powers are armed to the teeth with the deadliest weapons which mankind has ever invented. There are good reasons for believing that if they are ever used mankind might be entirely exterminated, and if not,

what is left of it reduced to such a miserable state as to signal the end of civilization and a return to antediluvian savagery. The posture, particularly of the free world and the Communist world bloc toward one another, is frightening. Here and there, wars are being waged, and everywhere revolutions are being planned or taking place which cannot be called internal, since those who foment and who lead them are inspired by outside Communist States.

The United Nations is demonstrating what was demonstrated *ad nauseum* by the League of Nations, that no league (even if called a union) can prevent war, can protect States against subversion, can assure disarmament and so create world conditions which can properly be called harmonious. The United Nations is a gigantic "talkathon" and a gigantic welfare bureaucracy (for the most part entirely superfluous), incapable of performing the real functions for which it was ostensibly organized. And none of the great powers have the slightest intention of permitting it to be anything else. A whole new set of ideas must become dominant in the minds of the determining numbers of people and in the public opinion of most of mankind. And of these ideas the most important is that briefly touched upon in the discussion of the idea of Federalism. The complete bankruptcy of Nationalism must be recognized. And only if such a state of opinion is created can what is needed, World Federation (instead of World Alliance or World Government) become possible. Only with re-education of this kind can the conditions which will make world harmony possible be created.

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To the question with which I began, "If not counterviolence, what?" all logical and consistent Hegemonists have to reply, "Nothing; there is nothing to do but use counterviolence more efficiently."

To this all logical and consistent Religious Pacifists who are deeply concerned with the political problem (followers of Gandhi and Tolstoy) are replying today, "Nonviolence."

To this I believe all logical and consistent Libertarians will some day be driven to reply, "Political Re-Education."

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem XV: The Political Problem

There is more material about the political problem in my files than about any other. It runs close to two thousand pages, including notes and charts. This condensation, of course, can only outline what should be included in a definitive study of the problem. The political problem unfortunately lends itself to over-simplification since it is the outgrowth ultimately of only two human activities, violence and counterviolence. But to make clear why this has led to such totally opposed political philosophies as that represented by the socialist clamor for more and more use of "violence" by the State, and the libertarian clamor for less and less use of it, is a very complex undertaking, very difficult and perhaps impossible to compress into a short paper.

1. *Politics and Statesmanship*—Politics in this study refers to the theory and practice of directing and managing populaces, political parties, public officials (governments), and States. Politics is the art of leading people to do what they believe is in their interest but what in fact is, firstly, in the politician's interest, secondly in his party's or his backer's interest, finally in the interest of the State and its ruling class.

Statesmanship, on the other hand, is the art of leading people, parties, public officials, and States to permit statesman to do what statesmanship prescribes that they should. As Henry Adams said, "They (the Adamses) were statesmen, not politicians; they guided public opinion, but were little guided by it."

By definition, the statesman must be a man of integrity, sagacity, and intellectuality; he must be adequately equipped with knowledge about the essential nature of the State and about the political history of mankind so that he can act with wisdom. The politician, if he is to succeed as a politician, cannot afford these luxuries; for integrity, he must substitute venality or at least indifference to integrity, for sagacity, expediency, for wisdom, cunning and knowledge of the weaknesses of mankind—the weaknesses typified by the cynical saying, "Every man has his price."

Politics ought to be a profession, not a trade, and certainly not a game. What makes medicine a profession is teaching people how to live so that it is unnecessary for them to resort to medicine; what makes the law a profession, is teaching people how to behave so that it makes it unnecessary for them to resort to law; what would make politics a profession would be making it unnecessary for people to resort to the use of the State's powers, and so ultimately make the very existence of States unnecessary. The politician, in the very nature of the game he plays or the trade he plies, is a demagog; the statesman, if he is really a statesman, is a professional man.

2. *Violence*—It must not be forgotten that violence is both overt and constructive. A blackmailer never uses overt violence; to physically injure his victim lessens the victim's ability to pay him blackmail; all he does is to threaten to expose what the victim wishes to conceal; if he does use violence he commits a different kind of crime—assault and battery, mayhem, perhaps murder. To blackmail is to use constructive, not overt, violence.

The State exercises constructive violence a million times as often as it exercises overt violence. Most tax-payers pay their taxes (as little as they can), quite submissively, even voluntarily, but back of the tax-collector is the statute authorizing the use of legalized violence—forcible confiscation of their property or extraction of a fine or forcible imprisonment—for failure to pay taxes in full. To withhold tax-monies legally due the State is to commit a sort of embezzlement, to exercise a sort of constructive violence. For the State to use its police power to enforce payment of taxes is for the State to use counterviolence. (See problem VI, the Ethical Problem, for the distinction between law and legality, between moral and statutory law).

3. *The State*—According to Oppenheimer, the State originated when the first conquering tribe set up a permanent organization to exact tribute from a conquered tribe. I believe Oppenheimer is right; the State did not originate in a voluntary pact; it originated in an act of compulsion when some conquering tribe for the first time in pre-history substituted the beehive-keeper principle for the beehive-destroyer principle of conquest and exploitation. Rousseau I believe to be completely wrong; his theory of origin in a social compact I believe a hopelessly romantic fiction.

4. *Military, Police, and Civil Powers*—Legally organized counterviolence is of three kinds, military, police, and civil. *Military power* (military violence) is exercised by a State through its military establishments and military personnel, ordinarily only in relations with other States but also when its own police power is insufficient to maintain public order or to prevent revolutionary attacks upon itself. *Police power* is exercised through police officials charged with the maintenance of public order within the State, with the prevention, detection, prosecution, and penalization of misdemeanors and crimes, and with the enforcement of the State's orders and statutes. *Civil power* is exercised by a State through its orders and statutes which citizens obey without forcing the State to have recourse to either its police or military power. A "law-abiding" citizen is one who observes all the State's orders and statutes. When exercising its civil powers the State practices constructive (implied) violence only; when the State practices overt violence, it exercises its police and military powers.

5. *Retaliation*—This was the primitive predecessor of the Roman *lex talionis*, the law of retaliation, the custom of inflicting upon the individual who injured another an injury similar to the one he had himself inflicted—"an eye for an eye."

6. *Counterviolence*—I have been criticized for the use of the word *violence* with which to designate what the State does in enforcing its statutes and in carrying on its various activities. Political scientists like to soften the harshness of what the State is and does by using the word *force* for this purpose. But a rose is a rose is a rose. The thing isn't changed by calling it *coercion* or *enforcement* or *the maintenance of law and order*; it remains either overt or constructive violence, justifiable when exercised as counterviolence, but highly difficult to rationalize, much less justify, when exercised to maintain schools, and utterly impossible to justify when exercised to maintain a Church. The really "hot" war about the word comes when it is used to designate the nationalization of economic enterprises: is the State justified or not in using violence to seize and operate farms and industries and other economic undertakings, and to prevent private persons from owning and operating them?

7. *Liberalism versus Libertarianism*—After World War I, the British Liberal party disintegrated. The term Liberalism, which had

been used to designate the party's ideology, the ethos of which was liberty, was then appropriated by the Fabian Socialists to designate their own ideology, the ethos of which was Socialism. In precisely the same manner, the Welfare Statists and Socialists here in the United States appropriated the term Liberalism, during the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, to make their ideology of which Statism was the ethos more palatable to the public. The term Libertarianism was then coined by American opponents of Statism and Socialism to distinguish the original ideology from Liberalism, as it has been used ever since that time.

Yet derivatively and denotatively, Liberalism and Libertarianism are identical. Connotatively, however, Liberalism today means not the limitation of government but on the contrary the extension of government and the expansion of the State's functions. Both terms derive from the Latin words *liberalis* and *liber*, meaning free. What Libertarians should do is to re-appropriate the term Liberalism and so end the masquerading of the wolf Statism in the livery of Liberty.

8. *Panarchism and Anarchism*—The nearest thing we have to Panarchist states today are Russia, China, and the other States in the so-called Communistic World. We have no Anarchistic "States" at all. If all States are classified in terms of the extent to which the State rules economically, in contrast to politically, we have a growing number of Megocracies (Poland and Rumania behind the Iron Curtain, Sweden, Mexico, and India, in the Free World); a considerable number of Mediocracies, (the United States and Britain); a constantly declining number of Minarchies which exercise the minimum of government (perhaps Switzerland).

Panarchists believe that the State should plan every institution in society and own and operate every enterprise. Anarchists believe that it should neither plan nor own and operate any; that they should all be planned, owned and operated by individuals and collectives voluntarily organized; in short that there should be no State at all. But as to this last point, Libertarians maintain anarchists go too far and ignore hard facts which should be taken into account.

Karl Marx, who was a humanitarian, believed that only Panarchism would make it possible to realize his kind of Utopianism. But this could also be said of Adolf Hitler, who was an in-

humanitarian. He too thought that only Panarchism would make it possible to realize his kind of Utopianism. Only the lunatic fringe among Anarchists believe in the use of violence to create their Utopia, but they are sufficient to discredit the very thought of Anarchism in the minds of most people. And yet it should be given first consideration in dealing with the political problem by really thoughtful and concerned persons.

9. *Ruling Class and Subject Class*—The idea that there is always a ruling class is central to Mosca's contribution to political science. Two things are implied in the theory: that the ruling class and the reigning or official class are not necessarily one and the same, and the other that there can be no ruling class without there being at the same time a subject class. Tested historically, the theory with these two main implications fits the facts. I suggest only two modifications of this thesis: one, to substitute for the concept of class, or rather to add to it, individual rulers and ruling oligarchies, both of which have often taken over, usually only temporarily, from the ruling class; and the other, that the ruling class, over a long period of time, changes, and some class which prior to the change was in the subject class, becomes the ruling class (as for instance, the replacing of feudal classes by the bourgeoisie as a result of the commercial and the industrial revolution).

10. *The State Apparatus*—As used in this study, the State apparatus refers to the police and the military establishments, the civil servants (rank and file of the civil service), the bureaucrats (permanent civil bureau administrators), and all public officials (including executive, legislative, and judicial officials with terms of office or serving at "pleasure").

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PROBLEM XVI.

Conservation and Reformation : The Institutional Problem

Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand; or your republic will be fearfully plundered and laid waste by Barbarians in the Twentieth Century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth—with this difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have engendered within your country by your own institutions.—Thomas B. Macaulay in a letter to H. D. Randall, May 23, 1857.

The facts which create what I think of as mankind's institutional problem include:

1. The fact that for mankind social institutions are biologically and psychologically necessary. Man's sheer survival is dependent upon them. But even more, without them the maintenance of sanity is impossible. Man cannot live alone. He began a gregarious animal and he remains one. His development of Individualism has proved not a substitute for his gregariousness, but an addition to it.

2. The fact that from the very beginning some of his social institutions have ministered to his well-being, mental and physical, while others have been positively injurious to him.

3. The fact that he is confronted with conflicting prescriptions about what should be done about existing institutions, not only about those he considers good, but also those he considers evil. Most of these prescriptions (if we include those felt but not expressed) call for the maintenance of existing institutions just as they are (conservation); some call for the return to institutions which have been changed or abandoned (reaction); some for the establishment of entirely new ones (revolution); some

merely for the correction of what are claimed to be defects in existing institutions (reformation).

The most radical conservative prescriptions call for the maintenance of all of them unchanged; the most radical reactionary prescriptions call for the abolition of all new institutions and the re-establishment of those which have been abandoned; the most radical revolutionary prescriptions for the destruction of all existing institutions and the substitution of entirely new ones. Reform, on the other hand, is essentially Pluralistic; it can logically be for the reformation of some institutions, the conservation of others, and the return to some which have been abandoned; it can even be for some sort of reform or improvement in all of them. But it assumes that unless some of them, and perhaps most of them, were in their essentials valid, man, in spite of his long history, would have made no progress at all and might not have even survived.

4. Finally there is the fact that the question of *whether* to change and *whether* to maintain an institution tends to be confused with the question of *how* they should be reformed or conserved. Whether an institution should be changed or maintained calls for consideration not in terms of what I think of as the institutional problem, but in terms of the particular basic problem with which each institution deals. It is the question not of *whether* but of *how* to change existing institutions, *how* to create and substitute entirely new institutions, *how* to maintain existing institutions in the face of proposals for their change or abolition, and *how* to restore institutions which have been abandoned, which created the basic problem which I am here trying to outline.

The institutional problem, it is true, is a problem purely of means and methods, of techniques and practices. But since the means which can be used, and which are used, range between the most peaceful and nonviolent, to the most horrible and violent conceivable, it is impossible to exaggerate its importance.

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Conditions today lend peculiar importance to the consideration of the problem.

Before the dawn of history, social institutions changed slowly and almost imperceptibly. They evolved, rather than mutated,

Then the practice of changing them violently—and suddenly—was instituted. Pagan institutions to begin with, and then what remained of Primitive institutions, were destroyed by fire-and-sword and Christian institutions substituted for them in what became Christendom. In what became the Saracenic world, primitive (idolatrous) Pagan, and finally Christian institutions were destroyed in the same way, and Islamic institutions substituted for them. The descendants of Christian martyrs who had been slaughtered by Pagan Romans in the attempt to conserve their own Pagan institutions embarked on crusades to maintain Christian institutions and annihilate those of Islam. Muslims responded with Jehads and holy wars of their own.

The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation began the long, tragic struggle between the protagonists of Protestant and the defenders of Catholic institutions. The birth-pangs of the modern world have been called the Age of Revolution. A decade of revolution in America was followed by decades of revolution in Europe. During half of this time the armies of revolutionary France plunged the whole of Europe into orgies of slaughter and destructions. Perhaps—in the long run—it was worth it all. Perhaps. But untold human anguish could have been avoided if some less bloodthirsty method of changing social institutions had been used.

From all this tragic history, the theorists of Marxism have learned nothing. On the contrary, they have written learned tomes rationalizing revolution, and today we are confronted by a world-wide revolution aimed not merely at abolishing Capitalist economic, but also bourgeois religious and political institutions, and substituting Socialist institutions for them. The question of whether, first, the protagonists of Fascism and, now, the protagonists of Communism are right in insisting that revolution is essential and justifiable as a means of doing away with what they maintain are unendurable social evils has to be dealt with.

The question of whether the tough-minded Jefferson was right (a revolution is needed every twenty years to remind our rulers that liberty is sacred), or the tender-minded Gandhi (means and ends must both be nonviolent), is a question which very definitely falls within the area with which the institutional problem deals.

The problem of distinguishing between the institutions which minister to man's well-being, and those which are injurious to him, does not; that problem is really determined as each of the basic problems with which man and society are confronted is resolved.

The institutional problem arises not in connection with the validity of institutions, but in connection with the means to which conservatives resort to maintain them, and reformers resort in order to change them.

The question of *whether* the institution of exorcism, as practiced at one time by the Roman Catholic Church, should have been replaced by the institution of modern medicine, is a psychophysiological and not an institutional problem. The problem of *how* to persuade people to abandon the institution of exorcism and *how* to create and persuade people to substitute the institution of *materia medica* for it was an institutional problem; that of *how* to maintain the institute of exorcism, also an institutional problem. It is easy to underestimate the importance of such problems, to consider them minor rather than major problems. The problem involved in abolishing exorcism and substituting medical treatment for it may not seem a very difficult one today, but it was not only difficult, it was dangerous when Church and State were both bitterly hostile to what the pioneers of modern medicine were trying to do.

I can make clearer what is involved by referring to something I wrote and which my friends in India persuaded me to call *A Pan-Humanist Manifesto*. It was published by the Libertarian Social Institute in Bombay in 1958. It was a "Call to the New Elite" and outlined a program for far-reaching changes in our educational, political and economic institutions. (To a degree it was a reply to the famous Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels).

One of the many changes and reforms I called for in that Manifesto dealt with the politico-economic institution of international trade. The institution of international trade as it exists today is protectionist; each nation protects its own interests, the interests of the industries it favors, and the interests of the laborers employed in the favored industries, by protecting them from the competition of foreign nations, foreign industries, and foreign laborers

by means of tariffs, quotas, import licenses, and regulations dealing with foreign exchange.

I favor international trade; I believe in both the importation and exportation of goods of all kinds; not on economic grounds, not in terms of the national interest (though I think an excellent case can be made for free trade on economic grounds if long term interests are taken into account), but in terms of sheer morality. On the same grounds I urged that the institution of international trade be changed by abolishing the entire system of protection (gradually, to begin with, but ultimately completely) and substituting for it the institution which used to be called free trade. Protection is inconsistent with freedom; free trade is not. All the people of the world are entitled to freedom; freedom should not be restricted by national boundaries; freedom inside of them and authoritarianism across them is in my opinion immoral and inhumane.

The real question which is involved in what I am here calling the institutional problem is not free trade or protection; this is a question which falls within the "jurisdiction" of what I call the distribution problem. The jurisdiction of the institutional problem embraces only the question of how the changes should be brought about.

The tough-minded and the revolution-minded will have no patience with the method for changing institutions which I recommended in the Manifesto. Protective tariffs in the United States exist for only one reason: because capital and labor joined hands over a century ago in clamoring for them. (McKinley, for instance, was elected on a high tariff platform on the slogan of "the full dinner-pail.") If the tough-minded and the revolution-minded could be worked up sufficiently about the matter, they would be tempted to use violent means—means ranging from mob action to downright rebellion—rather than the suasive means which I recommended for the substitution of the institution of free trade for that of protection. Strange as it may seem, this actually took place in the history of America; we do not, however, recognize it in the frame of reference in which I am making this study. A mob in Boston "violently" seized British ships containing tea and dumped their cargoes into the harbor rather than permit the pay-

ment of duties upon the tea; the event became known as the Boston Tea Party; because of other burning differences with the British crown, this violent quarrel about free trade proved an important contributing factor in launching the American Revolution.

I do not like revolutions, in spite of the fact that it is possible to make out a pretty good case for the moral validity of the doctrine of justifiable revolutionary war (just as it is possible also to make out a pretty good case for the doctrine of justifiable homicide, but then I don't like homicide either). So in *The Pan-Humanist Manifesto* I proposed that the change recommended in the institution of international trade, along with the other changes I proposed, should be made by persuasion and education, by teaching both the people and, if possible, their politicians, their presidents, their senators and congressmen, the truth about the moral and political-economic principles involved, and then persuading them to repeal the statutes which now legalize protection.

* * * *

Here, then, we have two completely contrasting methods of dealing with the institutional problem, one involving resort to violence, the other to persuasion.

Of the facts which must be taken into account in evaluating different solutions of this problem, five seem to me most important.

*Institutions versus Enterprises*¹—In discussing social, economic and political problems, institutions are usually confused with enterprises. Institutions are sets of inter-related activities practiced long enough by a sufficient number of individuals in any particular population to become socially accepted and socially advocated, not merely as the customary but also as the right way in which to deal with any problem. Enterprises on the other hand, as we have seen in the discussion of the organizational problem, are undertakings which come into existence, are equipped, and are conducted to produce or to supply the goods and services for which the institutionalized practices of people create the demand.

Survival, Genetic, Cultural and Necrotic Institutions—All the institutions of mankind, without regard to society or culture, fall into one of four categories: (a) survival institutions, which come into existence to enable man to maintain his own life and to cope

with all the various threats to its maintenance: (b) genetic institutions, which come into existence to enable man to maintain the existence of his own species and to cope with the problem created for him by his bisexual nature; (c) cultural institutions, which come into existence because he finds himself endowed with an inborn drive to express himself in arts and activities other than those involving survival and reproduction, and finally (d) necrotic institutions, which include not only those having to do with the fact that he has to die, but also those which come into existence when he finds himself so frustrated in dealing with his survival, genetic, and cultural needs that life does not become worth living, and escape from it, either permanently (suicide and homicide) or temporarily (alcoholism, addiction, aggression, neurosis, psychosis) becomes more attractive than struggling to maintain it.

Whether existing institutions of various kinds do or do not adequately and satisfactorily fulfill these needs is not the question which we are presently trying to formulate; our present concern is with one *cultural* institution, the institution to be organized and the practices followed in dealing with the problem of how to establish, how to change, how to maintain, and how to abolish institutions.

Social "Orders" or "Systems" versus Institutional "Structures"—In my vocabulary for the consideration of these problems, I do not like to use concepts as ambiguous as social "orders" and social "systems." Except among primitive tribes isolated for aeons of time, no society (no culture and no civilization) has ever had such a thing as a true social order. All of them, particularly the high cultures, are social conglomerates. That is they consist of a mixture of institutions often antagonistic to one another. Their "social" institutions, even when deliberate efforts have been made (as in the new Communist nation) to impose one particular social system upon their societies, promptly break down into a conglomerate of new and old institutions.

Every high society consists of a hodge-podge of institutions, and this I call its institutional structure. No society can avoid having an institutional structure of some kind, however illogical and incongruous it may be. Ideally, this structure ought to evolve in the direction of what an adequate social science would indicate

to be a rational and a humane institutional order, but since we have no such sciences, and since there is no assurance that either the School, the State, or the Church would implement what such a science would show to be rational and humane social order, the prospects of transforming our institutional structures from conglomerations into orders or systems are not too encouraging.

Social Orders versus Social Conglomerations—The institutions in some social systems constitute what might properly be called orders; in others, including that of our own, conglomerations.

A social order is a structure composed of institutions all of which reflect the system's ethos²—its charismatic central telic value—and all of which function harmoniously together.

A social conglomerate, on the other hand, is a structure composed of institutions some of which act harmoniously together and in accordance with the underlying social ethos, some of which act at cross-purposes with other institutions, and still others in complete conflict with the social ethos itself.

The only institutional structures in the history of mankind which deserve to be called social orders have probably been those of primitive tribes whose institutions, by a process of endless minute adjustments, had come to work harmoniously together and to be completely representative of the ethos of the tribe. The social structures in the modern world, with the possible exception of the social structures which the dictatorships of the proletariat are trying to impose upon their own subjects in Communist States, are all of them social conglomerations, and even the Communist institutional structure (planned around an ethos which the Communist Manifesto described as that of "production according to ability and distribution according to need") is in all Communist States already developing antithetical institutions of various kinds. Lenin, when he instituted the famous N.E.P., legalized the free market in a frantic effort to get production moving with some degree of efficiency; subsequently Stalin tried to stamp out every vestige of it, slaughtering some seven million kulaks in the effort to do so; but in spite of all efforts, the free market (the so-called black market) has always kept creeping back:

The institutional structure in the United States, which ought to consist of a set of institutions all acting harmoniously together

to implement freedom (which is at least traditionally the ethos of the American people) is full of institutions which limit freedom or deny it altogether. It has in trade-unionism a legalized institution which in many industries has succeeded in abolishing the right of individual workers in them to bargain freely with their employers (of course this is rationalized as in the interest of the workers themselves); it has, in its privileged and monopolistic corporations (trusts and cartels as they are called) another legalized institution which aims at preventing new enterprises which seek to compete for the market from being established, and at preventing the prices of what the members of the cartels are producing from falling to what they should be in a free market; it has an endless number of institutions, which both State and Nation have set up for the purpose of fixing the prices on cotton and corn, on milk and sugar, to mention only a few commodity markets which operate in complete opposition to the ethos of freedom.

Violent versus Non-Violent Reform and Conservatism—While new institutions have been established and existing institutions changed rationally and humanely to conform more perfectly to the ethos of a people, increasingly in the modern world institutional changes tend to be made either arbitrarily and inhumanely by revolutionary action, or equally arbitrarily, if somewhat more humanely, by statutory enactments. The two have a relationship almost of cause and effect. To the extent to which statutory and constitutional law prevents institutions which should be changed from being changed at all, the tendency to resort to violence and revolution increases.

Both statutory and revolutionary changes involve the use of violence. The question of whether it might be possible to resort to any other method is unexplored by those who pride themselves on being practical and who believe, whether they say so explicitly or shrink from doing so, that there is no way of dealing with the human animal which does not involve resorting to the use of force and violence, constructively if possible, overtly if necessary—the use of force as applied by the law, the police, and the courts if possible, but with resort to military violence if the use of civilian force proves insufficient.

Four doctrines, which are not so much doctrines as they are states of mind and emotional attitudes, are central to the understanding of the way in which mankind is moved to deal with the problem of institutional change. That they are used to designate political parties and political movements merely adds to the confusion in which mankind has always dealt with its political problems. These doctrines I shall call Conservatism, Reactionism, Revolutionism, and Reformism.

Conservatism, as a doctrine, maintains that the social structure as it is should not be changed either in whole or in part, that existing institutions, existing statutes, and existing forms of government (having established their validity by mere virtue of the fact that they exist and have been tested by the ordeal of the "survival of the fittest") should not be changed in any essential respect.

But considered as it should be, as the designation of a particular temperament expressing itself socially, economically and politically, it is something entirely different. The Conservative is frequently an intellectually and often an emotionally lazy person; he simply does not examine the implications of his doctrine. That many existing social institutions, and perhaps in many societies most of them, are good enough and have proved their value by the test of time is undoubtedly true, but that they are all so good that none of them need change and none radical change is an absurdity belied by every page of history. Every revolution, every war, every depression, every social crisis is a demonstration of the fact that some of mankind's institutions are bad. Even if the evil be attributed not to institutions but to men, then all that is being said is that the educational institutions of society are in need of drastic change of some kind. Properly educated men, as we shall define them when we consider the educational problem, do not plunge mankind into revolutions, they do not wage war, and they do not permit depressions and social catastrophes to occur. And this is true even more of the leaders of society than it is of the rank and file of its membership.

The simple truth is that we shall probably never arrive at that Utopian state institutionally when no social changes of any kind need ever be made. Some institutions should be conserved; it is absurd to make a political doctrine out of the feeling that all

of them are so perfect that none of them should ever be changed.

Reactionism, like Conservatism, is a state of mind rather than a doctrine. But considered as a doctrine, it maintains that the social system should be returned to a previously existing form by restoring all the institutions of which it is composed to the form in which they existed at some time in the past.

Like Conservatism and Revolutionism, it is an intellectually impossible one; it is unintelligent to be utterly opposed to all the institutions of any society, no matter how bad the society as a whole. The Nazi, the Fascist, the Marxist social structures, as they have existed and still exist in various nations, I consider among the worst with which mankind has been confronted—almost as bad, though probably this is an emotional rather than an intellectual judgment—as that which plunged Europe into the Dark Ages in the name of Christianity. Yet I can name many institutions, highly developed in some instances, in all these “bad” social systems, which are basically excellent and superior to those which we have been conditioned to like because we have been enculturated to believe that all the institutions of our own society are good.

Some relatively new institutions in virtually every society are undoubtedly inferior, either in detail or as a whole, to the institutions which they replaced. So far as these are concerned, the advocacy of a return to institutions the superiority of which had been in this way proved, is intellectually defensible. But that there ever was a society, the institutions of which were all so perfect that all that is needed is to return to them in toto, is nonsense.

Revolutionism too is a state of mind; as a doctrine it is indefensible. As an expedient, resorted to in desperation to correct an intolerable situation, it is understandable and perhaps in some instances justifiable, but as a doctrine and as a habitual practice, it evidences not merely a neurotic but a downright psychotic temperament. Both Progressives and Reactionaries tend to exhibit it, and those with temperaments of this kind frequently switch from one of these poles of thought to the other (Mussolini, Hitler).

The Revolutionist is, however, always emotionally and sometimes intellectually much more alive than is the Conservative and

the Reactionary. The difference is not, of course, merely an intellectual one; Conservatives and Reactionaries can be very intelligent men, just as Revolutionists can be very stupid. But that they are lazy is never true; their temperaments simply do not permit them to indulge in laziness. But as a doctrine, the same objection can be made to it that I make to all four of these as the basis for any intellectually valid approach to the institutional problem. There never has been, if I read history correctly, any social system, no matter how bad, that did not have some institutions which were good; the real problem is not whether they are all good or all bad, but how to discriminate between them. This the Revolutionist does not do; he is for Revolution, period.

Doctrinally, Revolutionism assumes that the social structure as it exists is so corrupt, so unjust, so inhuman, and so degenerate that the structure as a whole with all its institutions should be forcibly destroyed and replaced with an entirely new set of institutions which are forcibly imposed upon everybody.

The cure, with very, very few exceptions, is worse than the disease. And this is true even if the structure which ultimately emerges from the Revolution is an improvement over the structure which it destroyed. The American Revolution is undoubtedly one of the exceptions to this generalization, but that is unquestionably due to the very exceptional nature of its leadership. It sought to avoid, and was able to a very great extent to avoid, the excesses of inhumanity unleashed by most revolutions. The French Revolution, ostensibly aiming as did the American Revolution at the substitution of a free and representative State for a monarchical and despotic State, indulged in excesses of murder and slaughter which were utterly unnecessary. Had the Girondists been able to retain their leadership, this might have been avoided, but once the Nihilistic elements in both the leadership and the masses took over, both the immediate result (the Terror) and the subsequent result (the Bonapartist wars) involved such massive slaughter as to make the ancient regime seem in retrospect a benevolent tyranny. In a sense the Terror made Bonapartism inevitable. Some such reaction was accepted by the people, because no price seemed too high to pay for the imposition of any sort of order. But the revolutionary temper was still such that it was.

possible for Bonapartism to bring death and destruction into every part of Europe. That the sort of social structure and the sort of institutions which finally emerged from all this horror and bloodshed was a better one than the one it replaced proves nothing. In order to justify the French Revolution, it would have to be proved that there could have been no such improvement without it. The fact, however, that Britain, to mention only one example, was able to make similar and even greater institutional improvements without any such blood-letting makes it impossible to make out any kind of case for Revolution for the sake of Revolution.

Reformism I think of as designating the doctrine that what is defective in the existing social structure should be corrected by reorganizing its faulty institutions, discarding those which are incurably bad, and establishing new or re-establishing discarded institutions which will tend to perfect the social structure.

Reformism, thus defined, is not a mere state of mind or mere emotional attitude. It is factually and intellectually defensible. Some historical illustrations will make this clear.

The Protestant Reformation is well named; it dealt with the reformation of one institution, the church. (It is too bad that it was not restricted to Reformation.) Luther started out trying to reform the Catholic Church. What he started, ended in the establishment of a virtually new religion in which the Bible, not the Papacy, became the supreme source of authority and means for the revelation of God's will. But since the Christian religion is a whole social ideology rather than just a single doctrine dealing with salvation, the Reformation ended by changing drastically many of the other institutions in the nations which constituted Christendom as a whole.

The substitution of Parliamentarianism for Monarchical Absolutism in England furnishes an instance of Reformism devoted to changing another kind of institution, this time a political one. The power and hegemony of the State was unchanged by the reform; it was merely shifted from the Monarchy to Parliament. Similarly the more recent reform of Parliament, in which the House of Lords was virtually stripped of all power, did not in the slightest alter the central facts of the State's power; it merely

shifted it from both Houses to the Commons alone. It was a strictly political reform; it dealt with no other kind of institution.

Finally, the peaceful substitution of Capitalism—a free economy such as that prescribed by Adam Smith in England and the Physiocrats in France—for the Mercantilist and Feudal economy which then prevailed, provides an instance of Suasive reform of society's economic institutions. This contrasts vividly with the Impositional method of substituting Communism for Capitalism—a planned and regimented economy for a free economy—which is taking place wherever a "dictatorship of the proletariat" takes over a State.

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Social Innovators and Social Movements—Because institutions are produced by socially accepted practices and activities (even though the practices are not always motivated by a desire to change existing institutions), it is easy to assume that the genesis of all institutional reformatations and conservations is to be found in some slowly evolving social movement.

Nothing is less in accord with the facts. Even the most superficial study of history demonstrates that while many of the movements are produced by social evolution, many of them have their source not in any slow change in behavior but in the ideas or the activities of some innovator or prophet (Jewish Monotheism in Moses, Christianity in Jesus, Sarvodaya in Gandhi, Civil Disobedience in Henry D. Thoreau, the Industrial Revolution in James Watt).

Sometimes such social movements are deliberately generated by the innovators (Capitalism by Adam Smith, Scientific Socialism by Karl Marx, Land Reform by Henry George). Sometimes they are by-products of the innovation (European-Asian trade and communication by Marco Polo, the Age of Discovery by Christopher Columbus, Heliocentrism by Copernicus, Social Darwinism by Charles Darwin's "survival of the fittest," the Sex Revolution by Freud's studies of neurosis).

* * * *

The institutional problem, like all these basic problems, is not new, and mankind has dealt with it not in one way but in a multiplicity of ways. And as in the case of all the other basic

problems, the solutions fall into one or the other of three categories, (1) solutions which base themselves upon what is Supernaturally vindicated, upon what the Supernatural religions call for, which I think of as Conversional methods of dealing with the problem; (2) solutions which reflect a tough-minded Objectivism, which I think of as Impositional; and (3) solutions which are Intellectually justifiable and which I think of as Suasional.

* * * *

Conversional Solutions of the Institutional Problem—All doctrines and rationalizations, all theories and practices, all methods and techniques for effecting institutional changes which have in common the achievement of a sudden emotional change which leads to the acceptance and adherence of non-believers, or of the believers in other religions to what the apostles, missionaries, priests, ministers, and others engaged in proselytizing believe or maintain is "the true faith" fall into the category of Conversional solutions of the institutional problem.

If a sufficient number of converts to a new religion is obtained, a change in the religious institutions of society automatically takes place, but along with this will come changes in all the other institutions of a society—including that of the State itself—which are called for by the teachings of the new religion.

Doctrinally, the Christian assault upon Pagan institutions and the substitution for them of Christian institutions was to be based upon conversion. Doctrinally, the Mohammedan attempt to substitute Islamic for Gentile institutions was likewise to be by conversion. But in practice, as the history of both religions makes clear, the substitution was effected almost wholly by the use of fire-and-sword. The rationalization of this "violent" conversion is one of the saddest chapters in the intellectual and ideological history of mankind. Typical of what I have in mind are Catholic apologetics for the reconciliation of what Jesus taught ("Resist not him that is evil; but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek turn to him the other also") with the savage treatment of heretics and infidels by the Inquisition. Simply by turning over condemned heretics to the "the secular arm" of the State to be tortured or burned, the Holy Church absolved itself from doing violence to

the teachings of Jesus. How Mohammedan apologetics reconcile "Islam," which means submission, with the doctrine of *jehad* (Holy War) baffles me.

Conversional doctrines and practices fall into two sharply divided groups, one nonviolent and the other violent. The fact that those religions which have used violence (Supernatural religions like Christianity and Mohammedanism, and anti-religions like Communism and National Socialism) have managed to secure a very much greater number of believers and adherents than those which have relied exclusively upon peaceful methods of conversion (Buddhism and Humanism, Ethical Culture and Quakerism) proves conclusively that Terrorism and War are effective means for achieving changes in institutions of all kinds, including religion.

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Nonviolent Doctrines and Practices—Some of the most important of the methods used for effecting religious institutional changes peacefully and non-violently include:

Proselytization, which includes *Missionizing* both by preaching and with "good works"; *Revivalism*; *Ritualism*; *Denominational Schooling*; *Sacred Processions*; *Holy Days* and *Holy Festivals*; *Monasticism* and *Eremiticism*.

Two need some explanation for the terminology used in designating them:

Psychic Bribery, the offer of a future reward of eternal felicity to induce adherence, support, and obedience to the religion's priesthood or ministry, and

Psychic Terrorism, the use of threats of damnation and the inculcation of fear of future eternal torment as a means of enforcing adherence, support, and obedience.

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Overt and Constructively Violent Doctrines and Practices—Most of these methods call for some comment:

Excommunication, the religious equivalent of what non-religiously is boycotting;

Sectarianism, which justifies imbuing believers with strong and narrow sectarian prejudices, not only to make them self-sacri-

ficing, but to make them callous and sadistic about any suffering inflicted by their sect upon heretics and infidels;

Clericalism, which in effect maintains that the State should be Theocratic or Hagioocratic, or at least Clerically dominated. Without Clericalism there is no assurance that the State will resort to forcible measures in dealing with religious recalcitrants;

Religious Fanaticism, which rationalizes itself on the ground that, without arousing it in believers, they will not engage in the odious work of persecuting, torturing, and killing (and risk themselves being injured or killed in the process);

Religious Terrorism, in which non-believers are attacked by mobs (pogroms in Czarist Russia; Brown Shirt in Nazi Germany; Black Shirts in Fascist Italy), or in which public officials penalize, or threaten to penalize, non-believers;

Holy War—Finally, there is *Holy War*, of which the Christian crusades, the Muslim jihads and the wars between Catholic and Protestant States in Europe are among the worst. Holy Wars, however, are not obsolete as means for effecting institutional changes, and some relatively recent ones are for their horrors indistinguishable from the worst instances of such violence in the past. For instance, the fratricidal war (though it was not called that) between the Muslims and the Hindus of India over the partition which had its genesis in Muslim insistence upon the institution of the Caliphate and the establishment of a theocratic State.

That nonviolent methods can also be effective, however, is proved by the history of Buddhism, which substituted Buddhist institutions for pre-existing institutions in India, where it originated, to distant China and Japan, with almost no record of resort to either police or military force to effect the substitution.

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To me, what seems to make conversion a dubious solution of the problem (as seems to me also true of other Supernal approaches to other basic problems) is that conversion, no matter how effected, provides no valid basis for resolving the conflicts between different religions about their conflicting beliefs and conflicting claims to the exercise of authority.

Impositional Solutions of the Problem—All the various methods used and advocated for changing the social system in whole or in part, which rationalize and prescribe methods for affecting it either by cheating people, deceiving them, tricking them, or by forcing them (if the necessary power is possessed) to do what is desired, I think of as Impositional. Some of the most important, which unfortunately have to be too briefly described, include:

Sophism, which rationalizes the use of a wide variety of methods (all of which have in common the fact that they "make the worse appear the better reason") including *Propaganda*, *Venal and Deceitful Advertising*, and *Indoctrination* through the school system. These are just a few of the sophistic methods used today and which ultimately effect the social system and result in changes in commercial, labor, professional, social, religious, political, and international institutions.

These subtle impositional methods are so similar to suasion methods that it is easy to lose sight of the essential distinction between them. *Venal and Deceitful Advertising*, for instance, "persuades" the public by means of sophisticated arguments and suggestions (in advertisements in newspapers and magazines, posters and handbills, pamphlets and even books, and by the use of radio, television, and other media for mass-communication) to change its buying habits. If widespread enough, changes eventually become institutionalized and so change the social institutions involved and the social structure itself either in whole or in part. (For a detailed discussion of indoctrination and sophistication educationally, refer to Problem XVII, the educational problem). This is very different from real suasion, as we shall see when we consider suasion solutions of the problem. With *Propagandizing*, the same result is obtained clandestinely by providing "information" and "news stories" to newspapers and other media for mass-communication. When propaganda is used to promote the interests of a person, place, cause, enterprise or institution, Imposition becomes doubly Impositional because Sophisticated arguments are clandestinely made to appear the work of impartial writers in impartial newspapers and other mediums of mass-communication. Most of the commercially inspired methods of

this kind are unfortunately written and paid for by men who have sold their souls for money, while that which is ideologically inspired is the product of men who believe that the ends they seek justify the use of any—even the most corrupt—means of realizing them.

Solidaritism—The advocacy of solidarity, as if it were in some sense a virtue, is a favorite resort (under many different names) of those seeking to impose rather than to persuade. Regimentation, the most effective method for at least assuring outer unity and solidarity, requires the organization of a dominant group (partisan, sectarian, commercial) which becomes powerful enough to regiment not only adherents but non-adherents and dissenters as well.

Enthusiasm, Zealotism, and Fanaticism—If the believers in a cause to which there is intense opposition are to make the sacrifices needed and to practice the ruthlessness which may be necessary for the realization of their aims, they must be fired with enthusiasm and, if this is not enough, with actual fanaticism. *Zealotism* and *fanaticism* have both tended to be practiced in attacks upon entrenched religious, social, political, and economic institutions, and both fall into the category of impositional solutions of the institutional problem.

Boycotting—With sufficient solidarity and zeal, various methods of boycotting can be practiced. Boycotting (the concerted refusal to traffic with a reprobated institution or enterprise) can take many forms, of which refusal-to-patronize is only one. *Land Rent* and *House Rent Strikes* and *Strikes by Workers* are others. The most drastic form of boycott is the general strike.

Impositional Political Practices—If the cause is one which can only be realized by the enactment of legislation or by the enforcement of existing statutes, the first overt imposition to which both "practical" men and "idealistic" reformers turn is *Practical Politics*. If there are existing statutes to be invoked, this may aim at *Intimidational Law Enforcement* or intimidation by *Judicial Re-Interpretation*. If this is not possible, then the resort becomes *Legislation*, and this in terms of practical politics justifies *Lobbying*, *Intimidation*, (pressuring by blocs), and *Bribery*, which may range from merely giving favors to outright venality. Final-

ly, if what is sought involves international institutions and relations, two kinds of impositions may be mentioned, *Diplomatic Power Politics* and *Military and Naval Demonstrations*.

If on the other hand Fanaticism calls for the use of violence, various kinds of *Terrorism* are invoked: *Tyrannicide*, *Rioting*, *Mutinying*, *Rebellion*, and *Revolution*, and finally what I think of as *Institutional War*, war either by an established State or by a revolutionary government on other states which, whatever it is called, aims at imposing on another people the institutions the belligerent wish to establish.

To prove that *Revolution* is political and impositional in nature would be an act of supererogation. This too is true of *Terrorism*. There is, however, not one kind of terrorism but two—*Official Terrorism*, (to which States have resorted over and over again in defending existing institutions), and *Revolutionary Terrorism*, to which fanatics or deeply concerned people resort in desperation to abolish or change institutions which they abhor. Unfortunately, when revolutionary terrorism succeeds and a revolutionary government takes over the State, too often the very revolutionists who denounced the official terrorism of the previous regime resort to an official terrorism of their own in maintaining themselves in power and in forcing those who oppose them to accept the new institutions they are determined to establish.

The clearest exposition of the theory of revolutionary terrorism is probably that found in the program of that famous Russian revolutionary organization, the *Narodyana Volya* (People's Will) formed in 1879. The program described terrorism in these words:

Terroristic activity, consisting in destroying the most harmful person in the government, in defending the party against espionage, in punishing the perpetrators of the notable cases of violence and arbitrariness on the part of the government and the administration, aims to undermine the prestige of the government's power, to demonstrate steadily the possibility of struggle against the government, to arouse in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and their confidence in the success of the cause, and finally, to give shape and direction to the forces fit and trained to carry on the fight.³

The purposes of Terrorism, which clearly involves institutional changes of the most radical kind, was stated as follows;

By this overturn [of the Autocracy], in the first place the development of the people will proceed independently and in line with their dispositions, and, in the second place, many purely Socialist principles common to us and the people will gain recognition and be supported in our Russian life.³

Mussolini's and Hitler's terrorism could be rationalized in almost identical language.

Only one point needs to be made about solutions of the problem which I think of as *Statutory*, in contrast to *Revolutionary*, and that is that statutory enactments also involve the use of force to make institutional changes or to maintain them as they are. When the State deals with economic and educational institutions, when it deals with religious or cultural institutions, by statutory enactments or by constitutional provisions, by collecting taxes and by using tax-moneys to support them, it is using legal coercion (a gilded euphemism for legal force and legal violence) which is inescapable. The tough-minded man, the so-called practical man, believes in it, because it accords with his belief about the nature of human nature. The masses must be forced to do what he believes they should do (or he wishes them to do), and there are only two ways in which he believes this can be done: by using economic pressure or by using political power.

If the tough-minded are right, Thoreau and Lao-Tse, Tolstoy and Gandhi were wrong, and those who believe what Tolstoy said about the limitations of reform⁴ by statutory or revolutionary action are mistaken.

We ought to realize the truth of what Junius said long ago (when they had only a tithe of the laws on the statute books which we have today), "The world abounds with laws, and teems with crimes."

* * * *

Suasional Solutions of the Institutional Problem—"When you have convinced thinking men that it is right, and humane men that it is just, you will gain your case. Men lose half of what is gained by violence. What is gained by argument is gained forever," said Wendell Phillips. This is the essence of all those approaches to the institutional problem which I think of as *Suasional*. It underestimates, of course, the emotional problem; when

Wendell Phillips spoke, so long before the era which Freud inaugurated, even the most thoughtful men underestimated its importance. But in practice, men like Wendell Phillips never underestimated it; they moved men not merely by the logic of what they said, but by the eloquence of the oratory with which they said it. And that is true from the beginning of time; long before men began to analyze what they did, their leaders moved them not by logic but by knowing how to reach them emotionally, and the more they moved them through suasion, the less need was there to resort to force in effecting institutional changes.

I shall submit only one bit of rather curious evidence from my files on cases of Imposed Institutional changes, to establish the fact that in dealing with the problem of social reform, the social reformers, with their exclusive preoccupation with statutory changes, are mistaken, and that is the fact that business in America, and Big Business at that (which reflect par excellence the practicality of those who manage our industries) has transformed American ways of living—has transformed the social institutions for which the American way of life calls and at the same time the economic and political, the religious and cultural institutions necessary to them—through the use of *Suasion*.

How was the practice of buying bread instead of baking it at home institutionalized; in fact, how was the practice of buying nearly everything that used to be at one time made at home institutionalized? How was the practice of job-holding by married women institutionalized? How was the practice of smoking cigarettes by American women institutionalized? How was the practice of going into debt to buy not only houses and furniture, automobiles and household appliances, but even to indulge in expensive vacations and touring abroad, institutionalized? Not by legislation and certainly not by terrorism. These profound changes were all the work of those past masters of *Suasion*, the advertising men of America, whose symbolic center is Madison Avenue, New York. But though they involve persuasion rather than the use of force, it is a misnomer to call this kind of advertising *Suasional* in the meaning attached to the term in this study. Because of the sophisticated nature of the arguments and suggestions made, it is *Impositional* rather than *Suasional* in nature.

Suasional Pluralism—That *Suasional* methods of dealing with institutional injustices will not always work is patently obvious. A genuinely rational analysis of cases in which they do not or cannot work clearly shows that logic calls for no exclusive reliance upon them.

Suasion did not work against the Romans in Ancient Judea in the trial of Jesus; "turning the other cheek" neither saved him nor did it save the victims of the subsequent persecutions of Christians by them; it took the might of the Emperor Constantine to do that. *Suasion* worked successfully in the struggle to abolish slavery in the British Empire; it failed when tried in the United States by zealous workers trying to abolish the same institution. No one is justified in believing that *Suasion* would have worked against Mussolini, against Hitler, or against Stalin. When social reformers find that every imaginable peaceful and humane method fails to abolish intolerable institutionalized evils, social pluralism justifies resort to almost any other method, no matter how violent.

While it can justify resort to *Impositional* methods when all sorts of *Suasional* methods have been tried and have failed, there are also cases in which (no matter how unsuccessful *Suasional* methods may have been) resort to *Impositional* methods cannot be logically justified. Social pluralism cannot justify resort to any method which is a denial and contradiction of the ultimate purpose for which the method is being used; it cannot for instance justify "a war to end all war." It cannot justify resort to methods which institutionalize evils worse than the evil which the method is being used to eliminate; it cannot for instance justify resort to statutory laws declaring gambling illegal when that merely results in institutionalizing police-corruption.

Gradualism and Radicalism—These two entirely antithetical methods of dealing with institutional problems, different as they are, seem to me both justifiable rationally and humanely. *Gradualism* (Fabianism) maintains that important changes in the social system or in any of its institutions should be made by gradual stages, not immediately and without regard to existing personal interests and the number of persons which the change may injure. *Radicalism*, on the other hand, maintains that one should go to the root-causes of all great evils and, if reform is called for (no matter how drastic), make the change called for im-

mediately, since the continuance of the institution, or even the social system responsible for it, means the continuance of the injuries inflicted upon those suffering from it.

Gradualism is valid only if the aggregation of the injuries which would be caused by the immediate termination of any existing evil would be greater than those which would be inflicted during the time its was being gradually ameliorated. And Radicalism is only valid if the injuries which would be inflicted during the period of gradual elimination would be greater than those suffered by those injured by its immediate termination. Whether one should deal with an institutional problem gradually or radically should, therefore, not be determined Monistically but Pluralistically, in accordance with the conditions presented case by case.

Among the more important strictly *Suasional* means of dealing with the institutional problem I include the following:

Nonviolence (ahimsa)—This doctrine, which prohibits the use of violence in dealing with social problems, Gandhi made famous. It deserves a Hindu rather than a Latin designation (in Hindu *a* means non and *himsa* violence). Ahimsa is of the essence of *Suasion*;

Non-Conformism—This is the mildest form, (though sometimes the conformists make it painful enough to the non-conformists) in which both to demonstrate conviction and to try to break the mold of what is considered a mistaken institution;

Publicity—All the means enumerated in connection with propaganda can be legitimately used to publicize valid movements for social change, but since there is in fact a distinction between deliberately biased, sophisticated, deceitful "publicity" and sincere and honest "propaganda," I suggest the abandonment of the use of these two terms synonymously.

Demonstrations—The widest possible scope for the use of the imagination is possible in demonstrations, which may range all the way from the symbolic demonstration of the importance of home production which Gandhi's *charka* (spinning-wheel) provided, to gigantic meetings and processions.

Agitation—If people are indifferent and callous, then "agitation," which is an attempt to arouse them emotionally, is plainly called for.

Metanoia—What actually takes place when a person who has been indifferent to an important problem suddenly recognizes it and decides to do something about it is the secular equivalent of Conversion—in technical terms *Metanoia*. This kind of sudden change in feeling and judgment is a psychological fact, not just a religious experience; men experience it who haven't a trace of "old fashioned religion" in them, and experience it with regard to all of the kinds of problems discussed in this study, not only those of a religious nature. Suasionists should deliberately study the methods which can be used to bring it about, and use them in dealing with those who are apparently hopelessly biased and prejudiced.

Schooling and Incultation—The young, and particularly those in colleges and universities who are potential leaders, need to be exposed systematically in the course of their education to what is valid and what is the truth about any demand for institutional reform.

Civil Disobedience—This is the most drastic strictly *Suasional* doctrine about how to deal with institutional problems. When the practice of civil disobedience to existing statutes and commands (by non-payment of taxes, by conscientious objection to military service, by entering places segregated by statute) on a sufficiently large scale and for a sufficiently long time fails, nothing is left but the resort to Impositional methods of dealing with important injustices and breaches of human rights. No amount of civil disobedience by Southern slaves (running away from their owners was a kind of civil disobedience) seemed sufficient to change the institution of slavery after the Dred Scott decision. Nevertheless, they continued to run away with the help of those who operated the underground railway, who were also practicing a kind of civil disobedience. It took the shot which was fired at Fort Sumter to convince the North that *suasion* had failed.

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That *Suasional* methods nevertheless can be used to effectuate the most difficult of institutional changes—to realize changes that at first blush seem impossible without resort to the most bloody of Impositional methods—was proved by Mahatma Gandhi during the long struggle for Indian independence. On one side,

there was the British Empire, at the time when its might exceeded that of any other empire known to history. On the other, the followers of a tiny, ugly, weakened figure of a man (unlike Napoleon he did not ride a horse to lift himself above his fellowmen) who apparently had none of the charismatic appeal associated with the great leaders of mankind. But he had both moral and promotional genius (*Suasional*, in my vocabulary), and it was dramatically symbolized in what he did and what he persuaded his lieutenants to do, to use *suasion* to fire millions of Indians with the ideal of nonviolent civil disobedience as a means of "persuading" Great Britain to grant India its independence. Gandhi and his followers used a wide variety of *Suasional* methods including publicity, mass-meetings, demonstrations, processions, festivals and holy days.

It is true that in spite of this extraordinary demonstration of what *Suasional* methods can be used to do in dealing with institutional problems, there may always be vested interests—criminally stupid and obstinate persons and political parties (particularly when entrenched in power)—which can only be dealt with by resort to force. But what the history of Gandhism has already shown—dramatically here in the United States by Martin Luther King in the fight for the civil rights of Negroes—is that each success makes it easier to use *Suasional* methods and therefore less necessary and less justifiable to resort to *Impositional* methods to realize institutional changes.

It is high time that the revolutionists on the left, thirsting for bourgeois blood, and the extremists on the right, anxious to liquidate Communism with Western armies, rejoin the human race. It is high time that not only social reformers but social scientists reconsider their tendency to concentrate on government action in dealing with social, economic, and political evils and instead begin to ask whether *Suasional* methods of dealing with institutional problems are not only more rational and humane, but also in the final analysis more enduring and effective.

If I had my way, I would clap every man in jail who discussed a social problem by prefacing what he had to say with the words, "There ought to a law—." That's how consistent I am.

Appendix and Bibliography on Problem XVI: The Institutional Problem

1. *Institutions*—Malinowski attributed the genesis of all of mankind's institutions to eleven "biological drives." I attribute them to man's four "instinctual drives." These four drives express themselves in a vast variety of traits which are institutionalized in four groups of basic institutions; survival, genetic, cultural, and necrotic. Nine of Malinowski's biological drives (breathing, hunger, thirst, fatigue, somnolence, bladder pressure, colon pressure, fright, pain) are really survival drives and covered by my concept of survival institutions. One of his drives (sex) is covered by my concept of genetic institutions. The remaining one (restlessness)—which I equate with my concept of psychological irritability—displays itself in my scheme in man's cultural institutions when the restlessness is normal, and in what I call necrotic institutions when abnormal.

I think mine are more in accord with what is human rather than animal-like in man. Included in my four basic institutions are nineteen genuses and 102 species of institutions. I am none too certain about these subordinate categories since they were based upon only 8,000 cases of human action, but I am rather confident about the validity of the four final categories. The matter is so important that exhaustive research would be justified in determining the number and nature of the basic institutions (even though they are interrelated) which have to be taken into account in discussing social problems.

2. The *ethos* of a group (of a church, a party, a labor union, a social club); of a population (of a community, a region, a whole nation, perhaps even a whole civilization such as Christendom or Islam); and even of a single individual, is the charismatic ideal—the moving value and ultimate purpose—characteristic of the spirit, sentiment, and disposition of any individual or group. All other values and purposes tend to implement the ethos, to become means of which the ethos is the end. In a static primitive society, it is not too difficult to recognize its

ethos; in a fluid society such as our own, the ethos shifts from time to time, is not uniform in all groups and classes, and is correspondingly difficult to recognize.

3. From Par. 2, Sec. D, of *Programma, Ispolnitelango Komitata*, 1879.

4. From Tolstoy's *Appeal to Social Reformers*—This will be found in *The Works of Tolstoy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934.

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PROBLEM XVII.

Instruction and Cultivation : The Educational Problem

I am done with great things and big things, great institutions and big success, and I am for those tiny invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, creeping through the crannies of the world like so many rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, yet which, if you give them time, will rend the hardest monuments of man's pride.—William James.

The first and last of the basic problems of man and of society is undoubtedly the educational problem. As Henry Adams said, "Education is from the cradle to the grave." I have often said that there is no one of these basic problems of which it could be said, "This is the first problem; this problem is the most important." But when pushed to the wall by someone who insists upon getting an answer to the question, I have said, "Begin with the educational problem; it is difficult to understand any basic problem in its fullness without knowing something about all of them; all the problems are equally important, but begin with the educational problem because it is the 'most equal'."¹

* * * *

Four facts—four indubitable and indisputable propositions, in my opinion—create the problem, and explain why man must do and always has done something about it:

1. The first is that he is not only born, like all animals, with what the biologists call biological irritability, but that immediately after birth he begins to acquire what I call psychological irritability. When confronted with his sensations², his nerves, sense organs, brains and muscles react to them; this is what the biologists call biological irritability. But when he perceives, incepts, or conceives² anything, it is his mind rather than his brain which reacts to it; his muscles are frequently not involved at all.

2. The second fact is that man, unlike all other animals, is not born with a set of instinctual drives strong enough to tell him how to deal with either his sensations or his perceptions, inceptions, and conceptions. He is born with instincts, it is true, but these are in his case so plastic that he cannot rely upon them to tell him what to believe, what to value, and how to put into practice what he values and what he believes; he cannot rely upon them to furnish him with directives with which to control rationally and humanely the impulses which spring up in him constantly from his unconscious mind; *he has to learn*, willy-nilly; he cannot escape from the necessity of acquiring some sort of "education" (without regard to how much mis-education it includes); otherwise he cannot avoid reverting to animal behavior, dealing with his problems irrationally and inhumanely as animals do, and acting on his animal impulses alone.

3. The third is that he has to acquire (he has to learn; he is not born with) the traits—the beliefs, the values and the practices—of the culture into which he is born. Unfortunately some of the beliefs of every culture are mistaken, some of the values invalid, some of the practices harmful; too often they dehumanize rather than humanize him; too often they prevent rather than help him to realize the highest potentialities of *Homo sapiens*. Enculturation up to a point is necessary if he is to be adjusted to life in his own culture—instruction³ of the kind he receives today not only in school but from his experiences in his home and outside of it in his community. But while this is necessary up to a point, a system of education which does no more than this is a system not of right-education but of mere indoctrination.

4. Finally there is the fact that only by a process of cultivation⁴ can he learn how to deal with the problem of enculturation and adjustment as he should; only cultivation can teach him to see his own culture not only from within but also from without, impartially and objectively, as if it were a valley which he was examining from a mountain top.

* * * *

The most important ancillary problems which must be taken into account in dealing with the problem as a whole fall into six

groups: (1) conception and definition (the semantic difficulties in education are bad enough, but the proper conception of education as an activity is a complex problem of its own); (2) the various kinds of education needed to equip men and women to live in a highly developed society; (3) the organization of the curriculum; (4) the methods of teaching; (5) the education system as a whole; and finally (6) the problem of the conflicting solutions of the problem among which a choice must be made. It becomes perfectly plain, when the problem as a whole is considered, that the naive notion that the problem can be disposed of by sending our own children to the right kind of schools is just that, naive in the extreme.

* * * *

1. *Conception and Definition*—Since the purpose of this book is to outline rather than to discuss fully all the basic problems with which mankind is confronted, only the most essential aspects of the educational problem can be discussed, and even more unfortunately, for the most part only defined.

The Educatee—Since the educational problem has to deal not only with students but with everybody, the word student becomes almost a misnomer; it is the educatee³ whose nature must be understood, and since the educatee is every man, the problem of the educatee's nature is really the problem of human nature. Without knowing the nature of the educatee, how can the educator possibly prescribe what is really right-education for him? If this aspect of the problem is ignored, what the educatee will get is what I believe he is getting everywhere where the lessons to be learned from Grundtvig, Montessori, Freud, Pavlov, and Patanjali⁴ are not properly taken into account.

If the educator adequately understands infant and child nature, adolescent and adult nature, and the difference between male and female nature at each age in the life-cycle, what is right and what is wrong in existing education (in the school and outside of it) becomes clear, and means to substitute right-education for it become apparent. The problem of the educatee has been outlined in Problem I in discussing the nature of man; it does not need to be repeated here. But one thing which emerged from that study must again be mentioned: the importance of values,

If axiological education is left out of the curriculum (as it is today), what is given as education will in fact be miseducation.

*The Educator*⁵—In most discussions of education, it is taken for granted that the educator is a professional teacher. This is true enough if education is equated with schooling, but what the study of education as a basic problem makes clear is that there is no warrant for doing this. There are as a matter of fact two kinds of educators; the professional teacher; and a host of non-professional teachers, in the lower echelons of which unfortunately we find the modern parent (who has virtually resigned this role as far as is possible to the professionals in the schools), and in the higher echelons of which are the politicians and publicists, the salesmen and advertising men. These are the real educators of modern man, and until the educators in the school face the problem of what to do about preparing the parents for the role which they should play in education and what to do to prevent politicians and publicists, salesmen and advertising men from playing the role in mis-education which they are now playing, no matter what is done in the schools, the mis-education of the educatee will continue.

2. *Education*⁶—This is not only schooling; schooling is only one part of education. It is the whole process by which the educatee acquires his beliefs, his values, and his practices.

Mis-Education—This is what the educatee gets when he receives instruction but not cultivation; when he is adjusted to his own society only; when he is intellectually or technically educated, but not rightly educated emotionally; when he is made into a specialized and not a whole man.

Right-Education—This is education planned "from the cradle to the grave," and planned not merely to make the educatee a competent but a humanized man.

Humanization—In *Education and Living* I discussed at length the concept I there called normalization. Man, I maintained, cannot be expected to behave normally, he must be normalized educationally. Since he cannot rely (as can other animals) upon his instincts to behave as members of the species normally should, he often tends to behave worse than he should, or, as in the case of geniuses like Marx and Wagner, his behavior in one area of

living is far above average and in others far below it. *Supernormal* behavior in one area usually means subnormal behavior in others: *subnormal* behavior in one area does not mean supernormal behavior in others—it may mean subnormal behavior in all areas; *normal* behavior in one area does not necessarily mean normal behavior in all of them.

The masses, on the other hand, behave not normally, as humane and rational human beings should, but as members of a herd, conforming to herd values and responding as most herds of human beings do to whatever leadership happens to grip them emotionally from time to time. They can be fired to actions of great nobility and supreme self-sacrifice, as when masses of Americans responded to the leadership of Lincoln, and masses of Indians to the leadership of Gandhi. But too often in the tragic history of mankind, they have been fired to behave worse than the most feral of animals, to behave as masses of religious fanatics behaved under the infectious leadership of Omar and the Mahdi, of St. Louis and Richard the Lion Hearted, and as masses of fanatic Communists and Fascists behaved under the leadership of Stalin and Mao, of Hitler and Mussolini.

Normalization and humanization cannot be taken for granted. If it is to become, as I believe it should, central in curricular planning both in intramural and in family and social education; if right-education is in fact impossible without it, then it must be precisely defined. It must not be confused with average, as it usually is. Because animal behavior, other than man's, is instinctually determined, the average animal—no matter what the species to which it belongs—behaves normally. Average, on the other hand, in the case of man merely means in accord with the customs or fashions of the group or culture to which the individual happens to belong. Normal behavior is something entirely different.

The concept calls for definition scientifically. The behavior of man is subject to scientific study just as is the behavior of tigers. If tigers are deprived of their normal diet and instead compelled to eat the herbivorous diet of cattle, they sicken—they react and behave—abnormally. If man is mis-educated, as he is today, his tendency to behave abnormally should be no matter for surprise. If he is conditioned, as education today conditions

most men, to live in megalopolitan rabbit warrens and to endure the stresses and strains of industrialized work, industrialized food, and industrialized play, he too sickens mentally even more than physically, and reacts and "behaves" abnormally. Alienation is one name for the abnormality this inflicts upon him.

Normal behavior for man, as for every animal, requires the use of all his faculties of mind and body (not just some of them as in most specialized vocations) in activities and in occupations which use them harmoniously to their fullest potentialities. In the case of man, unlike that of other animals, this calls for no uniformity of behavior but for a range of behavior within the area of the normal. Within this normal range the diversity is so great that normality should not be equated with mediocrity.

And since all of man's distinctively human behavioral traits are acquired and not inherited, the task of equipping him with and instilling in him normal behavior falls into the jurisdiction of education.

*Re-Education*⁷—Since every educatee has already received an education of some kind, right-education presents special problems; it calls not only for right-education but for re-education, something which it is enormously difficult to do with the emotions, as every psychoanalyst knows. If the distinction between mis-education and right-education is not only realized but felt, the fact remains that, since everybody gets some sort of mis-education from birth to death, the only hope is education of the right kind "from the cradle to the grave."

3. *The Curriculum*—The problem of the curriculum is not the problem with which the school system is struggling from school to college; it is not that of providing as effectively as possible the sort of instruction which will enable the educatee to earn a living in the culture into which he is born; *it is that of organizing a curriculum which will produce properly cultivated whole men and whole women.* As it is, we are producing plenty of intelligent men, plenty of specialized competent men, plenty of successful men; but because of our failure to include in the curriculum the education in values which I have tried to show is so important, we are also producing plenty of cynical men, plenty of venal men, plenty of ruthless men, plenty of neurotic men, and plenty of

prejudiced and fanatical men. We need not more but fewer cynics. A well-educated cynic is the worst of all cynics; the better his education, the more harm he can do. Madison Avenue is populated with cynics of that kind; so are the editorial offices (and for that matter the rest of the staffs) of our modern newspapers; so are our impressive TV establishments in their palatial offices and studios; and now that our schools of political science are turning into vocational schools for politicians and bureaucrats, so are the public officials who are running both our States and our Republic.

What we are doing is producing altogether too few genuinely moral and genuinely wise human beings.

Some of my experiences in India make me feel that more wisdom⁷ is to be found among the illiterate peasants in the villages of the underdeveloped nations of the world than is to be found among the graduates of the schools and universities of which we in the West are so proud.

My own particular obsession so far as curriculum is concerned is my conviction that it should be problem-centered and not subject-centered; all the subjects included should be organized in terms of the light they throw on the basic problems with which mankind has to deal in the form in which the problems present themselves today. Subject-centered education produces specialists; problem-centered education should produce whole men and women. If whole men and not mere specialists are to be produced, men and women must be equipped with at least some inkling of the various valid and invalid ways in which it is possible to deal with both the personal and the public problems with which life confronts them.

If the curriculum is to make possible the education of the whole man, it must deal not only with the problem of educating his conscious mind (providing instruction in the three "r's" and related subjects, and training him vocationally and professionally), but also with the problem of educating his unconscious mind; it must deal with both his intelligence and his emotions.

Instruction—Instruction is mainly intellectual, mainly directed at the conscious mind; this is true not only of the three "r's"

but also of technical and vocational education. It is "how to do it" education with the question of "what to do" predetermined by the culture. Most of what is called general education is still instruction.

Cultivation—Cultivation, while it includes instruction and information, puts its main emphasis on inculcating⁸ good taste; it should not however be limited to good taste in literature and the arts, not even in all the liberal arts; it should inculcate good taste of all kinds, in ethics, in esthetics, in economic and utilitarian wants, and finally in purposes—in the goals and purposes with which man should concern himself. Given the right purposes to which life should be devoted, and thoroughly imbued with them, the probability that right activities will be practiced is enormously increased. *Morals* are certainly just as important as *esthetics* ("Manners Makyth Man"); *purposes and objectives* are important too, but so are man's *economic desires* if education is to produce in the Aristotelian sense the man whose ideal is "excellence," and in the Confucian sense the man who is a "superior person."

Instruction versus Cultivation—These unavoidably brief definitions of instruction and cultivation do not sufficiently emphasize the importance of the distinction between them. The best vindication of that distinction, particularly as it applies to education in America, is that made by Albert Jay Nock in his *Theory of Education in the United States*. Nock based what he said upon the distinction the French make between instruction and education. I have substituted the word *cultivation* for Nock's word *education*, because I use the word education to refer to every kind of education, good and bad, while Nock followed French usage and used it to refer to a very special kind of education, roughly equivalent to what in Americanese we call education in the liberal arts and humanities.

Emotional Cultivation—This is cultivation which has to be directed at the unconscious mind even when first presented to the conscious mind, as for the most part it must be. If properly provided for in the curriculum, the individual finds himself equipped not only with a moral conscience but also with esthetic, economic, and telic consciences.

Volitional Cultivation—Though talk about the will has been outmoded, that man uses some faculty "to will" is indisputable, and the cultivation of "will power," as it used to be called, is, if anything, more badly needed today than in the past.

Axiological Cultivation—This is education both in the validation and the inculcation of the various kinds of values discussed in the second part of this study. Intellectual study—a purely scientific study of ethics and ethical values, for instance—is not enough; unless the educatee is imbued with right-values, it is a kind of futile activity to spend time discussing academically what are and what are not valid values. The failure to inculcate right-values—to impress them deep into the unconscious—leaves the way open for the kind of scientific study of the subject which ends with Relativism with regard to all values; it makes not only for disillusionment, which is bad enough, but for what is far worse, cynicism.

In connection with axiology, it is important to recognize explicitly what inculcation implies. Incultation calls not for imbuing *some* individuals with right-values but for imbuing *everybody*, including the masses, with them; it calls for their dissemination. Education generally ought to abhor the inculcation of uniformity; it ought to nourish diversity, but with regard to basic values, uniformity should be the aim. This is obviously true about values in their basic signification—everybody ought to be conditioned to respond to the good, the beautiful, and the true with attraction-reactions, and to evil, to ugliness, and to error with aversion-reactions. This is particularly true about many disvalues; everybody without exception ought to be conditioned to disvalue murder and robbery, bigotry and discourtesy. Disvalues of this kind should not only be inculcated but disseminated.

Perceptual Cultivation—This is really an essential prerequisite for any kind of right-emotional education, but is confined specifically to the sensitizing of the sensibilities. The individual does not need to be taught to perceive, but there is no limit to the extent to which his perceptions can be sensitized.

Introspectional Cultivation—Introspection should be taught; it should not consist only of what has been called "the stream of consciousness"; it should be practiced for a definite purpose,

the cultivation of the Self. Most people have no true Self; their personalities as a result are in an infantile state (in William James' famous words) of "buzzing confusion"; because of this, most people are immature, if they do not actually suffer from adult infantilism. Introspection can be disciplined just as meditation is disciplined in Yogic education.

4. *Teaching*—Teaching methods have been studied in our modern schools of education with such concentration that critics of modern education insist that substance is considered less important than method. But these teaching methods again have to do with instruction and not with cultivation. As I have tried to show, if emotional education is to be properly taught, not logical but alogical teaching⁹ is needed. But alogical education, important as it is, I have already explored in my *Education of the Whole Man*; it is beyond the scope of a mere outline of the problem.

The most important task of the teacher is not so much instructing as challenging the educatee; if he can be made to feel that becoming a properly educated person is just as important as making himself a success financially, he will educate himself, teacher or no teacher, school or no school. What a properly organized school with a properly staffed set of teachers will do for the properly inspired educatee is to make it much easier for him to educate himself.

5. *The System*—The educational system in every culture except the most primitive has been both intra-mural (in schools and by professional teachers of some kind) and extra-mural (outside in the family and in the environment). The first schools were religious, but almost from the beginning there were both temples and academic schools—the first to provide a cementing philosophy for society, the second to provide the "educated" with basic literate skills. Both intra-mural and extra-mural education, and both adult and juvenile education are still a fact in all modern cultures, and no problem is more important for the school than the question of determining the role which it should play in the system as a whole. One of the reasons for the perennial dissatisfaction with education today may have its source—I believe it has—in the fact that the school has undertaken to provide what

the organized family and what organized social and cultural education outside the school should provide.

Equally important is the fact that as the school system has been increasingly secularized, it has left the role of providing the philosophy by which people live solely to the churches (which are doing a very bad job of this indeed), and has not faced the problem of how the vast number—probably the majority—of people who are either churchless or do not take their churches seriously should be provided with such a philosophy.

The nature of the problem can only be suggested in this outline, but its importance is not lessened by this fact.

Actually what we have in "free" America (and in the whole of the so-called Free World for that matter) is not an educational system but an educational conglomerate. What is most terrible, the professional educators in "free" America are unaware of what is involved; they are so busy trying in the school to cope with the problem which this lack of a comprehensive system creates in their schools that they have no time (as they see it) to look at the problem as a whole. Yet there are such systems, and one at least has a history going back for almost two thousand years. Unfortunately it is not a free but a Totalitarian system.

That the Catholic Church developed it is no accident; Catholicism, so far as education is concerned, has the same problem which every Totalitarianism has: it cannot permit indulgence in heresies, any more than Communism can permit indulgence in deviations. And curiously, it is this problem, which all Totalitarianisms face, which makes their leaders recognize the need of a total system of education.

Survival, for all Totalitarianisms, depends upon somehow or other suppressing man's instinctual drive for self-expression—upon suppressing his inborn need for freedom. No man can realize his full potentialities without it. And this the Totalitarians can only cope with if they condition—"brainwash"—him into forgetting it. Henry George expressed all this in his ecstatic eulogy of liberty which he called "The Central Truth" in *Progress and Poverty*. All the States in the history of mankind, he pointed out, progressed in accordance with the degree to which freedom

was realized in them. But freedom, he also pointed out, can only survive if it is served wholly; when half served, it introduces such massive inner contradictions into the psyche of the individual and the institutions of society as to invite the demoralization of both. And it is our failure to serve freedom wholly that is now leading the Free World to embrace Totalitarianism (when it has not been forced to accept it by "barbarians" from outside).

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6. *Solutions*—It is at this point that we are ready to evaluate the three categories of educational doctrines and ideologies into which all solutions of the educational problem (and not schooling only) fall, categories which I think of as Evangelic, Sophistic, and Philosophic.

Indoctrination—The most important fact which in my opinion must be recognized in the evaluation of different solutions of the educational problem is this: no matter how much a teacher or a school or a whole educational system might seek to avoid the indoctrination of its educatees, indoctrination is inescapable.

No matter what the educator says, no matter what the educator writes, he cannot keep what he believes out of the way in which he communicates and the way in which he conducts himself. To the extent to which he succeeds in eliminating what he believes and what he feels from what he teaches (in pursuit of an impossible ideal of impartiality), he chills the curiosity of those whom he teaches and tends to emasculate them spiritually. If human beings could be reared from birth on a diet of pure and undiluted facts, they would be monsters. Instead of trying to avoid indoctrinating the educatee, the real problem of the educator is three-fold: selecting the doctrines in which he himself should believe, keeping the educatee on notice about them, and trying to give him the essential facts about alternate doctrines in which others believe.

This is what I have tried to do in this book.

It is, I believe, the only way of coming to grips rationally and realistically with the problem of religion and secularism, and the equally important problem of *Pejoristic Realism* and *Melioristic Idealism*. Secularism is a doctrine; those defenders of a system of non-religious public schooling who deny that they are indoc-

trinating are wrong; the religionists who criticize them are right. And this is true also of the much less clearly recognized fact that those who believe that everybody should be taught to be "practical" (to practice what practical men think of as realism but which is often indistinguishable from cynicism and sophistication) are advocating the inculcation of an educational doctrine as truly a doctrine of its own as are religion and secularism.

There are realists of this kind not only on Madison Avenue, not only on newspaper row and in the whole field of mass-communication, but also in the school system itself. The educatee is entitled to know why they believe in realism and how that belief is rationalized by them, and that is all. Meanwhile the educator, on the other hand, had better make up his mind about whether he is or is not an idealist. What the existing educational system needs is an adequate supply of unashamed idealists who have faced the facts which make us a nation of covert sophists and cynics, sensualists and materialists, and who know what to do about it.

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Evangelistic Solutions of the Educational Problem—The problem of all religions, once they are organized into churches, is not how to educate but how to evangelize; their problem is not how to educate the educatee for life as a human being in this world, but to prepare him educationally for his salvation. The Roman Catholic approach to education¹⁰ may be considered typical of the way in which all highly organized churches in some degree or other deal with the problem. All of them see that conversion can only be achieved and heresy avoided by education "from the cradle to the grave." The Catholic Church does this by pre-conditioning the family to begin the conditioning of every newborn infant at its christening in church. It goes on with it in the elementary school (which must be a religious school), in the secondary school, in the college, and in the university (all of which should also be religious institutions). In between and along with the schooling and after graduation into the world, attendance at church continues the process, until in the service in which he is lowered into his grave, it indulges in its final act of conditioning not the dead but those he has left behind him. It

is because of its realization of the need for such a total approach to education that it quite logically insists upon the union of church and school.

This sequence does not sufficiently distinguish between what I think of as *Juvenile Evangelical Education*, (Sunday schooling, and schooling in elementary, secondary, and college denominational schools), and *Adult Evangelical Education*. Considered from the standpoint of the broad definition of education used in this study (which I believe the only valid one), the church itself is a school, and all that takes place in it a form of adult education—of course more emotional than intellectual. But evangelical adult education is not limited to churchgoing, to listening to sermons, to praying and practicing rituals. It includes the reading of Bibles, religious books and periodicals, and decorating the home with sacred pictures, icons and idols.

Still another very different and very terrible kind of education which must be mentioned is *Evangelical Fanaticism* and *Anti-Gentilism*. This may be defined as imbuing believers with an absolute and unreasoning, obstinate and intolerant certainty and conviction about the righteousness of their beliefs, and inspiring and provoking them to feel such hatred for everybody who opposes them or any institution which threatens to undermine their faith that they are ready to use "fire and sword," not only to destroy gentile and heretical property and institutions, but to destroy with the most inhuman savagery and barbarity the gentiles and heretics themselves.

* * * *

Sophistic Solutions of the Problem—I think of all those methods of education as Sophistic in which the real purpose is not the education of the educatee but the promotion of some interest which the educator takes it for granted that education should serve. To serve this interest most effectively, "making the worse appear the better reason" acquires the character of a positive virtue. Everything having to do with education, including particularly the curriculum, is tested not for its efficacy as education but for its efficacy as promotion.

That this is true of both *Political Enculturation* and *Political Indoctrination* is fairly obvious. That *Patriotism* (a doctrine full

of Sophisms), even though not listed as a "subject" in any curriculum, should be included in the enculturation of the educatee (no matter what the nationality involved) is taken for granted. But imbuing the educatee with a love of his own country (and coincidentally with a feeling of contempt and hostility for others) is not merely a matter of rites and rituals, of pledges and salutes to the flag. It is also teaching from the kind of history, at every grade below graduate university education, which Napoleon called "a lie agreed upon."

This is even truer in the case of *Political Indoctrination*. Indoctrination differs from enculturation in that the interest involved is not that of a whole culture, but that of a particular *section* (the "South" or the "North" in the United States), a particular *ideology* (in the United States the American school system today is ideologically almost exclusively "Liberal"; in Mexico, the Constitution actually prescribes that education shall be ideologically "Socialistic"), or even a particular political *party*. Up until recently there were States in the Union in which every educatee was expected to become and to be made into a Democrat, and in others into a Republican, (the so-called "one-party States").

That this is true, however, of all kinds of indoctrination is not so obvious. To indoctrinate effectively, one should remember that "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" is never as effective as the half-truth or the big lie. Indoctrination by its very nature has to be sophisticated; the process has to be partisan or sectarian with regard to the doctrine involved.

Religious indoctrination has already been discussed in connection with Evangelical solutions of the educational problem. At least reference must be made to what might be called *Commercial Indoctrination*, even though most of this takes place outside of the school system. Yet the school system and the professional educators conducting and teaching in it have a responsibility for it, if only because of their failure to teach the truth about it, a failure partly due to the fact that they are themselves victims of commercial indoctrination, and partly to the fact that they are so little dedicated to truth-seeking that they do not wish to incur the hostility which criticizing commercial indoctrination entails.

Yet it is doubtful whether in the whole history of mankind people have ever been more grossly mis-educated by Sophists than by the professional Sophists who infest the Madison Avenues of the world. What is most unfortunate is not that they are hoodwinked and cheated, but that the real educators of the adult population of the world are not the teachers in our schools (mistaken as so much of what is taught there may be), but the advertising men engaged in promoting the interests of business men for whom, if money is not God, the bitch-goddess Success certainly is.

Enculturation—In its broadest signification, enculturation can be described as the process used to equip the educatee with the language, the beliefs, the purposes and ambitions, the mores and manners, the values and folkways, and the techniques for the practice of the vocations and recreations of the society in which he lives and will probably continue to live throughout his life.

One of the truly fundamental distinctions in philosophies of education is that between educational individuation and educational socialization, between *education* on one side and *enculturation* on the other. We individuate educationally when we aim at the fullest development of the potentialities of each individual human being; when we recognize that every individual is unique and idiosyncratic and emphasize the fact that he is a human being—one of a species of animal the characteristics of which are the most variable of all—and not a mere unit in a herd, a mere part of an aggregation of humans, or a mere cog in a social machine. In *Education and Living* I discussed this at length, though I called the process humanization and normalization. (pp. 279-305 and 677-712).

There is neither any need, nor is there any temptation, in the practice of education which is individually and humanistically oriented, to resort to the promotion of any interest other than that of the individual educatee; it is only by abandoning the recognition of the primacy of the individual and making some other interest—some social interest usually—primary, that such an ulterior temptation and ulterior need develops. The moment this takes place, the need to realize what is ulterior to the individual

creates the temptation to resort to Sophism to assure successful inculcation.

Linguistic (Basic) Enculturation—Enculturation in practice takes at least four important distinguishable forms, and the endless controversies about philosophies of education remain endless mainly because what is valid in enculturation is not distinguished from its promotional and indoctrinal (and Sophistic) elements. Take these out and what is left is, for the most part, language and literature, and for the primitive and the illiterate, folklore and folk culture. The process might well be called either linguistic or basic enculturation. As a doctrine it recognizes that every educatee must be, and cannot avoid being, equipped with the language, the folklore, and if literate, the literature of the educator's culture.

Conventional Enculturation—With the second kind of enculturation, the sophistication of education begins. What I think of as *Conventional Enculturation* adjusts the educatee to the current customs of the society to which he belongs. This is today called "adjusting the child to society" and "educating for citizenship." As customs (and fashions) change, the curriculum for conventional enculturation changes with them. What is taught is as valid or as invalid as is the convention, but even if invalid, it is automatically and almost instinctively defended, because it is considered superior (it has to be superior, being *ours*), and Sophistry used in defending our own and in derogating the conventions of other cultures. Conventional enculturation naturally calls for conformity, yet as Emerson pointed out, "Whosoever would be a man, must be a non-conformist."

Traditional Enculturation—The third kind of enculturation, which Brameld called essentialism but which has more often been called Classicism, I think of as *Traditionalism*. Like our own conventions, our own traditions, since they are also "ours," are naturally the best and truest, and naturally those which we must defend and promote in what we teach.

Unlike conventions, traditions can be different from the customs of the moment; conventions, by definition are the beliefs, the values, the practices—in short the customs—of the moment, no matter how recent. Traditions and conventions may be one

and the same, but some of the traditions, and perhaps in theory all of them, may have been set aside or completely replaced by customs which have become more acceptable generally. In most cultures today there is a sharp contest between modernists, who believe that traditionalism is dated, and traditionalists who insist upon its revival. Traditionalism relies upon what dates back to time immemorial; conventionalism upon what prevails. Traditions are supposed to have established their validity by long usage and by endless trials and errors; conventions by the fact that they are so widely accepted and practiced at the existent moment.

Progressive Enculturation—In rapidly changing societies in which the trend of change is readily discerned, enculturation tends to anticipate progress. Conventional and traditional enculturation will obviously fail to prepare children for the sort of changed world in which they will find themselves as adults. It was this fact which led John Dewey to develop what was for a long time called Progressive Education and is now called by its devotees the New Education. What John Dewey called attention to was the fact that, in a nation in which farm life and small town life was rapidly shrinking relative to industrial life and big city life, children in school should be equipped educationally for the life they would live in the emerging new society. Both the methods of education and the curriculum of the schools should therefore replace the old scheme of education, he maintained, with a new scheme adapted to the changes taking place—to the indicated progress—in society. Enculturation should, therefore, include only what was still viable in the old education but add to it the new education which would equip the child for life as an adult in an urban and industrial world.

The trouble with *Progressive Enculturation*, as I think of it, is that it takes the trend—whatever it may be—for granted, and trends obviously are not all good for either the educatee or for society, since trends in some societies are diametrically the opposite of trends in others. One or the other trend must plainly be bad. In America the advocates of Progressive Education at first took both the old and the emerging society for granted; they raised no questions about the validity of either. To have raised

them about the existing social system would have incurred the enmity of all the interests satisfied with things as they were, to have raised them about the emerging social system would have been to raise doubts about the wisdom of preparing educatees for living in it. Progressivism in America takes democracy for granted; in Russia it takes dictatorship for granted. In America, the existing social system (which is defended if not promoted) is based upon what remains of our free economy (or rather of our so-called Capitalistic system); the emerging social system, which is being promoted, is what is sometimes called a Welfare State and sometimes a planned economy by those who believe in it, and Socialism by those who do not. In Communist Russia, the existing social system which is taken for granted is called Socialism; the emerging social system for which educatees are being prepared is called Communism.

In both instances, the need for indoctrination and the temptation to Sophisticate the curriculum to promote rather than to educate are perfectly obvious.

Ideological Enculturation—At this point, enculturation becomes almost indistinguishable from indoctrination. It remains enculturation only as long as the ideology with which the educatee is being equipped is the one which is not only prevalent but dominant in the educatee's and the educator's society. In homogeneous primitive cultures, ideological enculturation was part and parcel of the whole activity of enculturation; it imbued the educatee with the dominant religion and philosophy, the dominant values and the dominant practices of his own tribe. But in modern heterogeneous societies, while there is almost always a prevalent ethos and a prevalent ideology, there are usually other ideologies which are being proposed and advocated by those who are seeking to substitute them for the one which prevails. Insofar as these are included in any educatee's education, they involve indoctrination and not enculturation.

Since political, social, and economic enculturation are virtually indistinguishable from what I call Ideological Indoctrination, it is unnecessary to discuss each one separately.

Indoctrination involves not only instruction in the theory and the application of some specific ideology or doctrine but also

inculcation. Without inculcation, it is academic; among those who are the concerned and dedicated advocates of some particular doctrine, what they want is adoption, what they want are co-workers in getting the doctrine adopted; what they do not want is mere instruction—mere knowledge for its own sake. Of necessity, if it is to be effective, it has to be partisan and sectarian. It cannot afford to be objective and impartial. It is at this point that sophistication begins.

Indoctrination should first of all be distinguished from enculturation. With enculturation, the *interests* of a whole nation, a whole society, or even a whole culture are promoted; with inculcation it is a particular part of the whole of society which is promoted—a particular *political interest* (the Democratic Party in the United States, the Labor Party in Britain, the Congress Party in India); a particular *economic interest* (labor, capital; agriculture, industry; the dairy or the margarine industry; a particular brand of cigarettes or of Coca Cola); or a particular *ideological interest* (Liberalism and Statism [the “main stream”] in the United States; Communism in Russia and the rest of the Communist World).

Ideological Indoctrination—What I have just called *Ideological Indoctrination*, Bramold calls *Educational reconstructionism*. And in the educator’s frame of reference, this means deliberately injecting into the curriculum a bias in favor of the particular ideology with which the school, or the teacher in the school, is trying to replace the prevailing ideology in society. Quite obviously, no matter how sincere may be his belief in it, no such bias can be justified. Yet it is much more common than is realized. The educational establishment today in America has a very real bias in favor of what is called Liberalism, but what is in fact Ideological Indoctrination with Socialism. The bias is so strong that it is not exaggerating the matter to say that Conservatism—defined as the ideology which prevailed before the political revolution engineered by the New Dealers under Franklin D. Roosevelt—is misrepresented both in the text books and in the courses taught.

This is of course so close to Political Indoctrination, to which reference has already been made, that it is almost indistinguishable from it,

Indoctrination with Socialism has been volubly denied by American educators, but indoctrination with democracy is apt to be just as volubly defended and rationalized on the ground that the promotion of democracy is essential in a world which, before World War II, was threatened by Fascism and which since then is threatened everywhere by Communism. What must be recognized is that in teaching history and political science, in which the validity of an all-embracing ideological concept of democracy is taken for granted, a bias is injected which is factually and intellectually indefensible.

Communist education in Russia immediately after the revolution (as soon as the educational system was taken into hand by the new revolutionary government) taught that there was nothing valuable at all in the old Czarist regime, the old Orthodox religion, and the old social and economic system, not only in Russia but in the rest of the Imperialistic world. At the same time it promoted in every possible way the new Marxist-Leninist ideological "superstructure" which was to replace it. For a parallel illustration of the same sort of thing in America, there is the change in what was taught immediately after our own revolution—consider what was taught about the Monarchical social and political system in which "God save the king!" was a universal toast, and the new Republican social and political order for which everybody had to be re-educated and in which every vestige of Monarchism was to be eliminated.

One kind of sophistry practiced in the indoctrination of students with democracy in American schools today (though educators do not think of it in such invidious terms) is rationalized on the ground that the preservation of democracy is essential in a world in which it is threatened by both Fascism and Communism. What is overlooked is that the uncritical laudation of democracy, and the taking of the whole concept for granted, is itself a form of indoctrination, and in my opinion, sophisticated indoctrination, because the concept as it is usually understood is factually and intellectually indefensible.

Most of our authorities on education consider Thomas Jefferson the great American apostle of democracy. But he

was no such thing. He called himself a Republican. He believed in representative, not democratic, government.

Jefferson was the apostle of freedom and of education, not of the *demos* and of democracy. He considered the notion that "the voice of the people, is the voice of God!" utter nonsense. The histories and the political science texts used in teaching in America grossly misrepresent what Jefferson believed and what in fact the evidence indicates to be true. They frequently fail to say anything at all about the importance of the distinction between democratic and representative government; they say nothing at all about how consistently throughout the whole history of mankind, acceptance of the ethos of democracy by any nation was followed by the destruction, at the hands of mobs and of demagogues, of every vestige of freedom.

Jefferson is much more profound than his unthinking laudators realize. He wanted a body politic which was educated not only scholastically but also vocationally, so that they would select the right kind of men to represent them. Farm-owners he considered to be best qualified for the exercise of citizenship; professional men and craftsmen who were their own masters and owned their own shops came next; last of all came the traders, bankers, and manufacturers whose god was neither integrity nor craftsmanship, but money. As for the hordes and "mobs" who infest our big cities (most of whom work on assembly lines, clerk in gigantic office-bureaucracies, or do similar repetitive work), he would have considered them utterly unfit to exercise the franchise at all.

How does all this square with the shibboleth of democracy by which our educators say all the curriculums in school and college ought to be tested?

That ideological movements of all kinds indulge in misrepresentation, and that the effect educationally is very bad is painfully obvious when the literature of social movements of all kinds is studied. By its very nature, impartiality and objectivity is a danger to the promotion of such movements. Nothing illustrates this better than the study of what Communist Russia and Communist China say about the Free World, and particularly about the United States. To us it seems incredible that people should believe such outright fabrications. But what is even more

unfortunate is that we are just as blind, as are the helpless masses locked behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, to the ideological misrepresentations in which the spokesmen for the Free World indulge.

The worst aspect of Ideological Indoctrination is the fact that it is so easy to use it as the basis for inculcating fanaticism. In this respect ideologies are like religions.

This brings me to the last of these Sophistic methods of education, the method I think of as *Ideological Fanaticism*. Fanaticism is both a product and a means of indoctrination; it is a contagion and can spread like an infectious disease.

That ideological indoctrination, as it is practiced by Russia and China and by Communist Parties all over the world, aims at instilling ideological fanaticism is, of course, generally recognized, though it is usually called "idealism" by those who believe in it and "subversion" by those who do not. Without it there would be none of the terrorism and revolution which Marxist theory feels is essential in the creation of genuine Communist States.

But that the same kind of ideological indoctrination and the same kind of ideological fanaticism, followed by the same kind of destructive and murderous violence, dots the history of America and features not only past history but current history, is not recognized at all. "Bloody Kansas" was the scene of the ideological fanaticism inspired on one side by Abolitionists like John Brown and on the other by the fanatic defenders of the South's "Peculiar Institution."

But the whole United States at present is the scene of similar lunatic forms of ideological indoctrination in connection with two conflicting social movements, one calling for "Negro Equality" and the other for "White Supremacy." There is, of course, some truth in what the ideologists on both sides teach, but it is almost like trying to find a needle in a haystack to find it among the sophisms in which both indulge to promote what each believes. The end product is terrorism such as reigns in places as wide apart as Alabama and Harlem, murders such as those of Medgar Evers, and finally destructive and bloody riots such as erupted

in 1965 in the Negro sections of Los Angeles and a dozen other cities throughout the nation.

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We owe to the Greeks perhaps the first systematic attempt at the introduction of right-education, but we owe to the Greeks one of the worst examples of Sophistic education. The Spartans were not interested in cultivating the potentialities of man; they simply took advantage of his educability to fit him, whether helot or freeman, for the role which in their judgement would best promote the interests of the Spartan State. In its way it was just as horrible a travesty as are essentially similar systems of education today.

That all totalitarianisms tend to deal with education sophistically is illustrated by the totalitarian regimes established in Europe after Mussolini paved the way for them in Italy. In Spain and Portugal they still continue to deal with education as the Fascists did in Italy and the National Socialists in Germany. Behind the Iron Curtain education is equally Sophistic, in spite of Communist lip-service to the idea of real education. In Italy, when Mussolini began to build his Fascist State, he enlisted the cooperation of the Church, (it did cooperate); in Germany Hitler started to cooperate with it (see Hochhuth, *The Deputy*,¹¹) and then finally decided that he could not brook its rivalry; he had a "religion" of his own which he wanted promoted.

In Russia, Lenin and his Bolshevik followers, after establishing themselves in power, decided that Christian Orthodoxy was so entangled with Czarism that it too had to be destroyed. In destroying them both, they destroyed both the State system and the religious system of education provided by the Orthodox Church. Even before they had fully consolidated their government, the Bolsheviks made a start at building an educational system such as had been envisioned by the early theorists of Socialism, a system which was to have only one objective, to fashion man for life in a totally Socialized society and to equip him with all the techniques for the role he was to play in a totally industrialized and urbanized State.

First they tried the proposal that family life should be abolished; this they finally abandoned; it was orthodox Socialist doc-

trine, it was true; the family, the theorists had maintained, was the seed-bed of private property; to shift loyalty from family to State, the child had to be taken over by the State virtually at birth. But the immediate consequences were so demoralizing that Stalin initiated the process of temporizing with family life. They then substituted the establishment of creches in every factory; the mothers were to return to work as quickly as possible, the infants reared in the factory's nursery school. Elementary schooling continued the process of socialization and indoctrination; every child was to go not only to School but to belong to the Pioneers, then the Komsomols, finally the Party; even if they did not join the Party, adult education in Socialist theory and practice was to continue in endless meetings in the factories and on the collective farms.

What resulted was not so much a system of education as a system for producing homunculi for whom "society" would be God and the "self" nothing. If I may venture to prophesy (basing my prophecy upon the theory of human nature to which the studies I have made of the anthropoic problem seem to point), the time will come when the communist leadership will discover that this cannot be done. Their whole social theory disregards an inherited trait of man. If they did succeed in producing the Socialized robots with which they are trying to replace wayward mankind, two things would happen: the robots they would have produced would lose all zest for life, and they would begin the practice of race-suicide—even if they did not become physiologically infertile and psychologically impotent before that.

A Sophistic solution of the educational problem, unfortunately, is also our own, but fortunately it is not a totalitarian one. In spite of the extent to which the school system has already substituted socialization for individuation, and has sophisticated its teaching accordingly, it is traditionally—and still to a great extent is in fact—critical of departures from what used to be called the eternal verities.

The worst Sophistic leadership in education, however, is not in the school but in the business world, and the citadel from which it emanates is symbolized by Madison Avenue. It begins edu-

cation and conditioning even before the child is born; (where do the mothers and fathers get their ideas about how children should be raised? From advertising!); it continues as soon as the child can sit before a TV screen, and it never relaxes, using every available mass medium to whet desire for the way of life which creates a maximum demand for what industry finds it profitable to produce.

So far as the school system is concerned, the business world has succeeded much too well in enlisting the system's aid in the two-fold task of training educatees for the kind of repetitive jobs needed in the industrialized world it has created, and making them the kind of consumers who have been conditioned for "impulse buying" and from whom all "sales resistance" has been eliminated. The more the school cooperates in technicizing and vocationalizing its curriculum, the more completely will its graduates succumb to the lure of the values being inculcated and disseminated for Big Business by the Sophists it employs on Madison Avenue. If it ever succeeds in completely eliminating all study of the liberal arts and all humanistic courses from the curriculum, it will have completely captured the school system.

In a free society, fortunately, total acceptance of such a program is virtually impossible; the degree to which it has already been accepted is bad enough.

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Philosophic Solutions of the Educational Problem—Fore-runners of the doctrine that education should be philosophic in its aim are to be found in the authors of the ancient wisdom literature of both the East and West. Confucius was probably the first to prevision its implications in his doctrine of Moral Law and particularly in *The Great Learning*, his doctrine for the realization of peace among nations. Confucius is actually, as I see it, vindicated by the Roman doctrine of natural law and in the work of Grotius and Puffendorf on international law and internationalism. Back of the Roman idea of a law superior to that of national law is the implication of what I think of as *Educational Cosmopolitanism*. Medieval education, which used Latin as an international medium of instruction, did not think of education as national; it was then definitely Cosmopolitan in its whole outlook,

But the doctrine in its fullness will not be formulated, much less put into practice, as long as educators everywhere in the world, including those nations supposedly belonging to the highest cultures and civilizations, remain parochial and nationalistic and insist upon nationalizing education (as we too insist upon its Americanization). Education must cease being nationalistic; it must become education for membership in "one world."

It is true that Roman Catholicism was in theory ecumenical; it envisioned one world and was in a sense cosmopolitan, but this world had to be a Christian world; it was geographically ecumenical but theologically could not have been more parochial; there was only one true religion, and that was the Church's—all other religions were inventions of Beelzebub.

In thinking about a date which might be used to symbolize the dawn of the cosmopolitization of education, I would pick the year 1899, the year which ushered in the Twentieth Century and when the world was thrilled by the erection of the Czar's Peace Palace at The Hague. Unfortunately cosmopolitization has not progressed much beyond dawning.

Educational Wisdom and Educational Philosophy—The word, philosophy, as we use it connotes *doctrine*; an effort must be made to make people today realize that it in fact denotes *wisdom*. What is common to what I am calling Philosophic solutions of the educational problem is not that they consist of Philosophic doctrines, but that they have in common the ethos of wisdom, the creation—by a process of right-education—of wise men and women. They recognize that real wisdom even illiterates can acquire, but that great knowledge can only be acquired by a few. In terms of priorities, they put wisdom before both technical and academic competence. They do not need to exclude the production of intelligent and competent men and women; but they must not put that first, for the same reason that no system of education which tries to really meet the educational problem can put the production of *patriotic* American citizens (America first!) or the production of *devout* Roman Catholics before producing human beings who have discovered that they belong to the whole human race.

The besetting sin of education as a whole in industrialized and urbanized America today is that it has not only ignored the problem of producing wise men and women, but that it has (in turning its back on the classical conception of general education) even abandoned the idea of producing intelligent men and women. Modern man is not really supposed to think; he is too busy for that; he is supposed to specialize. When he is not busy producing, he is supposed to be busy consuming. The school lends its support to this idea by assuming that if it succeeds in producing competent specialists and technicians, it will have automatically endowed them with the intelligence and the wisdom to use their competence as they should.

Cosmopolitanization versus Enculturation—Perhaps a first requirement for this conception of education is putting cosmopolitanization in the position of supremacy now accorded Enculturation. Enculturation should, of course, come first in elementary education, both in the school and the home. The child must be equipped with the knowledge, the values, and the skills which will enable it to live comfortably and competently in its own culture—insofar as this does no violence to cosmopolitanism. Educators ought never forget that man is a member of the human race before he is a member of any one race, religion, or nation.

Education must, therefore, include instruction in other languages than the educatee's native tongue (Latin and Greek at one time were attempts at meeting this requirement). At the beginning of the century, French was supposed to be mankind's international language; today it seems to be English. There are no insuperable difficulties involved in teaching languages, particularly if some of the time now wasted on physics and mathematics, (which are equated with science, as if there were no other sciences!) were used for that purpose. In a humanized world, the literature of the most important cultures of the world would have been made accessible to at least the determining number of educatees; it is only in a technologized world that we need the quantity of physics and mathematics included in the curriculum today.

The trouble at this time is that we have forgotten the mood of the world immediately after the end of World War II, a mood engendered by the fact that the horrors of World War I had not

been forgotten and the horrors of World War II were still vivid in everybody's mind. Wisdom plainly dictated the folly of reviving the chauvinisms and insularisms (and the fanaticisms) which had made both wars possible—a mood typified by the fact that millions of copies of Wendell Wilkie's *One World* and Stringfellow Barr's *Let's Join the Human Race* were sold.

Rationalism versus Secularism—Since education without indoctrination is impossible, the problem is not whether, but with what, to indoctrinate. In terms of my problem-centered approach to the planning of the curriculum, some of the doctrines which seem plainly to emerge from this study of mankind's basic problems may be summarized as follows:

In dealing with all practical and praxiologic problems, the doctrines which it seems to me call for emphasis are those which are Humanistic rather than Supernal (salvational and other-worldly) or Materialistic (Sensual and this-worldly).

In dealing with axiological problems (values) they must inculcate a kind of melioristic idealism, and neither the optimism which is traditionally American nor the burgeoning pessimism, pejorism, and cynicism of the dominating materialism of our times.

Finally, in dealing with noetic problems—with purely religious and purely scientific problems—it can neither teach supernalism (which automatically calls for an answer to the question of *which* Supernalism) nor secularism (which automatically calls for the repudiation of supernal faiths altogether); it must teach *Rationalism*. Rationalism as a doctrine makes the ultimate test of what is to be considered true the use of the reasoning powers of the mind, not just any kind of reasoning, but the kind I have called ratiocination, the kind traditionally called right-reasoning. Ratiocination is not just logical reasoning (logical reasoning is possible about premises which are myths pure and simple), but reasoning which insists that both the premises and the propositions based upon them must be vindicable rationally.

Because of this the rationalist must logically believe in the reality of eternal verities and eternal values; he cannot be either a relativist or subjectivist. He can be an objectivist but not a positivist. He cannot be a positivist, because positivists consider

all values relative in nature. Nor can he be an intuitionist; he cannot believe all values to be subjective in nature. Nor can he be an Inspirationalist; he cannot believe in an absolute "inspired" truth; he can only believe in ratiocinative truth.

To the logical rationalist, the three most important institutions which enter into the resolution of the educational problem—Church, State, and School—are custodians respectively of Revelation, of Power, and of Truth. Since the rationalist, by definition, puts "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" first in his hierarchy of values, it is the perfection of the School which is called for.

The school, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, must speak about anything and everything—even about things "whereof it knows nothing." But about churchly truths, about which it knows nothing or can know nothing, it must be agnostic (not Atheistic); about power and about the state, individualistic and anarchistic rather than centralistic, collectivistic, and socialistic.

Eduction versus Adjustment—The distinction between individualization and socialization has already been briefly discussed, as has the fact that socialization is impossible without enculturation and indoctrination (except with sheer Linguistic Enculturation, which is about as free from indoctrination as is possible in any kind of Educational Adjustment). The educational theory and practice which makes individualization possible is *Eduction*. It is the antithesis of Adjustment.

There is nothing new about eduction except the term I am using to designate the classic Aristotelian and Confucian conception of education. What may be new is my conviction that, taking man as he is and society as it cannot help being, the prevailing doctrine and practice of adjusting the educatee to society—of making the perfection of society the end, and man the means for its realization—represents the worst kind of folly, and in the end produces neither wise men and women nor creates a good society. Adjustment and socialization assumes that the society into which the educatee is born (Muslim or Animist, Feudal or Capitalist, Agrarian or Urban, Fascist or Communist), no matter what its nature and no matter how patently vicious some of its institutions, is nevertheless the one which the educatee should be conditioned

to accept and which he should be taught to perfect and not to change.

What may also be new is my insistence that no merely socially approved conception (not even our own society's) of the ideal in man, neither the Greek conception of excellence in man (after all, Greek excellence called for slave ownership) nor the Chinese conception of the superior man (he had to believe in the perfection of his Ancestors!) should be accepted in toto as normal for man.

Eduction, as a doctrine, maintains that the true function of education is to help the individual to realize the highest potentialities of which *Homo sapiens* is capable. The essence of the distinction between Eduction and Adjustment is that Adjustment socializes the educatee while Eduction individualizes him by bringing out the qualities which are latent, potential, and undeveloped in him. It elicits, evokes, and develops what is his *in esse* or *poten*, instead of conditioning and manipulating him to accept the customs and traditions of the society in which he is born. It cultivates what is unique in each educatee instead of adjusting everybody to the prevailing or emerging institutions of society, without regard to what they happen to be.

Normal Individualization and Normal Socialization—Two theories are implicit in Eduction as I have defined it, the theory that it is possible scientifically and objectively to describe both the essential characteristics of a normal individual and the essential institutions of a normal society. To discuss this process in detail here is impossible; much of *Education and Living* was devoted to both these theories. I believe that once it is recognized that such a definition of the normal can only, and need only, describe the range of qualities and activities within which man remains normal and outside of which he becomes abnormal, the fact that this is scientifically possible becomes apparent even though (aside from my own definition of the normal in *Education and Living*) only perfectionists and utopians have attempted anything of the sort.

Once it is recognized that the normal is a range and not a uniformity, we will also recognize that an immense variety of individualities can yet be within the range of individual normality, and immense diversities of institutions and societies within the

range of social normality. Until this is done, the social sciences will remain standard-less pseudo-sciences. They can describe, as they already do, but they cannot prescribe.

Without first determining what society should be, how can we really reform it? Without first determining what man should be, how can we go about educating him?

* * * *

Both Plato and Aristotle made the aim of education the cultivation of excellence, and the flowering of Greek civilization showed that to some extent Greek educators succeeded. In ancient China, Confucius initiated a similar approach to the educational problem. The Greek ideal in education became the production of aristocrats, the Chinese ideal the production of superior men. The Greeks relied upon citizenship to realize the ideal; the Confucians upon *li* and ritual, upon manners and upon ceremonies first practiced in the family and then implemented in society by the etiquette practiced from the lowest peasant to the Mandarin, and from the mere Scholar to the Son of Heaven on the throne. With the family, the Confucians succeeded amazingly well; his followers, if anything, overdid the ritualizing of life. But with the rulers of China, Confucius himself failed. This was his Gethsemane, and he wandered from duchy to duchy hoping that somewhere he would find a ruler who would avoid being corrupted by what two thousand years later Acton called power (all power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely).

In the West, education for excellence ended with the martyrdom of Hypatia, when Christian education for Salvation completely took over. Not until the Renaissance did Philosophic solutions of the educational problem reappear. Unfortunately, excellence later came to be identified not with an aristocracy of character and intellect but an aristocracy of birth. Still more unfortunately, even this farcical tribute to excellence was wiped out by the rise of science and technology, the take-over of Industrialism and Commercialism, the rise of Nationalism and Imperialism, and finally "the degradation of the democratic dogma" in the emerging Free World. In the emerging world today, both Free and Communist, it is competence and affluence which is the aim of education.

My interpretation of what is happening may be unduly pessimistic. But it seems to me that the Philosophic ideal is again disappearing, this time not because the Religious ideal is taking its place as it did during the Dark Ages, but because (thanks to our modern Sophisticates) the bitch-goddess Success is replacing Athena and Saraswatee, and because everybody is being taught to try to become affluent rather than superior or excellent.

* * * *

The moral is plain: if man is mis-educated, no matter how good the social system he inherits, the society he creates will be a bad one; if he is rightly educated, no matter how bad the social system may be to begin with, both the social system and the society he will create will become better and better.

Commentary and Bibliography on Problem XVII : The Educational Problem

In outlining the educational problem, I have had to condense not only what I have in my files—close to five hundred pages of manuscript, charts and notes—but also what I have already written about the problem in *Education and Living*, published in two volumes, and in *The Education of the Whole Man*. The problem encompasses so much that this outline barely suggests what should be taken into account. If only schooling were involved, which is what education means to most people, the statement of the problem would be much simpler. But when all the factors in man's environment which "educate" him are taken into account, schooling being merely one of them, it takes on entirely different dimensions. It is this which makes it so difficult to state the problem satisfactorily.

1. From George Orwell's often-quoted amusing expression in his *Animal Farm*.

2. *Sensations and Perceptions, Inceptions and Conceptions*—I distinguish sharply between *sensations*—the responses man makes to stimuli from his environment; *perceptions*—the qualification of man's sensations by his education; and *inceptions* and *conceptions*—both of which originate in his mind and neither of which are conveyed, like sensations and perceptions, to the mind and brain through the afferent nerves from any sense organ.

3. *Educatee versus Student*—I have been driven to use the rather barbarous term, *educatee*, because we have no word with which to designate every individual as a subject of education. Students, it is true, are educatees, but nobody can avoid being one. In literate, "school-equipped" cultures, the educatee can be said to be subject to three kinds of education: pre-school or infant education (he learns more during this period per hour than at any other), juvenile education (which schooling provides until he graduates), and adult education (post-schooling) which in our culture is provided mostly by newspapers, television, the movies, and

other media of mass-communication. The most important part of every educatee's education, and the most neglected since modern disintegration of family life, is that provided in the home by the parents and other members of the household.

4. *Inspiration, Sensibilization, and Emotional Education versus Intellectual Education*—Five great heroes of education symbolize, in my opinion, what is here involved. Bishop Nicholas Grundtvig, the founder of the Danish Folk School movement, who made it clear that the teacher must inspire and not only instruct; Maria Montessori of Italy, who made it clear that the perceptions and the sensibilities must be cultivated; Sigmund Freud and Ivan Pavlov, who made it clear that emotional education involved the cultivation of the unconscious mind; and Patanjali of India, the author of the Yoga Shastra, who made it clear that systematic emotional education is possible. Parenthetically, the most effective exponents of Pavlov's discovery of conditioning were not the Russian and Chinese Communists with their "brainwashing," but long before Pavlov, the Jesuits, who built their system of education upon the principles of Ignatius de Loyola.

5. *Educator versus Teacher*—A teacher is a professional educator in my terminology. Non-professional educators can and do teach particular educatees (a parent can teach his child to read, to swim, to cook, etc.), but that does not make them professional teachers. Everybody is an educator to the extent to which he influences anybody else, and everybody influences somebody at sometime, either for good or for ill. Everybody ought to be made conscious of this fact; the moment they become both intellectually and emotionally aware of it, it makes them behave more responsibly.

6. *Education, Mis-Education, Right-Education, and Re-Education* were exhaustively defined in the first volume of my *Education and Living*, published in 1948. These concepts were further developed in *The Education of the Whole Man* which was published in 1963.

7. *Wisdom versus Knowledge*—All of the texts and the entire formal curriculum used in our modern schools aims at providing facts and know-how; the wisdom-literature of mankind is

almost completely ignored. The few who know the Bible in the West know it as a sacred scripture and not as a part of the wisdom literature of mankind. As the East is modernized, its wisdom-literature is similarly being neglected. In India, even the Gita is suffering from its identification with the sacred. Chinese, Indian, and Arabic literature is particularly rich in wisdom-literature. There are plenty of moderns who rate inclusion in this category of literature—Shakespeare and Goethe, Tolstoy and Gandhi, Thoreau and Emerson, Ruskin and Nietzsche, for instance.

8. *Inculcation and Dissemination*—These concepts have already been discussed in the commentary on the telic problem, Problem IV.

9. *Logical, Illogical, and Alogical Teaching*—Alogical teaching should not be confused with illogical teaching; on the contrary, it can be used just as thoughtfully and purposefully as can logical teaching. For a discussion of what is involved, see my *The Education of the Whole Man*, pp. 407-418.

10. *Catholic Education*—The Catholic system of education owes most, perhaps, to two very different educational geniuses, Saint Benedict (480-543), who was tender-minded and developed the Benedictine, tender-minded method of Catholic teaching, and Ignatius de Loyola (1491-1556), who was tough-minded, and developed the tough-minded method of Catholic teaching used by the Jesuits. Both the Benedictines and the Jesuits are pre-eminently teaching orders.

11. This is the theme of Rolf Hochhuth's drama, *The Deputy*, Grove Press, N. Y., 1964.

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Summa Summarum :

The holiest temple is not a church but a school. The holiest man is not a priest but a teacher. The holiest book is not a bible but a dictionary. The holiest study is not science, not art, not philosophy, not religion, but the study of the truth about how to live, how to treat our fellow men, and how to use what has been entrusted to us like decent and honest, sensitive and concerned, cultivated and considerate human beings.

What the study of the truth teaches us—the study of the holiest of all holies—is that Man¹ is holy, the Earth is holy², the Sunshine is holy, the Rain is holy; that all Matter, all Energy, all Nature is holy; that the Procession of the Sun above us and the Seasons here on Earth is holy; that Evolution—beginning with the Evolution of the Rocks and ending with the Evolution of Man—is holy; that the painful History in the course of which Man has lifted himself from primitive bestiality and savagery to civilized life, and from the crude craft and artistry of Aurignacian Man to the artistry and science of Confucius and Aristotle, of Gautama and Plato, of Shakespeare and Newton, of Goethe and Galileo, of Darwin, Freud, and Einstein; from the painting of Altamiras to the painting of Mona Lisas, from the carving of Lingans to the carving of Pietàs; from the music of the tom tom to the music of Eroicas; from the architecture of Stonehenges to the Architecture of Taj Mahals, is the holiest of all Historiography³.

* * * *

What the study of the truth about how to live teaches us is that the Rights of Man are only earned by observing the Obligations of Man; that the four great duties which constitute the Obligations of Man are (1) the obligation of conservation and economy, (2) the obligation of creation and beauty, (3) the obligation of harmony and morality; (4) the obligation to realize Man's highest potentialities. Without unreserved commitment to behavior on the basis of these values, Man can be a human animal but cannot become human in fact.

Without the practice of conservation and economy; without the practice of art and craft, of poetry and beauty; without the practice of what Plato called "the science of good and evil" and Confucius the "moral law," Man seems to be but is not in fact a human being.

Finally, without making the supreme purpose for which we live our lives the enduring satisfactions which are existentially possible for mankind—and not the sensate gratifications of the moment nor the future salvation of our souls in some sort of paradisiac immortality—we shall fail to make ourselves into normal human beings.

* * * *

What the study of how to live, how to treat our fellow human beings, and how to use the resources of the Earth entrusted to us like decent and honest, sensitive and concerned, cultivated and considerate human beings finally teaches us is the ultimate importance of right-education. It bids us never to forget two things: that we come into the world innocent and ignorant but that we are, like every man, the heir of the ages.

By all those who have lived before us, we have been dowered with all that we have today of what is true, what is good, and what is beautiful. Only by rightly educating ourselves can we equip ourselves to honor those who have, in the long history of mankind, bequeathed to us all their art and science and all their painful labors and heroic sacrifices. What has been entrusted to us, we must multiply, and with it endow those who follow after us.

Upon what the thoughtful and concerned men and women of the world do to help those teachers and those institutions dedicated to right-education are dependent not only the young but also the mature for right-direction, right-guidance, right-discipline, right-instruction, and right-values.

And this is the beginning and end of right-education:

Wisdom, not novelty; courage, not cupidity; right-feeling, right-reasoning, right-speech, right-action, right-purposes.

Of all these products of right-education, neither courage alone nor wisdom alone are quintessential. For without courage, wisdom becomes a sharp tool in hands afraid to use it, and without wisdom, courage an equally sharp tool in hands which do not know the uses to which it should be put.

Wisdom cherishes nothing merely because it is old, and nothing merely because it is new.

Wisdom cherishes only that which makes for the development of the highest potentialities of Man.

And courage, if it cherishes wisdom, shinks neither from defeat nor from victory.

Only with courage and wisdom can mankind deal with ignorance, with folly, with greed, with violence.

Only with wisdom and courage can mankind be saved.

RALPH BORSODI

Exeter, N.H., July 2, 1966.

Commentary on *Summa Summarum*

Without some explanation it will seem to many thoughtful people fantastically unrealistic to affirm that "Man is Holy, the Earth is Holy, History is Holy." But if what can be very properly meant when the words "Man," "the Earth," and "History" are used, their use in this affirmation will have been vindicated.

1. If by Man is meant *man as he is* (the overwhelming masses of mankind), the proposition that he is Holy becomes absurd. But it is not absurd if by Man is meant man as he is potentially capable of becoming, and as many men and women at their best have over and over again demonstrated that he can be. It is not Man as he is but the Schweitzers, the Einsteins, the Spinozas, and the Gautamas, the Cornelias, the Hypatias, and the Florence Nightingales that Shakespeare was thinking of when he wrote what would be called nonsense by the Cynic:

What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite
in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action
how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god!

Supernaturalists will consider the statement "Man is Holy" blasphemous; for fundamentalist Christians he is a contemptible worm, born in sin, capable of salvation only by the grace of God; not Man, but God and His Angels alone are Holy. Materialists on the other hand will hoot at the notion that Man is Holy, but they will have their eyes fixed on his potentiality—and his history—for viciousness. They will see only his obvious stupidities, vulgarities, and bestialities; they will see only the obvious fact that he is the most cunning of the primates and that he is fashioned out the same kind of materials as are all other animals. Entranced Supernaturalists, on the other hand, see only his Soul and pin their faith and hope in the fact that he is capable of achieving eternal felicity in Nirvana or Paradise.

The Philosophical Rationalist, defending the attempt to make men conscious of their potentialities for good and not only for

evil, is justified in retorting that to say that "Man is Holy" is to indulge in a poetic expression of an inspiring aspiration; they can say to the Supernaturalist that if there is a God he needs no inspiration from Man, but that Man does; and to the Materialist, that however true it is that the statement is merely allegorical and metaphorical, the central maxim of Materialistic Cynicism—"Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die"—would make man no better and almost certainly make him a worse Egotist than he already is.

2. As to my eulogy of the Earth, I know of nothing better than a reading of Liberty Hyde Bailey's *The Holy Earth*. Bailey was no professional poet; he was the most realistic of all realistic agricultural scientists, yet for him, as for all nature lovers like him, the Earth is Holy.

3. To understand my eulogy of Historiography, one must turn one's face from the long and bitter record of man's beastliness as it appears on page after page of his history, and contemplate instead how often he has tried to build a rational, a beautiful, and a humane social order in spite of the fact that the Earth on which he is trying to do so is the graveyard of civilization after civilization.

* * * *

Finally, to understand my eulogy of truth-seeking, and my belief that it may be the highest of all values (a eulogy which will be easier for most of my readers to accept than some of the other eulogies), I can do no better than quote Gandhi:

I used to believe that God was Truth;
I now know that Truth is God.

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