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Goal is to digitize the current Dutch voting pass (first prototype).
This voting pass prevents double voting and check if this citizen is allowed to vote.
This project is a first step to increase the digital steps in the voting process. Critical requirement is ensuring trust, integrity, security, auditability, etc. Currently it seems to have occurred that people moving between municipalities obtained two voting passes, obviously we want to prevent this irregularity.
Scope question: partly digital voting. No changes required in legacy procedures and infrastructure.
Current law does not permit digital voting, it specifies analog world : 80 gram paper only.
Problem of identification and authentication in voting station. Role of smartphone?
Private key location, airgapped ?
How historic and old is the voting pass (e.g. procedure never changed in decades)?
key lib: An Open Source Java Implementation of Machine Readable Travel Documents. Dutch pasport from French company uses Elyptic curve crypto, not compatible with standard binary OpenSSL signature validator. Support challenge response, access photo etc in .apk.
Create fully documented docker Alpine-based image to talk to drivers license or e-passport.
We tackled the problem that we were unable to verify a signature from a dutch travel document due to Elliptic Curves signatures instead of RSA.
Will update the pypassport library and add support asap.
We are still having an issue with the limit of bytes which can be signed by the travel document. This is limited to exactly 8 bytes according to the ICAO standard.
SHA1 or SHA256 hashes have lengths 20 and 32 byte respectively. Therefore these hashes cannot be signed by a travel document.
Hashfunctions with smaller sizes a not recommended for cryptographic usage. @synctext Do you think that it is still secure to sign a hash in parts?
Voornemen is oplossing bieden voor digitaal verkrijgen stem pas.
Tip: Benader het vanuit de functie van de stem pas, niet de stem pas zelf, nl. het persoonlijk kunnen claimen van je recht om te stemmen!
We blijven de stem pas uitdelen
a. Papier
b. BSN + public key reisdocument = digitaal token
Stemmen
a. Zelf aangeven dat je digitaal wilt stemmen
i. Reisdocument is het vehicle (omdat elk reisdocument een unieke privรฉ sleutel heeft)
ii. Met reisdocument verkrijg je stembiljet door eenmalig uitgave digitaal token
b. Papier
i. Papieren stem pas inleveren
ii. Stembiljet verkrijgen
Met stembiljet stemmen <-- het stemmen zelf is verder buiten scope
Architectuur vragen
Complimenten voor de praktische benadering en tastbaar zoeken naar te realiseren prototype / concept. Realiseer je dat er vele vragen onderweg zijn die (on)bewust een antwoord krijgen. Probeer die te benoemen en formuleer je keuze(s) en overwegingen daarbij.
Hoe self-sovereign is een reisdocument eigenlijk?
Standaard ECDSA mogelijk aanpassen tgv cryptotechnologie?
Plaatsen we de (betere?) beveiliging van deze oplossing in referentie t.o.v. het bestaande proces?
Is gas โprijsโ ethereum echt relevant?
Welke opties zijn er voor het elimineren geclaimde recht (ie voorkomen double spending digitale token)
o (โฆ)
o (โฆ)
thnx! good stuff. please include the ICTU argumentation:
We have self-driving cars soon. In the future it is likely that the new generation of citizens are not willing willing to vote, unless it is electronic from any place using any approved device.
Please add 4.2 "trust requires uncompromising usage of open source technology" or something. all hardware used should be open hardware licensed to build trust with voters.... it is essential to provide end-to-end integrity checks to ensure correct functioning of the ecosystem.. etc.
Bonus: that 8 Byte sign restriction.. try to get rid of that using a 3DES aanpak (CBC chaining):
by using a standard string of specially crafted repeated and chained signatures we are able to iteratively sign standard SHA256 signatures... hash collision.. etc... (argument/proof included..)..
The SIG rules of code review include: each library you include in your project becomes your responsibility and you need to ensure sufficient quality.
However, this e-voting pass project includes a whole blockchain infrastructure in the form of a library. Fixing numerous person-years of code is not realistic. Stats: X lines includes, of which Y line got modified by us.
In de tweede upload zien we dat zowel de omvang van het systeem als de score voor onderhoudbaarheid is gestegen. Op het gebied van Unit Size zien we een bescheiden verbetering ten opzichte van de eerste upload. Let wel op dat je niet aan de ene kant aan het refactoren bent, en vervolgens aan de andere kant weer net zo goed nieuwe lange methodes aan het toevoegen bent.
Ook is het goed om te zien dat jullie naast nieuwe productiecode ook aandacht hebben besteed aan het schrijven van nieuwe testcode. De hoeveelheid nieuwe tests kan nog wel iets beter.
Uit deze observaties kunnen we concluderen dat een deel van de aanbevelingen van de vorige evaluatie zijn meegenomen in het ontwikkeltraject.
Activity
landgenoot commentedon Apr 28, 2017
Repositories:
https://github.com/landgenoot/digital-voting-pass-server
https://github.com/landgenoot/digital-voting-pass-app
The research process is tracked in the issues in the server repo.
wkmeijer commentedon May 1, 2017
Project Plan
Digital_voting_pass_Project_Plan.pdf
synctext commentedon May 4, 2017
Scope question: partly digital voting. No changes required in legacy procedures and infrastructure.
Current law does not permit digital voting, it specifies analog world : 80 gram paper only.
Problem of identification and authentication in voting station. Role of smartphone?
Private key location, airgapped ?
How historic and old is the voting pass (e.g. procedure never changed in decades)?
key lib: An Open Source Java Implementation of Machine Readable Travel Documents. Dutch pasport from French company uses Elyptic curve crypto, not compatible with standard binary OpenSSL signature validator. Support challenge response, access photo etc in .apk.
Create fully documented docker Alpine-based image to talk to drivers license or e-passport.
Possible architectures (explore in report):
Perhaps link to our biometric validation basic building block. #2812
landgenoot commentedon May 7, 2017
We tackled the problem that we were unable to verify a signature from a dutch travel document due to Elliptic Curves signatures instead of RSA.
Will update the pypassport library and add support asap.
We are still having an issue with the limit of bytes which can be signed by the travel document. This is limited to exactly 8 bytes according to the ICAO standard.
SHA1 or SHA256 hashes have lengths 20 and 32 byte respectively. Therefore these hashes cannot be signed by a travel document.
Hashfunctions with smaller sizes a not recommended for cryptographic usage.
@synctext Do you think that it is still secure to sign a hash in parts?
sgort commentedon May 8, 2017
Concept
Voornemen is oplossing bieden voor digitaal verkrijgen stem pas.
Tip: Benader het vanuit de functie van de stem pas, niet de stem pas zelf, nl. het persoonlijk kunnen claimen van je recht om te stemmen!
We blijven de stem pas uitdelen
a. Papier
b. BSN + public key reisdocument = digitaal token
Stemmen
a. Zelf aangeven dat je digitaal wilt stemmen
i. Reisdocument is het vehicle (omdat elk reisdocument een unieke privรฉ sleutel heeft)
ii. Met reisdocument verkrijg je stembiljet door eenmalig uitgave digitaal token
b. Papier
i. Papieren stem pas inleveren
ii. Stembiljet verkrijgen
Met stembiljet stemmen <-- het stemmen zelf is verder buiten scope
Architectuur vragen
Complimenten voor de praktische benadering en tastbaar zoeken naar te realiseren prototype / concept. Realiseer je dat er vele vragen onderweg zijn die (on)bewust een antwoord krijgen. Probeer die te benoemen en formuleer je keuze(s) en overwegingen daarbij.
o (โฆ)
o (โฆ)
wkmeijer commentedon May 10, 2017
Attached: research report concludes the research phase of the project.
Digital_Voting_Pass_Research_report.pdf
Digital_Voting_Pass_Research_report_v2.pdf
Digital_Voting_Pass_Research_report_v3.pdf
synctext commentedon May 10, 2017
thnx! good stuff. please include the ICTU argumentation:
We have self-driving cars soon. In the future it is likely that the new generation of citizens are not willing willing to vote, unless it is electronic from any place using any approved device.
Please add 4.2 "trust requires uncompromising usage of open source technology" or something. all hardware used should be open hardware licensed to build trust with voters.... it is essential to provide end-to-end integrity checks to ensure correct functioning of the ecosystem.. etc.
Bonus: that 8 Byte sign restriction.. try to get rid of that using a 3DES aanpak (CBC chaining):
by using a standard string of specially crafted repeated and chained signatures we are able to iteratively sign standard SHA256 signatures... hash collision.. etc... (argument/proof included..)..
landgenoot commentedon May 10, 2017
CBC seems to be a really clever solution, thanks!
Need to find out if it works with non deterministic signatures.
wkmeijer commentedon May 15, 2017
@synctext
Thanks for your feedback, we added the ICTU argument in the introduction and updated 4.2.
Digital_Voting_Pass_Research_report_v2.pdf
11 remaining items
landgenoot commentedon Jun 14, 2017
Digital_voting_pass___Final_report.pdf
Draft report
synctext commentedon Jun 14, 2017
The SIG rules of code review include: each library you include in your project becomes your responsibility and you need to ensure sufficient quality.
However, this e-voting pass project includes a whole blockchain infrastructure in the form of a library. Fixing numerous person-years of code is not realistic. Stats: X lines includes, of which Y line got modified by us.
kc1212 commentedon Jun 16, 2017
Recent publication on voting https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3019841
not sure if it's related to this work, but might be interesting
jonathanraes commentedon Jun 22, 2017
Digital_voting_pass___Final_report.pdf
2nd Draft final report
synctext commentedon Jun 23, 2017
synctext commentedon Jun 26, 2017
Digital Voting Pass - Final Report.pdf
Digital Voting Pass - Info sheet.pdf
landgenoot commentedon Jun 26, 2017
Thanks Jaap, looks good!
Maybe you should also post it to #2925
klikooo commentedon Jun 27, 2017
@syntext we have come up with the following structure for the presentation:
Do you have any comments/feedback?
synctext commentedon Jun 27, 2017
please post .pdf of .ppt... Suggest add problems with paper 14000 vote diff.
wkmeijer commentedon Jun 29, 2017
Draft presentation (pdf)
wkmeijer commentedon Jun 30, 2017
Feedback on second SIG upload
synctext commentedon Sep 11, 2018
Project finished with 91-page final report, see above, closing issue...