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Battle of Anzio

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Battle of Anzio
Part of the Winter Line and the battle for Rome of the Italian campaign of World War II

Men of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division landing in late January 1944
Date22 January – 4 June 1944 (4 months, 2 weeks and 2 days)
Location
Anzio and Nettuno
41°26′35″N 12°37′30″E / 41.443022°N 12.624979°E / 41.443022; 12.624979
Result Allied victory
Territorial
changes		 Liberation of Rome
Belligerents
United States
United Kingdom
Canada		  Germany
Italian Social Republic
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Harold Alexander
United States Mark W. Clark
United States John P. Lucas
United States Lucian K. Truscott
United States Geoffrey Keyes
United Kingdom Richard McCreery		 Nazi Germany Albert Kesselring
Nazi Germany E. von Mackensen
Nazi Germany Alfred Schlemm
Nazi Germany Traugott Herr
Italian Social Republic J.V. Borghese
Italian Social Republic Umberto Bardelli †
Units involved

United Kingdom 15th Army Group

Nazi Germany Army Group C

Strength
Initially:
36,000 men
2,300 vehicles
2,700 aircraft[1]
Breakout: 150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns		 Initially:
Nazi Germany 20,000 men
Italian Social Republic 4,600 men
337 aircraft[1]
Breakout: 135,000 German soldiers and two Italian battalions
Casualties and losses
43,000 men
(7,000 killed, 36,000 wounded or missing)[2]		 40,000 men
(5,000 killed, 30,500 wounded or missing, 4,500 prisoner)[2]
Battle of Anzio is located in Italy
Battle of Anzio
Location within Italy

The Battle of Anzio was a battle of the Italian Campaign of World War II that commenced 22 January 1944. The battle began with the Allied amphibious landing known as Operation Shingle, and ended on 4 June 1944, with the invasion of Rome. The operation was opposed by German and by Italian Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI) forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno.[a][4]

Allied landings on the Italian mainland began in September 1943, and after slow gains against German resistance, the progress was stopped in December 1943 at the German defensive Gustav Line, south of Rome.[5]

The operation was initially commanded by Major General John P. Lucas, of the U.S. Army, commanding U.S. VI Corps with the intent to outflank German forces at the Winter Line and enable an attack on Rome.

The success of an amphibious landing at that location, in a basin consisting substantially of reclaimed marshland and surrounded by mountains, depended on the element of surprise and the swiftness with which the invaders could build up strength and move inland relative to the reaction time and strength of the defenders. Any delay could result in the occupation of the mountains by the defenders and the consequent entrapment of the invaders. The initial landing achieved complete surprise with no opposition and a jeep patrol even made it as far as the outskirts of Rome. However, Lucas, who had little confidence in the operation as planned, failed to capitalize on the element of surprise and delayed his advance until he judged his position was sufficiently consolidated and he had sufficient strength.

While Lucas consolidated, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander in the Italian theatre, moved every unit he could spare into a defensive ring around the beachhead. His artillery units had a clear view of every Allied position. The Germans also stopped the drainage pumps and flooded the reclaimed marsh with salt water, planning to entrap the Allies and destroy them by epidemic. For weeks a rain of shells fell on the beach, the marsh, the harbour, and on anything else observable from the hills, with little distinction between forward and rear positions.

After a month of heavy but inconclusive fighting, Lucas was relieved and sent home. His replacement was Major General Lucian Truscott, who had commanded the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. The Allies broke out in May. But, instead of striking inland to cut lines of communication of the German Tenth Army's units fighting at Monte Cassino, Truscott, on Clark's orders, turned his forces north-west towards Rome, which was captured on 4 June 1944. As a result, the forces of the German Tenth Army fighting at Cassino were able to withdraw and rejoin the rest of Kesselring's forces north of Rome, regroup, and make a fighting withdrawal to his next major prepared defensive position on the Gothic Line.

The battle was costly, with 24,000 U.S. and 10,000 British casualties.[5]

Background

[edit]

At the end of 1943, following the Allied invasion of Italy, Allied forces were bogged down at the Gustav Line, a defensive line across Italy south of the strategic objective of Rome. The terrain of central Italy had proved ideally suited to defense, and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring took full advantage.

Operation Shingle was originally conceived by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in December 1943, as he lay recovering from pneumonia in Marrakesh. His concept was to land two divisions at Anzio, bypassing German forces in central Italy, and take Rome, the strategic objective of the current Battle of Rome.[6] By February he had recovered and was badgering his commanders for a plan of attack, accusing them of not wanting to fight but of being interested only in drawing pay and eating rations.[7] General Harold Alexander, commander of the Allied Armies in Italy, had already considered such a plan since October using five divisions. However, the 5th Army did not have the troops nor the means to transport them. Clark proposed landing a reinforced division to divert German troops from Monte Cassino. This second landing, however, instead of failing similarly[clarification needed], would hold "the shingle" for a week in expectation of a breakthrough at Cassino, and so the operation was named Shingle.[8][9]

The Anzio beachhead is located at the northwestern end of a tract of reclaimed marshland, formerly the Pontine Marshes, now the Pontine Fields (Agro Pontino). Previously uninhabitable due to mosquitoes carrying malaria, in Roman times armies marched as quickly as possible across it on the military road, the Via Appia. The marsh was bounded on one side by the sea and the other by mountains: the Monti Albani, the Monti Lepini, the Monti Ausoni, and further south the Monti Aurunci (where the allies had been brought to a halt before Monte Cassino). These mountains are collectively referenced by the name Monti Laziali, the mountains of Lazio, the ancient Latium. Invading armies from the south had the choice of crossing the marsh or taking the only other road to Rome, the Via Latina, running along the eastern flanks of the Monti Laziali, risking entrapment. The marshes were turned into cultivatable land in the 1930s under Benito Mussolini. Canals and pumping stations were built to remove the brackish water from the land. These canals divided the land into personal tracts with new stone houses for colonists from northern Italy. Mussolini also founded the five cities destroyed by the battle.

When Lucian Truscott's 3rd Division was first selected for the operation, he pointed out to Clark that the position was a death trap and there would be no survivors. Agreeing, Clark canceled the operation, but Churchill revived it. The two allies had different concepts: the Americans viewed such a landing as another distraction from Cassino, but if they could not break through at Cassino, the men at Anzio would be trapped. Churchill and the British high command envisioned an outflanking movement ending with the capture of Rome. Mediterranean Theatre commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower, leaving to take command of Operation Overlord, left the decision up to Churchill with a warning about German unpredictability.[10]

The final plan called for Lucas to lead the US VI Corps in a landing in the Anzio area, followed by an advance into the Alban Hills, to cut German communications and "threaten the rear of the German XIV Panzer Corps"[citation needed] (under general Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin). It was hoped that such an advance would draw German forces away from the Monte Cassino area and facilitate an Allied breakthrough.

Plan

[edit]

Planners argued that if Kesselring (in charge of German forces in Italy) pulled troops out of the Gustav Line to defend against the Allied assault, then Allied forces would be able to break through the line; if Kesselring didn't pull troops out of the Gustav Line, then Operation Shingle would threaten to capture Rome and cut off the German units defending the Gustav Line. Should Germany have adequate reinforcements available to defend both Rome and the Gustav Line, the Allies felt that the operation would nevertheless be useful in engaging forces which could otherwise be committed on another front. The operation was officially cancelled on 18 December 1943. However, it was later[when?] reselected.

Clark did not feel he had the numbers on the southern front to exploit any breakthrough. His plan therefore was relying on the southern offensive drawing Kesselring's reserves in and providing the Anzio force the opportunity to break inland quickly. This would also reflect the orders he had received from Alexander to "... carry out an assault landing on the beaches in the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German XIV Corps [on the Gustav Line]."[11] His written orders to Lucas did not really reflect this. Initially Lucas had received orders to "1. Seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio 2. Advance and secure Colli Laziali [the Alban Hills] 3. Be prepared to advance on Rome".[11] Clark's final orders stated "... 2. Advance on Colli Laziali" giving Lucas considerable flexibility as to the timing of any advance on the Alban Hills.[12] It is likely that the caution displayed by both Clark and Lucas was to some extent a product of Clark's experiences at the tough battle for the Salerno beachhead and Lucas' natural caution stemming from his lack of experience in battle.[13]

Neither Clark nor Lucas had full confidence in either their superiors or the operational plan.[14] Along with most of the Fifth Army staff they felt that Shingle was properly a two corps or even a full army task.[15] A few days prior to the attack, Lucas wrote in his diary, "They will end up putting me ashore with inadequate forces and get me in a serious jam... Then, who will get the blame?"[12] and "[The operation] has a strong odour of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur was still on the coach's bench."[15] The "amateur" can only have referred to Churchill, architect of the disastrous Gallipoli landings of World War I and advocate of Shingle.

Availability of naval forces

[edit]

One of the problems with the plan was the availability of landing ships. The American commanders in particular were determined that nothing should delay the Normandy invasion and the supporting landings in southern France. Operation Shingle would require the use of landing ships necessary for these operations. Initially Shingle was to release these assets by January 15. However, this being deemed problematic, President Roosevelt granted permission for the craft to remain until February 5.

Only enough tank landing ships (LSTs) to land a single division were initially available to Shingle. Later, at Churchill's personal insistence, enough were made available to land two divisions. Allied intelligence thought that five or six German divisions were in the area, although U.S. 5th Army intelligence severely underestimated the German 10th Army's fighting capacity at the time, believing many of their units would be worn out after the defensive battles fought since September.

Order of battle

[edit]

Task Force 81

Allied naval commanders for Operation Shingle
Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry, USN
Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge, RN
Rear Admiral Lowry's flagship, the amphibious command ship Biscayne, anchored off Anzio
Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, USN

Allied forces landed: approx. 40,000 soldiers, and 5,000+ vehicles[16] Naval losses: 2 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 minesweepers, 1 hospital ship[17]

"Peter" Force

[edit]
Rear Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge
Comprising 2 light cruisers (HMS Orion, HMS Spartan), 12 destroyers, 2 anti-aircraft/fighter director ships, 2 gunboats, 6 minesweepers, 4 transports, 63 landing craft, 6 patrol craft, 1 oiler, 1 net tender, 2 tugs, 4 hospital ships, 1 submarine
Landed "Peter" Beach, 6 miles (9.7 km) north of Anzio:

Ranger Group

[edit]
Soldiers of the 3rd Ranger Battalion board LCIs that will take them to Anzio. Two weeks later, nearly all were captured or killed at Cisterna.
Captain E.C.L. Turner, RN
Comprising 1 transport, 1 submarine chaser, 7 landing craft
Attacked the port of Anzio:

"X-Ray" Force

[edit]
Shermans disembarking from an LST at Anzio
Rear Admiral Lowry
Comprising 2 light cruisers (USS Brooklyn, HMS Penelope), 11 destroyers, 2 destroyer escorts, 24 minesweepers, 166 landing craft, 20 subchasers, 3 tugs, 1 submarine, multiple salvage ships
Landed "X-Ray" Beach on the coast east of Nettuno, 6 miles (9.7 km) east of Anzio:

Southern attack

[edit]

The Fifth Army's attack on the Gustav Line began on January 16, 1944, at Monte Cassino. The operation failed to break through, but it partly succeeded in its primary objective. Heinrich von Vietinghoff, commanding the Gustav Line, called for reinforcements, and Kesselring transferred the 29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions from Rome.

Battle

[edit]

Initial landings

[edit]
Force dispositions at Anzio and Cassino January / February 1944
British landing ships unloading supplies in Anzio harbour, 19–24 February 1944

The landings began on 22 January 1944.

Although resistance had been expected, as seen at Salerno during 1943, the initial landings were essentially unopposed, with the exception of desultory Luftwaffe strafing runs.

By midnight, 36,000 soldiers and 3,200 vehicles had landed on the beaches. Thirteen Allied troops were killed, and 97 wounded; about 200 Germans had been taken as POWs.[18] The British 1st Division penetrated 2 miles (3 km) inland, the Rangers captured Anzio's port, the 509th PIB captured Nettuno, and the US 3rd Division penetrated 3 miles (5 km) inland.

In the first days of operations, the command of the Italian resistance movement had a meeting with the Allied General Headquarters: it offered to guide the Allied Force through the Alban Hills territory, but the Allied Command refused the proposal.

After the landings

[edit]

It is clear that Lucas' superiors expected some kind of offensive action from him. The point of the landing was to turn the German defences on the Winter Line, taking advantage of their exposed rear and hopefully panicking them into retreating northwards past Rome. However, Lucas instead poured more men and material into his tiny bridgehead, and strengthened his defences.

Churchill was clearly displeased with this action. He said: "I had hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale".[19]

Lucas' decision remains a controversial one. Noted military historian John Keegan wrote, "Had Lucas risked rushing at Rome the first day, his spearheads would probably have arrived, though they would have soon been crushed. Nevertheless, he might have 'staked out claims well inland."[20] However, "Lucas did not have confidence in the strategic planning of the operation. Also, he could certainly argue that his interpretation of his orders from Clark was not an unreasonable one. With two divisions landed, and facing two or three times that many Germans, it would have been reasonable for Lucas to consider the beachhead insecure." But according to Keegan, Lucas's actions "achieved the worst of both worlds, exposing his forces to risk without imposing any on the enemy."

Response of Axis forces

[edit]
British and American POWs
American POWs with arms raised on the Nettuno bridgehead. In the foreground, an armed German soldier.
An M4 Sherman tank destroyed in the fighting

Kesselring was informed of the landings at 03:00 22 January. Although the landings came as a surprise, Kesselring had made contingency plans to deal with possible landings at all the likely locations. All the plans relied on his divisions each having previously organised a motorized rapid reaction unit (Kampfgruppe) which could move speedily to meet the threat and buy time for the rest of the defenses to get in place.[21] At 05:00 he initiated Operation "Richard" and ordered the Kampfgruppe of 4th Parachute Division and the Hermann Göring Fallschirm Panzer Division to defend the roads leading from Anzio to the Alban Hills via Campoleone and Cisterna whilst his plans expected some 20,000 defending troops to have arrived by the end of the first day. In addition, he requested that OKW send reinforcements, and in response to this they ordered the equivalent of more than three divisions from France, Yugoslavia, and Germany whilst at the same time releasing to Kesselring a further three divisions in Italy which had been under OKW's direct command.[22] Later that morning, he ordered General Eberhard von Mackensen (Fourteenth Army) and General Heinrich von Vietinghoff (Tenth Army – Gustav Line) to send him additional reinforcements.

The German units in the immediate vicinity had in fact been dispatched to reinforce the Gustav Line only a few days earlier. All available reserves from the southern front or on their way to it were rushed toward Anzio and Nettuno; these included the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and 71st Infantry Divisions, and the bulk of the Luftwaffe's Hermann Göring Panzer Division. Kesselring initially considered that a successful defence could not be made if the Allies launched a major attack on 23 January or 24 January. However, by the end of 22 January, the lack of aggressive action convinced him that a defence could be made. Nevertheless, few additional defenders arrived on 23 January, although the arrival on the evening of 22 January of Lieutenant General Alfred Schlemm and his 1st Parachute Corps headquarters brought greater organisation and purpose to the German defensive preparations. By 24 January, the Germans had over 40,000 troops in prepared defensive positions.[23]

Three days after the landings, the beachhead was surrounded by a defence line consisting of three divisions: The 4th Parachute Division to the west, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division to the center in front of Alban Hills, the Hermann Göring Panzer Division to the east.

Von Mackensen's 14th Army assumed overall control of the defence on 25 January. Elements of eight German divisions were employed in the defence line around the beachhead, and five more divisions were on their way to the Anzio area. Kesselring ordered an attack on the beachhead for 28 January, though it was postponed to 1 February.

Liberty ship involvement

[edit]

Liberty ships, which were never intended as warships, were involved in some fighting during the Battle of Anzio. On 22 to 30 January 1944 the SS Lawton B. Evans was under repeated bombardment from shore batteries and aircraft throughout an eight-day period. It endured a prolonged barrage of shrapnel, machine-gun fire and bombs. The gun crew fought back with shellfire and shot down five German planes.[24]

Allied offensive

[edit]
Allied force dispositions on 1 February 1944

Further troop movements including the arrival of U.S. 45th Infantry Division and U.S. 1st Armored Division, brought Allied forces total on the beachhead to 69,000 men, 508 guns and 208 tanks by 29 January, whilst the total defending Germans had risen to 71,500.[25][26] Lucas initiated a two-pronged attack on 30 January. While one force was to cut Highway 7 at Cisterna di Latina before moving east into the Alban Hills, a second was to advance northeast up the Via Anziate towards Campoleone.

Battle of Campoleone

[edit]

In heavy fighting British 1st Division made ground but failed to take Campoleone and ended the battle in an exposed salient stretching up the Via Anziate.

Battle of Cisterna

[edit]

The main attack by the U.S. 3rd Division captured ground up to 3 miles (4.8 km) deep on a seven-mile wide front, but failed to break through or capture Cisterna. On the right, ahead of the main assault, two Ranger battalions made a daring covert advance towards Cisterna. Due to faulty intelligence, when daylight arrived they were engaged and cut off. A brutal battle with elements of the Fallschirm-Panzer Division 'Hermann Göring' followed and Rangers began surrendering. Of the 767 men in the 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions, six returned to the Allied lines and 761 were killed or captured.[27]

Axis counterattacks

[edit]
M4A2 Sherman tanks, knocked out near the commune of Aprilia.

By early February, German forces in Fourteenth Army numbered some 100,000 troops organised into two Army Corps, the 1st Parachute Corps under Schlemm and the LXXVI Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Traugott Herr. Allied forces by this time totalled 76,400 (including the recently arrived British 56th Infantry Division, under Major-General Gerald Templer, which arrived complete on 16 February).[28]

First Counterattack

[edit]

After making exploratory probes on the Campoleone salient on the afternoon of February 3 the German forces launched a full counterattack at 23:00[29] in order to reduce the salient and "iron out" the front line.[28] Von Mackensen had planned for the salient to be ground away rather than employing a rapid, focused thrust to cut it off. Some hours after the attack started the coherence of the front line had been completely shattered, and the fighting for the salient had given way to small unit actions, swaying back and forth through the gullies. In the morning of 4 February the situation was becoming more serious, with the 1st Battalion, Irish Guards (of 24th Guards Brigade), only having one cohesive rifle company left and on the opposite side of the salient, the 6th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders (of 2nd Brigade) was beginning to crumble and later lost three complete companies as prisoners.[30]

Even though the base of the salient was nearly broken, Lucas was able to bolster the British 1st Division's defenses with the newly arrived 168th Brigade (from the 56th Division, containing 1st Battalion, London Irish Rifles, 1st Battalion, London Scottish, 10th Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment).[31] The 3rd Brigade had been tasked with holding the tip of the salient 2 miles (3 km) long and 1,000 yards (900 m) wide on the road going north of Campoleone, but after the German attacks in the early hours of 4 February, the 2nd Battalion, Sherwood Foresters, 1st Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry and 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment (all of 3rd Brigade) had been cut off and were surrounded in the pocket. They held the line all day, taking heavy casualties, but were eventually ordered to pull back and made a fighting retreat at 17:00 to the Factory with the aid of artillery, and a successful assault launched by the London Scottish, of 168th Brigade,[32] supported by the 46th Royal Tank Regiment (46 RTR).[33]

From 5 February to 7 February both sides employed heavy artillery concentrations and bombers to disrupt the other side and at 21:00 on 7 February the Germans renewed their attack.[34] Once more the fighting was fierce and they managed to infiltrate between the 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards (24th Guards Brigade) and the 2nd Battalion, North Staffordshire Regiment (2nd Brigade) and nearly surrounded them; it was for his leadership of British counterattacks during this period that Major William Sidney, a company commander in the 5th Grenadier Guards, was later awarded the Victoria Cross.[35][36] Slowly the Allies were forced to give ground and by February 10 they had been pushed out of the salient.[37] Lucas ordered attacks on 11 February to regain the lost ground but the Germans, forewarned by a radio intercept, repelled the Allies' poorly coordinated attack.[38]

German armour at a field repair point operating near the Anzio-Nettuno front.

Operation Fischfang

[edit]

On 16 February, the Germans launched a new offensive (Operation Fischfang) down the line of the Via Anziate, supported by Tiger tanks. They overran the 167th Brigade, of the recently arrived 56th (London) Division, and virtually destroyed X and Y Companies of the 8th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, each of which was reduced from around 125 down to a single officer and 10 other ranks. One of the men killed was Second Lieutenant Eric Waters, whose son Roger Waters of Pink Floyd, created a song (When the Tigers Broke Free) in memory of his father and describes his death.[39]

German troops occupy a trench network near the Aprilia sector in March.

By 18 February, after desperate fighting, the Allies' Final Beachhead Line (prepared defenses more or less on the line of the original beachhead) was under attack. Numerous attacks were launched on 1st Battalion, Loyal Regiment (2nd Brigade) and they lost a company, overrun, and the day after had suffered 200 casualties.[40] On the same day Major-General Ronald Penney, General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 1st Division, had been wounded by shellfire and the division was temporarily commanded by Major-General Templer, GOC 56th (London) Division,[36] which had arrived complete. However, a counterattack using VI Corps' reserves halted the German advance, and on 20 February, Fischfang petered out with both sides exhausted. An important contribution to stopping the German counterattack was the Allied artillery outshooting the German by a ratio of about ten to one, which had broken up attacks by hitting German assembly areas.

During Fischfang the Germans sustained some 5,400 casualties, the Allies 3,500. Both had suffered nearly 20,000 casualties each since the first landings,[41] and it was "far the highest density of destruction in the Italian campaign, perhaps in the whole war".[42]

Also on 18 February while returning to Anzio the light cruiser