Cikini Incident
| Cikini Incident | |
|---|---|
Sukarno in 1952 | |
| Location | Cikini School, Jakarta, Indonesia |
| Date | 30Â November 1957 8:55Â p.m. (WIB; UTC+07:00) |
| Target | Sukarno |
Attack type | Attempted assassination |
| Weapon | Hand grenades |
| Deaths | 9â11[a] |
| Perpetrators |
|
The Cikini Incident or Cikini Affair (Indonesian: Peristiwa Cikini), also known in Indonesia as the Cikini Tragedy (Indonesian: Tragedi Cikini), was an assassination attempt against President Sukarno of Indonesia. On 30 November 1957, Sukarno attended the fifteenth anniversary celebrations of the Cikini School in Cikini, Jakarta, with his son Guntur and daughter Megawati. While his children entered the school to watch a film, Sukarno walked towards his limousine as a crowd gathered around him. When he was approximately halfway to the vehicle, five grenades were thrown from individuals hidden within the crowd. Sukarno was initially thrown to the ground by his aide Sudarto, who then worked with two bodyguards to rush him into a building across the street.
Although Sukarno escaped the attack unscathed, delivering a brief speech to the nation shortly afterwards, the grenades killed several bystanders and wounded dozens more, with most of the casualties being children. The Indonesian military arrested more than sixty individuals by the end of December, with fourâSaadon bin Mohammed, Tasrif bin Hussein, Jusuf Ismail, and Moh. Tasin bin Abubakarâbeing found guilty at trial in 1958. Fallout from the attack led several members of the Islamic party Masyumi to flee Jakarta for Sumatra, ended government negotiations with dissident groups, and exacerbated anti-Dutch sentiment. Sukarno, who ruled Indonesia until 1967, later came to believe that the Central Intelligence Agency had orchestrated attempts on his life.
Background
[edit]Sukarno became the President of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, the day he proclaimed the nation's independence. He led the country through a four-year national revolution against returning Dutch colonial forces, which ended in December 1949 with formal recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.[1] The new country implemented a parliamentary system, and in 1955, Indonesia held its first legislative election.[2] Sukarno remained the country's president, though his critics accused him of lacking a coherent political vision and focusing excessively on personal pleasures.[1]
At the same time, his government faced several challenges to its rule. Groups such as the Dewan Banteng (lit.â'Bull Council') and Dewan Gajah ('Elephant Council') in Sumatra, decried the national government's treatment of less developed areas outside Java.[2] Meanwhile, the Darul Islam rebellion clashed with government forces through the 1950s in its efforts to establish an Islamic state.[3] To control unrest, Sukarno attempted to reach compromises with dissident groups,[4] though he also had plans for "Guided Democracy" that would unite feuding political parties under his singular rule.[1]
Attack
[edit]
On 30 November 1957, President Sukarno attended the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the Cikini School at 76 Cikini Street in Cikini, Jakarta.[5] Speaking with Cindy Adams in the 1960s, he recalled that more than five hundred guests were in attendance, as well as teachers, children, and thousands of spectators.[6] During the event, he sat with his children Guntur and Megawati, who were students of the school,[7] before delivering a speech.[4] A third child, Rachmawati, was enroled at the school but not in attendance.[8]
After the ceremony concluded, Guntur and Megawati reentered the school building to watch a film,[8] while Sukarno left. Surrounded by a crowd, he headed towards his limousine,[6] a Chrysler Imperial known as Indonesia 1.[9] At 8:55 p.m. Western Indonesia Time (WIB), Sukarno was about halfway to his car.[10] Soon after the commander of his escort called "Attention!",[6] a sound initially identified as a gunshot was heard.[11] A grenade soon followed, the first of five thrown by individuals concealed in the crowd.[9]
Amidst the ensuing panic, a second grenade was thrown at Sukarno from close range.[10] The president was then thrown to the ground and covered by his aide, Major Sudarto.[12] With two bodyguards, Sudarto then grabbed Sukarno and pulled him past Indonesia 1, shortly before a third explosion destroyed its interior and wounded Sudarto. Fourth and fifth grenades followed, with the latter injuring one of the bodyguards.[13] Speaking with the newspaper Sin Min after the incident, Sudarto recalled, "I realized that there was no other way to save the President's life from the danger other than sacrifice myself. ... WeâAdjunct Police Inspector Sudio, Officer Oding [Suhendar], and myselfâwere the last line of defense."[b][9]
Sukarno was brought across the street, initially seeking shelter in the home of a Dutch-Indonesian before finding safety elsewhere. Sukarno later recalled, "Lest the President of Indonesia meet his maker on Dutch territory, I scurried out and into another shelter."[14] A reserve car arrived to retrieve Sukarno at approximately 10 p.m. WIB.[14] Unable to go directly to Merdeka Palace due to closed railway gates, the president and his aides circled Jakarta's streets.[9] Guntur and Megawati, meanwhile, were able to be brought from the school directly to the palace, where they awaited news from Sukarno.[8]
Aftermath
[edit]Government response
[edit]
Sukarno was uninjured, as were his children.[7] Initial reports indicated 7 fatalities among bystanders, with another 47 wounded.[7] Among those killed were two members of the Presidential Guard, a pregnant woman, and several children.[15] Oding's thigh was ripped open, while Sudarto was hospitalized for an injury to his leg;[13] Sudarto later received a promotion for his actions.[16] The Indonesian government called for available doctors to report to the Central Hospital (now Dr. Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital),[4] and the Indonesian Red Cross called for blood donations to support the wounded.[7] Further medical support was provided by the Soviet embassy.[17]
Hours after the attack, Sukarno delivered a radio address on Radio Republik Indonesia, interrupting a wayang (puppetry) broadcast. In his brief speech,[18] he praised God for his escape, called for calm and sympathy for the victims, and urged continued Indonesian unity.[4] Casualty figures increased to 10 deaths and 137 wounded by the following day, mostly children.[12] Subsequent casualty reports varied, with the number of fatalities ranging from nine to eleven.[a] Reports of non-fatal wounds, meanwhile, ranged from at least 30[19] to 167.[c][20]
Sukarno did not make a public appearance until 4 December, when he visited the wounded in hospital,[21] and he postponed a planned trip to Latin America.[22] Still shaken by the assassination attempt,[23] Sukarno was described by Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja as "physically and mentally tired"[24] and uncharacteristically losing his train of thought mid-sentence.[25] Sukarno took a month-long sabbatical, beginning late December. During this period, Sartono served as acting president,[23] leading to later-debunked rumours that Sukarno had been overthrown.[24]
Investigation
[edit]Although no suspects were initially reported,[4] the Indonesian military initiated an expansive search. By 2 December, they announced that two individuals had been arrested in connection to the attack,[7] with another wave of arrests the following day.[26] By the end of the December 1957, the Indonesian military reported 60 arrests.[27] Four attackers were identified, youths named Saadon bin Mohammed, Tasrif bin Hussein, Jusuf Ismail, and Moh. Tasin bin Abubakar.[28] These attackers, most of whom came from Bima or Sumbawa, were found staying in a dormitory near the school. All were members of the Anti-Communist Movement (Gerakan Anti-Komunis, GAK),[29] and suspected by investigators to have been influenced by the Darul Islam movement.[15]
During interrogation, the youths stated that they had begun preparations several months in advance. Initially expecting Sukarno to seek shelter in his limousine, they had targeted the vehicle and been slow to react to the emerging situation.[9] As their motivation, they cited Sukarno's continued support for the Communist Party of Indonesia, which they identified as detrimental to Muslim groups.[15] Trials began in April 1958.[30] Tasrif, one of the defendants, denounced Sukarno as a "mere orator" and kafir (unbeliever) who "had to be eliminated".[31] Jusuf, who was identified in court as having planned the attack,[15] described Sukarno as the "chief protector of the Communists".[32] Co-defendant Saadon argued that violence would achieve his goals more quickly than waiting for parliament.[32] The youths also stated that they had already perpetrated several previous attacks to advance an Islamic state and to have planned further attacks on other national leaders. The American historian Audrey Kahin writes that their testimony in court was likely prompted by the government.[29]

The trials were covered extensively in the Indonesian press, with testimonies printed verbatim.[13] All four defendants were found guilty.[33] Saadon, Tasrif, and Jusuf were sentenced to death. After their appeal was denied, they were executed by firing squad on 28 May 1960.[34] Sources differ as to Tasin's fate. The journalist Arnold Brackman gives a sentence of twenty years;[17] the historians Audrey and George McTurnan Kahin write that the final attacker was sentenced to life imprisonment;[33] and the Ministry of Education's Encyclopedia of Indonesian History records all four attackers as having been executed.[15]
The Indonesian government identified GAK's founder Zulkifli Lubis, who had previously served as the first director of the State Intelligence Agency, as the mastermind behind the attack,[35] and an arrest warrant was issued on 22 January 1958.[36] An associate of Lubis's, Saleh Ibrahim, was also sought. Neither man was arrested, and they both fled to West Sumatra.[d][37]
Impact
[edit]During the investigation, the Islamic political party Masyumi came under suspicion.[38] Many of the perpetrators were members of its youth wing, the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia), and a party member's automobile had been used in the attack.[39] In late December 1957, prominent party leaders such as Mohammad Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara were accused of complicity in the attacks by newspapers associated with the Communist Party or Sukarno's National Party of Indonesia (PNI). As the anti-Masyumi campaign intensified to include threatening telephone calls, without intervention from the Indonesian government, many of the party's leaders left for Sumatra,[40] fearing for their lives.[41] These included Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin in December 1957 and Natsir in January 1957.[40]
As the assassination attempt had occurred shortly after the United Nations General Assembly failed to pass an Indonesian resolution related to its ongoing dispute with the Netherlands over West New Guinea,[42] the Indonesian press linked it with the ongoing crisis. An editorial in the newspaper Suluh Indonesia, for instance, argued that the attack "strengthens the belief that the destructive elements want to annihilate the Republic of Indonesia".[43] The day after the attack, the government banned Dutch-language publications and rescinded the Dutch airline KLM's landing rights.[17] Within weeks, amidst a wave of anti-Dutch sentiment, Dutch-owned enterprises were seized by the PKI and PNI before falling under military control while 46,000 Dutch citizens were expelled.[42]
Immediately following the Cikini Incident, Indonesia stopped ongoing negotiations with dissident groups.[44] In subsequent months, it changed its approach to handling dissidence, holding that compromise was no longer possible. When a group of military officers affiliated with the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) demanded Sukarno's resignation in 1958, the government responded by giving them dishonorable discharges and accusing them of complicity in rebellion and the assassination attempt.[45] Masyumi and the Socialist Party of Indonesia were likewise banned in 1960 after being accused of supporting the PRRI.[46] The government executed Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, the leader of Darul Islam, in 1962;[47] Sukarno wrote that memories of Cikini were on his mind as he signed Kartosoewirjo's death order.[14]
The Cikini Incident was the first of several assassination attempts on Sukarno,[48] which also included an aerial attack on Bogor Palace in 1960[49] and a grenade attack in Makassar in 1962.[50] He remained president of Indonesia until 1967,[1] formalizing his "Guided Democracy" concept in a 17 August 1959 speech.[51] According to the Australian biographer John D. Legge, Sukarno's continued survival of attempts against his life gave rise to a public belief that he was invulnerable.[49]
After Indonesia found evidence that the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had supported dissidents in Sumatra and Sulawesi,[52] it began to blame the agency for backing the attack.[19] Sukarno continued to believe that the CIA sought his death into 1965, when he told White House aide Michael Forrestal that the agency was "out of control".[53] In 1975, United States Senator Frank Church led investigations into the CIA's alleged involvement in assassination attempts around the world; the final report indicated that the CIA had contemplated an attempt on Sukarno, and had an asset in the region, but provided no further details.[38] Documents declassified in 2015 showed that Richard M. Bissell Jr. testified that the CIA's plot involved Sukarno being enticed by a female asset and then immobilised.[54] As of 2020[update], the agency has not confirmed involvement in the Cikini attack.[25]
Explanatory notes
[edit]- 1 2 Sources indicating nine deaths include Fischer (1959, p. 227) and Brackman (1963, p. 242). Sources indicating ten deaths include Time (1957, p. 32), Lararenjana (2021), and Sukarno & Adams (1966, p. 273). Sources indicating eleven deaths include The New York Times (1960, p. 6), McIntyre (2005, p. 142), and Kahin & Kahin (1995, p. 112).
- â Original: "Saya berpendapat tidak ada jalan lain menyelamatkan jiwa Presiden dari bahaya maut itu kecuali mengorbankan diri terlebih dahulu. ... Kami, Ajun Inspektur Polisi Sudio, anggota polisi Oding, dan saya sendiri sebagai perisai terakhir
- â Other figures include 48 (Amaruli), 146 (The Waco Times-Herald 1957, p. 7), and 150 (Brackman 1963, p. 242).
- â In Sumatra, Lubis joined the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. He evaded capture until after Sukarno was overthrown (Tirto.id). While he acknowledged meeting the perpetrators, he denied involvement in the attack, and charges were later withdrawn (Amaruli).
References
[edit]- 1 2 3 4 Hanna 2026.
- 1 2 Maslan 2024.
- â Dijk 1981, pp. 1â3.
- 1 2 3 4 5 The Journal Star 1957, p. 1.
- â Adryamarthanino & Nailufar 2021; The Age 1957, p. 1
- 1 2 3 Sukarno & Adams 1966, p. 272.
- 1 2 3 4 5 The Age 1957, p. 1.
- 1 2 3 McIntyre 2005, p. 142.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Chandra 2015.
- 1 2 Fischer 1959, p. 227.
- â The Age 1957, p. 1; Battle Creek Enquirer 1957
- 1 2 Democrat and Chronicle 1957, p. 2.
- 1 2 3 Fischer 1959, p. 228.
- 1 2 3 Sukarno & Adams 1966, p. 273.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Amaruli.
- â Poulgrain 2020, p. 95.
- 1 2 3 Brackman 1963, p. 242.
- â Tempo 1984, p. 14.
- 1 2 McIntyre 2005, p. 45.
- â Time 1957, p. 32.
- â The Macon News 1957, p. 1.
- â O'Sullivan 1994, pp. 6â7.
- 1 2 Kahin & Kahin 1995, pp. 118â119.
- 1 2 The Washington Daily News 1957, p. 4.
- 1 2 Poulgrain 2020, p. 189.
- â Intelligencer Journal 1957, p. 25.
- â The Waco Times-Herald 1957, p. 7.
- â Adryamarthanino & Nailufar 2021.
- 1 2 Kahin 1999, p. 205.
- â Kahin 1999, p. 204.
- â quoted in Fischer (1959, p. 228)
- 1 2 Fischer 1959, p. 229.
- 1 2 Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 113.
- â Adryamarthanino & Nailufar 2021; The New York Times 1960, p. 6
- â The Buffalo News 1957, p. 2; The Waco Times-Herald 1957, p. 7; Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 113
- â Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 135.
- â Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 113; Kahin 1999, p. 204
- 1 2 Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 114.
- â Kahin 1999, p. 204; Lararenjana 2021
- 1 2 Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 118.
- â Fischer 1959, p. 230.
- 1 2 Ricklefs 1981, p. 249.
- â Lewis 1963, p. 77.
- â Nadhirianto 2024, p. 26.
- â Ricklefs 1981, pp. 249â250.
- â Ricklefs 1981, p. 61.
- â Ricklefs 1981, p. 262.
- â Lararenjana 2021.
- 1 2 Legge 1972, p. 293.
- â Madera Tribune 1962, p. 1.
- â Ricklefs 1981, p. 255.
- â Kahin 1993, p. 163.
- â Kahin & Kahin 1995, p. 225.
- â Trenta 2024, pp. 35, 43.
Works cited
[edit]- "20 Under Arrest in Sukarno Plot". The Macon News. Macon, Georgia. 4 December 1957. p. 1.
- Adryamarthanino, Verelladevanka; Nailufar, Nibras Nada (27 August 2021). "Tragedi Cikini 1957, Upaya Pembunuhan Soekarno" [1957 Cikini Tragedy, Assassination Attempt on Soekarno]. Kompas (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 25 August 2026. Retrieved 25 August 2026.
- Amaruli, Rabith Jihan. "Peristiwa Cikini" [Cikini Incident]. Ensiklopedi Sejarah Indonesia (in Indonesian). Ministry of Education. Archived from the original on 27 August 2026. Retrieved 27 August 2026.
- Brackman, Arnold (1963). Indonesian Communism: A History. New York: Praeger. OCLCÂ 1097530527.
- Chandra, Bobby (7 October 2015). "Tragedi Cikini: Skenario Gagal Membunuh Soekarno" [The Cikini Tragedy: A Failed Plan to Kill Soekarno]. Tempo (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 25 August 2026. Retrieved 25 August 2026.
- "Dari Granat di Cikini Sampai Bom..." Tempo. Vol. 14, no. 33. 13 October 1984. p. 14.
- "Death Toll Rises to 10 in Attack on Sukarno; 137 Hurt; 2 Arrested". Democrat and Chronicle. Rochester, New York. 2 December 1957. p. 2.
- Dijk, C. van (1981). Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Vol. 94. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-9024761722. JSTOR 10.1163/j.ctvbqs6vx.
- "Dr. Sukarno Escapes Assassins; 7 Others Killed". The Age. Melbourne, Australia. 2 December 1957. p. 1.
- Fischer, Louis (1959). The Story of Indonesia. New York: Harper. OCLCÂ 1151344331.
- "Grenades Kill 7, Sukarno Unhurt". The Journal Star. Peoria, Illinois. 1 December 1957. p. 1.
- Hanna, Willard A. (17 August 2026). "Sukarno". Encyclopedia Britannica. Archived from the original on 23 August 2026. Retrieved 23 August 2026.
- "Indonesia Arrests 60 in Plot to Kill Sukarno and Aides". The Buffalo News. Buffalo, New York. 24 December 1957. p. 2.
- "Indonesia: Time of the Assassin". Time. Vol. 70, no. 24. 9 December 1957. p. 32.
- "Indonesian President Escapes Assassination". Battle Creek Enquirer. Battle Creek, Michigan. 1 December 1957. p. 1, 2.
- "Jakarta Executes 3: Terrorists Who Tried to Kill Sukarno Are Shot". The New York Times. New York. 31 May 1960. p. 6.
- Kahin, Audrey (1999). Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity, 1926â1998. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. ISBNÂ 978-90-5356-395-3.
- Kahin, Audrey; Kahin, George McTurnan (1995). Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: The New Press. ISBNÂ 978-1-56584-244-1.
- Kahin, George McTurnan (October 1993). "In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir (1907â1903)". Indonesia. 56.
- Lararenjana, Edelweis (29 November 2021). "Tragedi Cikini 30 November, Upaya Pembunuhan Presiden Soekarno dalam Ledakan Granat" [The Cikini Tragedy of 30 November, Assassination Attempt on President Sukarno with Grenades]. Merdeka.com (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 20 August 2022. Retrieved 27 August 2026.
- Legge, John D. (1972). Sukarno: A Political Biography. London: Penguin Books. ISBNÂ 978-0-7139-0244-0.
- Lewis, Reba (1963). Indonesia: Troubled Paradise. New York: David McKay. OCLCÂ 301593.
- "Man Linked to Attempt on Sukarno". The Waco Times-Herald. Waco, Texas. 25 December 1957. p. 7.
- Maslan, M. Rizal (2 June 2024). "Isu CIA di Balik Tragedi Granat Cikini" [Claims that the CIA Was Behind the Cikini Grenade Tragedy]. Detik (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 26 August 2026. Retrieved 26 August 2026.
- McIntyre, Angus (2005). The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal Toward Constitutional Rule. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBNÂ 978-1-4616-0465-5.
- Nadhirianto, Averio (2024). "Managing Disappointment: Regime Survival and the Normalization of Indonesia-United States Relations 1957-1958". Jurnal Asia Pacific Studies. 8 (2): 20â33. doi:10.33541/japs.v8i2.6088.
- O'Sullivan, James L. (1994) [2 January 1958]. "3. Memorandum of Conversation". In McMahon, Robert J. (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958â1960, Indonesia. Vol. XVII. Washington: United States Government Printing Office.
- Poulgrain, Greg (2020). JFK vs Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia. New York: Skyhorse Publishing. ISBNÂ 978-1-5107-4480-6.
- Ricklefs, Merle Calvin (1981). A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the Present. London: MacMillan. ISBNÂ 978-0-333-24378-7.
- "Still Around, Sukarno Says". The Washington Daily News. Washington, D.C. 13 December 1957. p. 4.
- Sukarno; Adams, Cindy (1966). Sukarno; An Autobiography. Hong Kong: Gunung Agung. OCLCÂ 2159630.
- "Sukarno Escapes Assassination Attempt; Rips Netherlands in Speech". Madera Tribune. Madera, California. 8 January 1962. p. 1.
- Trenta, Luca (2024). The President's Kill List: Assassination and US Foreign Policy since 1945. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBNÂ 978-1-3995-1951-9.
- "Wave of Arrests Follow Attempt on Life of Sukarno". Intelligencer Journal. Lancaster, Pennsylvania. 3 December 1957. p. 25.
- "Zulkifli Lubis". Tirto.id (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 11 February 2021. Retrieved 25 August 2026.
Further reading
[edit]- Nugraha, Arifin Surya (2013). Tragedi Cikini: Percobaan Pembunuhan Presiden Sukarno [The Cikini Tragedy: Attempted Assassination on President Sukarno] (in Indonesian). Yogyakarta: Ombak. ISBNÂ 978-602-258-013-3.